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ABSTRACT 
Background: Indonesia is well-known for its plurality of people, either in terms of ethnic 
cultures or religions and beliefs. The diversity of the Indonesian nation can be viewed as one 
of the means to strengthen the unity of the nation by always developing tolerant and 
respectful attitude toward each other. Currently, the diversity existing in Indonesia tends to 
cause many conflicts due to people are less able to view the existing equation and to 
appreciate the differences in society. In Semarang City, (Indonesia) there is a plurality of 
cultures and religions, precisely at the Kongkong Village, Ngadirgo District, Mijensub 
district. That most of the population is Hindu. By the occurred conflict, the urgent need to be 
noticed by the Indonesian people is to redefine the appropriate attitude of diversity within a 
plural society. One way that should be developed to foster harmony among plural religious 
adherents as in Indonesia is to develop tolerance among religious adherents. Religious 
tolerance is an attitude of accepting the presence of others which differ on faiths and 
respecting others’ beliefs even if he/she does not agree with them. Methodology: The 
population in this study is the citizens of Kongkong Village, Mijen Subdistrict, Semarang 
City, and Central Java, Indonesia who are Moslem and Hindu from 15-50 years of age. The 
samples of 157 people in this study were taken by using purposive sampling technique. The 
religious tolerance scale used in this study is partly an adaptation of the religious tolerance 
scale compiled by Walt et al in 2014 and partly compiled by researchers with a benchmark of 
religious tolerance dimensions by Walt (2014). Result: There is no significant difference in 
religious tolerance between Islamic and Hindu subjects in Kongkong Village. 
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Indonesia is well-known for its plurality of people, either in terms of ethnic cultures or 
religions and beliefs. Ethnic or tribal pluralism in Indonesia, such as the Javanese, Sundanese, 
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Malay, Madurese, and many more are scattered over the islands. In addition, there is also 
religious pluralism in Indonesia. There are five recognized religions: Islam, Christianity, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Kong Hu Chu's creed. 
 
The diversity of the Indonesian nation can be viewed as one of the means to strengthen the 
unity of the nation by always developing tolerant and respectful attitude toward each other. 
Currently, the diversity existing in Indonesia tends to cause many conflicts due to people are 
less able to view the existing equation and to appreciate the differences in society. For 
instance, a religious conflict between villagers of Karang Gayam and Buluran, Sampang, East 
Java, on August 26th, 2012 that happened again (Liputan 6, 2015). Interreligious conflict also 
happened in Aceh on October 18th, 2015, namely the combustion of a place of worship in 
Aceh Singkil, on Tuesday afternoon October 12th, 2015. Hundreds of people involved a riot 
which broke out in Dangguran Village, Simpang Kanan District, Aceh Singkil Regency, 
Aceh Province. The masses protested against the construction of place of worship that was 
considered to be unlicensed (Liputan6, 2012). Religion is frequently the most sensitive 
tangent point in the plural society. Each side claims that he is the right one, while the other is 
wrong. The perception that difference is either a bad thing or a frightening thing, is so 
ingrained in the soul of the religious community (ethnocentrism). 
 
According to Nasih & Agung (2011), the results of their research “Harmonisasi RelasiSosial 
Umat Muslim dan Hindu di Malang Raya” (Harmonization of Social Relations of Moslems 
and Hindus in Great Malang) indicates that the fundamental thing which causes a harmonious 
relationship between them was the mutual understanding and tolerance, and the agreement of 
social system without sacrificing their respective faiths. In addition, Faridah (2013) also 
revealed about the influence of religious tolerance to social interaction of the community 
through the results of her research “Toleranasi Antarumat Beragama Masyarakat 
Perumahan” (Interreligious Tolerance of Housing Society), that the form of tolerance done 
by religious citizens was religious tolerance and social tolerance. Factors that influence the 
tolerance among religious citizens consist of both driving factors and inhibiting factors. The 
driving factors include a firm principle of harmony and respect, and a high solidarity among 
the people while the inhibiting factors include conflicts such as competition and suspicion of 
other religious people. By the research of Nisvilyah (2013) entitled "Interreligious Tolerance 
in Strengthening Unity and Nation (Case Study of Moslems and Christians of Segaran 
Hamlet, Dlanggu Subdistrict of Mojokerto Regency)" shows that the fundamental values of 
the bases of religious tolerance, normatively include religious value and cultural values while 
empirically include (1) humanitarian value; (2) nationalism value; (3) historical value; (4) 
exemplary value of community leaders; and (5) value of patience. 
 
In Semarang City, Indonesia, there is a plurality of cultures and religions, precisely at the 
Kongkong Village, Ngadirgo District, Mijensubdistrict. That most of the population is Hindu. 
In Kongkong Village there are two temples, namely Pura Buana Mandala and Pura Setya 
Darma, which is divided into two groups. People who have different religious backgrounds 
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help each other in the construction of places of worship. According to preliminary data 
(November 9, 2014), the village elder said, 
"They are different (people who do the work of devotion), anyone who wanted to help ". 
Since the Hindu community as a minority, and Moslems as the majority, conflict arises. 
According to preliminary data (November 9th, 2014), the village elder said, 
"Indeed, there are differences, it depends on each person, for example, when the village chief 
was a Hindu, he embraced all citizens, but now the village chief does not, even he tends to be 
fanatic, I don’t mean to speak ill of him, I just tell the fact" 
 
By the occurred conflict, the urgent need to be noticed by the Indonesian people is to redefine 
the appropriate attitude of diversity within a plural society. One way that should be developed 
to foster harmony among plural religious adherents as in Indonesia is to develop tolerance 
among religious adherents. 
 
According to Borba (2008), tolerance is an attitude to appreciate each other without 
differentiating tribes, genders, appearances, cultures, beliefs, abilities, and sex orientations. 
Allport (1954) gave limitation to the tolerance that is someone’s friendly and confidence 
attitude toward other people without considering others’ origin. This tolerance manifestation 
is a kind of someone’s attitude that can  accept someone else, so that, religious tolerance is a 
kind of someone’s attitude to accept and respect the presence of other person with different 
religion although he/she do not agree with other’s faith. Another word of tolerance is 
tasamuh. Hasyim (1979) stated that tasamuh means a kind of someone’s attitude who can be 
broad minded and also can respect to the others. To create a harmonious life, it does not mean 
that it needs to integrate a certain faiths with other ones (Syncretism). While religious life in 
harmony includes respecting and helping each other in the society. 
 
Tolerance could happen in several forms, such as conformity tolerance, character 
conditioning tolerance, militant tolerance, passive tolerance, liberalism tolerance, radicalism 
tolerance (Allport, 1954). Tolerance is a complex topic. Therefore, to understand the 
tolerance, it needs to notice tolerance dimensions proposed by Walt (2014). This research 
focuses on the the: (1) personal fish-bowl; (2) expectancy filters; (3) the radical centre of 
values; (4) the expectancy filters of value orientation; (5) relative value of emptiness; (6) 
tendency toward total tolerance; (7) the technicalities of religious and world view tolerance; 
(8) same further technical distinction; (9) toleration approach; (10) willingness to enter into 
social contract; (11) a healthy modus vivendi; (12) grand narratives and the new 
spirituality. Allport (1954) explained that many factors influence someone’s tolerance are the 
results from the interaction factor with the same direction. The outline of the tolerance 
could be classified into three main factors, namely the early life, education, and empathy. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The populations in this research were Moslems and Hindus in Kongkong Village at the age of 
15-50 years. This village is located in Ngadirgo sub-district of Mijen districts, Semarang, 
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Central Java, Indonesia. The populations inthis research were 274menandwomenofKongkong 
villagers. This research sample as much as 157 people were taken using Purposive sampling 
technique. The sample characteristics used in this research were as follows: 
a. Male and/or Female. 
b. Age of 15-50 years 
c. Kongkong villagers 
d. Moslem or Hindu 
 
Instruments 
The method to obtain the data used in this research was one of the psychology scales, which 
was the religious tolerance scale. 
1. Religious Tolerance  Scale: Some parts of religion tolerance scale used in this 
research was the adaptation one arranged by Walt et al in 2014 and also some parts of it were 
arranged by researchers based on the dimensions of religious tolerance asserted by Walt 
(2014). There are two item variations in this scale, namely favourable and unfavourable 
items. Responses options used in this scale were Very Relevant (VR), Relevant (R), Not 
Relevant (NR), and Very Not Relevant (VNR). Item format used in this research 
was statements-responses. The Validity Test was done using Product Moment technique 
from Pearson on software app. Then, there were obtained 43 valid items. To measure the 
reliability, the researchers used Alpha Crompach formula on the statistics software app. From 
the reability test, it was obtained the Coefficient Reliability Instrument with as much as 
0.899. Therefore, it could be declared as reliable instrument. 
 
Procedure 
First stage in doing this research was permission process in order to ease the research 
conduction so that it can meet the goals. After that, the process of collecting data was done 
using religious tolerance scale on 157 Kongkong villagers. There were 157 booklet 
were shared by researchers on the every house of Moslem and Hindu who meet the 
determined requirements. Next, scoring and tabulation were done on the scale that has been 
filled by the respondents. 
 
RESULTS 
The data analysis to see if there is the distinction in the religious tolerance, used is Wilcox on 
Mann Whitney Test (the difference among groups), due to this research aimed to know 
whether or not there is the difference religion tolerance. 
 
Table 1.Summary of the distribution of religious tolerance 
Category Score Interval Interval Criteria F Percentage 
Moslem µ + 1σ ≤ X 129 ≤ X High 81 77,1% 
µ - 1σ ≤ X < µ + 1σ 86 ≤ X < 129 Medium 24 22,9% 
X < µ - 1σ  X < 86 Low 0 0% 
Hindu µ + 1σ ≤ X 129 ≤ X High 35 67,3% 
µ - 1σ ≤ X < µ + 1σ 86 ≤ X < 129 Medium 17 32,7% 
X < µ - 1σ X < 86 Low 0 0% 
General µ + 1σ ≤ X 129 ≤ X High 116 73,8% 
µ - 1σ ≤ X < µ + 1σ 86 ≤ X < 129 Medium 41 26,2% 
X < µ - 1σ X < 86 Low 0 0% 
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Based on table 1, it could be known that the religious tolerance on the Moslem is in the high 
category as much as 77.1% while the religious tolerance on Hindu is also in the high 
category, as much as 67.3%. Thus, the religious tolerance of Kongkong villagers in 
general is in the high category, which is as much as 78.8%. 
 
Table 2. The result of the differentiation of religious tolerance test between Moslem and 
Hindu subjects [Test Statistics*] 
 Value 
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
2209.000 
3587.000 
-1.946 
.052 
 
Based on table 2, it could be known that both Moslem and Hindu subjects have Sig value 
with as much as 0.052. Due to the Sig value is .054 > 0.05, it could be declared that there is 
no significant difference between Moslem and Hindu subjects. 
 
Table 3.Result of religious tolerance differentiation test based on gender 
Independent Samples Test* 
 Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
taile
d) 
Mean 
Differe
nces 
Std. 
Error 
Differe
nce 
95%  
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
G
ender 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
,042 ,838 -,054 155 ,957 -,10549 1,96448 -3,98608 3,77511 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -,054 154,976 ,957 -,10549 1,96447 -3,98608 3,77511 
Based on table 3, it could be known that both male and female subjects have Sig value as 
much as 0.957. Due to the Sig  value is 0.957 > 0.05, it could be declared that there is no 
significant  difference  between male and female subjects. 
 
According to the result of calculation on the Moslem subjects, the highest result of the 
religious tolerance dimension is tendency toward total tolerance dimension that is as much as 
90.4%. Based on Bennett (in Walt, 2014) there are six attitudes related to the religion, namely 
rejecting, distinction, building defense to the difference, difference minimization, accepting 
difference, adapting to difference, and integrating to the difference. Based on the Kongkong 
Religious Tolerance to Adherents of Islam and Hinduism in Kongkong Village 
 
© The International Journal of Indian Psychology, ISSN 2348-5396 (e)| ISSN: 2349-3429 (p) |    132 
Moslem villagers’ responses, they belong to the subject who can accept differences. They 
approve and appreciate religious difference on in the case of life value and behaviours. They 
actively build the inter-religion communication and integrate with different beliefs. 
 
While on the Hindu subjects, the highest result on the religious tolerance dimension is 
Expectancy Filters dimensions which is as much as 96.1%. The perspective of Kongkong  
Hindu villager is balance enough. They are not afraid to socialize in the society. They also 
trust to the others and belong to the open-minded people. According to Olthuis (in Walt, 
2014) psychology scientists identify at least there are four Expectancy filters, namely: Secure 
filter, Pre-occupied filter, dismissing filter, and Fearful filter. In this research, the villagers 
apply Secure filter. It means they could trust enough to the other person; they are open-
minded thinking as well. And also, it may be due to the same thinking way of religion figures 
in Kongkong village. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Generally, religious tolerance in Moslem is in high category similar with Hindu. Tolerance is 
really needed in Indonesia which is a plural country. Kongkong Village is one of 
heterogenous villages consists of various religions. Therefore, the religious tolerance is really 
needed in enduring the social life. 
 
Tolerance is the basic prerequisite between groups constructively. Verkuyten & Slooterin 
Mashuri et al. 2014). Talibet al. (2013) explained that tolerance is about the balance that 
needs the action between two sides to decide the result needed based on the agreement. The 
essesntial point in religious tolerance as a behaviour of desire to approve the religious 
difference in plural society without any prjudice or discrimination even though one of them 
has the power to refuse or deny to reach the prosperity and harmony in society (Talib, 2013). 
Tolerance is not about equality, justice, or neutrality. It is about how to manage the social 
relationship to prevent the tension between two sides or more in a disagreement situation. 
 
Based on the result of study and consideration, it is known that the significant standard p= 
0,052. Because p > 0,05,it can be concluded that there is no significant difference in religious 
tolerance between Moslem and Hindu in Kongkong Village. The result study which stated 
that there is no significant difference in religious tolerance between Moslem and Hindu in 
Kongkong Villageis agree with the result of study conducted by Nasih & Agung (2011) that 
Hindu in Malang Raya is a minority in which most of them live in rural area. The relationship 
between Moslem which is majority and Hindu has run well so far. The basic thing for this is 
that there is an understanding and tolerance between them, and the social system agreed 
without sacrificing their own beliefs. 
 
Nowadays, Kongkong villagers are able to mix with the believers from other religions. 
Globalization caused the thinking system of each to be more plural and able to accept the 
difference. People begin to respect the rights of other believers and respect the opinion of 
each. Instead of each group thinking which is open minded, there are other factors that caused 
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the religious tolerance between believers is getting higher based on the interview with an 
Islamic leader (13 Mei 2017) and Hindu leader (19 April 2017) in Kongkong Village. From 
the interview with the Islamic leader in Kongkong Village, it is known that there is an 
agreement made and done together for all religious believers in Kongkong Village (the 
conformity tolerance), for example, there is a donation for mourning (mourning fee) as much 
as Rp 5.000,- for each household that then given to themourning family. All villagers from 
different religion gather when there is a villager dead without differenciating the religion 
background. 
 
Moreover, there is a mutual cooperation in Kongkong Village such as community service, 
help village who have events, build or rebuild houses, and repair thepublic facilities such as 
repairing the bridge and irrigation. When there is a mutual cooperation, all villagers 
participate without looking at the religion background butthe equality as villagers. The 
mutual cooperation in Moslem and Hindu is an ancestor’s inheritance trandition that has to be 
endured. The mutual cooperation is a form of social interaction involves many sides, for 
example, the mutual cooperation in building villager houses. Such things done in Kongkong 
Village wothout lookng at the religion background voluntarily. 
 
For Kongkong villagers, the commemorate of Indonesian Independence Day is a media to 
communicate between them. Moslem and Hindu held the events together to comemorate the 
Indonesian Independence Day  through some events. Usually the religion figure of Moslem 
and Hindu did the meeting to discuss about the events, time, and committee composition. The 
committeearranged with the consideration of representative of each religion. Sometimes the 
leader of committee is from Hindu, and sometimes is from Moslem. The alternation is is 
believed that it can develop the togetherness in society because each of religion believers feel 
represented and own the events in the village. Based on the interview with religion leaders of 
Moslem and Hindu, it is known that conflict about religion between Moslem and Hindu never 
happened in Kongkong Village. According to Setiawan (2012), in multicultural society, the 
interaction is a key for all part of social life since it is a basic of social process that show the 
dynamic social relationship in multicultural condition of Kongkong villagers, the harmonious 
social interaction caused by the good concept of the attitude of understanding each other and 
protect the regionand the involvement of all sides in every events that lead them to te process 
of life assimilation. 
 
According to Setiawan (2012), in multicultural society, the interaction is a key for all part of 
social life since it is a basic of social process that show the dynamic social relationship in 
multicultural condition of Kongkong villagers, the harmonious social interaction caused by 
the good concept of the attitude of understanding each other and protect the regionand the 
involvement of all sides in every events that lead them to te process of life assimilation. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Kesimpulan 
Based on the analysis, the following are the conclusions of this research: 
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• The level of tolerance in Muslim in Kongkong Village is in high category as many as 
77,1%. It means the Muslim villagers in Kongkong Village have the high level of 
tolerance.  
• The level of tolerance in Hindu in Kongkong Village is in high category as many as 
67,3%. It means the Hindu villagers in Kongkong Village have the high level of 
tolerance.  
• There is no significant difference between the subject of Muslim and Hindu in 
Kongkong Village. 
• There is no significant difference between the subject of male and female in Kongkong 
Village. 
• The form of tolerance in Kongkong Village is comformity tolerance. 
 
Keterbatasan Penelitian 
There are some limitations in this research: 
• There are subjects who filled the tolerance scale in rush so that the answer obtained is 
not maximum. 
• The research was conducted collectively so that it is possible for the member of 
family copied others’ response which affect the validity test result, realibility, and 
hypotheses test.  
• Some respondents chose the answers that is socially faking good. 
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Article
It is widely agreed that the core of the concept of toleration is the 
refusal, where one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously 
interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable.
—Horton (1996, p. 28)
A shift in emphasis in the ethnic attitudes literature from prime 
concern with intergroup feelings (however measured) to equal 
concern with intergroup tolerance would broaden the scope of 
the literature from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, 
increasing both its sensitivity to and its relevance for the general 
problem of multigroup coexistence in a democratic society.
—Jackman (1977, p. 167, emphasis in original).
How do we manage cultural differences? This is a question 
hotly debated in many countries, cities, neighborhoods, 
organizations, and schools around the world. The topic has 
stimulated various empirical studies on the negative and 
positive effects of cultural diversity for intergroup relations. 
On the negative side, diversity would lead to categorizations 
of others into “us” versus “them” with feelings of out-group 
threat and group competition that can lead to intergroup 
conflict. On the positive side, diversity implies opportunities 
for intergroup contact, cultural learning, and cognitive adap-
tation that can lead to less stereotyping and higher out-group 
acceptance (Crisp & Turner, 2011).
Social-psychological research has examined the intergroup 
consequences of cultural diversity in terms of acculturation 
strategies (R. Brown & Zagefka, 2011), social categorization 
processes (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009), and diversity 
ideologies (Plaut, 2010). For example, various ideological 
frameworks for dealing with diversity have been proposed 
and examined. Diversity can be ignored in favor of individ-
ual characteristics (color blindness), or rejected with a focus 
on the dominant majority group (assimilation), or acknowl-
edged and celebrated (multiculturalism). Research shows that 
these diversity ideologies can promote positive out-group 
attitudes, but also lead to lower acceptance of out-groups 
(see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013, for 
reviews), and that the outcome depends on, for example, the 
national context (Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugies, 
2014), the level of intergroup conflict (Correll, Park, & 
Smith, 2008), in-group identification (Morrison, Plaut, & 
Ybarra, 2010), and whether the ideology is understood in 
abstract or concrete terms (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).
In contrast to this body of work, there is very little 
systematic social-psychological theorizing and empirical 
investigation into toleration in which differences are 
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The global increase in cultural and religious diversity has led to calls for toleration of group differences to achieve intergroup 
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including its three components—objection, acceptance, and rejection—while drawing out its implications for future social-
psychological research. We then explore some psychological consequences to social groups that are the object of toleration. 
By doing so, we consider the complex ways in which intergroup tolerance impacts both majority and minority groups and 
the dynamic interplay of both in pluralistic societies.
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endured. Vogt’s (1997) assessment nearly 20 years ago is 
still accurate:
Although social psychology has contributed crucially to our 
understanding of phenomena related to tolerance, such as 
stereotyping and prejudice, the theoretical work on tolerance 
itself in social psychology is so underdeveloped that almost any 
systematic investigation is likely to be productive. (p. 237)
As illustrated by the second quote heading this article, 
this lack of theorizing and research is unfortunate for several 
reasons. One is that mutual tolerance is critical because 
objection and disagreement about what is good and right are 
inevitable in pluralist societies. Social psychologists tend to 
focus on improving intergroup attitudes, but often this is 
very difficult (Paluck & Green, 2009) and not realistic. A 
diverse, egalitarian, and peaceful society does not require 
that we all like each other, but it does require that people at 
least tolerate one another. Tolerance is the necessary step 
toward living together: a barrier against discrimination, 
hostility, conflict, and a critical condition for citizenship and 
democracy (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Walzer, 1997). It is 
an integrative principle across which basic forms of accep-
tance and peaceful coexistence between groups can be 
established despite controversial differences.
Second, a focus on tolerance draws attention to concrete 
norms and practices, and to the notion of citizenship which 
is a subject that is hardly addressed directly by psycho-
logical theory and research (Condor, 2011). Many social- 
psychological studies have examined people’s stereotypes 
and general attitudes toward ethnic and religious out-groups, 
but few have focused on perceptions of concrete and contro-
versial practices and actions of out-group members. Yet, in 
culturally diverse societies, the hotly debated questions and 
issues evolve around foreign dress code, language use, 
dietary requirements, Mosque building, freedom of speech 
(e.g., the drawings of Prophet Mohammed), gay marriage, 
and various other religious and cultural practices. It is 
around concrete issues that cultural diversity is put to the 
test, ways of life collide, and the need for toleration is dis-
cussed. People might support the general idea of tolerance, 
but react negatively when facing its practical consequences 
(Jackman, 1978; Lawrence, 1976).
Third, although in the context of cultural diversity toler-
ance is an intergroup phenomenon, social psychology has 
made little contribution to the understanding of toleration 
(e.g., Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). The prime theoretical 
and empirical concern has been with prejudicial attitudes 
rather than with intergroup tolerance. And the reverse is 
also true: Knowledge of intergroup processes and social-
psychological theories are seldom considered in the exten-
sive political science literature on political tolerance (see 
J. L. Gibson, 2006; J. L. Gibson & Gouws, 2000). This litera-
ture has focused on individual characteristics such as dogma-
tism and closed-mindedness, as well as political expertise, 
political participation, and commitment to democratic 
values, as determinants of tolerance (J. L. Gibson, 2006; 
Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Vogt, 1997). Yet, tolerance pre-
supposes intergroup differences and typically implies that 
one group has the power to interfere with the dissenting 
beliefs and practices of the other.
The aim of this article is to discuss various aspects and 
paradoxes of intergroup toleration to raise novel questions 
for social-psychological theory and research. Our argument 
is that intergroup tolerance is critical for living together in a 
culturally diverse society: “Toleration makes difference pos-
sible; difference makes toleration necessary” (Walzer, 1997, 
p. xii). We will try to demonstrate that tolerance is more than 
the absence of intolerance, and its psychological processes 
involve moral disapproval (“strong tolerance”) rather than 
simple dislike (“weak tolerance”) (see Table 1). While 
“strong tolerance” raises many novel questions for social-
psychological research, “weak tolerance” is more related to 
the phenomenon addressed in existing prejudice research. 
And finally, tolerance is not inherently good and intolerance 
is not inherently bad because not everything can and should 
be tolerated.
In the following sections, we will first discuss the concept 
of toleration and its three components: objection, acceptance, 
and rejection. This is followed by a discussion of the permis-
sion and respect understanding of toleration that relate to 
more vertical and horizontal intergroup relations, respec-
tively. Then, we will consider the target’s perspective by dis-
cussing the potential social-psychological consequences of 
being tolerated. Here, we consider the potential consequences 
of toleration for the target’s sense of belonging, control, 
identity, (collective) self-esteem, desire for collective action, 
and the target’s attitudes and behaviors toward those “tolerat-
ing” them. The article concludes with future directions for 
theoretical and empirical development.
In the present context, we are not concerned with the 
more interpersonal settings of tolerance such as parents tol-
erating particular behaviors of their children, but with inter-
group situations in which the toleration of cultural and 
religious differences is at stake. This means that we will also 
not be directly concerned with political tolerance which is 
extensively studied in political science and focuses, for 
example, on different groups trying to gain influence on 
decision-making processes or how religion affects political 
intolerance (Djupe, 2015). Our focus here is on tolerance of 
different group practices that sustain and reproduce an iden-
tity and way of life among its group members.
Historically, the concept of tolerance evolved from efforts 
to deal with the harmful and violent effects of religious con-
flicts (Walzer, 1997). Immigration and globalization have led 
to an increased need for people to live besides ethnic, cul-
tural, and religious diversity. For example, the presence of an 
increasing number of Muslims in Western countries has 
given a renewed urgency to the idea of tolerance as a mecha-
nism for dealing with diversity. Islam has emerged as the 
focus of immigration and diversity debates in Europe (Cesari, 
2013; Zolberg & Long, 1999) and increasingly in North 
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America (Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009; Shipler, 2015) 
and Australia (Fuller & Innis, 2014; Sparrow, 2015). Islam’s 
presence in the West has also been at the heart of what is 
perceived as a “crisis of multiculturalism” (Modood, 2007). 
Islamic norms and values are often considered incompatible 
with Western values, and Muslims have been labeled as the 
“indigestible” minority (Huntington, 2004, p. 188). Several 
of our examples therefore relate to the (perceived) tension 
between Islamic and Western norms and values as this is part 
of much public and political discourse in Europe, North 
America, and Australasia today.
However, in addition to tolerance in the context of Islam 
in the West, intergroup tolerance can also be investigated in 
other social contexts where a minority group’s norms and 
values are perceived to be incompatible with that of the dom-
inant culture. For example, these principles may apply in the 
context of other ethnic and religious groups that have diverg-
ing beliefs, values, and practices from the dominant culture 
(e.g., the Roma people in Europe or Amish people in the 
United States). Similarly, these phenomena may also apply 
to various social and political groups, including hate groups 
(e.g., the Ku Klux Klan, European National Front, or the 
Abiding Truth Ministries) and extremist political parties 
(e.g., Golden Dawn in Greece, Maoist Communist Party of 
India, or the Australia First Party or New Zealand First politi-
cal party). With that said, these principles would not apply in 
the context of all ethnic minority or immigrant groups, espe-
cially if their values, norms, and practices are not perceived 
as incompatible with the mainstream (e.g., Asian Americans 
in the United States; Germans in the Netherlands). Therefore, 
we are cautious to generalize these claims beyond cultural 
and religious groups whose values, practices, and norms are 
considered incompatible with the dominant culture, thereby 
leading to a (perceived) clash of worldviews.
The Concept of Tolerance
The concept of tolerance has a long history going back to 
antiquity. It was used in early Christianity when dealing with 
religious differences and conflicts, and it became a central 
concept after the Reformation, when Europe faced many 
religious–political conflicts. Philosophers such as Spinoza, 
Bayle, Locke, and Montesquieu developed toleration 
theories to reconcile religious differences, and in the 19th 
century, John Stuart Mill discussed toleration in relation to 
other forms of cultural and political plurality. The impor-
tance of tolerance for contemporary diverse societies is dis-
cussed by current thinkers such as W. Brown (2008), Forst 
(2012), Habermas (2004), and Walzer (1997).
All these scholars are concerned with situations in which 
people put up with or endure norms and practices that they 
object to. As stated in the first quote heading this article, the 
core of toleration “is the refusal, where one has the power to 
do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one 
finds objectionable” (Horton, 1996, p. 28). This means that 
tolerance is not indifference, neutrality, or refraining from 
acting out of fear, and it is also not the opposite of prejudice 
(e.g., Crawford, 2014; Jackman, 1977; Van der Noll, Poppe, 
& Verkuyten, 2010; Van Zalk & Kerr, 2014). In social 
psychology, tolerance is often equated with being nonjudg-
mental, open, and valuing diversity, or it is considered a 
generalized positive attitude toward out-groups (e.g., Brewer 
& Pierce, 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Yet, the 
concept of tolerance shares with prejudice the aspect of 
“negativity,” but emphasizes forbearance and not begrudg-
ing other people their own ways. Tolerance, therefore, serves 
as a barrier against discrimination.
According to Forst (2012), this conceptualization has three 
components: the objection, the acceptance, and the rejection 
(see also Galeotti, 2002; Habermas, 2004). Tolerance requires 
(a) reasons to object to norms and practices of others, (b) rea-
sons to nevertheless accept them and show self-restraint, and 
(c) reasons for the limits of tolerance and not accepting par-
ticular norms and practices. In the sections that follow, we 
unpack these different components of tolerance and explore 
how each of these can inform social-psychological research 
on intergroup relations. Table 1 summarizes the main aspects 
and differences that we will discuss.
The Objection Component
There are many situations in which people put up with some-
thing that they disapprove of. Religious believers tolerate 
homosexuality, gay marriage, and abortion; nonbelievers 
Table 1. Three Components of Weak and Strong Intergroup Toleration (Objection, Acceptance, and Rejection) and Their Related 
Psychology.
Toleration
Components Weak Strong
Objection  
 Affective states Dislike for out-group as a whole Disapproval of specific practices of out-group
Acceptance  
 Psychological processes Suppression and compunction over negative sentiments Balancing considerations of competing values
Rejection  
 Behavioral outcomes Discrimination: Justification of negative behaviors Intolerance: Moral reasons for objection 
outweigh those for acceptance
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tolerate religious teachings in schools, religious holidays, and 
ritual slaughter of animals. In some Western countries, female 
officials are allowed to wear a headscarf in public institutions, 
and in other countries, people with radical views are allowed 
to congregate and rally (e.g., White supremacists). The toler-
ated norms or practices are considered wrong or bad and 
evaluated negatively. The objection component implies a 
negative judgment for which a general distinction between 
dislike and disapproval can be made (Horton, 1996). The for-
mer implies (implicit) negative feelings of dislike, distaste, 
or hate toward categories of people or their practices. The lat-
ter involves normative and moral reasons for considering 
specific beliefs, norms, or practices wrong or bad. One can 
dislike Muslims, but that does not have to mean that one 
disapproves of all their religious practices, and vice versa. 
Similarly, people can disapprove of smoking, but that does 
not have to mean that they dislike smokers. The distinction 
between dislike and disapproval is, of course, not always 
clear-cut, but it features in debates about toleration (see 
Horton, 1996).1 For some, the notion of toleration is only 
appropriate when there is disapproval, while others extend 
the notion to cases in which the objection takes the form of 
(implicit) feelings of dislike. The latter has many similarities 
with the thinking about prejudice and has been defined as tol-
eration in a weak sense, whereas the former has been concep-
tualized as toleration in a stronger sense and implies virtuous 
conduct (Mendus, 1989; Pasamonik, 2004; Warnock, 1987). 
This distinction is important in terms of underlying psycho-
logical processes (Table 1) and is useful for explaining the 
nature and importance of strong toleration, which is our aim.
Out-group dislike. Tolerance is often examined in terms of 
disliked groups. For example, many studies in political sci-
ence, and social psychology (e.g., Crawford, 2014), use the 
so-called “least liked group approach” to measure political 
tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979). With this 
measure, people are first asked to indicate which group in 
society they dislike most. In a next step, they are asked 
whether members of this group should be allowed to hold 
public office, teach in schools, and hold public rallies. This 
approach allows one to examine political tolerance of groups 
that participants themselves dislike (Hurwitz & Mondak, 
2002). Tolerance is considered to occur jointly with feelings 
of dislike: It is about how far one is willing to grant equal 
rights to disliked groups.
This approach has its limitations because not only feelings 
of dislike but also disapproval of practices can be involved in 
people’s reactions (Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, & Togeby, 
2010).2 With this approach, it is often difficult to make a dis-
tinction between the act and the actor (Hurwitz & Mondak, 
2002). People can object to a particular practice of a group 
because they dislike the group or because they disapprove of 
the practice itself. For example, one can resist the idea of 
Muslims establishing Islamic schools or an Islamic political 
party—as happens in some European countries—because 
one feels negatively toward Muslims, or because one thinks 
that any religion has no place in education or in party politics 
(Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015).
A focus on feelings of dislike or hate involves a limited 
understanding of toleration and leads to the paradox of the 
tolerant racist. A racist person showing self-restraint in the 
face of the racial category that he or she despises would be 
tolerant, and the more racist the person is, the more tolerant 
he or she would be (Horton, 1996; King, 1976). Higher toler-
ance would imply stronger dislike together with more 
endurance resulting from stronger self-restraint. This coun-
terintuitive implication indicates that a focus on dislike, 
or (implicit) negative feelings more generally, passes over 
something important. The psychology of racial hatred is 
something other than objecting toward dissenting norms and 
practices that one disapproves of. The nature or grounds for 
the objection to what one tolerates is important. For example, 
whereas racial tolerance involves prejudicial beliefs and 
“unreasonable” feelings of dislike, religious tolerance typi-
cally involves the “reasonable” disapproval of conflicting 
beliefs and convictions. A racist person showing self-restraint 
can be considered tolerant, but it can be argued that he or she 
should not want to act on his or her racist beliefs in the first 
place. Addressing racism is not about increasing tolerance, 
but about recognizing the “intrinsic moral irrelevance of 
racial differences” (Horton, 1996, p. 34). Racists should be 
discouraged from having racist beliefs and feelings rather 
than be encouraged to be tolerant. In contrast, promoting 
religious tolerance is more about encouraging people to 
accept other religious beliefs and practices rather than dis-
couraging them from having any objections toward things 
that contradict one’s sacred beliefs.
Out-group disapproval. A religious believer can be convinced 
that “Jesus is the only way” and object toward humanism 
as a belief system, but one should be egalitarian toward 
humanists as a group of people. Criticizing a system of 
belief is more socially acceptable than stereotyping or 
dehumanizing a group of people. And defining a system of 
belief as being unequal to “our” norms and values is more 
acceptable than labeling a (racial) group of people inferior. 
The implication is that “the reasons for objection must be 
reasonable in a minimal sense” (Forst, 2012, p. 2). The dis-
approval interpretation of tolerance implies that the objec-
tion must not be rooted in feelings of fear or hatred, but 
rather must not be unreasonable (e.g., not arbitrary) or 
without value. It is much more difficult to recognize the 
value and reasonableness of racist belief and hatred than of 
secularists’ concerns about the imposition of religious laws, 
or of antiabortionists’ concern for the unborn life.3 This 
raises the question of what subjectively these defensible 
reasons for disapproval might be, and this is an important 
topic for future research. Here we want to suggest that at 
least two types of reasons should be examined: shared 
norms and conventions, and values.
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Norms and conventions. Toleration questions in plural-
ist societies are often about social standards, conventions, 
and customs. They stem from perceptions that dissenting 
beliefs and practices are “unduly upsetting the orderly social 
life based on ingrained and familiar conventions and stable 
expectations” (Galeotti, 2015, p. 98). In everyday life, indi-
viduals rely on the ideas they assume are socially shared to 
establish common ground (Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2008). 
In communicating with in-group members, people draw on 
shared knowledge and implicit expectations which enable 
them to anticipate and comprehend the actions of others. 
People “think and act on ideas perceived to be consensual 
with little reservation” (Zou et al., 2009, p. 580), and in 
doing so reproduce the prevailing, cultural patterns: patterns 
that are seen as simple “common sense” and equated with 
normality (Verkuyten, 2001; Zou et al., 2009). As a result, 
objection to and condemnation of dissenting or “abnormal” 
norms and practices are considered reasonable and even 
“logical” (Billig, 1988).
Perceived cultural consensus implies a bias toward tradi-
tionality and does not have to implicate the self or require 
awareness of one’s cultural group identity (Zou et al., 2009). 
Yet, rules of civility and propriety relating, for example, to 
dress code, collective celebrations, and religious rituals are 
often linked to notions of in-group identity and therefore 
considered legitimate reasons for disapproval. This is sum-
marized in the maxim, “when in Rome, do as the Romans 
do.” The self-evidence of this expectation is typically sub-
stantiated by the claim that one would, of course, adapt to the 
normative and customary ways of life when emigrating to 
another country (Verkuyten, 1997). Research has shown that 
the maintenance and adaptation to the established rules and 
standards that bind society together and defines the in-group 
identity is a central and independent reason for why people 
disapprove of disrupting out-group norms and practices (e.g., 
Altemeyer, 1996; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Sniderman & 
Hagendoorn, 2007).
Value pluralism. Very meaningful or sacred values lead 
people to act in terms of principles rather than prospects, and 
to strongly protect their own worldview (Ginges & Atran, 
2011). People are extremely resistant to taboo trade-offs in 
which these values are compared with or transacted in mar-
ket pricing (Tetlock, 1986). This resistance cannot fully be 
explained by an incommensurable objection that makes 
people confused, but rather implies a principle disapproval 
involving moral indignation and outrage (e.g., Tetlock, 
Kirstel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). These values and 
principles tend to be in-group defining but can also have a 
universalistic appeal (e.g., human rights).
For example, the lives of observant believers are orga-
nized around their religious beliefs, values, and practices that 
are considered binding and provide certainty and meaning-
fulness. Religions involve truth-claims and absolute moral 
principles that define what it means to be a believer of a 
particular religion. For a true believer, all religions are not 
equally right because one’s own faith is the correct one, and 
the idea of making adjustments is an oxymoron. Religious 
belief is concerned with the moral good and divine truth, 
which are difficult to reconcile with moral and epistemic 
diversity (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Trying to 
convert people to one’s religious belief and punishing apos-
tasy are aims, and even duties, in some religions.
A similar difficulty is involved in cultural value pluralism. 
The “culturalist” view of each human group having their 
own culture, and that the differences and boundaries between 
cultures can be specified, is very intuitive and powerful in its 
appeal (Morris, Chiu, & Liu, 2015). Culture deeply matters 
to people, and everyone would need his or her own culture to 
live a meaningful and free life. The attachment to one’s cul-
tural values implies that things that conflict with those values 
will be considered wrong or inferior. Because of their propo-
sitional content, all cultures cannot be considered as equal. 
Different cultural worldviews about what is right or wrong, 
true and false, cannot all be simultaneously confirmed, but 
they can be tolerated.
Principle reasoning, rejecting value pluralism, and having 
an ethnocentric worldview are not necessarily contradictory 
to toleration. Rejecting the idea that all religions or all cul-
tures are equally right and valuable is something other than 
being intolerant. In social psychology, there is research on 
fundamentalist, orthodox, and strong beliefs as forms of 
intolerance and as underlying prejudice and discrimination. 
Empirical evidence reveals that these types of beliefs relate 
to out-group stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (for 
a meta-analysis, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Yet, being 
deeply convinced that one is right and following a strict set 
of beliefs and rules does not necessarily imply intolerance 
(Eisenstein, 2006). Rather, disapproval based on core beliefs 
and principles is an aspect of toleration, which additionally 
requires the component of acceptance. People may have 
rigid beliefs about the rightness of their own religion or their 
cultural group’s norms and values, but yet accept other social 
groups as having a right to their own way and tolerate the 
diversity in people’s values and belief systems.
Integrative thoughts on dislike and disapproval components of 
objection. The distinction between dislike and disapproval 
indicates that individuals can disapprove of out-group norms, 
values, and practices that are incompatible with their own, 
without necessarily disliking the category of out-group peo-
ple (Rokeach, 1960). In a large study of the Netherlands, it 
was demonstrated that majority Dutch who object to what 
they consider unequal treatment of women and children 
among Muslim immigrants do not necessarily dislike Mus-
lim people (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). They disap-
proved of certain practices based on their commitment to 
liberal values of gender equality and freedom of thought, and 
showed no dislike or hatred toward Muslims as a group (see 
also Imhoff & Recker, 2012). This is in line with research 
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that has demonstrated that intergroup prejudice and intoler-
ance tend to be weakly or nonsignificantly associated (J. L. 
Gibson, 2006). Many majority members judge male–female 
relationships and the parenting style within Muslim immi-
grant communities as morally reprehensible, and similarly 
many Muslims reject the “liberal” practices of the majority or 
the Western world more generally (Norris & Inglehart, 2004).
Similarly, among national samples in the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands, it was found that a 
substantial portion of people with a positive attitude toward 
Muslims supported a ban on headscarves (Van der Noll, 
2010). Analyzing data from six European countries, Helbling 
(2014) found that Europeans with liberal values were posi-
tive toward Muslims as a group, but felt torn regarding the 
legislation of religious practices such as the wearing of the 
headscarf. He concluded that “people in western Europe 
make a distinction between Muslims as a group and the 
Muslim headscarf” (p. 10). Similarly, political conservatives 
might oppose policies like affirmative action not because 
they are racially prejudiced but because they believe such 
programs violate core values of meritocracy and individual-
ism (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986).
Although there is debate about the empirical evidence for 
this principled conservatism (e.g., Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, 
& Tucker, 2005; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996) and also for 
the belief incongruence proposition (R. Brown, 2010), the 
point is that objections toward out-group beliefs and practices 
can be based on perceived inconsistencies between in-
group norms and values rather than generalized prejudice 
(e.g., Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman, & Verberk, 2001; Son 
Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008). This is further 
supported by research showing that those on the political left 
and right are equally intolerant toward ideologically dis-
similar groups (e.g., Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & 
Wetherell, 2014; Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 
2014), but that the political left is more tolerant toward immi-
grants as a category of people (e.g., Van Prooijen, Krouwel, 
Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015). Future social-psychological 
research would benefit from disentangling the influence of 
thoughts and feelings toward out-group practices and values 
from the people in particular. Moreover, social-psychological 
research would broadly benefit from exploring the distinction 
between dislike and disapproval in relation to (in)tolerance.
The Acceptance Component
Toleration involves acceptance of dissenting out-group 
norms and practices. This acceptance should be voluntary 
and not compelled. Although feelings of out-group threat and 
fear are among the most important determinants of intoler-
ance (e.g., J. L. Gibson, 2006; McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, & 
Nolle, 1995), these do not form the basis of tolerance. 
Toleration begins where discrimination ends—It involves 
the intentional suppression of the inclination to oppress out-
group norms and practices (Schuyt, 1997). Toleration always 
involves two sets of considerations, for objection and for 
acceptance, that should be examined in relation to each other. 
As shown in Table 1, we propose that depending on the type 
of objection (dislike or disapproval), other psychological 
processes are involved in showing self-restraint.
Dislike, and suppression and compunction. Accepting things 
that one disapproves of is challenging from an attitude–
behavior perspective. It creates an inconsistency between 
one’s attitude and behavioral intention, thereby eliciting dis-
sonance and uneasiness (Festinger, 1962; Harmon-Jones & 
Mills, 1999). Such dissonance may create obstacles for the 
achievement of toleration in an everyday context and means 
that tolerance may be much more fragile than intolerance 
(J. L. Gibson, 2006). The asymmetry of (in)tolerance refers 
to the finding that it is easier to convince tolerant people to 
give up their tolerance than to persuade intolerant people to 
become more tolerant (e.g., Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Peffley, 
Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001). With intolerance, the negative 
judgment about a dissenting norm or practice is in agreement 
with rejecting those norms or practices: You reject what you 
object to. Being tolerant, on the contrary, implies putting up 
with actions and practices that you consider wrong: You 
accept what you object to.
Toleration in a weak sense implies that feelings of dislike 
are not translated into negative behavior. The justification–
suppression model suggests that people simultaneously hold 
negative beliefs and unprejudiced values and norms that sup-
press the expression of these beliefs (Crandall & Eshleman, 
2003). Relatedly, the dissociation model of prejudice pro-
poses that conscious normative and moral beliefs can over-
ride implicit negative stereotypes and attitudes (e.g., Devine, 
1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), and the 
self-regulation of prejudice model argues that normative and 
moral standards make people internally motivated to control 
their prejudicial feelings (Monteith, Arthur, & McQueary 
Flynn, 2010; Plant & Devine, 1998). These models are typi-
cally based on the need to be viewed by oneself, or others, 
as unprejudiced. People might accept that they are perhaps 
less competent or sociable than others, but they want to 
have a sense of being a good person (Ellemers & Van den 
Bos, 2012). Such research examines how automatically 
activated negative stereotypes and prejudicial biases are 
self-monitored, inhibited, and controlled, and concludes 
that these processes of self-regulation are more effective 
than thought suppression (Monteith et al., 2010). In subtle 
or modern forms of prejudice, people regard their own 
prejudices as unjust and offensive because it goes against 
principles of equality and justice. Allport (1954) argued that 
prejudice with compunction is common because prejudicial 
attitudes often conflict with personally held values leading to 
inner conflicts and feelings of guilt.
Disapproval and psychological balancing. Toleration implies 
that it is preferable to accept disapproved out-group norms or 
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practices rather than to reject or ban them outright. Thus, the 
norms or practices are considered wrong but not intolerably 
wrong. In other words, tolerance based on disapproval 
implies a trade-off between contrasting reasons for objecting 
and for accepting the dissenting norms or practices: There 
need to be additional good reasons that trump the reasons for 
disapproval. The social-psychological processes involved 
here are different from what is described in the suppression 
and self-regulation models of prejudice. These are not pro-
cesses of suppression and compunction but rather the balanc-
ing between competing considerations and reasons whereby 
there are more important reasons for accepting than rejecting 
the disapproved norms and practices.
One important reason for toleration is the endorsement 
of civil equality and liberties such as freedom of thought, 
expression, and equal opportunity. Although subjectively 
there are acceptable reasons for disapproval, it is simultane-
ously emphasized that every citizen has an equal right to 
practice his or her culture or religion. For example, in 
research on religious toleration among Muslims living in 
Germany, it was found that the disapproval of others’ beliefs 
and practices was balanced by respect for them as fellow 
citizens (Simon & Schaefer, 2015). And a research in the 
Netherlands demonstrated that the endorsement of liberal 
values was associated with the acceptance of Muslim veils 
(Gustavsson, Van der Noll, & Sundberg, 2016). With tolera-
tion, there is a commitment to “agree to disagree” because 
the freedom and reasons of the other are acknowledged with-
out giving up one’s own convictions and beliefs. Research 
has demonstrated that support for civic and democratic 
values are among the most important predictors of political 
tolerance (see Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Furthermore, peo-
ple tend to be more tolerant of dissenting speech than prac-
tices (Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998). Laws often protect 
people from engaging in dissenting speech (e.g., public criti-
cism of government or hate speech), but not actions against 
the same targets (e.g., actions against the government or 
attacks on specific groups). Tolerance toward the public 
expression of dissenting beliefs is consistent with the idea of 
freedom of speech and stimulates debate which is important 
for the democratic process.
Another reason for toleration is prudential and involves 
the costs of interference in comparison with the value of 
social order and civil peace. Dissenting practices, norms, and 
beliefs can be tolerated because these are part of living in a 
liberal democracy. Yet, the value of social order and peace 
can also be used to argue against tolerance. Questions of tol-
eration tend to involve competing principles and values. 
For example, the debate over tolerance for political extreme 
groups contains a conflict between competing fundamental 
values (Tetlock, 1986). On one hand are the civil rights to 
free speech and assembly, and on the other hand are the val-
ues of the preservation of public order and safety. These dif-
fering values can conflict with each other, for example, when 
civil liberties put public order at risk. If both the reasons for 
disapproval and those for acceptance involve moral princi-
ples, then it becomes morally right or even required to toler-
ate what is morally wrong: “the paradox of moral tolerance” 
(Horton, 1994; Raphael, 1988).4
Paradox of moral tolerance. One psychological solution to this 
paradox is to distinguish between various kinds of principles, 
whereby the ones supporting toleration outweigh those that 
ground the disapproval. For example, majority groups in 
Western nations might object to some dissenting norms 
and practices of Muslim immigrants because they consider 
conformity to operative public values that are embodied in 
norms and rules that govern civic relations critical for a 
cohesive and just society (Parekh, 2000). Yet, maintaining 
established social rules and standards can be considered as 
less important than freedom of thought and the right to fol-
low one’s own way. In the context of the Netherlands, it was 
found that majority Dutch who strongly take exception to the 
perceived way in which Muslim immigrants treat women 
and children overwhelmingly support the right of Muslim 
immigrants to follow their own ways of life (Sniderman & 
Hagendoorn, 2007). This support was equal to those who had 
in every respect a favorable attitude toward Muslims.
Thus, the way people rank competing values (e.g., civil 
liberties or social order) plays an important role in tolerance 
judgments (Peffley et al., 2001), which raises the important 
psychological question of how people come to rank compet-
ing values and how this ranking affects tolerance judgments. 
For example, people can clearly prioritize one value over 
another, but experiences of value conflict are also possible 
because competing values are simultaneously considered 
equally important. Existing research, however, mainly 
focuses on the association between tolerance and separate 
values rather than investigating the relative importance of 
self-endorsed values (see Peffley et al., 2001). Yet, for under-
standing the balancing process involved in toleration, research 
should examine the relative importance of the values that are 
involved in the reasons for disapproval and self-restraint.
However, psychologically, there is another more dynamic 
solution to the paradox of moral tolerance whereby both the 
reasons for disapproval and those for acceptance involve 
valuable principles. This solution focuses on the situational, 
and thereby alternating, salience of values and is based on 
the assumption that whether a particular value guides one’s 
actual judgment is dependent not only on the relative impor-
tance attached to it but also on the situational cues that 
make that value relevant. According to Fazio (1986), attitudes 
influence a person’s interpretation of an event only when 
these attitudes are activated from memory. Feather (1990) 
argued that values are more readily activated when the cog-
nitive or emotional associations in which they are embedded 
are triggered by an external stimulus. Most events and situa-
tions can be interpreted in multiple ways, and depending on 
the interpretation, competing values become temporarily rel-
evant as standards of evaluation. For example, people may 
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strongly endorse freedom of speech, but for this value to 
influence their judgment, an event or situation should be 
interpreted as one in which freedom of speech is at stake. 
Focusing on the effects of media framing on tolerance, 
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) found that when news 
regarding political actions of the Ku Klux Klan was framed 
in terms of the importance of freedom of speech, participants 
had higher levels of political tolerance for this group com-
pared with a situation in which the importance of public 
order was emphasized. These and other results (e.g., Nelson 
& Oxley, 1999; Vescio & Biernat, 2003; Zilli Ramirez & 
Verkuyten, 2011) suggest an additive model which asserts 
that when a particular value is both strongly endorsed and 
situationally salient, people tend to evaluate an event in 
terms of that value (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Zaller & 
Feldman, 1992). Hence, the strength of the relationship 
between civil liberties and tolerance is influenced by the 
salience of equality and freedom values. When civil liberties 
are endorsed relatively strongly and made temporarily rele-
vant, they will guide one’s interpretation and judgment. And 
when the value of social order is endorsed relatively strongly 
and made relevant, this value will inform (in)tolerance judg-
ments. Collectively, these varied themes suggest that future 
research on tolerance would benefit from examining both 
individual differences in value priorities and situational con-
ditions that make particular values salient in contexts where 
toleration is relevant.
Perspective taking. The acceptance component of tolerance 
does not mean that the objection is removed but rather 
implies a dual form of thinking. On one hand, there is what 
one sincerely believes is true and right, but on the other hand, 
one must be able and willing to try to understand the perspec-
tive of the other. Tolerance is not the same as indifference or 
accepting anything blindly but involves comparing one’s 
own worldview with that of others. The ability to entertain 
the perspective of another is a critical ingredient in the accep-
tance component of tolerance and distinguishes it from 
acceptance based on indifference, misunderstandings, or a 
lack of knowledge (Graumann, 1996). Tolerance is difficult 
when one does not understand the reasons behind dissenting 
beliefs and practices. One has to understand the self-defining 
meanings of out-group beliefs and customs to be able to 
accept the right to be different.
Perspective taking can reduce stereotyping and increase 
positive attitudes toward out-groups (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 
2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003; Wang, Ku, Tai, & 
Galinsky, 2014). It broadens people’s horizons by recogniz-
ing the value of other cultures and thereby put their own 
taken-for-granted cultural standards into perspective, making 
them less in-group centric (Galinsky, 2002). However, per-
spective taking in the context of toleration is not concerned 
with improving out-group attitudes, but rather with the 
acceptance of what one objects to, while also trying to con-
vince the other without force or oppressive means. Being 
able to think about controversies from more than one per-
spective encourages (political) tolerance (Habermas, 2003; 
Mutz, 2006). Taking the perspective of the other allows one 
to understand the legitimate rationale for dissenting beliefs 
and practices. This in itself can lead to greater tolerance and, 
importantly, forms the basis for dialogue. Understanding 
other’s point of view is a central aspect of interaction and 
debate that is needed to maintain democratic citizenry (Mutz, 
2006).
Future research should examine the importance of per-
spective taking for toleration and the related commitment to 
try to convince others to change their “misguided” beliefs 
and practices (Schuyt, 1997). In doing so, it is important to 
consider person-based factors. For example, although funda-
mentalist and orthodox beliefs do not necessarily imply 
intolerance, they do make it more likely (e.g., Burdette, 
Ellison, & Hill, 2005; Jelen & Wilcox, 1990). These beliefs 
make it more difficult to accept other beliefs and lifestyles 
that are considered contrary to in-group defining cultural val-
ues or the holy scripture. In addition, rigid forms of thinking 
can hinder perspective taking and the willingness to enter in 
debate. Cognitive inflexibility, closed-mindedness, and a 
desire for simplicity, certainty, and security (e.g., need for 
closure) not only make it likely that individuals object toward 
dissenting beliefs and practices but also that they are unwill-
ing to accept or tolerate them (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). In 
addition, feelings of fear and uncertainty result in resistance 
to change and opposition to equality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, 
& Sulloway, 2003). This means that individuals higher on 
conservatism or authoritarianism, as indicators of tradition-
alism, and social dominance orientation, as an indicator of 
(in)equality, can be expected to be less tolerant of dissenting 
minority norms, beliefs, and practices (e.g., Crawford & 
Pilanski, 2014; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Whitley, 1999; but 
also see Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008).
The Rejection Component
Toleration is not without limits and thereby differs from rela-
tivism with its abstention of judgment toward the norms and 
practices of others. If we are to avoid tolerating everything, 
there must be norms and activities that we regard as intoler-
ably wrong, for subjectively right reasons. For dislike-based 
or weak tolerance, these reasons justify the translation of 
one’s prejudicial attitudes into discriminatory practices. The 
justification–suppression model suggests that people simul-
taneously can have negative feelings and endorse values and 
norms that suppress the expression of these beliefs (Crandall 
& Eshleman, 2003). One implication of this model, and of 
related ones, is that the expression of prejudice in discrimi-
nation is facilitated by justifications such as legitimizing 
myths that support unequal social arrangements (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999), threat perceptions (Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 
2010), perceived procedural and distributive justice (Louis, 
Duck, Terry, Schuller, & Lalonde, 2007), and processes of 
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infra- and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). For example, 
research shows that infra- and dehumanization alleviate 
moral concerns and thereby facilitate punishment and vio-
lence of out-groups (see Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 
2014), and the availability of nonracist justification facili-
tates discrimination by aversive racists (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
1986). These justifications resolve the psychological conflict 
that derives from, on one hand, the display of discriminatory 
behavior, and, on the other hand, the need to view oneself as 
a good person (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In these mod-
els, intolerance has a negative connotation because it implies 
a motive for justification that makes people to look for beliefs 
that legitimize their prejudices and discriminatory behavior. 
With the proper justifications, racists will express their racist 
feelings in racist acts.
For strong tolerance based on disapproval, the psycho-
logical process is different. It is about balancing reasons for 
finding something objectionable with reasons for showing 
self-restraint. The limits of tolerance occur when reasons for 
rejection become stronger than the reasons for acceptance. 
The considerations for rejecting particular norms and prac-
tices outweigh the ones for acceptance either because of a 
more enduring ranking of competing values or because of the 
alternating salience of values. In both cases, there are moral 
reasons to regard out-group norms and activities as intolera-
bly wrong, making intolerance (or zero tolerance) a positive 
rather than a negative response.
This means that the question of strong (in)tolerance does 
not apply to out-groups that are deprived of their humanity 
(Haslam, 2006). There is no need to tolerate those that 
are considered nonhuman or less than fully human because 
these groups are removed from moral concern and can sim-
ply be ignored, rejected, or excluded (Bandura, 1999). Self-
categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) argues that people 
understand and interpret group differences and similarities 
within the context of a common identity. Intergroup com-
parisons are always made against the background of what is 
shared. It is the shared humanity that forms the moral basis 
for evaluating out-group norms, beliefs, or practices as going 
against basic human rights and therefore as not to be toler-
ated. And it is the shared identity as citizens that forms the 
basis for being intolerant toward those who reject society’s 
core values and principles. So toleration implies shared 
(human, national) categorization. Strong intolerance does 
not imply that out-group members are dehumanized or 
excluded from the common category but rather requires that 
they are humanized and included. Future research should 
examine whether there is empirical support for this paradoxi-
cal implication.
Tolerance in its strong sense is not a value, but requires 
other values and principles, and the same is true for intoler-
ance (Forst, 2004). This raises the question of what morally 
right reasons people can provide for rejection. We suggest 
that these reasons can be based, at least, on the harm and 
rights principle, the principle of identity continuity, and the 
self-defense principle. In the section that follows, we will 
elaborate on all three of these principles and future research 
that could systematically examine the role of each in the lim-
its of tolerance.
Harm and rights principle. The moral domain is predomi-
nantly concerned with fairness, justice, and other’s welfare; 
it is typically considered to apply anywhere and everywhere 
(Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Turiel, 2002). 
Research with children demonstrates that they interpret 
issues of fairness, justice, and avoiding harm to others as 
unalterable, general, and not subject to authority jurisdiction 
(Wainryb, 2006). It is, of course, not always clear whether a 
particular practice is interpreted as belonging to the moral 
domain, but when it does, tolerance of the practice becomes 
difficult. Rozin (1999) described the process of moralization 
through which preferences are converted into moral values. 
In many Western countries, for example, cigarette smoking 
is not accepted anymore because it has changed from a pref-
erence to a moral violation related to health concerns (Rozin 
& Singh, 1999). Moralized entities and activities tend to lead 
to avoidance and rejection rather than toleration.
Similarly, the refusal to shake hands with someone of the 
opposite sex by Muslim civil servants and teachers has led to 
some uproar in Europe (Verkuyten, 2014). Critics construe 
the act of shaking hands as a matter of principle because it 
symbolizes the moral equality of men and women rather than 
a preference or social convention. If I say that I stand for 
gender equality, but that other people may think differently 
about it, then it becomes a matter of personal preference. But 
if I consider the equality of men and women a moral princi-
ple, I stand for gender equality everywhere and want every-
one else to do so. If people from another community disagree, 
there is a problem, one that goes beyond differences in 
preferences and social conventions that can be solved with 
mutual understanding and reasonable accommodations.
One can argue about the interpretation and applicability 
of a moral principle but not about the principle itself. 
Research on moral emotions shows that people exhibit strong 
intuitive objection to the physical and psychological harm of 
others and to unfair treatment (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 
1987; also see Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Furthermore, 
sacred values make people act in terms of moral principles 
and to react with moral outrage when the integrity of these 
values is challenged (Ginges & Atran, 2011; Tetlock et al., 
2000). And people also tend to reject beliefs and practices 
that go against basic human capabilities (Turiel, 2002). From 
a human rights perspective, accepting honor killings, female 
genital mutilation, domestic violence, and forced marriage 
would imply culpable indulgence and not tolerance. In these 
cases, toleration would infringe on the harm principle and 
the rights of others. Thus, it is likely that tolerance will be 
harder to achieve if out-group practices are perceived as 
causing harm to others (e.g., hate groups) or as mistreating or 
threatening the freedom and rights of others (e.g., against 
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women and gay rights). Future work can systematically test 
whether framing out-group actions as causing harm or vio-
lating human rights reduces tolerance toward the out-group 
and increases restrictions for minority rights.
Identity continuity. Another reason for the limits of toleration 
has to do with the importance of maintaining one’s cultural 
identity. In-group and out-group values can be experienced as 
conflicting and being irreconcilable because they contradict 
each other and therefore cannot be simultaneously pursued, 
or they may be mutually denunciatory whereby taking one 
seriously is to repudiate the other (Lukes, 2008). Perceptions 
of incompatible ways of life have been found to predict the 
feeling that one is not able to live by one’s in-group identity 
(Sindic & Reicher, 2009) or not able to develop a sense of 
shared national belonging (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012). 
In addition, perceived violation of cherished in-group values 
is a predictor of negative out-group attitudes, often indepen-
dent of group membership (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 
1996; Marques & Paez, 1994; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). 
Furthermore, research has demonstrated that people tend to 
oppose social developments and out-groups that undermine 
the continuation or future existence of their group identity 
(Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010).
In a “culturalist” perspective, the idea of conflicting and 
incommensurable values is a key proposition (Morris et al., 
2015; Wimmer, 2009). This idea is quite powerful and fea-
tures in analyses and concerns about “colliding ways of life” 
(Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) and the confrontational 
clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). It is also prominent 
in the way in which laypeople think about cultural differ-
ences. Self-defining core values tend to be seen as nonnego-
tiable (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) providing a justifiable reason 
for rejecting those norms and practices that are grounded in 
different moral values (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). 
Accommodations and changes that are perceived as under-
mining or destroying the core of one’s group identity are 
almost impossible to accept (Kelman, 2001; Sindic & Reicher, 
2009). Human beings would “have a right to culture—not just 
any culture, but their own” (Margalit & Halbertal, 1994, 
p. 491). For example, liberal principles of gender equality and 
individual freedoms would form the nonnegotiable core of 
American, British, French, or Dutch identity and thereby a 
justified basis for being intolerant of illiberal beliefs and prac-
tices that subvert this core (Schildkraut, 2007). The result 
is that Muslims in Western Europe, North America, or 
Australasia are criticized for their lack of allegiance to a set 
of “core national values” that their religion would reject 
(Kundnani, 2007).
The limits of tolerance can also be drawn in relation to 
in-group members. In fact, the rejection might even be stron-
ger toward dissenting beliefs and practices within one’s own 
community. Research on the black sheep effect convincingly 
demonstrates that normative deviant in-group members are 
evaluated more negatively than deviant out-group members 
(Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). 
Furthermore, when in-group members cannot agree about 
the defining characteristics or essence of their group identity, 
this will instigate schismatic processes (Sani, 2005, 2009). 
To tolerate dissenting beliefs and practices of out-group 
members living in the same society is one thing, but it is 
quite another thing to tolerate in-group members who put 
forward a contrasting understanding of the group identity. 
This directly undermines the continuity of the nature of the 
group and where it stands for. For example, Muslims in the 
United States have been found to be more intolerant of 
diverse interpretations of Islam than of dissenting beliefs of 
other groups (Djupe & Calfano, 2012). Similarly, members 
of the Church of England have left their own institution 
because of the ordination of women to priesthood (Sani & 
Reicher, 1999, 2000). The ordination of women priests was 
seen as subverting the group identity because it fundamen-
tally denied core beliefs and values (i.e., apostolic succes-
sion). Here, the limits of tolerance are found in the threat to 
the continuation of the historically grounded principles that 
are considered to form the heart of the group identity. Taken 
together, future empirical research would benefit from exam-
ining how perceived threats to the in-group’s identity conti-
nuity emerging from both in-group and out-group sources 
influence toleration (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015).
Self-defense principle. In addition to the harm and rights 
principle and to in-group continuity, there is the principle of 
self-defense of the liberal and democratic order. Toleration 
cannot constitute a virtue if it is at the expense of the collec-
tive security and persistence of the social and political order. 
What threatens the stability of liberal society is often a con-
tested matter, and social-psychological research should 
examine why and when certain practices are considered to 
undermine the liberal order. In doing so, it is important to 
recognize that the principle of self-defense can also be used 
for strategic purposes.
Reciprocity, for example, is central to the idea of tolera-
tion. It implies the classical paradox that one cannot tolerate 
those who are intolerant. Walzer (1997) noted that some 
immigrant minorities are tolerated, but cannot practice intol-
erance in the society of settlement even though their fellow 
believers in other countries may be “brutally intolerant” 
(p. 81). Being tolerant toward forces that fail to reciprocate 
undermines the benefits of civil liberties and equality and 
therefore cannot be tolerated. The principle of reciprocity 
is essential for tolerance because otherwise the practice of 
toleration is destroyed.
However, the slogan “no toleration for the intolerant” is 
used by populist politicians in Europe to argue against 
Muslims (e.g., Verkuyten, 2013) suggesting that this propo-
sition is not unproblematic. There is always the question of 
who draws the line against whom, for which reasons, and by 
what means. In liberal democracies, only political authorities 
have the legitimate power to interfere with people’s liberties. 
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This means that majority members call on political authori-
ties to reaffirm the boundaries for toleration. The implication 
is that social-psychological research on toleration should not 
only focus on the majority–minority relation but should also 
consider the perceived role of political authorities (Allport, 
1954; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Subašić, Reynolds, 
& Turner, 2008). Populist politicians emphasize the self-
defining meaning of in-group tolerance to criticize Muslim 
immigrants for their intolerance and unwillingness to adapt 
(Kundnani, 2007; Verkuyten, 2013). It is argued by these 
politicians that we have been tolerant enough and that “our” 
tolerance has led to segregated and isolated communities that 
threaten to self-destroy our liberal society (see Blommaert & 
Verschueren, 1994; Vasta, 2007). This indicates that the 
notion of tolerance can be used to argue not only for accep-
tance of the beliefs and practices of immigrants but also for 
drawing a moral boundary between “us, the tolerant” and 
“them, the intolerant” (Van der Veer, 2006).
This discourse about the reversal of (in)tolerance tends 
to draw upon a disapproval rather than dislike conceptual-
ization of toleration. Populist politicians argue that “our” 
tolerant and democratic values are threatened by particular 
ideologies (e.g., Islam) rather than by a certain group of 
people (see Mols & Jetten, 2014; Verkuyten, 2013). A dis-
tinction is made between disapproval of out-group ideology 
and dislike of out-group people, and this distinction miti-
gates against accusations of racism. A focus on Islam draws 
attention away from human groups, which makes populist 
proposals to limit and forbid Islamic schools, Mosques, the 
headscarf, and other visible signs of this religion under-
standable. Criticizing a system of belief is acceptable and is 
part of what is expected of a politician. In addition, defin-
ing a system of belief as being unequal to “our” norms and 
values is more acceptable than labeling a group of people 
inferior. Notions of tolerance depend on equality and, as 
populists argue, Islam is unequal to our liberal worldview, 
and therefore it is not intolerant to treat Islam in a different 
way (Verkuyten, 2013).
There is a further implication of this “reversal of toler-
ance.” In their fight against the alleged Islamization of the 
West, populist politicians give a reified and essentialist rep-
resentation of Islam as being intrinsically contradictory to 
“our” tolerant norms and values (Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Wood 
& Finlay, 2008). A representation of profound and inherent 
cultural differences is typical of a cultural racist discourse in 
which minority cultures are defined as subordinate, back-
ward, or inferior, and the majority culture needs protection 
(Barker, 1981; Wieviorka, 1995). Yet, the notion of tolerance 
has also been criticized for reifying and essentializing group 
identities (W. Brown, 2008). A cultural essentialist discourse 
can be found among minority groups and proponents of 
diversity and toleration. They emphasize the self-defining 
importance of genuine cultural differences and therefore the 
need to tolerate these differences (Verkuyten, 2003). Cultural 
essentialism is an important political tool for ethnic and 
racial minority groups (Hodgson, 2002; Morin & Saladin 
d’Anglure, 1997). Culture is the socially right category on 
which to rest the claim for group rights and to argue for 
toleration of one’s authentic identity.
The social-psychological implication is that cultural essen-
tialism is not just oppressive but can have strategic advan-
tages for minority groups. Essentialist beliefs are typically 
examined as supporting prejudice and discrimination against 
minorities and as rationalizing social hierarchies and existing 
social arrangements (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; 
Jost & Banaji, 1994; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). 
However, for ethnic and racial minority groups, higher in-
group essentialism can be expected to go together with stron-
ger demands for group rights and toleration. Research has 
shown that minorities use essentialism to counter the denial 
of their identity (Morton & Postmes, 2009; Verkuyten, 2003), 
and that majority members reject essentialism when they 
argue against multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2003) and when it 
is used to exclude them (Morton, Hornsey, & Postmes, 2009). 
Future research should examine the strategic aspects of cul-
tural essentialism in relation to toleration.
The Intergroup Context of Tolerance
The aim of toleration is not to abolish the “us–them” distinc-
tion but rather to ensure peaceful coexistence between 
the two. Toleration refers to a relation between those who 
tolerate and those who are tolerated, between subjects and 
objects of toleration. This means that the relevant intergroup 
context needs to be taken into account to understand how 
toleration is experienced and practiced. This context can be 
characterized by a difference in power and status whereby 
the powerful majority permits dissenting minority groups to 
live according to their way of life. Alternatively, the inter-
group context can be more equal in which there is mutual 
respect between the tolerating parties. In the former situation, 
the relation of toleration is vertical or hierarchical, whereas 
in the latter it is horizontal. This difference in intergroup con-
text corresponds to the permission and respect understanding 
of toleration, respectively (Forst, 2012).
Permission Understanding
Toleration according to this conceptualization implies that 
the dominant majority has the power to interfere with the 
practices of a minority but nevertheless tolerate (some of) 
these practices.5 Thus, the majority allows minorities certain 
privileges on conditions specified by them, such as allowing 
Muslims to pray at work, but not during office hours; and to 
allow political protests to take place outside government 
buildings, but only if they do not disrupt the daily function-
ing of the offices. The qualified permission to the minority 
group members to live according to their beliefs affirms the 
dominant position of the majority. As a corollary, the minor-
ity should accept its minority position and not claim equal 
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public and political status. A historical example of this is the 
millet system of the Ottoman Empire, which was character-
ized by religious and linguistic pluralism. The empire was 
very accommodating toward the different religious commu-
nities (the millets) that had a great deal of autonomy, but this 
relied on the official toleration position taken by the govern-
ment for the sake of peace (Walzer, 1997).
The reasons for granting minority groups qualified per-
mission to practice their own beliefs can be pragmatic or 
principled. Pragmatically, toleration can be considered the 
least costly way to accommodate diversity without disturb-
ing existing social order and civil peace. A more principled 
reason is when one finds it morally problematic to force peo-
ple to give up their identity-defining norms and practices as 
witnessed in the forced assimilation programs of indigenous 
populations in America (Heart & DeBruyn, 1998; Hoxie, 
1984) and Australia (Haebich, 2008; Van Krieken, 1999).
These norms and practices are often tolerated as long as 
they are confined to the private realm of the minority commu-
nity or do not interfere with public life. In line with this rea-
soning, research in the American context reveals that people 
show greater national exclusion and dislike for ethnic minori-
ties (e.g., Chinese Americans and Native Americans) after 
exposure to six individuals from the ethnic group speaking a 
language other than English in public spaces relative to when 
these individuals speak the same language in the privacy of 
their home (Yogeeswaran, Adelman, Parker, & Dasgupta, 
2014; Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta, Adelman, Eccleston, & Parker, 
2011). However, seeing the same ethnic minority individuals 
speak a language other than English in the privacy of one’s 
home had no effect on one’s attitudes or national inclusion of 
the ethnic group relative to baseline controls suggesting that 
people specifically frown upon public expressions of ethnic 
identity. Such negative reactions toward public expressions of 
ethnic identity were especially strong among Americans who 
strongly identified with the nation (Yogeeswaran et al., 2014).
The permission form of toleration implies a strong “us–
them” distinction whereby the majority is the subject of 
toleration and minorities the object of it. Because it confirms 
the dominant position of the majority, it is likely that it is 
endorsed more strongly among politically right-wing (com-
pared with left-wing) individuals who tend to have antiegal-
itarian beliefs such as those high in social dominance 
orientation (Jost et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For 
example, research has shown that political conservatives and 
those high in right-wing authoritarianism react especially 
negatively toward immigrants and ethnic minorities after 
exposure to diversity messages (Kauff, Asbrock, Thorner, & 
Wagner, 2013; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). A permis-
sion form of tolerance is also more likely in settings in which 
there is a stable and clear group-based hierarchy, whereas it 
is less likely when the intergroup context is rather insecure 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Giving qualified permission to 
minorities to live according to their beliefs is less threatening 
in a context in which the intergroup structure is perceived to 
be relatively stable and legitimate. Such a context makes it 
less likely that qualified permission is a stepping stone for 
minority groups to organize themselves and act collectively 
to challenge and change the status quo (Bettencourt, Dorr, 
Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Future 
research should systematically examine the influence of 
these intergroup factors on toleration and its limits.
Respect Understanding
The respect understanding of toleration involves a more equal 
relationship between groups (Galeotti, 2002; Honneth, 1995). 
While groups hold very different beliefs about the good life 
and have different cultural or religious norms and practices, 
they recognize and respect each other as equal citizens with 
the same rights and liberties. Here the subjects of toleration 
are at the same time the objects of it. An example is the pil-
larization history in the Netherlands, a country often cele-
brated for its tolerance (Lechner, 2008). Traditionally, Roman 
Catholics lived in the southern part of the country, while 
Lutheran, Reformed, and Dutch Reformed lived in the north-
ern part. These religious differences were institutionalized in 
the separate, “pillarized” state structure (together with a social 
democratic pillar) with parallel newspapers, broadcasting 
stations, labor unions, medical organizations, schools, and 
political parties. The different groups knew that they will not 
agree about the good life but accepted others as equal citi-
zens. In practice, the respect understanding of toleration can 
take two different forms with different implications for inter-
group relations (Forst, 2012): the formal equality model, and 
the qualitative equality model of toleration.
The formal equality model is based on a strict distinction 
between the public and private sphere. Beliefs and practices 
related to group identities are confined to the private domain, 
and the general citizenship values and principles apply to the 
public sphere. The French secular republicanism is a clear 
example. It implies, for example, that religious symbols are 
not tolerated in public schools in which children are educated 
to be autonomous citizens. As a result, Muslim students are 
not allowed to wear headscarves to school just as Christians 
are not allowed to wear a necklace with a cross. The formal 
equality model comes down to color blindness whereby a 
secular citizen identity has primacy.
Social-psychological research in the American context 
has shown that color-blind ideologies are endorsed more 
strongly by majority compared with minority group mem-
bers, and that this ideology can be used to rationalize minor-
ity group disadvantages and leads to more negative attitudes 
toward minorities (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2015; 
Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Yet, this ideology can be defined 
in different ways, and its understanding depends on the 
national context. For example, color blindness has quite a 
different meaning in France compared with the United States. 
In the former country, it is positively associated with multi-
culturalism because both reflect a commitment to equality 
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(Guimond et al., 2014; see also Hahn, Banchefsky, Park, & 
Judd, 2015). And because the shared citizenship identity is 
central, it is possible that color blindness does not lead to a 
more positive attitude toward a dissenting out-group but 
does have a positive effect on toleration. Similarly, multicul-
turalism which calls for the recognition of cultural differ-
ences may also promote greater toleration as people may 
recognize differences they may not agree with, but neverthe-
less accept. For example, multiculturalism in education does 
not have to discourage children from having any objections 
to things that conflict with what they strongly believe or 
value, but can focus on encouraging them to be tolerant. 
Future research should examine the importance of these 
different cultural diversity ideologies for toleration across 
varied national contexts. Although many studies have exam-
ined the effects of diversity ideologies on out-group attitudes 
(see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013), 
little is known about their role in toleration and its limits.
A problem with the formal equality model is that it con-
siders cultural identities as private affairs that do not require 
public enactment. Yet, a rigid distinction between the pri-
vate and public realm can be quite difficult when identity-
defining beliefs and practices are involved, such as with 
religion. Such a distinction would mean that a true believer 
can only be a Muslim, Christian, or Jew at home or in his or 
her own religious community. Social identities, however, are 
not like private beliefs but require social validation. They do 
not simply exist in people’s head but are bound up with 
socially defined distinctions that position people in the world 
and have real social implications (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 
2007; Verkuyten, 2005). For example, one’s ethnic identity 
can be very present in one’s thoughts, but that identity must 
be recognized and accepted by other people. Self-verification 
theory argues that individuals seek out external verification 
from others about their internally held identities, regardless 
of whether the self-view is positive or negative (see North & 
Swann, 2009, for a review). In addition, research on identity 
denial has demonstrated that denying one’s social identity 
leads to negative emotions and attempts at proving one’s 
belongingness in the group (Cheryan & Monin, 2005; 
Guendelman, Cheryan, & Monin, 2011; see also Huynh, 
Devos, & Smalarz, 2011). Therefore, it can be argued that 
not only the freedom of belief should be protected but also 
the freedom to publicly express one’s belief in appropriate 
practices.
This problem with the formal equality model is acknowl-
edged in the qualitative equality model of toleration (Forst, 
2012). This model considers identity-defining beliefs and 
practices as sufficient grounds to exempt certain groups from 
the rules or behavioral codes that apply to everyone else. As 
a result, group members are respected as equals and also as 
having a distinct cultural identity that should be tolerated. 
For example, in some contexts, Sikhs have been exempt 
from wearing motorcycle helmets and being allowed to carry 
their kirpans (dagger) in public places. As such, tolerance 
denotes higher level unity (equal citizenship) rather than 
lower level uniformity.
In social-psychological terms, this latter understanding of 
toleration is similar to dual identity models of intergroup 
relations, but with some interesting twists. Dual identity 
models (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2009) propose that the combina-
tion of subgroup and superordinate identities is most promis-
ing for developing harmonious intergroup relations in plural 
societies. Dual identities would reduce subgroup identity 
threat, and the shared superordinate identity would stimulate 
positive attitudes and cooperation with other subgroups 
(Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Out-group members will be evalu-
ated more positively when they are seen as part of a shared 
superordinate category through processes that involve pro-
in-group bias (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This is especially 
likely when the superordinate category is represented as a 
dual identity that affirms subgroup distinctiveness in the con-
text of common belonging (R. Brown & Hewstone, 2005; 
Dovidio et al., 2009; but see Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).
However, the qualitative equality understanding of tolera-
tion is different in at least three respects. First, this under-
standing is not concerned with the development of more 
positive intergroup attitudes but rather with accepting things 
that one continues to object to. Second, the basis for accep-
tance is not, for example, pro-in-group bias or increased 
cooperation because of reduced subgroup threat (Hewstone 
& Brown, 1986), but respect for others as equal citizens 
(Simon, Mommert, & Renger, 2015). This respect is a form 
of social recognition (Honneth, 1995) and balances people’s 
objection, making it possible to tolerate out-group members’ 
way of life. Thus, the social-psychological processes behind 
the dual identity model and the equality toleration under-
standing seem to be different, and this should be examined 
empirically.
Third, the nature of the dual identity representation dif-
fers. Specifically, the focus in the equality understanding of 
toleration is on equal citizenship or one’s membership of a 
particular political unit. So the emphasis is on the combina-
tion of specific cultural identities with equal rights and liber-
ties. In contrast, dual identity models in social psychology 
tend not to specify the identity content. To measure a sense of 
dual identity, people are asked about their level of ethnic and 
national sense of belonging (“I identify with my ethnic 
group,” “I identify with the national category”) or requested 
to indicate to what extent they identify with hyphenated 
labels such as African-American, Turkish-German, or 
British-Muslim (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2015). Yet, it 
makes a difference whether individuals identify with a 
national community of people, a particular territory and his-
tory, mainstream cultural beliefs and practices, or rather with 
political institutions (S. Gibson & Condor, 2009). The con-
tent of the identity provides direction for how to perceive, 
evaluate, and behave in situations of identity salience (Turner 
et al., 1987). Citizenship implies membership of a particular 
polity and involves the acceptance of other group identities 
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as moral and political equals. The result is not the recogni-
tion and valuing of cultural differences, as in forms of multi-
culturalism, but rather the acceptance of other ways of life to 
which one continues to object to. Furthermore, the respect 
understanding of toleration implies that the limits of toler-
ance lie in the citizenship rights, duties, and liberties. One 
cannot tolerate illiberal practices when citizenship is defined 
in terms of liberal principles.
Integrative Thoughts on Permission and Respect 
Understanding of Toleration
The permission and respect understanding of toleration can 
be present in society at the same time and fuel conflicts about 
whether and to what extent certain practices should be 
accepted. From a permission understanding perspective, one 
can accept that a Muslim woman is a teacher at a public 
school but not with a headscarf. This is problematic from the 
perspective of a respect understanding because the headscarf 
might be an intrinsic part of her religious identity. A research 
example comes from a large-scale study of majority Germans 
where approximately 70% accepted the right of Muslim 
women to wear headscarves, and of Muslims to build 
Mosques and to have Islamic education at German public 
schools (Van der Noll, 2012). Yet, less than 6% accepted the 
idea of an important Islamic holiday becoming a national 
holiday in Germany. Accepting that Muslims can practice 
their religion similar to other religious groups is one thing, 
but symbolically incorporating them as equals with public 
recognition of their identity is something else. This finding 
illustrates that toleration has important implications for 
group identities and intergroup relations. And because much 
is at stake, strong debates exist. In several European coun-
tries, opponents of the headscarf argue it should be banned in 
public places because it is a sign of intolerance and gender 
inequality. In contrast, others argue that it would be an act of 
intolerance if Muslim women were not able to wear a heads-
carf (see Verkuyten, 2014).
Unfortunately, there is hardly any systematic theoretical 
and empirical research on the differences and relations 
between the permission and respect understanding of tolera-
tion. We do not know how people perceive and assess these 
different understandings and how these influence (in)toler-
ance judgments and behaviors. Therefore, empirical research 
would strongly benefit from examining how contexts that 
characterize the permission and respect understanding of 
tolerance impact out-group attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, 
as well as one’s self-conceptions.
To Be Tolerated: The Targets’ 
Perspective
Toleration is a necessity for living together and “to be the 
object of tolerance is a welcoming improvement on being the 
object of intolerance” (Horton, 1996, p. 35). Toleration has 
several positive consequences for minorities. It allows them to 
express their cultural identities, provides access to resources 
and rights, and protects them from violence. Toleration gives 
minority citizens the freedom and right to define and develop 
their own ways of life. Most ethnic, religious, sexual, and 
other minorities do not proselytize but rather try to convince 
others to expand the scope of acceptable positions or their 
latitudes of acceptance (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). In terms of 
minority influence research, these minorities try to increase 
the societal tolerance of diversity rather than seeking to 
convert society to their position. Experimental research has 
shown that minority members advocating tolerance (com-
pared with seeking conversion) valued the group more, were 
more likely to consider themselves a member of the group, 
and were more loyal to the group (Prislin & Filson, 2009; 
Shaffer & Prislin, 2011).
However, toleration is only likely to fully satisfy minority 
members when they themselves accept that what they do 
is in some respect objectionable. If not, negative social-
psychological implications are likely, especially in the con-
text of the permission understanding of tolerance whereby 
toleration can be seen as “a word signifying power, domina-
tion and exclusion” (Forst, 2012, p. 3). A well-known quote 
from the German thinker and writer, Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe (1829), states, “Tolerance should be a temporary atti-
tude only: it must lead to recognition. To tolerate means to 
insult” (cited in Forst, 2012, p.3). It is argued that “mere” 
tolerance is not enough because toleration would be a poor 
substitute for the recognition and affirmation that minority 
members deserve and need (Parekh, 2000).
There is a sizable literature on the “target’s perspective” 
that is concerned with the social-psychological implications 
of belonging to a devalued, discriminated, or stigmatized 
minority group (Major, Quinton, McCoy, & Schmader, 
2000; Swim & Stangor, 1998). Such research examines the 
influence of negative stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimi-
nation on minority members’ psychological well-being 
(Pascoe & Richman, 2009; D. R. Williams, Spencer, & 
Jackson, 1999); academic adjustment (Major & O’Brien, 
2005; Schmader, Major, & Gramzow, 2001); group identifi-
cation (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999); and collec-
tive action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). With 
discrimination, social identities are at stake because people 
are treated unjustly on the basis of their group membership. 
Being the victim of discrimination implies a lack of control, 
lower status, and a lack of belonging. Psychologically, 
blaming outcomes on discrimination acknowledges that 
these are under the control of prejudiced others (Major, 
Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). This may protect feelings of 
self-worth (e.g., “that employer discriminated against me 
and therefore it is not my fault that I did not get the job”) and 
also threatens one’s sense of control over personal outcomes 
(e.g., “not me, but the employer decides my life”; Crocker, 
Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major et al., 2002; Ruggiero 
& Taylor, 1997).
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Publicly interpreting events in terms of discrimination 
also elicits negative social costs. Experimental research has 
demonstrated that individuals who report discrimination are 
perceived negatively by others (e.g., being “moaners” or 
embracing victimhood), even when discrimination was the 
clear cause of the event (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). In addition, 
it has been found that in the presence of majority group 
members, ethnic minorities are relatively unwilling to report 
that negative events occurring to them are the result of dis-
crimination (Stangor, Van Allen, Swim, & Sechrist, 2002). 
Furthermore, coethnics can also react negatively toward 
individual group members, for example, when they fear that 
they themselves or their entire ethnic group will be labeled as 
moaners who avoid responsibility for their lives (Garcia, 
Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005).
By contrast to the rather large social-psychological litera-
ture on the effects of being a target of prejudice and discrimi-
nation, very little is known about the social-psychological 
implications of being the object of toleration. Toleration is 
the opposite of discrimination and implies that minority 
members are permitted or allowed to express and enact their 
group identity. However, being tolerated may still have nega-
tive consequences on the individual and their group. We pro-
pose that there are several possible negative consequences of 
the experience of toleration, especially in its permission 
understanding form that may help to understand why people 
often do not like to be tolerated. These consequences should 
be examined in future research.
Implications for Belonging, Self-Esteem, and  
Well-Being Among the Tolerated
First, toleration implies objection toward one’s values, 
beliefs, and practices and can be experienced as noninterfer-
ence based on a dismissive attitude: The majority grudgingly 
agrees to turn a blind eye or puts up with minorities. In doing 
so, the larger society’s dislike and disapproval of minority 
identities and practices is implicitly affirmed. What is being 
tolerated transgresses or deviates from what is considered 
appropriate and normative and this implied deviance and 
inferiority thereby threatens a valued group membership 
among the tolerated. Such an identity threat may negatively 
impact (collective) self-esteem (Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, 
& Broadnax, 1994) and well-being (Branscombe et al., 1999) 
among the tolerated. In such a context, the tolerated may 
react with stronger in-group closure and out-group deroga-
tion, especially among higher identifiers and when the social 
structure is thought to be stable and legitimate (Branscombe 
et al., 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Relatedly, being tolerated may also undermine one’s 
sense of belonging thereby impacting (collective) self-
esteem and well-being. Tolerance can define minorities as 
second-class citizens and legitimizes and reinforces the 
power of those who extend the tolerance. There is no full 
inclusion on equal footing as the majority. This means that 
toleration can be perceived as an (implicit) form of unequal 
treatment whereby society itself is not considered just and 
worthwhile and the practices and policies of toleration are 
seen as confirming the lack of social recognition and respect 
(Honneth, 1995). Such a perspective may imply that the tol-
erated individual or group feel a decreased sense of belong-
ing (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) within society as their 
practices are merely being tolerated but not valued. Such a 
threat to belonging may lead the tolerated to experience a 
host of negative emotions, decreased well-being, and reduced 
(collective) self-esteem. Future work can thereby benefit 
from examining the consequences of being “tolerated” for 
the target’s self-esteem, well-being, and sense of belonging 
within particular group contexts.
Implications for Social Distancing, Perceived Control, 
and Collective Action Among the Tolerated
One possible implication of being an object of toleration is 
that it will be more difficult to convince others of the nega-
tive implications of toleration, compared with the negative 
implications of discrimination. While people in many places 
recognize that it is wrong to discriminate (and it is illegal to 
do so in many countries), it is much more challenging to 
demonstrate the harm of being tolerated. The social accusa-
tions and possible costs of discussing tolerance are likely to 
be different. For example, rather than being seen as a moaner, 
one might be considered unreasonable and demanding. 
Minority and disadvantaged groups may, therefore, refrain 
from expressing their viewpoints on the topic to people in the 
majority or those belonging to privileged groups, which may 
promote greater social distancing.
A related implication of being “tolerated” is that it may 
undermine a perceived sense of control and feelings of 
(collective) efficacy. Tolerance affirms a relationship of 
inequality where the tolerated group is cast in an inferior 
position: “To tolerate someone else is an act of power; to be 
tolerated is an acceptance of weakness” (Walzer, 1997, 
p. 52). As tolerance implies that one has to rely on the self-
restraint or “good grace” of the majority, tolerance can be 
experienced as an act of generosity whereby the object of 
tolerance should be thankful for being allowed to express 
their identity and are placed in a dependent and vulnerable 
position. One becomes dependent on the goodwill of the 
majority rather than to take control themselves. By feeling 
that one’s standing and membership within the larger com-
munity is precarious and dependent on the good grace of 
those around, the tolerated can feel a decreased sense of 
control over their own lives (Crocker et al., 1991; Major 
et al., 2002). Such a lack of perceived control may under-
mine personal and group efficacy. Psychological research 
has shown that this is a difficult situation that can lead to 
feelings of depression and helplessness, and a reduced will-
ingness to act collectively against social inequality (Van 
Zomeren et al., 2008).
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The latter implication would be that politics of toleration 
can lead minority members to attend less to group-based dis-
parities and to engage in collective action that challenge and 
change these disparities. This possibility is reminiscent of 
Marcuse’s (1965) analysis of repressive tolerance as a subtle 
social mechanism contributing to domination: “what is pro-
claimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its 
most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppres-
sion” (p. 81). This would mean that a focus on toleration can 
contribute to a further social-psychological understanding of 
why and when minority members’ willingness to protest on 
behalf of minority groups is undermined. Research has 
shown that an emphasis on a shared national identity can 
have such an undermining effect (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; 
Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Ufkes, Dovidio, & Tel, 2015). 
In addition, it has been demonstrated that positive contact 
with the dominant group can reduce awareness of group 
inequality and discrimination, and decreases support for 
social policies that benefit minorities (e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, 
& Tredoux, 2007; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; 
Tropp, Hawi, Van Laar, & Levin, 2012). Future research 
could examine whether, when, and why a politics of tolera-
tion has a weakening effect on minority member’s sense of 
control and collective action intentions or even feelings of 
personal efficacy in more everyday contexts.
Discussion
Toleration is a core feature of liberal democracy and a neces-
sary condition for pluralistic societies. It makes difference 
possible by defining the conditions of peaceful coexistence. 
People inevitably and regularly object to ways of life other 
than their own, and despite such objection, they have to learn 
to live with it. Toleration does not require that people give up 
their objections of out-group norms, beliefs, and practices, 
which may in fact be very difficult, if not impossible, to do, 
but stimulates debate and mutual accommodation. However, 
the societal and everyday importance of toleration is ignored 
or underrated in social psychology, which has predominantly 
focused on the reduction of stereotypes and prejudices. 
Although the goal of reducing stereotyping, prejudice, and 
discrimination is important, there are many situations where 
people may simply never see eye to eye or accept what are 
considered blasphemous, disastrous, or obscenely wrong 
out-group beliefs and practices; in such cases, members of 
these different groups should agree to peacefully coexist side 
by side.
We have tried to argue that toleration raises important and 
novel questions for social psychology and intergroup rela-
tions research in particular. We have discussed various impli-
cations, and for several of these implications there is empirical 
evidence. Yet, the different aspects should be examined more 
fully and systematically in future research. Thus, the sug-
gested questions, paradoxes, and implications are meant as 
directions for further social-psychological theory and research 
on toleration. There are some additional issues that might be 
important for future work that we were not able to discuss 
thus far. We will briefly draw attention to three of these.
First, it is important to note that we have discussed tol-
eration from a more cognitive, reflexive perspective that 
requires an active and principled balancing of different rea-
sons for objection, acceptance, and rejection. The reason is 
that although the objection component of (weak) toleration 
might be based on gut feelings of dislike and related implicit, 
unconscious processes, this is less likely for the acceptance 
component that requires that people consider additional rea-
sons to do so. Yet, it does mean that we did not consider more 
prereflexive forms of toleration whereby people habitually 
provide each other normative leeway. Future research exam-
ining automatic and controlled processes might be important 
to shed further light on these forms of toleration. It may be 
that toleration in its weak sense promotes lower levels of 
deliberate stereotyping and prejudice or lower levels of 
blatant discrimination as individuals self-regulate (Monteith 
et al., 2010) or control their negative sentiments. However, 
when it comes to automatic stereotyping and prejudice, it may 
be that people fail to refrain from discrimination (thereby 
failing to demonstrate toleration). By studying toleration 
using both explicit and implicit measures (e.g., Yogeeswaran, 
Devos, & Nash, 2016) as well as by using blatant and subtle 
discrimination paradigms (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; 
Rooth, 2010), we may be able to better understand the 
nuanced ways in which toleration can impact intergroup 
relations.
Second, our aim was to provide a conceptual analysis that 
initiates new lines of intergroup and cultural diversity theory 
and research, rather than to develop a coherent theoretical 
framework or a particular conceptual model that can be 
tested empirically. This means that future work should exam-
ine possible social-psychological processes underlying toler-
ance as well as individual differences and social conditions 
that stimulate or hamper toleration. Future work could sys-
tematically examine, for example, why and when exactly 
people are tolerant and how they decide about the limits 
of toleration. In doing so, it is important to recognize that 
tolerance is not an all-or-none construct but depends on 
whom, what, and when people are asked to tolerate dissent-
ing norms and practices (McClosky, & Brill, 1983; Sigelman 
& Toebben, 1992). People take into account various aspects 
of what they are asked to tolerate and the sense in which they 
should be tolerant. The type of actor, the nature of the social 
implication of the behavior, and the underlying belief type of 
the dissenting norm or practice, all make a difference (e.g., 
Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007). For example, the level of toler-
ance might depend on the type of social relationship. One 
might accept Muslim immigrants as co-nationals or co- 
residents in one’s neighborhood, but reject them in one’s 
sporting club or voluntary organization. There also are indi-
cations that people are more tolerant toward actions that are 
based on a different factual view of the world (“they think it 
is like that”) than on different moral beliefs (“they think that 
it is right and good”; for example, Wainryb, 1993; Wainryb 
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et al., 1998). For example, in one study, Dutch majority 
group adolescents were found to be more tolerant of Muslim 
practices based on dissenting cultural beliefs than on dissent-
ing moral beliefs (Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007). One reason 
for this was that the type of underlying belief could be used 
to infer intentions behind the practice that one objects to but 
is asked to accept. Ignorance and misinformation can be 
inferred from informational dissent, whereas badness or 
immorality is a more likely inference from moral dissent. 
Furthermore, it is important to examine different aspects of 
tolerance because accepting that people have different beliefs 
does not have to imply that one accepts that they act on those 
beliefs or that they try to persuade others to engage in such 
dissenting practices. Accepting that a religious group has a 
different religious belief is easier than accepting that they 
can enact their religious identity in public life (Yogeeswaran 
et al., 2011), and it becomes even more problematic when the 
group tries to mobilize others to also start practicing these 
beliefs in everyday life (e.g., by also wearing a headscarf or 
not shaking hands with someone of the opposite sex; Gieling, 
Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010).
Third, we have discussed tolerance in terms of self-
restraint and putting up with out-group norms and practices 
that one dislikes or disapproves of. This means that without 
objection, the question of tolerance does not arise. However, 
the distinction between dislike and disapproval indicates that 
the basis and strength of the objection can be different and 
might change. For example, people can gradually become 
acclimated to ideas and practices they once found very 
offensive (Chong, 1994). They can get used to living around 
groups with different cultural beliefs, customs, and practices, 
and become more inured to things that once bothered them 
(e.g., abortion, gay marriage). This does not mean that they 
no longer have objections, but these might be less strongly 
felt and less infused with fears and anxieties, and thus, there 
is less psychological balancing and tension and less need for 
self-restraint. Future research could examine tolerance in 
relation to the processes of psychological adaptation to 
changing norms and practices. People’s feelings about the 
things that they tolerate can gradually change and the limits 
of their tolerance can alter. In this respect, it also may be 
fruitful to consider the impact of promoting toleration on 
majority group members’ stereotypes, prejudice, and dis-
crimination toward minority group members and immi-
grants. Given that a message of tolerance has been a message 
promoted for years by authority figures, it is surprising that 
few social-psychological studies have directly examined 
the impact of toleration for people’s thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors toward others.
Conclusion
In the past decade, social-psychological research on inter-
group relations and cultural diversity has grown tremen-
dously. While the great majority of studies on the topic have 
focused on negative stereotypes, prejudicial attitudes, and 
discriminatory tendencies, this work has not examined the 
importance of toleration in intergroup relations. Toleration 
emphasizes civic identity and individuals’ freedom to define 
and develop their own identities, while offering crucial space 
for religious and cultural diversity. This means that it is 
important to consider and systematically investigate what the 
basis of the objection is, whether and when objectionable 
norms and practices should be tolerated or not, and what the 
social-psychological implications are of being tolerated.
In the present article, we have tried to offer an early 
mapping for a landscape that is largely unexplored by social 
psychologists. There is much to be discovered here, and our 
effort by no means is an adequate mapping of the whole 
terrain. We have identified some striking landmarks and put 
up some signpost that may be useful in further exploration. 
However, systematic attention for questions on tolerance is 
much needed as these can enhance the field’s contribution to 
the development of positive intergroup relations in plural 
societies. It can contribute to our continuing effort of devel-
oping a dynamic, challenging, and societally relevant social 
psychology.
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Notes
1. Dislike and disapproval may interrelate in a variety of ways, 
and the distinction is not always easy to make. Here we use 
these terms to explain the importance of different grounds for 
objection for understanding forms of toleration. For example, 
the distinction has implications for understanding the differ-
ence between religious and racial tolerance, and to assess in 
how far it is meaningful to speak about the latter.
2. One criticism is that the least-liked group approach implies 
that in comparing levels of tolerance, it is unclear whether 
the target groups are equally disliked. Furthermore, differ-
ent societies or different generations within the same society 
might be considered equally (in)tolerant despite clear coun-
try differences or societal changes in the direction of more (or 
less) acceptance of new groups, lifestyles, habits, and customs 
(Chong, 1994). Asking people about the groups they them-
selves dislike implies that the objection is taken into account, 
but this can result in overlooking the fact that historically a 
society has become more tolerant. Similarly, it may over-
look the fact that people living in liberal democratic societ-
ies are generally more tolerant than those living in dictatorial 
societies.
3. Obviously, in many cases it will not be straightforward what 
the merit of the objection is because it can be opaque or mixed. 
There will be hard cases and many disputes and disagreements 
but the important point is that it must be possible to recognize 
some (intersubjective) value in the objection.
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4. This paradox has also led to the argument that genuine toler-
ance is almost impossible. For a true believer, it is very hard 
to be tolerant because the views and practices of the other are 
considered blasphemous or obscenely wrong: “any conviction 
potentially precludes tolerance toward dissidence from that 
conviction” (B. Williams, 1999, p. 69).
5. Although the exercise of tolerance presupposes the power to 
interfere and therefore applies to the majority group in par-
ticular, there can be a disposition to be tolerant or intolerant 
among minorities. Minority members might have the intention 
to interfere or not interfere if they had the power to do so, and 
this can also be examined.
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Preface 
 
This monograph forms part of the output of a research project about the issue of religious tolerance 
among educators, particularly teachers and their students or pupils. A series of articles on religious 
tolerance has already been published or is currently in press, each covering only a specific facet of 
the problem. It was envisaged right from the outset that not only conceptual and theoretical 
investigations would be launched into the matter of religious tolerance in education but that 
empirical work should also be done, in the form of a comparative study of how the 203 member 
states of the United Nations have been dealing with religious differences and with religion 
(education), and in the form of a questionnaire that could probe the degree of religious tolerance 
displayed by educators (teachers) and student teachers, and the children in their care. This explains 
the origin of this monograph. It covers a number of conceptual and theoretical aspects regarding 
religious tolerance that normally would not be discussed in disparate journal articles, despite their 
importance for establishing the conceptual and theoretical substratum for a questionnaire. In this 
monograph, each of the items of the proposed questionnaire flows from a specific conceptually and 
theoretically developed viewpoint, enabling researchers to acquire a detailed picture of the extent 
to which educators and their students are tolerant of the religious views of others of a different 
religious persuasion. 
The findings after the eventual application of the questionnaire will be of the greatest import for 
practising teachers and their pupils as well as for student teachers, in mono-religious,  multi-
religious, purported non-religious, post-religious,  secular and / or post-secular
1
 settings (Taylor, 
2007; Miedema, 2012). The findings will inform the former that there is a wider world outside of 
their particularist setting for which they have to prepare their students, and it will assist them to 
devise the necessary strategies for helping their students to cope with the challenges of multi-
religionism. It will also enable them and their pupils to pre-empt the possible dangers of religious 
exclusivism, inclusivism and hence intolerance.  Those in multi-religious and the other settings 
mentioned above, in turn, might learn from the results of the survey that they live in a complex 
world for which they have to prepare their students; they will in the process also learn (how) to 
avoid the possible dangers of unprincipled tolerance and laissez faire relativism. 
I hereby express my gratitude to Dr Bram de Muynck, Lecturer at the Driestar Educatief, for the 
publication of this monograph, and especially to the panel of experts that he convened for the 
purpose of critically reviewing the manuscript. I also thank my colleagues Ferdinand Potgieter and 
Charl Wolhuter who critically reviewed the text of this monograph. I take responsibility for any 
mistakes and shortcomings remaining after this painstaking process and would welcome any advice 
for the improvement not only of this monograph but also of the questionnaire that it has given birth 
to. 
Hannes van der Walt 
                                                           
1
 “Post-secular” in this context refers to the period in which we now live, a period in which a variety of 
meaning choices, including choices of a religious or spiritual nature, is possible. 
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Measuring religious tolerance in education 
Towards an instrument for measuring religious tolerance among 
educators and their students worldwide 
The need for an instrument to measure religious tolerance2 
While his remark may sound cynical, Gray (2003: 12) is probably right in saying that humanity as 
such does not exist; there are only human beings driven by conflicting needs and illusions, and 
subject to every kind of infirmity of will and judgement. Because of this, human beings are unable to 
live together peacefully, and are often engaged in strife, whether on a personal, community or 
(inter-)national level. For some or other reason, people are either always in competition with one 
another or in conflict. Conflict can be caused by different interests, aspirations, gender, race, religion 
and faith. Alford (2009: 57) regards the latter, in the form of religious fundamentalism, as the cause 
of many of the world’s ills, including religious intolerance. 
A study of the role played by religious ideas in the great clashes between civilisations is instructive 
(Wright, 2010: 5). Even Christianity which generally regards itself as a balanced religion (with 
exceptions, of course) has not always been good. According to Van der Walt (2007: 159), the many 
heresies among Christians, injustice and even violence in the name of Christendom all through the 
past 2000 years clearly illustrate the fact that no faith is perfect and above criticism. Much of 
Christianity’s history since the 17
th
 century concurred with the rise of modernism, of which the 
Holocaust is emblematic.  
Despite unparalleled advances in almost every field of human endeavour, especially technology, our 
streets abound with the hungry and homeless, violence and war continue to plague us (Olthuis, 
2012: 2/7). Especially religious conflict is rife, as can be observed in the Middle East, North and West 
Africa, and of which the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 can be regarded as 
emblematic. No matter how promising the idea of non-oppositional differences with other people, 
the ever-present economy of violence makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to put into 
practice, says Olthuis. 
To further demonstrate the nature of the minefield in which we find ourselves with regard to 
religious violence and conflict, De Vos (2011) mentions that many passages in religious texts might 
appear inexplicable, demonstrably false, deeply hurtful, offensive and harmful to any reasonable 
person not blinded by his or her own cultural and religious commitments. According to him, many 
                                                           
2
Readers wishing to begin with a technical discussion of the meaning of “tolerance” could first read Sections 7 
and 8 of this monograph, particularly the second technical point where the word is semantically examined. 
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, “tolerance” can  mean any of the following: 1. the capacity to 
endure pain or hardship: endurance, fortitude, stamina; 2. sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices 
differing from or conflicting with one's own (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tolerance). 
(In)tolerance is an attitude with regard to, or response to a characteristic of an individuals or of a group; 
religious (in)tolerance, in particular is seen as an attitude that (a) flows from religious motives and/or (b) is 
directed at persons or groups from other religions. 
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passages in the Bible and the Quran may be interpreted as containing hate speech against women, 
gay men and lesbians, while other passages may be interpreted as inciting violence, either directly or 
indirectly, against women, gay men and lesbians.  Other examples of religious intolerance are the 
reactions of many people to the Rastafarian claim that partaking in the holy herb of cannabis will 
bring them closer to God, to the widespread practice among Muslims and Jews to cut off a part of a 
baby boy’s penis shortly after birth, and to the practice among Hindu school girls who attempt to 
wear nose studs in state schools in South Africa (De Vos, 2011b). 
The need for tolerance
3
 has not only increased because of an epidemic of hate crimes, but also 
because of daily social interactions that require treating one another with respect and dignity. 
(Religious) intolerance is most frequently reflected in classroom, hallway and playground insults
4
, 
angry outbursts, social cliques, put-downs and dismissals of others’ viewpoints during class 
discussions (cf. Gateways to Better Education, 2005: 1,2; Schweitzer, 2007: 89). 
The current strife in Syria, the recent “Arabic Spring” uprisings and the conflict between the Muslim 
north and the Christian south of Nigeria and Mali count as examples of religious (and ethnic) conflict. 
Peck (2006: 173) correctly points out that differences can exist between atheists and theistic 
believers as well as within religious groups. “We see dogmatism, and proceeding from dogmatism, 
we see wars and inquisitions and persecutions. We see hypocrisy: people professing the 
brotherhood of man killing their fellows in the name of faith, lining their pockets at the expense of 
others, and practicing all manner of brutality” (Peck, 2006: 184). In Wright’s (2009: 421) view, “the 
bulk of westerners and the bulk of Muslims are in a deeply non-zero-sum relationship, [and] by and 
large aren’t very good at extending moral imagination to one another”. Alford (2009: 57) concurs 
with him in saying that religious fundamentalism seems to be the cause of many of the world’s ills, 
the reason for this being that people tend to operate from a narrower frame of reference (world 
view) than what they are capable of, thereby failing to transcend the influence of their particular 
religion, culture, particular set of parents and childhood experience upon their understanding (Peck, 
2006: 180).  
Tensions and attitudes such as those just mentioned are understandable because of the importance 
of religion to every person. Religious tenets, convictions, attitudes and behaviours of people that 
contradict one’s own deepest religious convictions are not easily tolerated, and are often seen as a 
threat. On the one hand, Van der Walt (2007: 160, 162) avers, almost all religions preach love for 
one’s neighbour; on the other, violence is committed in the name of the very same religions. Large 
numbers of people on earth suffer from the scourge of intolerance (Wright, 2009: 5). In view of this, 
Needleman (2008: 99) despairingly concludes: “All we can say is that our religious ideals, our moral 
                                                           
3
 The contents of this paragraph pertain to violent societies such as those of South and West Africa. It is not as 
applicable to other societies, such as that of the Netherlands, where conflict does not necessarily rise from 
religious differences but rather from political and ethnical differences. The growing presence of immigrant 
groups (Moroccans, Antillians, Turks, Surinams and so on) has been the cause of conflict. In some cases, 
populistic politicians have ascribed the conflict also to religious differences by pointing fingers at, for instance, 
Islam. This is not done, however, on the basis of a pertinent Christian or other religious motive but rather to 
score political points. Academics in the Netherlands are therefore hesitant to ascribe this form of intolerance 
to religious differences. 
4
This monograph, as its sub-heading indicates, focuses on the situation in schools and broader pedagogical 
contexts. The problem of (religious and cultural) intolerance surfaces in all spheres of life, however. 
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resolves, our ideologies, our campaigns, however honourably conceived, have not prevented – and 
perhaps have even hastened – the arrival of our world and our lives at the rim of despair and 
destruction”. We find ourselves in the moral dilemma of, on the one hand, attempting to destroy 
one another, and on the other hand, to save one another (Grayling, 2010: 7). 
All of these conflicts, Wright (2010: 127) insists, demand a hermeneutic of understanding that is 
inseparable from moral obligation (cf. Levinas and Ricoeur). This has been recognised by humankind. 
From its very beginning, says Gray (2009: 11), moral philosophy has been a struggle to exorcise 
conflict among individuals and groups from ethical life. In the (ancient Greek) city, as in the soul, 
harmony has been the ideal. There has always been a search for harmony of values. The same can 
be said of politics, Comte-Sponville (2005: 13-14) avers. We need politics so that conflicts of interest 
can be resolved without violence, and so that the powers of humankind can be united rather than 
opposed. Comte-Sponville (2005: 15) goes so far as to define politics as the management of conflicts, 
alliances of balances and power without resort to violence or war, not simply among individuals but 
also in society as a whole.  Politics presupposes conflict, albeit governed by moral rules, 
compromises, albeit provisional, and eventually agreements on how to resolve disagreements. Also 
somewhat cynically, Hampshire (2003: 134) contends that political thought is no longer guided by 
the positive vision of what an ideal society should be like but rather on the negative vision, on what 
is wrong with society, and tries to remedy that. According to Hampshire (2003: 140-142), conflict 
resolution lies at the heart of political justice, and that demands conflict resolution mechanisms such 
as arbitration, a search of balance between conflicting interests and convergent reasoning. All these 
processes, he admits, are risky; they can go wrong. 
The above underscores the importance of investigating the problem of religious tolerance 
respectively religious intolerance, particularly in education. It is not our purpose in this monograph 
to enter into a discussion about how to actually resolve religious, cultural and political conflict
5
. The 
above merely provides background and rationale for our efforts in the rest of this paper to embark 
on the development of an instrument to measure the degree of religious tolerance (or intolerance, 
as the case may be) among teachers and their students (pupils). Leutwyler, Petrovic and Mantel 
(2012: 111) correctly point out that teachers are central actors in education; they are expected to 
provide equal educational opportunities to all children, irrespective of religious or cultural 
orientation. These authors refer to research on teacher competence that shows that “teachers’ 
personal dispositions are crucial for performing specific functions and tasks in teaching” and that 
these dispositions “correspond to deeply held beliefs, values and norms which are strongly anchored 
in individuals’ subjective theories
6
. These subjective theories may interfere with the normative 
claims inherent to the officially taught concepts how to teach productively in culturally diverse 
settings”. Because, as will be argued below, some of these privately held theories of teachers may 
impact on the degree of tolerance that teachers are prepared to display with respect to other 
                                                           
5
 It is important to note that there does not seem to be a necessary and linear connection or causal 
relationship between religiosity and intolerance. The possibility exists, however, as has been shown, that 
people may be intolerant on religious grounds of other individuals and groups. Empirical research is required 
to understand the extent of this phenomenon, and to devise a strategy to combat the problem.  
6
Life and world views, life concepts, see the discussion of the “fishbowl” below. These subjective theories 
represent the individuals’ cognitions about the world and their connected emotions, volitions and motivations. 
They express, therefore, the individuals’ understandings and interpretations of how the world functions; they 
express how individuals have constructed their world views, in other words: their realities (Leutwyler et al, 
2012: 111-112). 
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teachers and to children of a different religious orientation, we have to find ways and means to 
measure their dispositions in dealing with religious heterogeneity
7
. 
Once the degree of religious tolerance
8
 respectively intolerance has been measured attention can be 
paid to the issue of eradicating the scourge of religious intolerance (if indeed it exists, as we suppose 
it does). This has become necessary because of the much greater diversity in our societies than ever 
before and because of the religious intolerance under which many individuals and the world in 
general have been staggering of late.  The former “foreign” religions have in recent times become 
our “neighbour” religions. As the intermingling and contact increases, the potential for conflict also 
increases (Van der Walt, 2007: 154). The time has indeed come to “dance with diversity and value 
pluralism” in the form of having empathy with the other, and to enter into dialogue with the other 
(Schreiner, 2005: 13). 
Steps taken to draft an instrument to measure tolerance 
The end destination of the discussion in this monograph is the construction of a questionnaire 
regarding religious tolerance / intolerance based on a plausible theoretical foundation. Each item in 
the questionnaire should be traceable to a particular theoretical insight thereby ensuring construct 
and content validity for the entire questionnaire (see Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011: 188-189 for 
a detailed discussion of these forms of validity). As far as could be ascertained, no questionnaire 
based on theories such as the radical centre of value theory, modus vivendi theory, social 
imagination theory and several other similar theories exists, which underscores the necessity of not 
only developing such a questionnaire and also to theoretically justify every item therein.
9
 
The construction of the questionnaire on religious tolerance entails a number of distinctive steps
10
. A 
section of this monograph will be devoted to each of those steps. The discussion of each step will 
result in the formulation of one or more items that could become part of the final questionnaire. 
After working through the different steps, and after formulating the envisaged items for the 
questionnaire, all the items will be brought together in a separate final section (see the following 
diagram for a visual outline of the steps followed in the rest of this monograph).
11
 
                                                           
7
 The use of Bennett’s model in this study should not be construed that the stadia of cultural diversity, from 
ethnocentrism to ethnorelativism exactly coincide with the degree of religious tolerance or intolerance, as the 
case may be. The concept “cultural diversity” (at which Bennett’s instrument is aimed) has a broader meaning 
than “religion”. In a sense, culture can also embrace religion. Use was made of Bennett’s distinctions for the 
purpose of measuring the attitudes or perceptions regarding others, in the broadest sense of the word.  
8
 As mentioned, (in)tolerance need not be necessarily religiously inspired. This monograph is interested, 
however, in (in)tolerance that is indeed religiously inspired. 
9
The instrument to measure (religious) tolerance flowing from this monograph can be used for various 
purposes, for instance by someone interested in measuring religious tolerance in a culturally and religiously 
diverse setting, or by someone interested in measuring tolerance of this nature in a relatively religiously 
homogeneous setting. 
10
Tolerance can also be construed in psychological terms. It will become clear from the rest of this discussion 
that the instrument to measure tolerance is not of a psychological nature but rather of a religious 
philosophical nature. 
11
 The drafting and editing of an actual questionnaire on (religious) tolerance among school teachers and their 
students will of course require further processing.  
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The steps of constructing an instrument for measuring religious 
tolerance among teachers and students (pupils) worldwide 
1. Orientation: the personal “fishbowl” 
According to Olthuis (2012:  1/7
12
), the growing realisation that there are no innocent, unbiased 
ways of looking at the world, that everyone wears “glasses” and looks at the world through a 
peculiar lens,  window or frame, has given common currency to the idea of worldview. His view 
coincides with that of Hawking and Mlodinow (2010: 23) who came up with the following rather apt 
description of what has commonly become known as a life view, a worldview or a life and 
worldview: 
A few years ago the city council of Monza, Italy, barred pet owners from keeping goldfish 
in curved goldfish bowls. The measure’s sponsor explained the measure by saying that it is 
cruel to keep a fish in a bowl with curved sides because, gazing out, the fish would have a 
distorted view of reality. But how do we know we have a true, undistorted picture of 
reality? Might not we ourselves also be inside some big goldfish bowl and have our vision 
distorted by an enormous lens? The goldfish’s picture of reality is different from ours, but 
can we be sure it is less real?  
 
It is now generally acknowledged, Olthuis (2012: 1/7, 4/7) claims, that everyone comes outfitted 
with a wide array of faith-based pre-judgments, that everyone has built-in biases, and that 
knowledge is perspectival, world-viewish, rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, and 
never is universal or absolute. A world view is the pre-conceptual orienting lens or glasses in and 
through which people reach out to the world even as the world impinges on them. World-viewing or 
world-visioning, he is convinced, is a complex, developmental (as will be demonstrated below) and 
two-way looking process (also discussed below) (Olthuis, 2012: 4/7).  
Van der Walt’s (1999: 48 ff.) catalogue of the features of a life view casts light on the nature of a life 
and world view. A life and worldview is a way of looking at reality; it orientates a person and helps 
him/her to understand the world; it is a unity; it can be both descriptive and prescriptive; it demands 
full commitment; it is typically human; it is pre-scientific or pre-theoretical; it is a deep-seated 
source of action; it provides a definite view of reality but nevertheless remains fallible, and it evokes 
deeply felt emotions in the person. Important in Van der Walt’s (1999: 51-2) description of the 
structure of the fishbowl / the life and world view is his contention that a life and world view is a 
connection between a person’s faith and his or her practical everyday life. Each person believes in 
something; faith plays an important role in the lives of all people in that it gives direction to life. A 
person’s life view, Van der Walt maintains, gives hands and feet to a person’s faith, renders faith into 
something relevant for everyday life. In his words: A life view is a vision of faith for life. It also works 
in the opposite direction: a person forms a vision of life and then changes his or her faith 
accordingly: a vision of life for faith. Olthuis (2012: 4/7) agrees: as a person grows up, his or her 
experiences determine how he or she responds and acts to what they see and experience.  Put 
differently, a worldview is not only a vision of the world, but it is at the same time a vision for the 
world. 
                                                           
12
 This article is in electronic format. The page reference means “page 1 of 7”. 
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Hawking and Mlodinow’s metaphor is particularly apt in the case of religious attitude and viewpoint 
in that it reveals several things to us. Firstly, all people find themselves “swimming” inside their own 
respective religious and life and worldview “fishbowls”, in some cases for the span of an entire life 
without ever inquiring about the distortions created by the “glass sides” of the bowl or whether 
what is seen through the sides is “correct” by generally accepted standards or the standards of other 
people. Applied to religion, this could mean that a person “swims” within the confines of a fishbowl 
the size of, and the opaqueness of the sides of which are determined by a particular religion. He or 
she might have been born within that religion, grown up, been educated in terms of it, and now lives 
in accordance with its tenets without ever questioning the “correctness” or (the word is used 
advisedly) the “truth” of what is perceived through the sides of the fishbowl. 
Secondly, the metaphor underscores the fact that people might have a skewed picture of the reality 
outside, and would not know about their distorted view of reality, unless of course the distortions 
are pointed out to them by people looking in through the sides of their particular fishbowls.  This 
tells us that Socrates was correct in stating that the unexamined life is not worth living (Armstrong, 
2001:67). While we will never have any guarantees or warranties that we will gain a “more correct” 
or “truer” picture of reality by attempting to look at reality through the sides of other people’s 
fishbowls, we could get a better understanding of reality and of our own place therein by doing so. 
Put differently, we need to examine our own fishbowl perspective as well as those of others in order 
to see whether we could come to a better view and understanding of life and of the world. This 
means that we have to occasionally change our fishbowl perspective. As Peck (2006: 33) observed:  
…we are not born with maps; we have to make them, and the making requires effort. The 
more effort we make to appreciate and perceive reality, the larger and more accurate our 
maps will be. (…) the biggest problem of map-making is not that we have to start from 
scratch, but that if our maps are to be accurate we have to continually revise them. The 
world is constantly changing. (…) the vantage point from which we view the world is (also) 
constantly and quite rapidly changing. (…) We are daily bombarded with new information 
as to the nature of reality. If we are to incorporate this information, we must continually 
revise our maps
13
, and sometimes when enough new information has accumulated, we 
must make major revisions [to our map]. The process of making revisions, particularly 
major revisions, is painful…  
 
Each individual has a life-map that changes frequently without that individual’s knowledge or 
conscious collaboration, or is deliberately changed by the individual him-/herself, depending on his / 
her experiences with regard to the world around him / her. To return to the original metaphor: a 
person is occasionally compelled to change his or her fishbowl perspective because of his or her 
interaction with reality and because of self-reflection. In extreme cases, the change might be radical, 
analogous to jumping from a round fishbowl into a square tank.  
As mentioned, a world view is also a two-way bridge: a person’s perceptions might have an effect on 
the surrounding reality, and the person’s experiences in and with reality might impact on how 
he/she sees reality. Like a two-way bridge that carries traffic to and fro, a life view represents a 
                                                           
13
 In view of Peck’s over-all argument, this revision should not be construed to mean that individuals have to 
engage in some or other empirical verification process in order to arrive at a form of truth that could be shared 
by all other people, universally, Peck merely draws attention to the fact that each person should revise his or 
her map to a level where it most adequately provides a grasp of reality or provides a depiction of reality. 
12 
 
process through which a person’s daily experiences help him or her to either confirm, question or 
correct his or her faith. According to Peck (2006: 179), in endeavouring to create a life view map that 
conforms to the reality of the cosmos and a person’s role in it, as best as a human being can know 
that reality, a person must constantly revise and extend his or her understanding to include new 
knowledge of the larger world. A person must constantly change and adapt his or her frame of 
reference regarding reality and the larger world. There is, according to Peck (2006: 182), no such 
thing as a good hand-me-down religion and life and worldview; to be vital, to be the best of which a 
person is capable, a person’s religion and concomitant life and worldview should be a wholly 
personal one, forged entirely through the fire of his or her questioning and doubting in the crucible 
of his or her own experience of reality. It is by our implicit, often inarticulate awareness of our 
intuition, Olthuis (2012: 4/7) claims, by our bodily attunement, by our learned physical, emotional 
and moral reflexes, that we make our way in the world. Recognising the role of all our senses in 
finding our way in the world suggests that we would do well to talk of world orienting or world 
visioning rather than only world viewing. In saying this, he links up with views expressed by 
Heidegger and Gadamer: prejudgments are the frames, the pictures – the world views – from which 
and through which we see the world and make sense of it (Olthuis, 2012: 5/7). In a certain sense, a 
world view is not very stable because it is constantly changing, and – in the case of some people, 
even heterodox and eclectic – all features of a world view that postmodernists tend to exploit 
(Wright, 2010: 121, 123; Olthuis, 2012: 4/7). 
As one grows up and forms a religious perspective and / or a life-view, one tends to fill one’s life-
view with typical life-view content, among others convictions and assumptions about God / god, the 
world, the order in the world – including the place and duties of the human being – and about how 
all these entities cohere with one another. Everyone has an explicit or implicit set of ideas or beliefs 
as to the essential nature of the world (Peck, 2006: 174). No-one is able to live in a “fishbowl” 
defined by universal values only since such values are necessarily general and relatively 
indeterminate. As a person grows up and forms his or her life-map, he or she re-articulates the 
general or universal values in the language of norms. Norms, as Parekh (2000: 152) observes, relate 
values to conduct, indicate how the values are to be interpreted in a person’s life, and give them life-
view content. Norms in turn can be articulated in either the language of rights or that of duties and 
obligations. This entire process is at best only “incompletely conscious” (Peck, 2006: 174). As 
individuals, people decide which values would support their principles and hence to make part of 
their world view (i.e. internalise as their own).  
The values contained in a life and worldview place an imperative on a person to act in a manner 
consistent with what he or she regards as worth striving and living for, worth protecting, honouring 
and desiring (Nieuwenhuis, 2007: 9; Lusenga, 2010: 20). 
Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #1
14
: 
1.  With which religion do you associate yourself? If you associate yourself with a mainstream 
religion such as Christianity, the Muslim faith, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism then 
please write the name of the religion in the space provided. If you do not associate yourself 
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with any mainstream religion, please write a short phrase in which you describe your 
religious stance, e.g. “I believe in a form of spirituality that is not associated with any 
mainstream religion”.  
 
Interpretation of the response: This item informs the researcher whether the respondent 
associates him- or herself with a mainstream religion, with a form of spirituality not 
associated with any mainstream religion or with no formal religion at all – as far as the 
respondent is concerned (according to the literature, no person is ever actually without 
religion, however (Gray, 2009: 2; Peck, 2006: 108)).This item reveals the nature of the 
personal “fishbowl” (life and worldview orientation) of the respondent. 
 
2. Please respond to the statement: “I live very strictly according to the tenets and 
prescriptions of my religion and world view” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally 
agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist 
attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (based on 
Bennett’s
15
 work). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of 
being situated in a religio-relative orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 
response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or 
her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own 
worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the 
views of other people.   
 
3. Please respond to the statement “I am always and acutely conscious of my religious 
convictions and beliefs whenever I do something or have to make a choice in my life” by 
marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree 
to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist 
attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). 
A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in 
religio-relative orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to 
the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” 
and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it 
for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.   
2. Expectancy filters (theory) 
Olthuis (2012: 4/7) recently developed an interesting theory about how children learn to look at the 
world around them. According to him, world-viewing or –visioning is a complex, developmental two-
way learning process and a world view is the pre-conceptual orienting glass or glasses (referred to 
above as the “fishbowl” in which a person lives or learns to live) in and through which a person 
reaches out to the world even as the world impinges on him or her.  Under the guidance of their 
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educators and through their educators’ eyes children develop expectancy filters that affect not only 
how and what they observe and experience but also how they respond and react to what they 
observe and experience.  In other words, Olthuis says, a worldview is not only a vision of the world 
but also a vision for the world. 
According to Olthuis (2012: 4-5/7), much of our relational knowledge is encoded in emotional 
meaning-patterns which act as expectancy filters or attachment filters that predispose from a 
certain point on how a person experiences relationships. This occurs automatically, without the 
person even being aware of it. Olthuis is convinced that a person would be aware of his or her 
experiences but not of the filter itself through which the person experiences. According to him, 
psychologists have identified at least four such expectancy or attachment filters. A person using a 
secure filter is able to trust others and is open to the world; a person with a pre-occupied filter is 
engrossed in efforts to get his or her own needs met and is inattentive to the needs of others; a 
person with a dismissing filter expects nothing of others and of the world, and tends to be 
disconnected from the self or others; a person with a fearful filter may need closeness with others 
and the world but at the same time is fearful of any closeness. If early formation is good enough, in 
other words if the attachment filters are ‘secure’, there will tend to be a ‘good enough’, continually 
recalibrating, mutually interactive fit between the explicit knowledge of a love-oriented, other-
affirming world view and the person’s implicit gut knowledge. There will develop a double two-way 
movement: the implicit and explicit world views will interact dynamically and integrate in a positive 
growth spiral. The expressed and confessed world views will not only find embodied resonance in 
the implicit gut knowledge but they will act to encourage, direct and support explicit rituals, routines 
and rhythms in daily life. In that way world-viewing can play an indispensable role in the coming into 
being of liturgies of love, both personally and interpersonally in the various relationships that a 
person might find him- or herself. 
If the formed expectancy filters are fearful, dismissive or pre-occupied rather than secure, there will 
be strong, if implicit, resistance to adopting and living out a love-oriented, other-affirming world 
view. More than that, Olthuis (2012: 5/7) maintains, there will be deep-seated impulses to thematise 
world views which justify and thus rationalise a person’s fears and dreads. Unless these resistances 
are worked through, adherence to the articulated world view will lead to half-hearted lip-service. 
These expectancy or attachment filters, Olthuis (2012: 4/7) is convinced, act below a person’s 
awareness level  but nevertheless give shape to how a person feels about him- or herself, and helps 
a person make sense of his or her life, God / god and others – in other words, it gives shape to a 
person’s life and world view. These filters, which can also be described as moods or patternings, 
form in early childhood experience and continue to play an indispensable and inextricable role in a 
person’s later efforts to explicitly thematise and conceptualise his or her life and world view.  
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #2: 
1. (2.1) Which of the following views of the world is typical of how you personally view and 
approach the world and other people? Mark the response that describes your basic view of 
the world, and your attitude towards the world and other people most appropriately: 1. I 
feel safe and secure; I do not see the world and other people as a threat to me or my 
existence. 2.  I concentrate on my own affairs, and have very little to do with other people 
and their needs; I am concerned about my own welfare in this world. 3. I cannot be 
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bothered about the world and other people; I expect nothing from life or other people; one 
has to make your own fortune in life. 4. I would like to be close and friendly to other people, 
but at the same time I am fearful of them and what they could do to me. 
 
Interpretation of the responses: 1 indicates a balanced and secure world view. This person is 
not fearful of engaging with the world or with other people; he or she trusts others and the 
predictability of the world, and is generally open to the world. This person might be tolerant 
of others and their views.  2 is indicative of a pre-occupied life and world view; this is an 
inward looking person, who is not concerned about the welfare of others or of the world in 
general. This person is so concerned about him- or herself that tolerance of others and their 
views does not come into play. 3 This person is disconnected from the world, expects nothing 
from others or the world. This disconnection could be indicative of a mentality in which 
tolerance plays no significant role. 4. This person leads an ambivalent life; he or she is both 
fearful of the world and of others but also aspires to be close to others. Fear could lead to 
intolerant behaviour; on the other hand, the wish for closeness could lead to exaggerated 
tolerance of others and their views. 
3. The radical centre of values (theory) 
In the culturally, including religiously, diverse and pluralistic societies and communities that can be 
found all over the post-Second World War world people have a desire, on the one hand, to pursue 
the interests of their own well-being, and  on the other, to provide room for diverse positions and 
lifestyles. It is difficult, therefore, to find a single successful recipe or formula for ensuring both 
individual and group well-being and peaceful coexistence in the rich and complex diversity of social 
and moral phenomena that modern society consists of (Grayling, 2010: 10). Because of this 
difficulty, many communities depend on politics, the state and government to resolve conflicts of 
interests without violence and war, and also to unite all the forces in the community (Comte-
Sponville, 2005: 15). To reach a consensus of the kind needed to create a peaceful community all 
those whose interests are at stake tend to engage in a deliberative process of hearing all sides 
(Hampshire, 2003: 134, 137, 139). Such negotiations and arbitration require not only mechanisms 
through which all sides can be heard fairly but also institutions that can balance all the competing 
interests and the moral will among the participants to engage in the deliberations and to work 
across frontiers and the barriers that create divides among them. The arbitration about values 
regarding well-being, the common good and peaceful coexistence should be done fairly and justly, in 
a methodological and rational way, as far as possible under the guidance of recognised institutions 
and according to generally accepted procedures. Such interactive dialogue could lead to the 
discovery of common values that could be widely shared and even considered to be valid for the 
public domain (Van der Walt, 2007: 156). 
A basic thesis of the radical centre of values theory that will be outlined in the rest of this Section is 
that, despite the diversity of interpretations of values that we encounter in the world, there is a core 
of universal values that all people can associate with and that they will find broadly acceptable 
(Alford, 2009: 57, 163). Awareness of such universal values requires that each person for a minute 
step back from themselves and their personal interests (Needleman, 2008: 108) and that they 
develop an attitude of not excluding others or proving that their way is the only true or acceptable 
way, but to give witness of how and why they see things as they do. In that way, Olthuis (2012: 3/7) 
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maintains, a person can invite all others to share their deepest feelings and convictions for mutual 
learning and benefit. He is convinced that the welfare of humankind (and the rest of reality, 
creation) depends on such interfaith negotiation. 
As far back as 1990, cultural philosopher Frederick Turner (1990: 85, 97) wrote about the need for a 
“solvent” that could serve as a common medium for all kinds of cultural information. If we transpose 
his ideas about such a “solvent” to the realm of religious differences, he in effect claims that we can 
assume that once the bonds that hold the religious ideas and faith commitments of individuals and 
religious groups locked in a solid configuration are “loosed” by the solvent, in this case a radical 
centre of values, the elements of religion, being basically human, will have the hooks and valences to 
permit them to build up new coherent systems not limited to one religion. As the human race 
recognises itself as a “we” it will paradoxically be more and more surprised by the otherness of what 
was once considered familiar in the respective own religions. Elsewhere (Turner, 1990b: 745), he 
expresses the hope that moral values may one day be less arbitrary and thus more negotiable than 
they are today; that is, that it may be possible to develop some universal moral values from an 
understanding of human nature.  
Needleman’s (2008: 108-109) “ethics of the threshold” is likewise a plea for the adoption of more 
permanent principles, in the sense of “universally accepted”. We need to find ways and means, he 
says, to be “outwardly in the street” in our actual lives, while somehow, or to some extent, also 
remaining inwardly in the theatre of the mind. Put differently, we need to step back from ourselves 
while wholeheartedly engaging our lives and answering its obligations. In his opinion, a new morality 
will emerge from this seemingly self-contradictory effort.  As in the case of Turner’s “radical centre 
of values theory”, Needleman’s “ethics of the threshold” attempts to avoid the excesses of both 
moral absolutism and moral relativism, and is therefore akin to Makrides’s (2012: 264, 266) notion 
of a bridge between what we are and what we wish to be in the light of the ethical and religious 
commandments that have formed the basis of every civilisation in the world (Needleman, 2008: 
109), namely a trans-confessional theory of religious tolerance or a constructive dialogue about it. 
Olthuis (2012: 2/7) expresses much the same sentiment by stating that in our pluralistic, multi-faith 
global village, the honourable and respectful embrace of difference is the greatest challenge facing 
our postmodern world. We urgently need, he says, to develop a model of non-oppositional 
difference, an economy in which power-over (with its opposition to the other) is replaced with 
power-with (mutual recognition, attunement and empowerment). In a sense, Wright (2010: 132) 
also refers to a radical centre or core of values by saying that a critical spiritual education will take, 
with equal seriousness, the integrity of our developing experiences, and the authority of the-order-
of-things that stands accessible, if always ultimately beyond our understanding. 
Talen and Ellis (2002: 36, 37) summarise the theory of the radical centre of values as follows. The 
theory departs from a belief in self-organising principles, i.e. the idea that the universe is not 
deterministic but is self-renewing and infinitely creative. On the other hand, it questions the 
postmodern assumption that does not take the discussion of substantive goods, such as morality, 
seriously. It therefore departs from the assumption that there are durable, time-tested truths and 
discoveries that have been, and continue to be, made about various forms of moral behaviour 
(including the moral behaviour that is referred to as “religious tolerance”). 
Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #3: 
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The following items for a questionnaire among teachers and their pupils regarding the degree of 
religious tolerance they display could flow from the above discussion of the radical value centre 
(theory):  
1. (3.1)Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
am willing and prepared to associate myself with a set of values that has universal currency, 
a set of values, principles and norms that people say is true and valid for all people in the 
world, for all religions and world views in the world”. Please choose one of the following 
options: 1. I totally, fully agree with this statement.  2. I agree with it to a fairly large degree 
3. I only agree to a certain degree 4. Not so much 5. Not at all   
 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response would indicate that the respondent is not 
at all or at least not fully committed to some or other exclusive confessional stance far as his 
or her religious orientation is concerned. He or she is prepared to share a set of values that is 
supposedly universally applicable to all people. A 4 or 5 response will be indicative of the 
opposite, namely that the respondent is so committed to some or other confessional religious 
or life and world view stance and perspective that he or she does not find it possible or viable 
to share values, principles and norms with others of a different religious and / or life and 
world view conviction. 
 
2. (3.2)  Please respond to the statement: “I am prepared to live by values that are supposedly 
valid for all people in the world, irrespective of their personal religion and life and world 
view but I think I will need to reinterpret them according to my personal religion and world 
view”. Mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. 
Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative  of the fact that the 
respondent seems to be prepared to live by generally accepted and supposedly universally 
valid values, norms and principles but also feels the need to reinterpret those values and 
norms in terms of his or her private religious stance and life and world view. A 4 or 5 
response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1. 
 
3. (3.3) Please respond to the statement: “A value that does not flow from my own, personal 
religion and world view is worthless as a guideline for my life”. Please mark one of the 
following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. 
Totally disagree 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of (full) commitment 
to a personal religion and life and worldview.   A 4 or 5 response could be seen as 
confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1. 
4. The expectancy filter of value orientation 
In addition to the four expectancy or achievement filters mentioned by Olthuis (2012), and discussed 
in Section 2 above, we can distinguish a fifth, namely the expectancy filter of value orientation. 
Under the influence and guidance of our teachers and other educators, we learn how to orientate 
ourselves with regard to the values available to us in the life-world with which we slowly but surely 
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get acquainted as we grow up. Since all values are loaded concepts that mean different things to 
different people (Van der Walt, 2007: 172) and therefore seldom come to us in the sanitised form as 
described in terms of the radical centre of values, in the form of “mere names or words” without any 
life and world view content, they have to be reinterpreted.  According to Zecha (2007: 57), the 
names of values appearing in the radical centre of values “are all wonderful words which may 
certainly designate important attitudes or activities; however, they do not give a useful account of 
what the pupil is expected to do when he/she has acquired clarity, communication, loyalty, respect, 
etc.  … It is [therefore] … important to explore with the students what these key-words (value words) 
entail”. Gray (2009: 38) agrees with this in saying that values have to be given content, otherwise 
they will remain empty. Nieuwenhuis (2010: 2) significantly adds that the basically contentless 
values embodied in the radical value centre have to be filled with life-conceptual content. To be able 
to do so, says Van de Beek (2010: 41), philosophers and ethicists have been agitating for the use of 
“thick value language”, meaning language filled with life and worldview content.  According to Van 
de Beek, empty values can become more meaningful by filling them with content from the heritage 
of one’s religious and life and world view tradition. This, he claims, is what people do in real life; 
people do not live according to the abstract values contained in the radical value centre but rather 
according to how those same values have been filled-in and coloured by their respective religions 
and world views. Filled-in values do greater justice to real life than the abstract values in the radical 
centre. Ramcharan (2008: 13) agrees. Individuals generally tend to create space for themselves; 
individual choices abound, also within the holistic order of religions; individuals tend to attach their 
own interpretations and connections to the greater ideas that they encounter. 
Van de Beek (2010: 41-42) then makes a most important point with regard to the theme of the 
tolerance measuring instrument that is to flow from this monograph, namely that the more a person 
tends to fill in his or her values with confessional, religious and life and world view content, the more 
likely he or she would be to differ in life attitude from others, and the more he or she might come 
into conflict with others with a different value orientation, with values filled in with content from 
other religious and world view traditions. The more a person’s values get filled in with life view and / 
or religious content, the more specific they become and hence increasingly exclusive. This 
exclusivity, he avers, could lead to living a very private religious life the values of which cannot be 
publicly tested because they pertain, per definition, to a value world that transcends the actual 
world in which we live. In saying this, Van de Beek echoes a view expressed by Swartz (2006: 565-6), 
namely that the life-conceptual filling-in that people do can be plotted on a continuum ranging from 
the “thin-public-minimal-narrow” end, i.e. those values which may be described as “legal”, to the 
“thick-private-maximal-broad” end of a continuum, i.e. those values that are considered to be 
“personal” and private, left to the conscience of the individual, with a range of positions in-between. 
According to Du Preez and Roux (2010: 12-16), an education system cannot operate optimally on the 
basis of values filled with life and worldview content because, they claim, such values smack of 
culturalism and particularism. Such completely life-conceptually filled-in values, they aver, “[are] 
often embedded in one particular narrative (i.e. a specific religious or cultural belief system) – a 
specific life-view perspective”. The reason why an education system cannot be based on such a 
perspective – according to them - is because of “the relativity of truths, not only between different 
religious beliefs, but also the varying interpretations and truths found in one religious 
denomination.” They agree with other scholars that “a value system that is based on only one 
particular religious or cultural view means that only one narrative is taken into account. That could 
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jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of the democratic education system in South 
Africa. Such “mono” approaches to values in support of education might even take the form of a 
revival of the highly contested and divided ideology, Christian Nationalist Education, which 
dominated the apartheid era…” 
In their effort to steer away from particularist, i.e. completely life-conceptually filled values, they 
argue as follows: “We should not be asking whose values should be promoted in education, since 
this might lead to particularist hostility. It would also be precarious to accept human rights values as 
univocal and not subjected to diverse interpretation. For this reason we will discuss the position of 
Bikhu Parekh in terms of this debate, because he produces an alternative way of thinking about this. 
His position may assist in pursuing values … that (are) both contextually recognised and justified on a 
universal level. His main thesis [which Du Preez and Roux support] is that humans could express 
their moral life in different ways, but that this does not exclude anyone from being judged according 
to basic universal values. He refers to the latter notion as “minimum universality” which represents 
an intermediate position between relativism (particularism) and monism (universalism).” 
The discussion so far illustrates how the fifth expectancy filter works. Wolhuter, Steyn, De Klerk and 
Rens to whose particularistic and confessional approach Du Preez and Roux (2010: 14) object, 
applied an expectancy filter in terms of which they availed themselves of Christian values, i.e. values 
filled with content from a Christian and Biblical life view perspective, to promote discipline in 
schools. Du Preez and Roux (2010: 15), on the other hand, seem to have operated with quite a 
different expectancy filter, namely that values should be filled with contextual content that would 
not jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of a democratic country.  Whereas Wolhuter 
et al made use of Christian values in the expectancy of promoting discipline in schools, Du Preez and 
Roux made use of contextually recognised and universally justified values to promote their 
expectations in a multicultural school and education setting.  
We shall return to this issue of value fullness and emptiness and of thick and thin value language in 
the discussion of the “Valley of relative value emptiness” (see Section 5 below).  We first need to 
attend to two further issues regarding this, the fifth expectancy filter that educators employ when 
dealing with children and / or young people. The first is that the expectancy filter of value 
orientation that a child grows up with can change over time, as we have seen in Section 1. A very 
small child could be subject to a certain expectancy filter of value orientation, but gradually learn to 
develop his or her own expectancy filter of value orientation, and could end up with a value system 
filled with world view content that might be somewhat or even radically different from that of his or 
her parents and other educators. Such changes are due to influences that impact on the person 
growing up and because of his or her constant examination of own life and existence.  
The expectancy filter of value orientation can also be seen working in one and the same person. 
Take the following example: a person who is both a parent of a very young child, a church going 
person, and an educationist charged with the task of planning a national education system might, as 
parent, employ an expectancy filter in the education of the child which could lead to the instilment 
of Christian religious and church values in the child while, on the other hand, as an education system 
planner he or she might apply an expectancy filter inspiring him or her to employ values that are 
more generally or universally recognised and would promote the ideals of democracy and 
multiculturalism. Ackerley (2008: 24) thus rightly remarked about a dichotomy between, on the one 
20 
 
hand, church- and temple- and personal, cultural, life-conceptually filled values, and on the other 
hand the universal aspirations regarding, for instance, human rights. The latter is not substantively 
meaningful among people of religious communities where, for many, their religious institutions are 
the context and the structure of their moral value systems. 
Naudé (2010: 11) draws our attention to the second issue, namely the importance of distinguishing 
between relativism which says that we are all different from one another but that we should respect 
those differences regardless of whether we find the values associated with them acceptable or not. 
Relativity on the other hand says that we are different but not to such an extent that we cannot live 
peaceably together and that we should respect and tolerate another’s views and values, come what 
may.  There is sufficient agreement about generally shared values that we can live by them and also 
weigh our individual, personal convictions and values against them. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #4: 
1. (4.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
prefer values that are simple, have nothing to do with any religion or world view, that all 
people can agree with because they are formulated in very general terms, and will not lead 
to divisions and conflict among people”. 1 I strongly agree with this statement 2. I agree with 
the statement to a certain degree 3. I find this statement fairly acceptable.  4. I disagree with 
the statement to some extent. 5. I completely disagree with the statement. 
Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a respondent 
preferring to operate with minimalist, general values, values that have been thinly 
formulated. This person seems to pave the way for getting along with others on the basis of 
rather generally shared values.  A 4 or 5 response would indicate that the respondent prefers 
values that are maximally, thickly formulated in terms of his or her religious and life and 
world view convictions. Respondents who opt for a 4 or a 5 seem to be more likely to be more 
conscious of their own religion and life and worldview rooted value system, and hence also 
more aware of differences between his or her value system and those of others whose value 
systems might be rooted in different religions and world views. 
5.  The “valley of relative value emptiness” 
The phrase “valley of relative value emptiness” is not meant as a derogatory term but rather as one 
that describes a stance in which the discussants attempt to transcend their personal life-
conceptually meaning-filled values for the sake of a more general ideal, for example the promotion 
of multiculturalism, human rights, peaceful coexistence or democracy. It is understandable that 
some people, in some circumstances, might opt for the application of such relatively life-
conceptually empty values. Education system planners, for instance, might find themselves in a 
position where they have to apply such universally recognised and acceptable values as those 
contained in the radical value centre discussed in Section 2 because of the demands of democracy, 
fairness, social justice, peaceful coexistence and the ideals of multiculturalism. One example of this 
can be found in the three-fold position described by Ackerley (2008: 38): 
For those moved by human rights violations, (this) book offers three things. First, I offer them 
a philosophical justification for the political legitimacy of their moral intuitions. Regardless of 
the spiritual, religious, and personal resources that motivate them to think about the rights of 
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all humanity, whether their own moral system is grounded in a transcendental divine power, 
in the power of good argument, or in the power of human relationships, the concern for 
human rights has universal authority to guide criticism. Second, I offer those working for the 
human rights of all of humanity a way to think about human rights that is dictated neither by a 
cultural nor by a political tradition, but has nevertheless a universal authority to guide 
criticism. Third, the book offers guidance in thinking about universal human rights so that 
human rights activism continues in ways that support the human rights of all of humanity by 
transforming the institutions and practices that condition the lives of all of humanity. 
It is clear from this brief exposition that Ackerley wishes to move his discussion of human rights 
values out of the context of life-conceptual meaning-filling into what has been described above as 
the “valley of relative value emptiness” where the discussion is characterised by “philosophical 
justification”, “political legitimacy”, people’s general “moral intuitions”, “universal authority”, not 
dictated by any “cultural or political tradition”, “the rights of all humanity” and so on.  
As mentioned above, because of working in the public domain of human rights theory, Parekh 
(2000) also went a short step further in the direction of filling values with meaning in his attempt to 
“contextually fill” certain values that are universally recognised and justified. His description of the 
process entails four steps, of which the first three pertain to values that are relatively contentless: 
First, universal values can be understood in a variety of ways ranging from the minimalist to the 
maximalist. Secondly, since these universal values are necessarily general and relatively 
indeterminate, they should as far as possible be articulated in the language of norms. Norms relate 
values to conduct, indicate how the values are to be interpreted, and give them content. Thirdly, we 
should not confuse values with particular institutional mechanisms; we should not be dogmatic 
about values, and we should not so identify the institutions that hold particularist values with the 
values that the values cannot be discussed and defended separately. In the fourth place, Parekh 
recognises the need for life-conceptual content-filling of values but clearly sees it as a matter for the 
personal or private sphere: since every society enjoys the moral freedom to interpret and prioritise 
the agreed body of universal values, we cannot condemn its practices simply because they are 
different from or offend against ours (Parekh, 2000: 152-153). There is an inevitable dialectical 
interplay, he admits (Parekh, 2000: 158), between the relatively thin universal values and the thick 
moral structures that characterise different societies. The universal values regulate the national 
structures even as the latter pluralise the values. 
As observed earlier, others, such as parents of very young children and educators teaching children 
in the context of a religious institution such as a church, mosque, synagogue or temple might feel 
themselves compelled to apply a value system that is completely filled in by the life and worldview 
of that particular religious denomination. Parekh’s (2000: 158) position of regulative or pluralist 
universalism will not appeal to them. 
There might also be others who, for reasons of their own, prefer not to bind themselves to any 
religious value orientation and opt for a relativist, pragmatic or even a more or less laissez faire value 
stance. A moderate form of this, as Grayling (2010: 7-8) noted, is moral relativism, i.e. the view that 
there are no universal truths about what is right and wrong, but rather what counts as such in each 
different society is determined by that society’s own traditions, beliefs and experience. There is no 
objective ground for deciding between them. The pragmatist, in turn, holds the attitude of “doing 
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something” in the morally right or acceptable “direction” as conceptualised by the community, 
without interfering too much with other legitimate and personally significant commitments and 
avocations (Grayling, 2010: 18). The laissez faire approach in turn is a “do nothing” approach, says 
Grayling (2010: 18-190); it holds that unless a person can achieve the utmost in terms of value-
driven actions and behaviour, let him or her do nothing, which “is the same thing as letting him be 
careless and indifferent”. 
The current postmodern attitude of value relativism / relativity is also characteristic of the “valley of 
relative value emptiness”. According to Parkin (2011: 154-155), people have an entire supermarket 
of values at their disposal, and its impact on the soul, on the inner self of disorganised and 
vulnerable individuals has become the criterion for choosing a value (De Botton, 2012: 95). 
According to Bower (2005: 181, 254), it is a tenet of the postmodern perspective that people 
“invent” and create meaning in regard to their identity, value and purpose. A system of beliefs (i.e. a 
modernistic grand narrative) that weakens individual responsibility stands in the way of the 
emergence of an open society and an adult world in which the principle of individual responsibility 
and the accountability that goes with it, is the basis of all human relationships. McGrath (2005: 218) 
concurs with Bower’s analysis: reacting to the simplistic overstatements of the Enlightenment, 
postmodernity has stressed the limits to human knowledge and encouraged a toleration of those 
who diverge from the “one size fits all” philosophy of modernity. The world in which we live is now 
seen as a place where nothing is certain, nothing is guaranteed, and nothing is unquestionably given. 
It has become fashionable, Needleman (2008: 61) contends, to deny the existence of absolutes in 
the ethical sphere: who is to say what is good or bad, right or wrong? What is good in one place or 
for one person may be bad in another place or for another person. All morality is seen as relative to 
time, place, ethnicity, religion, social class, nationality and so on. For many people of this day and 
age, experiences are immediately translated into simply what “feels good” or what “feels bad”. The 
postmodern zeitgeist, says Needleman (2008: 108), dispirits people with ethical cynicism and 
relativism. It reduces every viewpoint, every norm and conviction, however firmly believed by some, 
to a temporary phenomenon, an event of transient nature. Everything is seen as historically 
determined and historically relative, in other words, everything is relativised (Van der Walt, 2007: 
178).  
According to Olthuis (2012: 1/7), worldviews are nowadays frowned upon because they are 
considered euphemisms for ideologies with their dogmatism. We need, it is said, to move beyond 
such exclusivism into an era after worldviews (i.e. grand narratives). According to the postmodern 
stance, life is more than logic; there is a limit to knowledge and knowledge is never disinterested, 
neutral, a-temporal or a-spatial. There is no such thing as Universal Reason, and reason is never 
impartial; it is always in the service of wider and broader interests. All grand narratives that claim to 
explain everything have lost credibility (Olthuis, 2012: 3/7). According to Wright (2010: 122), some 
postmodernists even claim that ultimately we fail to obtain knowledge of reality because, at the end 
of the day, there is no such thing as reality, no actual order of things. The notion of reality only exists 
within our psychological conventions and linguistic contractions
16
. 
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Wright (2010: 123) correctly says that these thinkers fall in the epistemic fallacy of confusing reality with 
knowledge of reality. We have no grounds to deny the existence of reality simply because it is beyond our 
intellectual powers to fully comprehend it. 
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No person is completely a-religious or can live without a trace of life-conceptual content filling of his 
or her values. All people have faith in something. Gray (2009: 13) rightly comes to the conclusion 
that “secular thinkers imagined that they had left religion behind, when in truth they had only 
exchanged religion for humanist faith in progress”. For this reason, he regards contemporary 
humanism as a religion in its own right (Gray, 2009: 15). In view of this, Peck’s (2006: 174) advice to 
psychologists is to find out their patients’ religions even if they say they do not have any. The same 
applies for a life and worldview; every person has an explicit or implicit set of ideas and beliefs as to 
the essential nature of the world. It is nowadays widely acknowledged that all knowledge is 
perspectival, world view-ish, rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, rather than 
universal or absolute (Olthuis, 2012: 1/7). 
What all of the above means for a person who wishes to exist in the “valley of relative value 
emptiness” is that it takes a special effort to leave one’s religious convictions, assumptions and 
prejudgements behind and to contrive living according to those supposedly empty values that 
transcend all life-conceptual differences among people.
17
 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #5: 
1. (5.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking with a cross one of the options 
that follow: “I prefer to deal with other people on the basis of values that are generally 
acceptable to all people, and not on the basis of my own religious and life view values which 
tend to make me different.” 1. Totally agree with the statement 2. Agree to a large extent 3. 
I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree to a certain extent  5. I totally disagree  
Interpretation of the responses: Responses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the respondent sees him- 
or herself as preferring values that are relatively devoid of content or that are universal 
though contextually filled and meaningful. The respondent seems to prefer to operate in the 
“valley of relative value emptiness” in order to get along with most other people, irrespective 
of their value stances. Responses 4 and 5 might be indicative of a respondent who prefers not 
to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” but rather with values that are more or 
less conceptually filled with meaning and content. The value stance of such respondents is 
likely to be rooted in a pertinent religious, faith or life and worldview commitment. 
6. A tendency towards total tolerance of others, their religious 
persuasion and their values 
A person preferring to relate with people of different religious and life and world view persuasion on 
the basis of the relatively “contentless” values embodied in the radical value centre, with the bare 
minimum of religious or world view filling, with values couched in thin value language, with a 
(postmodern) relativistic value attitude, and with a pragmatic or even a laissez faire attitude with 
respect to religious and world view differences, could be assumed to be tolerant of other people and 
their religious convictions and assumptions. It should be noted, however, that since no person is 
ever without religion or without religious convictions and a life and world view, no person is ever 
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As mentioned, a person such as a scholar or a curriculum designer may periodically and temporarily, for 
purposes of scientific objectivity in a diverse setting, contrive to transcend his or her personal life view 
convictions et cetera, but such a stance is not viable as a consistent life-view, certainly not for a person of 
integrity (Nolan, 2009: 13). 
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likely to be without a value system on the basis of which he or she would, if the occasion arose, be 
intolerant of the views of people of different persuasion. Nevertheless, theoretical provision has to 
be made for the possibility of total tolerance, for an attitude of “anything goes”, for complete 
relativism, for total naivety.  Bennett (1993) arguably made similar provision by distinguishing in his 
developmental model stages V “Adaptation to difference” and VI “Integration of difference”. 
It is necessary to stress at this point that absolute tolerance of others and their views is not 
necessarily “wrong” or “incorrect”. Whether it is to be adjudged as wrong or incorrect will largely 
depend on the observer’s religious stance, as will now be explained with the help of Bennett’s (1993) 
developmental model in which he makes certain distinctions in terms of cultura sensitivities (for the 
purposes of this monograph and of the questionnaire that has to result from it, Bennett’s 
distinctions in the cultural domain will be transposed to religious sensitivities. The formal distinctions 
that Bennett made and categorised can be just as valid as categories regarding religious attitude):  
I. Denial of difference: a person in this category is unable to construe religious difference. 
His or her attitude could be characterised by benign stereotyping (well-meant but 
ignorant or naïve observations) and superficial statements of tolerance. This attitude can 
sometimes be accompanied by attribution of deficiency in intelligence or personality to 
religiously deviant behaviour. There is a tendency to dehumanise outsiders and to 
isolate them in homogeneous groups, which deprives the person from either the 
opportunity or the motivation to construct relevant categories for noticing and 
interpreting religious difference. The person’s intentional separation from religious 
difference protects his or her worldview (“fishbowl”) from change by creating conditions 
of isolation.  
II. Defence against difference: a person in this category recognises religious difference 
coupled with a negative evaluation of most religious variations; the greater the 
difference, the more negative the evaluation. His or her thinking is characterised by 
dichotomous us-them thinking and is frequently accompanied by overt negative 
stereotyping. He or she has a tendency towards religious proselytising of “other” 
religions
18
.  The person in this category possesses cognitive categories for construing 
religious difference as isolated by evaluating them negatively, thus protecting his or her 
own world view from change. His or her existing world view is protected by exaggerating 
its positive aspects compared to all other religions. Any neutral or positive statement 
about another religion may be interpreted as an attack on his or her own religion. 
III. Minimisation of difference: a person in this category recognises and accepts superficial 
religious differences such as rituals and eating customs, while holding that all human 
beings are essentially the same. The emphasis is on the similarity of people and the 
commonality of basic values. There is a tendency to define the basis of commonality in 
egocentric terms (since everyone else is essentially like us, just be yourself). There is also 
an emphasis in terms of similarity (after all, we are all human). The emphasis may be on 
commonality of human beings as subordinate to a particular supernatural being, religion 
or social philosophy (we are all children of God whether we know it or not). The own 
worldview is protected by attempting to subsume difference into what is already 
familiar (deep down we are all the same). 
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See discussion of inclusivism below. 
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IV. Acceptance of difference: a person in this category recognises and appreciates religious 
differences in behaviour and values. Acceptance of religious differences is regarded as a 
viable alternative solution to the organisation of human existence.
19
 This person 
operates on the basis of religious relativity, and begins to interpret phenomena within 
their different cultural or religious contexts. Categories of difference are consciously 
elaborated. He or she is able to analyse complex interaction in religion-contrast terms. 
He or she has the ability to see beliefs, values and other general patterns of assigning 
“goodness” or “badness” to ways of being in the world in their different cultural and 
religious contexts. 
V. Adaptation to difference: this person is able to develop communication skills that 
enable inter-religious communication
20
, and to make effective use of empathy
21
, or 
frame of reference shifting, to understand and be understood across religious 
boundaries. This person is able to consciously shift perspective into alternative religious 
world view elements and to act religiously in appropriate ways in those areas. He or she 
is also able to shift their behaviour completely into different religious frames without 
much effort. For this person, internalisation of more than one complete worldview is 
viable. Knowledge and behaviour are linked to conscious intention, and category 
boundaries (i.e. between religions) become more flexible and permeable. 
VI. Integration of difference: a person in this category is able to internalise a bi-religious or 
multi-religious frame of reference. He or she is able to maintain a definition of identity 
that is “marginal” to any particular religion, and sees the self as “in process”. He or she is 
able to use multiple religious frames of reference in evaluating phenomena, and is able 
to accept an identity that is not primarily based in any one religion. He or she is able to 
facilitate constructive contact between religions for the self and for others, and is willing 
to participate to some extent in a “marginal reference group”, where other marginals 
rather than religious compatriots are perceived to be similar
22
. World view and religious 
categories are seen as “constructs” maintained by self-reflexive consciousness (religions 
and individuals are “making themselves up”). 
Leutwyler et al (2012: 113) gives a brief summary of the meaning of Bennett’s developmental model, 
again “translated” by the author of this monograph into religious sensitivities
23
. Inter-religious 
sensitivity can be approached in terms of this six-tier model  in terms of religious attitude, from a 
religio-centric on the one hand, to a religio-relative attitude or view on the other.
24
 The first three 
levels refer to a religio-centric world view, and the last three to a religio-relative world view. People 
with the former world view experience their own religion as the only reference to construct their 
reality while the deeply held beliefs and behaviours from their primary socialisation remain 
unquestioned. They are seen as “just the way they are”. In contrast, individuals with a religio-relative 
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See the discussion of the social contract below. 
20
See discussion of dialogical pluralism below. 
21
See discussion of moral imagination, empathy and sympathy below. 
22
The “new reformation group” in South Africa could be seen as falling in this category. 
23
 The formal categories distinquished for cultural attitude by Bennett and now explained by Leutwyler et al 
are valid – in a formal sense, not in terms of content – for religious attitude categories. 
24
We are not so much concerned about the developmental aspects in this monograph. These aspects are by no 
means unimportant, however; they will have to be reckoned with in efforts to redress any shortcomings 
among teachers and pupils with respect to religious tolerance. 
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world view experience their beliefs and behaviours as only one organisation of reality among many 
other possibilities. This distinction has clear implications for religious tolerance among teachers and 
students. Teachers and students will have different images of religious differences and similarities 
and therefore about inter-religious education and dialogue if they are in a religio-centric stage of 
development or if they have developed a religio-relative perspective. It can be expected that 
teachers and students in the former stage of development will have a less tolerant view of others of 
different religious persuasion than those in the latter stage. 
The question that confronts us here is whether education systems world-wide are meeting the 
target for education to encourage “tolerance and respect for the religion of others” also included in 
official political statements. Religions have not disappeared, as some social scientists predicted; 
religion now exists in more differentiated and individualised forms. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, institutionalised religion has lost influence and relevance in society, and religiously 
plural settings in school and in the classroom have become more and more common (Schreiner 
,2005: no page number). The question is whether Schreiner  is correct in surmising that “teachers 
are getting sensible to the individualised form of religion of their pupils as the context and the 
content of teaching”. Are they indeed coming to grips with the religious diversity with which they 
are confronted in school and in class? Are they indeed as religiously tolerant as expected? What 
about the children whom they are teaching – are they as tolerant as could be expected of religious 
differences in others (i.e. their teachers, their school mates)? Or do we have the situation described 
by Leutwyler et al (2012: 116): “It may be assumed that the more or less appropriate policies in this 
regard are not implemented in daily teaching – precisely because they do not fit the teachers’ 
individual belief systems”. As far as South Africa is concerned, Du Preez and Roux (2010: 12) indeed 
found the following: “Early in our research project, it became evident that some teachers believe 
that discipline can only be maintained through the elevation of cultural values (particularism). One 
reason for this phenomenon could be that people in many instances see traditional, cultural values 
as preferable to emancipatory, human rights values. … An illustration of a particularist stance is 
illustrated (sic) by Wolhuter and Steyn and De Klerk and Rens who argue that acceptance of certain 
Christian values could promote discipline in schools.” Could it be that teachers teaching children 
from a particularist, religio-centric perspective might be more or less intolerant towards others 
adhering to other particularist or confessional orientations? The purpose of the questionnaire to be 
developed on the basis of this monograph is to establish whether or not this is indeed the case. 
As will be discussed in the following Section, religious tolerance as such is characterised by a number 
of technical considerations. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #6: 
1. (6.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
could not care less what other people think and do; I feel comfortable around them when 
they act according to the dictates of their religion and world view; it does not matter to me 
what people think and do in terms of their religion; other people, their ideas and actions do 
not bother me at all”. 1. I totally agree with this statement 2. I agree with this statement to a 
certain extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree with this statement to a 
considerable degree  5. I totally disagree with this statement. 
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Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is more 
or less completely tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different religious 
persuasion. He or she may even be suspected of an “anything goes” attitude, and hence might 
belong in Bennett’s categories IV to VI. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is 
not prepared to be quite as tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different 
persuasion, and hence could belong in Bennett’s categories I, II or III. 
7. The technicalities of religious and world view tolerance 
The first technical point about tolerance that has to be kept in mind is that the well-being of 
individuals and of their societies depends to a significant extent on the degree of tolerance that is 
displayed by all concerned (Gray, 2009:21; Strauss, 2009: 509). As stated at the beginning of this 
monograph, societies are today more diverse and pluralistic than ever, and religious and cultural
25
 
conflict has become a fact of life. Tolerance therefore can be seen as the key to living together in a 
society that harbours many different ways of life. Societies and their members have to search for the 
best ways of living together, and tolerance seems to be one of the attitudes most sorely needed to 
ensure the well-being of all concerned. Olthuis (2012: 5/7) correctly observes that people have to 
make sense of the diversity of cultures, religions and world views around them; from their different 
viewpoints (through the sides of their different “fishbowls”, as it were), they are called to negotiate, 
to work together for justice with compassion, for mercy with truth. 
The second technical point is that tolerance does not mean accepting a belief or a practice that one 
does not agree with. As two authoritative dictionaries show, tolerance refers to endurance and not 
necessarily to acceptance of what has to be endured. Tolerance refers to the act of being tolerant, in 
other words the capacity to endure something such as pain or hardship, to treat with indulgence and 
forbearance, and to accept that people tend to hold religious and world view opinions that differ 
from the established religion of a country (Sinclair, 1999) or from one’s own.  It could also refer to 
allowing the existence or occurrence of something that one dislikes or disagrees with without 
interference (Soames & Stevenson, 2008). What underlies tolerance, Grayling (2002: 9) correctly 
concludes, is the recognition that there is plenty of room in the world for alternatives to exist, and if 
one is offended by what other do “it is because one has let it get under one’s skin”. In contrast to the 
dictionaries mentioned above, Van der Walt (2007: 202-203) mentions acceptance of what has to be 
tolerated but he immediately qualifies such acceptance. Tolerance, he says, is the degree to which 
we accept things of which we disapprove; the degree with which we understand differences and 
learn how to differ from others, and does not preclude appreciation for what is good in other 
religions (for instance). As far as acceptance is concerned he qualifies his definition with the rider 
that we are not to tolerate everything with which we do not agree
26
 (which explains the use of “the 
degree to which” in his definition of tolerance above).  According to Boersma (2012), tolerance is a 
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Other factors, such as economics and population pressure, might also lead to forms of intolerance and 
violence. 
26
Boersma (2012) shares a similar sentiment. In his case, the matter is complicated by a linguistic problem. He 
writes in Dutch: “Kern van tolerantie is dat ik verdraag wat ik niet accepteer maar wel aanvaard”. The Dutch 
“accepteer” is derived from English “accept”. The Dutch word “aanvaar” also means “to accept”. Taken at face 
value, Boersma seems to say: “The core idea of tolerance is that I tolerate or forbear that which I do not accept 
but which I do accept”. However, in view of the rest of his exposition one has to conclude that “accepteer” has 
a different meaning from “aanvaar”: “accepteer” seems to mean something like “do not agree with”, so what 
Boersma in fact states is: “The core of tolerance is that I tolerate something that I cannot agree with but which 
I nevertheless accept”.  If this translation is correct, he seems to agree with Van der Walt (2007: 202-203). 
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concept with inherent tension
27
, in the sense that it causes pain and requires from the person having 
to tolerate a degree of violation of his or her value system
28
.  
The third technical point pertains to the extent to which one (or a society) should tolerate beliefs 
and actions that they prefer not to adopt. Put differently, to what extent can open societies tolerate 
the existence and the efforts of fundamentalist
29
 enemies of freedom, in other words, those people 
who tend to live with a value system that is filled with value content from their own personal and 
private religious and world view approach and commitment to the extent that they openly and 
contemptuously reject the values contained in the radical value centre referred to above or in the 
value systems of others whose value systems differ from theirs? To what extent must open societies, 
i.e. societies that tend to operate on the values contained in the radical value centre; values that are 
universally recognised but contextually understood, abandon their own habits of tolerance in order 
to deny the right of its fundamentalist enemies to exist? (Bower, 2005: 43). The answers to both 
these questions, according to Grayling (2002: 8), should be a resounding “No!”.  Tolerance, he says, 
should protect itself, and can do so by saying that anyone is free to moot a point of view but no one 
can force another to accept it. The only acceptable coercion in an open and democratic society is 
that of reason and argument. Members of an open society have only one obligation: the power of 
honest reasoning, of argument.  Grayling is convinced that “the reasonings of an open mind will 
come out in favour of what is good and true” (ibid.). 
The fourth technical point about religious and other forms of tolerance is that it depends on trust 
(Arielly, 2010; 127-128; Ilbury & Sunter, 2011: 73) and moral imagination. Tolerance depends on 
trusting the bona fides of all other members of society. If trust is broken for whatever reason, there 
can be no tolerance of the other’s beliefs or actions. A lack of trust also cramps our moral 
imagination, in other words our capacity to put ourselves in the shoes of the other person.  As will 
be indicated below, the notion of peaceful coexistence (a healthy modus vivendi) depends to a large 
extent on the degree of trust and moral imagination that prevail in a society. 
The fifth technical point pertains to the reasons why people are either tolerant or intolerant.  
Morton (1998: 167 et seq.) explains this in some detail. Most people, he says, are torn between 
tolerance of the values of other people, which may be based on ideas and preferences that they do 
not understand, and dislike of values that seem wrong, especially those that seem to involve cruelty 
or hatred. Different people resolve the conflict differently. Some people are extremely tolerant (as 
demonstrated above with reference to people with a totally relativist or laissez faire attitude) of 
other people’s values, allowing others to hold and follow those values that seem to them repulsive. 
Others are extremely intolerant (as also demonstrated above with reference to people with a 
militant fundamentalist and radically exclusivist attitude), thinking that others should not hold and 
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According to Boersma (2012), the Christian view of tolerance differs from the liberal view in that the latter holds that one 
has to tolerate the other out of respect for his or her freedom (as a human right). Christians do not believe that human 
beings possess such absolute freedom, and rather base their conception of freedom on love, as mentioned by 
Olthuis (see previous paragraph in this section). 
28
Boersma (2012) also distinguishes a “milder” form of tolerance, namely “gedogen”, to disapprove of 
something but to just look the other way. The English equivalent of “gedogen” might indeed be “to look the 
other way” or to endure. 
29
Living strictly according to certain dogmas and doctrines or a set of thick (content filled) values does not 
necessarily amount to being a fundamentalist. Adherence to such dogmas and doctrines also do not 
necessarily lead to violence and intolerance – as the rest of the discussion in this monograph will illustrate. 
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follow values that are from their point of view wrong. These different attitudes can be explained as 
follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence in his or 
her own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their 
beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or 
her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society with a 
single set of shared values. 
The final technical point that has to be kept in mind is that the concept of tolerance has recently 
undergone a shift, what Van der Walt (2007: 203) refers to as a secular down-scaling , a shift from 
tolerating the ideas and beliefs of others to tolerating others. This is due, in his opinion, to an ethics 
of politeness, courtesy and decency. In his opinion, this down-scaling is a result of modern-day 
(postmodern) relativism which seems to promote an ethic of gentility and studied moderation; a 
code of social discourse whereby “religious beliefs and political convictions are to be expressed 
discreetly and tactfully and in most cases, privately. Convictions are to be tempered by good taste 
and sensibility. It is an ethics that pleads “no offence”. The greatest breach of these norms is 
belligerence and divisiveness; the greatest atrocity is to be offensive and thus intolerant. 
Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #7: 
1.  (7.1)Please respond to the following statement by marking the option that represents your 
view the most accurately: “The well-being of society and of the individuals that make up 
society depends on my being tolerant towards them, their ideas, their religion and their 
beliefs”. 1. I completely agree 2. I largely agree 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5 I do not 
agree at all. 
Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is 
religiously and otherwise tolerant of others and their ideas. A 4 or 5 response would be 
indicative of a person who is (fairly) intolerant of others and their ideas. 
 
2. (7.2) Please respond to the following statement by marking the most appropriate response 
that follows: “I just tolerate things in others that I do not like and will never accept”. 1. I fully 
agree 2. I agree to a large extent 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I completely disagree 6. I 
have no opinion about this 
 
Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a fairly tolerant 
person whereas a 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a fairly intolerant person. 
 
3. (7.3) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
can place myself in the shoes of a person who holds a religion and worldview that are 
completely different from mine and which I shall never accept as my own religion or life 
view.” 1. I fully agree with this statement 2. I agree to a certain extent 3. I agree 4. I do not  
agree to a considerable extent 5. I do not agree at all. 
 
Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of a person with moral 
imagination and who might be tolerant of the religious views of others. A 4 or 5 response is 
indicative of a respondent with very little or no moral imagination and who could be quite 
intolerant of others and their religious views. 
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4. (7.4) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: 
“My natural inclination is to trust other people”. 1. Fully agree 2. Agree 3. Agree to a 
considerable extent 4. Disagree to a considerable extent 5. Totally disagree. 
 
Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of the fact that the respondent 
is a trusting person and therefore probably tolerant of others. A 4 and 5 response is 
indicative of the fact that the person is not naturally inclined to trust others and therefore 
might be fairly intolerant. 
 
5. (7.5) Which TWO of the following views of others is most applicable to you as a person? (1) 
My confidence in my own moral beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow 
their beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own moral beliefs is high. (4) I 
believe in a unified society with a single set of shared values.  Mark ANY TWO in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3 4. 
 
Interpretation of the responses:  These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a 
person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence is his or her 
own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow 
their beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) 
because his or her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a 
unified society with a single set of shared values. 
 
8. Some further technical distinctions 
According to Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 39), three formal views are usually distinguished as 
far as the relationships among religions are concerned, namely exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism 
(also see Van der Walt, 2007: 195). The weakness of this typology lies in its rather vague 
understanding of pluralism. Whereas today there seems to be consensus about the models or views 
of exclusivism, the pluralist view is described in many ways, ranging from a relativistic approach 
stressing the quality of all religions, to a dialogical approach stressing the need for dialogue in order 
to find religious truth. Vermeer and Van der Ven therefore decided to differentiate this three-way 
typology more closely by breaking down the pluralism model into two components, with the result 
that they began working with a four-way distinction within religious plurality: exclusivism, 
inclusivism, pluralism and dialogical pluralism. 
In its most extreme form, the exclusivist claim would be that only one’s own religion is absolutely 
and uniquely true and that all other religions are therefore false. A more open version of this view is 
one where the followers of one religious tradition admit that their religion is not the sole possessor 
of truth in all respects and that they may perhaps learn from other religious traditions. Such a more 
open version is, according to Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 39-40), also exclusivist as long as the 
adherents to a religion are not prepared to question their own basic beliefs in light of encounters 
with followers of other religions. People entertaining such a more open view of exclusivism might be 
prepared to work together with adherents to other religions for the sake of promoting some or 
other shared interest, but they do not feel the need to enter into a dialogue about matters of 
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religious truth or salvation because they feel that they are already in possession of the truth. 
Exclusivism is characterised by an unwillingness to enter into religious dialogue with followers of 
other religious traditions. Exclusivism is characterised by absolutism, uniqueness, emphasis on 
difference, particularism and exclusive view of truth (Van der Walt, 2007: 197). 
Like exclusivists, inclusivists maintain the truth and superiority of their own religious tradition, but 
differ from the former in that the other religious traditions are considered as products of divine 
revelation or as legitimate paths to salvation. This is mainly done by interpreting other faiths in 
terms of one’s own faith and by claiming that other faiths either originated from one’s own faith or 
will one day reach fulfilment in one’s own faith. The difference between exclusivism and inclusivism 
is only one of degree (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004: 40). Generally speaking, inclusivism is 
characterised by relativism, emphasis on similarities, egalitarianism, the equality of all faiths as far as 
truth claims are concerned, and the view that truth is relative (Van der Walt, 2007: 197). 
As far as the third view, pluralism, is concerned, the basic claim is not that all religions are equally 
valid because they all worship and believe in the same God, but rather from a phenomenological 
point of view it is argued that the essence of all religions lies in the human experience of the 
transcendent, and from an epistemological view it is claimed that the articulation of this basic 
experience in belief systems is always related to a particular cultural environment and therefore 
cannot claim absolute validity. Religious pluralism can take one of several forms. Parallel pluralism 
holds that all faiths promote certain parallel dogmas, for instance about evil; puzzle pluralism holds 
that every religion only possesses a fragment of the full and final truth (about, for instance, 
salvation); gradual pluralism holds that in some religions the final truth comes to the fore in a 
stronger way than in others (Van der Walt, 2007: 196). 
Pluralism not only claims on a phenomenological basis that all religions are based on one and the 
same religious experience but also on epistemological grounds that they are always related to 
specific cultural environments. On the basis of these two arguments, the conclusion is drawn that 
basically all religions offer an adequate picture of the Divine. Although this does not mean that there 
are no metaphysical and theological differences between religions, the emphasis in pluralism is on 
what is shared by the different religious traditions rather than on what separates them from one 
another (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004: 41-42). 
The fourth view, brought to the fore by Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 42-43), is dialogical 
pluralism which stresses the need for an inter-religious dialogue for the mutual enrichment of 
different religious traditions. This view attempts to address two shortcomings of exclusivism, 
inclusivism and pluralism, namely the lack of perspective exchange between religions, the ability and 
willingness to try to understand the other in terms of own religious preconceptions; also the second 
shortcoming that is of an epistemological nature: exclusivists claim that their religion is the only valid 
or true one among many, and the inclusivists attempt to reconcile different sets of incompatible 
beliefs. The possibility exists, Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 43-44) claim, that aspects of religious 
truth also can be found in other religions. Therefore, in order to avoid these difficulties, dialogical 
pluralists avoid all preconceptions about the truth or falsity of different religions and instead claim 
that religious truth can only be discovered in a dialogue between religions. At the core of dialogical 
pluralism is a particular understanding of inter-religious dialogue, namely as a communicative 
process in which people of several traditions enter into discussions about what is ultimately true and 
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of value in life. This dialogue consists of three distinctive phases, namely information exchange, 
perspective exchange and perspective coordination. Van der Walt (2007: 187) supports the notion of 
conducting a dialogue between the adherents of the different religions. In his opinion, such dialogue 
is of import for the sake of a just and peaceful society. The only condition for dialogue, he says, is 
that one should believe that all religions are not all the same, because if they were, dialogue would 
be without purpose. He also warns that one should not enter such a dialogue with an attitude of 
superiority and pride as if one held the monopoly on truth. In such a dialogue, the discussion is not 
about who is right, but what could be seen as the truth. The aim of the dialogue is to lessen the 
tension between the different religions and to promote a peaceful and just society. This cannot take 
place without mutual understanding and trust. The alternative, he correctly concludes, is 
misunderstanding, conflict and violent clashes. 
In Van der Walt’s (2007: 207-208) view, pluralism can easily deteriorate into intolerance. His 
argument runs as follows. Absolute (in the sense of consistent) relativism is impossible. If every 
religion were relative, then the (mild and radical) relativists would have to acknowledge that their 
own viewpoint itself is also relative. Since no-one can think consistently relativistically – for then 
such a person would simply have to keep quiet – the so-called relativists today defend their 
standpoint in an intolerant way. Their so-called tolerance thus means intolerance towards all who do 
not share their point of view. The religious tolerance for which their “tolerance” fought is destroyed 
– ironically – by the same “tolerance”. On close analysis, a “tolerance” which thinks relativistically 
about truth is by no means an example of “democracy” in the religious field. It creates the 
impression of being “enlightened” and very modest but in essence relativism is just as arrogant as 
the other religions which are blamed for being arrogant.  
Although Van der Walt (2007: 195) begins his outline of the different views of the relationship 
between religions with the usual distinction between exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism, he 
discusses a whole variety of positions with regard to these views.  He begins, for instance, by saying 
that the phenomenological method promotes a view that can be typified as “historicist relativism” 
since it undermines the rather absolute nature of all religions with its basic assumption that 
everything is relative. It propagates the modern secularist relativism which teaches that all religions 
are equally true or false, and that it makes no difference which one chooses to adhere to. In Van der 
Walt’s (2007: 189) opinion, relativist religious pluralism is, in spite of the fact that it opposes all kinds 
of religious dogma and absolutism, itself guilty of a hidden dogma, namely that all religions are in 
principle equal. 
Van der Walt (2007: 196) also distinguishes at least three forms of confessional particularism. 
Magnetic particularism holds that a dogma might work like a magnet that draws all other religions to 
it; healing particularism teaches that a dogma may work like a vaccine that can cure believers and 
hence can draw non-believers; imperial particularism teaches that a particular dogma is of the 
utmost importance and that no salvation is possible without adhering to it (an example of this is the 
Christian belief that Christ is the only source of salvation and that an intentional confession of belief 
in Christ is the only hope for salvation). 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #8: 
1. (8.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I 
believe that my religion is the only true one, and that all others are false. (2) I believe that all 
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religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the 
truth the way we do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same 
God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and 
circumstances. (4) I believe in sincere dialogue with all other religions because I think my 
own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience.  Mark ONE in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3 4. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of an exclusivist and hence 
probably intolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of an inclusivist and hence probably 
intolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a religious pluralist and hence probably 
tolerant attitude. 4. This response will be indicative of a dialogical pluralist and hence probably 
tolerant attitude. 
9. Three approaches to tolerance 
As indicated in Section 8 above, there seems to be many ways of attempting to be tolerant towards 
the religious views and dogmas of others, some of which might lead to more success than others in 
the resolution of conflict, the procurement of mutual trust, human well-being and peaceful human 
coexistence. Three broad life and world view (“fishbowl”, ”life map”) approaches can be 
distinguished among the plethora of approaches to the plurality currently prevailing in Europe and 
Southern Africa, the two regions in which the questionnaire to be developed on the basis of this 
monograph will be administered, namely liberalism, Christianity (indeed post-Christianity in some 
areas and among some people) and what has become known as secularism, liberal secularism or 
secular humanism. 
From a modern liberal viewpoint, Grayling (2010: 220) advises that society should learn how to 
manage less acceptable beliefs and behaviour by understanding their ill consequences and to 
encourage more acceptable behaviour by sweeping up the pieces and “otherwise being stoical”. In 
brief, says Schreiner (2005: 13), people have to show empathy to the other, enter into dialogue with 
them and acquire the competence of “dancing with difference” in the increasingly pluralist 
environments in which they find themselves. Gray (2003: 112) agrees with all of the above, and 
reiterates that “fugitive empathy” with other living things is the ultimate source of ethics.  Moral 
imagination is required, in other words the ability to put oneself in the shoes not only of relatives 
and good friends but also in those of rivals and enemies. Moral imagination implies efforts at 
understanding others from the inside
30
 (Wright, 2009: 418). 
Olthuis (2012: 2/7, 6/7) gives similar advice from a Christian perspective: Firstly, in ethical 
Postmodernism, difference is not the enemy, a threat, defect or deficit which needs to be controlled, 
but rather a challenge that has to be connected with, attended to and honoured. The proper relation 
to the other (different) person is deference rather than domination, condescension, dismissal or 
persecution. Genuine community is being together in difference and diversity, rather than 
marginalisation or fusion into sameness.   In Biblical terms, freedom does not mean “free from” but 
rather “free to” love and minister to the other. As God is with us (Emmanuel), so a person should be 
with others; people are called to suffer with others, not to fusion with others, not to abandonment 
of others, nor even the rescue or persecution of the other, but being with the other, suffering-with 
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See the discussion of modus vivendi below. 
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and celebrating-with. Reason, transformed by and in the service of love, will have an eye for 
difference not in order to close it down or to marginalise it, but in order to approach and connect 
with it, and let it be. Love, in Olthuis’s understanding, is not an auxiliary to the order of reason; there 
is only one order, he says, and that is the order of Love, with reason as one of its dimensions. In very 
practical terms he advises that the members of a society should develop an economy of love not to 
exclude others or to prove that their own way of life is the only true way, but to give witness of how 
and why - rooted in their own religious and life view (“fishbowl”) perspective – they see things the 
way they do, and how they conceive of justice and practise mercy. Along these lines and in this way, 
they invite others to share their deepest beliefs and convictions for mutual learning, benefit and 
well-being. Van der Walt (2007: 202) makes the same point by stating that religious and other forms 
of diversity will not disappear in this dispensation, therefore tolerance towards all other people is 
the only and right attitude. People need to find ways of living alongside one another without 
destroying one another and without ignoring or trivialising the differences among them.  The task of 
tolerance, he avers, is not to ignore or to trivialise differences but to “establish the right to differ”. 
Olthuis (2012) agrees with the position outlined a few years earlier by Van der Walt (2007: 
213).Tolerance based on a Biblical view is aimed at establishing the truth, and should always be 
modest and based on love. Tolerance from a Biblical perspective implies full involvement with the 
other and a sincere interest in the other; it is eager to know as much about the other as possible. 
True tolerance is never hesitant or sentimental; to endure things that one does not approve of takes 
strength and courage. 
Secularism, in turn, as Mohler (2008: 29-30) correctly observed, is a lifeview according to which 
humankind sees itself not only as liberated from the bonds of the church and other religious 
institutions but from all forms of theistic religion. In view of the fact, as already mentioned, that no 
human being is ever without religion and religious commitment, secularists mistakenly believe that 
religion and religious forms will disappear in due course, that history was driving toward the utter 
removal of belief in God, and that education, technology and affluence would lead to a massive 
civilisation-wide loss of belief; secularisation would be a global phenomenon, marked by the 
rejection of both the social functions and the symbolic nature of theistic belief.  Although it is 
unlikely that secularism will dominate life and the world on this massive scale, there are clear signs 
of it making progress, also in the form of atheism (Mohler, 2008: 15). According to Tripp and Tripp 
(2008: 15), secularism is a “godless culture”, a majority culture that interprets life “through 
unregenerate eyes and promotes its conclusions through various means, from advertising to 
education”. Instead of depending on guidelines flowing from theistic religious books and dogmas, 
secularists depend on other mediators of values such as entertainment celebrities, the social media 
and advertisements.  
The central message of secularism, according to Tripp and Tripp (2008: 17) is “me!”, and as a result 
of that it leaves humankind without transcendent values. The only values that remain are those of 
survival by whatever means that serves the lusts and the needs of the moment. Van der Walt (2007: 
213) regards the secular, including the liberal, approach to tolerance as “negative, since it can say 
nothing more but that one should not be uncivil, discourteous, impolite, tactless, unpleasant or 
opposing”. Boersma (2012) also finds the secular-liberal-humanist view of tolerance unacceptable. 
He does not accept the “enlightened” dogma that one should allow the other to enjoy his or her 
freedom because of freedom being regarded as an absolute value that entails respect for the value 
of living and let live, all of which is based on the dogma of human autonomy.  Liberal tolerance does 
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not include tolerance of those who deem themselves to be subject to some or other heteronymous 
force; the purpose of liberal tolerance is indeed the liberation of such persons. To this could be 
added that it is indeed a question to what extent a me-centred person would be willing to tolerate 
others in his or her struggle for survival in the new secular age that Mohler refers to. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #9: 
1. (9.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I 
believe that all that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom, and that he or she should 
be allowed to believe in whatever makes sense to them. (2) I believe that people cannot 
follow the whims associated with the idea of individual freedom but that they should adhere 
to the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. The religious views of others 
should nevertheless be respected. (3) I believe that a person should live and behave in 
accordance with values that are not strictly religious, such as to be civil, polite and 
courteous, tactful, pleasant and not opposing.   Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a liberal and hence 
probably tolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of a stance rooted in some holy 
book but that the religious views of others should be respected. This is indicative of a tolerant 
attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a secular and hence probably tolerant attitude. 
10. Willingness to enter into a social contract 
Peaceful coexistence in a community or a society depends on a social contract among the members 
of such a community.  The contract should provide room for diverse positions in society, and emerge 
from a joint decision of rational individuals. Antecedent to a social contract there are no principles of 
justice or agreement about expectations in force. Put differently, the emergence of a social contract 
among individuals who widely differ from one another in terms of background, religion, culture, 
customs and habits leads not only to a well-ordered society, to the well-being of all the contracting 
parties and to social justice for all concerned (Strauss, 2009: 510-511). Following Rousseau, Rawls 
(2007: 566-571) states that government is based on a social contract among free, equal and rational 
persons entering into a contract based on the principle of justice as fairness and for the well-being of 
all concerned. The contract leads to the adoption of certain rights and duties and to the measuring 
out of benefits for everyone. The basic structure of society should provide for the governing of the 
assignment of rights and duties and the distribution of social and economic advantages. 
Bower’s (2005: 226, 228) assessment of the Constitution of the United States of America gives a 
good idea of what a proper social contract could provide for all. In his opinion, that Constitution “is 
nothing if not a repository of human values [which] had a profoundly beneficial effect on the 
development of civil society, on the emergence of a trustworthy judiciary and on the achievement of 
freedom…”. Part of the social contract is also common law which, in his opinion, governs the affairs 
and relationships of people. Common law is the law of common practice, the law emanating from 
the wisdom of peoples who strive to regulate their relationships with one another on the basis of 
justice and decency. Common law was responsible, among others, for establishing the notion that 
the relationship between people was governed by agreed standards of probity, rather than the 
unfettered exercise of power. Nussbaum (2000: 5) adds to this that the governments of all nations 
should adhere to those principles that a bare minimum of respect for human dignity requires. She 
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refers to the social contract as “an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very 
different conceptions of the good”. The contract should therefore provide for treating each person 
as an end and none as a tool of others. According to Robeyns (2005: no page number), the 
capabilities approach worked out by Nussbaum and Sen forms a broad normative framework for 
what has been referred to above as a social contract among individuals, in other words for the 
evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, 
and proposals about social change in society.  Sen (2010: 245, 247) concurs with her in saying that it 
would be hard to understand why and how a person undertakes some of his or her activities without 
comprehension of his or her societal relations. Individual human beings with their various plural 
identities, multiple applications and diverse associations are quintessentially social creatures with 
different types of societal interactions. 
Now, after briefly having looked at the nature and purpose of the social contract among individuals, 
we can return to the core argument of this monograph, namely the issue of religious tolerance. The 
question is, which of the two groups referred to above, those with a rather “thick” or maximalist 
value orientation or those with a rather “thin” or minimalist value orientation would be most willing 
and ready to enter into a social contract with others and hence be more tolerant of others involved 
in the contract and their views? Of course, to ask this question is more of an academic exercise than 
of practical significance since all of us, whether we wish to do so or not, are party to a social contract 
as embodied in the Constitution of our countries and in the Government of the day. By far the 
majority of us conforms to the rules and stipulations of that contract, on the one hand because of 
understanding the benefits that might flow from the contract in terms of personal and communal 
well-being, justice and fairness, rights and duties, and on the other hand, out of fear of punishment 
in the form of imprisonment, fines and social sanction. There have been incidents, however, caused 
by pathological dissidents, such as Timothy McVeigh responsible for the Oklahoma Bombing and 
Anders Behring Breivik, responsible for the Norway massacre, who do not accept the authority 
vested in the government of the day on the basis of a social contract, who not only wish to opt out 
from the contract but also to show their dissatisfaction with the status quo.  
An academic exercise has the value, however, of revealing something of the dynamics of religious 
tolerance in our present-day diverse societies. It can be reasonably and arguably expected that those 
individuals who operate with relatively “thin” or minimalist values, such as those contained in the 
radical value centre or in the “valley of relative value emptiness”, those with a laissez faire attitude, 
who are willing to accept that “anything goes”, those with a totally relativistic value system, will 
more readily enter into a social contract. They readily enter because they do not feel very strongly 
about their value system; they are prepared to enter into an “overlapping consensus” with others 
with quite different value orientations because they expect that doing so will not affect their own 
value orientation in any way. For this group, values are “just wonderful names with very little life 
and world view content” as Zecha remarked. In terms of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model, the 
members of this group arguably belong in either category IV - those who accept difference, or in 
category V - those who adapt to difference, or in category VI - those who integrate difference. In 
terms of the distinctions in the previous section, a person in this group might be prepared to practise 
religious pluralism and / or dialogical pluralism, and may also be tolerant of others and their religious 
views. 
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The obverse can also be expected. Those who operate with “thick” or maximalist values might be 
less willing to enter into a social contract because of their awareness of the deep value rifts that 
exist between them and others of different religious or cultural persuasion.  The “thicker” or more 
maximalist their value system, the less likely they will be prepared to enter into such a contract. 
There is also the distinct possibility that those operating with a maximalist value system that borders 
on fundamentalism and fanaticism, those with a “toxic” religious orientation might refuse to enter 
into a social contract and prefer to resort to terrorist tactics to destabilise the extant social contract 
because of its being founded on values unacceptable to the dissidents.  Such destabilising tactics can 
be observed both internationally where terrorist groups, inspired by religious fervour, attempt to 
undermine the extant world order (September 11, 2001 is a case in point), and also nationally, 
where religious groups attempt to destabilise the national order of their country (Mali and the DRC 
are currently suffering from such attempts).  The members of these groups might also be totally 
intolerant of the religious views of other groups which they regard as enemies and as heathens. 
Their efforts will be more directed towards proselytising and missionary work rather than to 
tolerating others and their religious differences.  In terms of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model, 
such a radical group might belong in category I – total denial of differences among people (in terms 
of the distinction in the previous section, totally exclusivist (only my religion is true) or totally 
inclusivist (since only my religion is true, I have to convert all others to it), or category II – I have to 
defend myself against difference.  
 The person with a less “thick” or maximalist value orientation might fall in category III – I feel the 
need to minimize the differences between myself and others. Ideally speaking, such a balanced and 
worthy member of society should fall in the category of some value “thickness” or maximalisation, 
not in the extreme categories of fundamentalist intolerance or of radical relativistic tolerance. Put 
differently, he or she should ideally fall in Bennett’s categories III – minimisation of differences 
among people (the differences between myself and others are not all that important; we can talk 
about them and exchange ideas – dialogical pluralism), IV – acceptance of differences among people 
(people are different, and that is a fact of life, we have to live with it), and V – adaptation to 
difference (although I have to live with the differences among people, I can be myself and apply my 
own value system in the context of the social contract to which I am party). 
Bennett’s category I – denial of difference (I recognise only my own value system; all others either 
do not exist or are not valid) is the reserve of the totally intolerant. Category VI – integration of 
difference (my value system is not so important to me that I cannot associate myself with all other 
values; all values are equally valid) is also the reserve of the totally tolerant. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #10: 
1. (10.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel 
so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not feel at 
home in my community and even in my country; I feel dissatisfied with the government of this 
country and with all people in charge; I dislike all people who do not see things my way; I wish 
I could move elsewhere where people approached daily life the way I see it. (2) I feel totally 
comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I cannot be bothered whether 
Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or New Agers governed this country. I just go with the 
flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that such 
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participation does not bring me in conflict with some of my basic religious convictions. I am 
prepared to vote for a government that does not deviate too much from my religious 
convictions. Although I do not always feel comfortable in my community and in this country, I 
do not wish to move elsewhere. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a person not wishing to 
enter or be part of a social contract and hence will probably be tolerant of others. 2. This 
response will be indicative of a person with a totally laissez faire attitude, totally willing to 
enter into a social contract, and who could be regarded as totally tolerant of others and their 
religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to 
enter into a social contract on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally 
tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
11. Tolerance (and respect) a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence 
(a healthy modus vivendi) 
In his book The Open Society and its Enemies, first published in 1945, Karl Popper engaged with the 
task of defining the best available conditions under which humanity could live as a community, and 
with a diagnosis of the factors that would undermine the achievement of such conditions (Bower, 
2005: 25). Popper’s search, launched nearly seven decades ago, is still an ongoing one in the present 
day. Even today, different societies and individuals interpret, prioritise and realise values that could 
be considered to be universal (radical centre values) differently, and this is both inescapable and 
desirable (Parekh, 2000: 158). 
The answer to Popper’s quest is not simple and straightforward. Its formulation will depend in the 
final analysis on one’s societal relationship theory. For example, a person with a socialist, communal 
view of society might feel that some people in society should not be allowed to express or even to 
possess their own values, ideas and beliefs in the interest of creating or ensuring a society with 
shared values. In this case, it is clear that the possession of private values (et cetera) that may 
deviate from the norm in a hoped-for unified society will not be tolerated by the majority. More 
cynical socialists such as Marxists would be wary of social structures that seem to serve the powerful 
or a particular interest group in society, that manipulate and exploit the sense of fear of ordinary 
people, structures that (for instance) use religion as a tool of social control or as an “opiate for the 
masses”. 
If, on the other hand, one had a more liberal view of society one would accept and honour people’s 
right to personal, private and often dissident views, and hence would be more tolerant of such views 
in the interest of a positive modus vivendi. In this context, it would be important to reason with 
others who think and behave differently (cf. dialogical pluralism, as discussed above), and to be 
sceptical of others’ ideas and beliefs (Morton, 1998: 171). If one believed in total individualism, 
however, one could be one of the causes of society falling atomistically apart, with very few shared 
values on which to base a social contract. If one believed in Mills’ no harm principle, the only reason 
for preventing someone doing or believing something  is the potential harm that it could cause 
another or society as a whole. No one has the right to tell another how to be or how to act provided 
that such being and acting does no harm to others (Grayling, 2002: 8). The challenge here is to only 
allow what should be truly allowed and forbid what should be forbidden. The harm principle should 
therefore never be used arbitrarily (Morton, 1998: 170-171).  
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If, in turn, one approached society from a functionalist view one would be interested in what 
promoted the interests of society as a whole, what would make society “socially good”, or 
“collectively stronger”, “socially more vital”, “more alive and active”, what would promote social 
cohesion and productivity, generosity and social harmony (Wright, 2009: 43-44). 
What underlies tolerance in a diverse or pluralistic society is the recognition that there should be 
room for all kinds of alternatives to exist. Learning to tolerate is indeed one of the aims of civilised 
life (Grayling, 2002: 9). Human community benefits by permitting a variety of lifestyles to flourish 
because they represent experiments from which much might be learned about how to deal with the 
human condition (Grayling, 2002: 8). 
While we will never discover cast-iron rules of good conduct and the good life in our societies which 
will answer every question that might arise about how human beings can live peacefully and well 
together, the lack of absolute agreement on what peaceful coexistence means and requires should 
not discourage us from investigating and promoting the theoretical notion of a healthy modus 
vivendi (De Botton, 2012: 83). As mentioned, peaceful coexistence depends, in the first place, 
considerably on the amount of moral imagination that the members of a community are able to 
display, i.e. the capability of placing themselves in the shoes of another, be it friend or enemy. The 
process entails scouring one’s mind and memory for shared points of reference, the mutual 
validation of feelings and ideas, working towards a common goal or perspective, the virtual sharing 
of experiences, knowing the other from the inside, putting prejudice in abeyance and showing 
empathy and sympathy. The expansion of moral imagination forces one to see the interior of more 
and more people for what their interiors are, namely remarkably like one’s own. Like one’s own 
interior, says Wright (2009: 428), it is deeply coloured by emotions and passions; like one’s own it 
also colours the world (cf. the “fishbowl” metaphor) with self-serving moral judgment. 
Whatever transpires in a society, it should create and promote the conditions of the good life. 
Something that happens defeats this purpose when it violates human dignity, (self-)respect and 
tolerance of others, and when it renders its members incapable of leading the good life (Parekh, 
2000: 157). Certain agreed-upon values should be respected by all in society, and each society 
should be free to find the most effective way to popularise and realise the values on which its social 
contract is founded (Parekh, 2000: 156). This is where tolerance comes in. Since every society and 
every individual member thereof enjoy the moral freedom to interpret and prioritise their values, 
their practices cannot and should not be condemned merely because they are different from or 
offend against one’s own (Parekh, 2000: 153). A healthy modus vivendi indeed rests on the 
assumption that people have so many things in common that they should be able to realise their 
ideals and goals through mutual support and cooperation, and this requires tolerance of the 
religious and other characteristics that members of a society might have. Through a healthy modus 
vivendi every member has an equal opportunity to develop his or her potential, or to protect the 
environment (Ramcharan, 2008: 53). 
Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, it should neither be expected nor 
desired that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life. Whatever one’s 
obligations to others (also reciprocally), each has the right to his or her own way (Schneller, 2011: 
190). What one might expect from others is the moral qualities of honesty, truthfulness, decency, 
courage and justice coupled with the intellectual qualities of thoughtfulness, strength of mind, 
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curiosity and the communal qualities of neighbourliness, charity, self-support as well as the political 
qualities of commitment to the common good, respect for law, responsible participation, 
helpfulness, cooperativeness and respect for others (Schneller, 2011: 175). Tolerance and respect 
seem to go hand in hand in the establishment of a healthy modus vivendi. Diversity needs respect 
(Christian Science Monitor, 2005: 8). Any attempt at coercion unglues the respect that holds a 
diverse society together.  
True tolerance, as observed in the previous section of this monograph, does not originate in 
opportunism which tolerates other religions merely for its own profit or for the sake of a superficial 
form of coexistence. It rather takes a sincere interest in the other(‘s religion) and is eager to know as 
much of it as possible (Van der Walt, 2007: 213). Honest and sincere interest and respect for others 
and their capabilities can indeed lead to happiness, the provision of space for one another and also 
to social justice as fairness. According to Valenkamp (2011), the philosopher Kant claimed that the 
actual practising of a healthy modus vivendi among diverse people requires a certain “push from 
behind”. The love commandment, as expressed in the various forms of the Golden Rule (see Comte-
Sponville, 2005: 8-10 for a discussion of the various versions of the Rule), is not the true ground for 
morality, Kant claims, but it provides the necessary flow, the inspiration to provide space for one 
another; it provides the stimulus to recognise-in-the-other-the–same-needs, to such an extent that 
the members of a society ought to do what the Golden Rule demands, i.e. to love one’s neighbour as 
oneself. People need to create societies in which differences can be recognised and conflicts 
resolved, where their forces can be united, not because all human beings are good and just, but 
because they are not; not because they are united, but so that they have a realistic chance to 
become united (Comte-Sponville, 2005: 15). 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #11: 
1. (11.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) 
I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do 
not think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people in a 
community are just too great for that. I think people also do not trust one another 
sufficiently to live peacefully together. (2) I think people should just find ways and 
means to live peacefully together in a community. People are just people, and there is 
very little that keeps them apart. People should be more trustful of others. (3) I think 
that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious convictions in the same 
community is possible on condition that every member of society respects the 
differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. 
Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant 
person. 2. This response will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and 
their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, 
willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be 
conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
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12. Grand narratives and the new spirituality 
As mentioned in Section 10 above, those with a rather “thick” or maximally life-conceptually filled 
value system might be reluctant to be tolerant of the religious and cultural views of those of 
different persuasion than themselves. The thesis there was that the “thicker” or maximalist a value 
system becomes, the more aware its adherents would be of the depth of the rifts between their own 
value system and those of others of different religious or cultural persuasion, to the extent that they 
might reach a point where they feel they have to dissociate them from the social contract with 
others. It could be argued, however, that this is highly unlikely among rational and sane individuals. 
Most people understand and welcome the profits that could be made by entering into the social 
contract and living according to values and principles about which consensus had been reached. 
However, there is a possibility
31
 that rational and sane individuals socially bonded together in what 
has been termed “a grand narrative” or “totalising system” (McGrath, 2005: 219) of whatever 
nature, could be less tolerant of others, their ideas and beliefs than those outside of such a “grand 
narrative”. Members of a mainstream church, for instance, could feel conscience bound by the 
dogmas and the confessions of their organisation, and hence not free to be tolerant of deviant 
views. This is because, apart from the fact that each individual member of such an institution comes 
with a set of in-built pre-judgments and biases, he or she is a member of an institution with a certain 
agreed-upon set of dogmas or ideologies which make it difficult for members to be tolerant of other 
views not consonant with those of the institution. In many cases, the personal “fishbowl” 
perspective of the members have been affected or coloured by the ideologies or dogmas of the 
institution as a grand narrative. As Olthuis (2012: 3/7) remarked, grand narratives tend to claim to 
be able to explain everything. This claim, as we have seen in the discussion of postmodernism above, 
has today lost much of its credibility. 
Although, as Makrides (2012: 250-251) correctly observed, the grand narratives of modernism have 
not been totally replaced by postmodernism, there is a strong tendency away from the grand 
narratives and their relative dominance over the thoughts and behaviour of their adherents. People 
understand nowadays that despite the claims of the grand narratives, people only know partially, 
not totally. The image of the all-knowing mind is slowly but surely being replaced by the image of the 
searching mind in and through a complex world, where answers are more likely to be wrong than 
correct.  
In contrast to the search for spirituality within the context of a grand narrative, such as a particular 
religion, church or other religious institution, there is a resurgence of interest in non-mainstream 
religion and spirituality, in the realm of the transcendent. There has been a concomitant breakdown 
in the social and religious cohesion formerly experienced in the context of grand narrative monoliths 
such as churches and mainstream religions (McGrath, 2005: 219, 263). Spirituality is now widely 
seen, also in educational context, as something fundamental to the human condition, something 
that transcends ordinary everyday experience and is concerned with the search for identity and 
meaning in response to death, suffering, beauty and evil. Spirituality may be encountered in our 
beliefs, sense of awe, wonder and mystery, feelings of transcendence, search for meaning and 
purpose, self-knowledge, relationships, creativity, feelings and emotions, and could be rooted in 
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Attention is drawn to the word “possibility”; not all of those attached to some or other grand narrative may 
feel themselves so conscience bound to the extent that they might be intolerant of others’ views.  
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curiosity, imagination, insight and intuition (Wright, 2010: 130). According to Julian (2002: 10), the 
base of spirituality is the notion of serving a higher purpose, but in Welch’s (1997: 84) opinion, 
spirituality has in practice been reduced to a feeling of the infinite, an inarticulate ecstasy before the 
wonders of the self or of nature, on an experience of the ineffable. Modern spirituality therefore has 
no hell, no doctrine, no substance; it is all about feeling. 
Kourie’s (2006: 22-23) definition of spirituality is quite different: spirituality refers to the deepest 
dimension of the human person; it refers to ultimate values that give meaning to one’s life, whether 
one is religious or not. Spirituality refers to one’s ultimate values and commitments, regardless of 
content. De Muynck’s (2008: 7) definition is similar to that of Kourie: spirituality is the manner in 
which one – by orientating oneself to a source – relates his or her beliefs and experience of 
inspiration and / or transcendence, more or less methodically, to the actual practice of life. 
The purpose of this section is neither to give a full depiction of modern-day spirituality (which is very 
difficult to do because of the nebulousness of the concept) nor to evaluate it in any detail. Suffice it 
to say that, as Mohler (2008: 89) observed, spirituality has risen as a replacement for identification 
with organised religion. It is a new non-theistic form of belief that can range from the New Age 
movement to the various quests for spirituality that mark popular culture and fit personal taste. 
Instead of, as expected, religiousness disappearing, it has been resurrected in another form, that of 
spirituality (Van der Walt, 2007: 150). 
The implications of the above for religious tolerance are clear. The more one is immersed in the 
doctrines, dogmas, structures of a mainstream religion that act as a grand narrative that binds the 
conscience of its members, the less likely one would be to be tolerant of the religious views and 
beliefs of others of different religious persuasion. The opposite might also be true: the more one is 
immersed in the nebulous ambience of some or other form of “new” spirituality, the more one is 
likely to be tolerant of others’ views. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #12: 
1. (12.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) 
I belong to a religious group with very strong convictions. Everything that we do in my 
church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution is so defined in terms of 
dogmas and doctrines that it is difficult for me to deal with people who do not belong to 
the same religious group or institution. I have to be inward thinking because I cannot 
understand the religions of other people, and I do not think they can understand my 
religion. (2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I 
regard myself as non-religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging 
them. (3) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutional religion, but I see 
myself as religious since I adhere to a form of spirituality in which I try to connect with a 
higher force. I think all people are involved in such a spiritual search for a higher force in 
their lives; some only do it within some or other religion, others find such 
institutionalised religion an obstacle in their search. (4) I belong to a religious group 
such as a church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution, and although we 
worship according to certain dogmas and confessional documents, we feel ourselves 
free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them. 
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Although I feel myself religiously different from other people, I treat them with respect 
and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant 
person. 2 and 3. These responses will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of 
others and their religious views.4.This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced 
view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be 
conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
13. Preliminary conclusion: (Religious) tolerance a “moving 
phenomenon” 
The discussion so far seems to suggest that (religious and other forms of) tolerance can be regarded 
as a “moving phenomenon” and hence very difficult to delineate, circumscribe in general terms or 
define. The discussion also proves that it has many facets and ramifications, and that one and the 
same aspect might be based in quite different theoretical perspectives. The term “tolerance” has, 
therefore, to be seen as a phenomenon with various nuances. 
(Religious and other forms of) tolerance pertain(s) to a certain moment in time; it seems to be a 
matter of a specific moment in question. Groups of quite different religious or life and world view 
persuasion might live peacefully together for many years, even centuries, and may be said to be 
quite tolerant of the other and its beliefs and convictions.  A relatively minor incident, such as the 
accidental death of a child at the hands of a member of the another (religious) community, may then 
spark a bout of severe (religious) intolerance - even conflict - that might last for years thereafter. 
Another incident, for example, a child saved from drowning by a member of the opposing group 
might terminate the violence, and lead to another prolonged period of (religious) tolerance. This can 
be practically illustrated with reference to the situation in Kiev, the capital city of the Ukraine in 
February 2014. The refusal of the president to sign an agreement with the European Union sparked 
a bout of severe intolerance and violence among the populace. The violence only ended when the 
president was deposed. Tolerance – in the political realm, in this instance - became the order of day 
once again.  
The degree of (religious and other forms of) tolerance experienced in a community depends on the 
degree of equilibrium in the system. The various groups of which a society is composed seem to be 
tolerant of one another if all the checks and balances are in place, when certain tendencies are 
effectively counterbalanced by others. 
Intolerance seems to need a spark or trigger to come to life. The relative peace and quiet and 
tolerance in a community characterised by potential for conflict can be broken by a single incident 
which acts as a spark or a trigger (see the examples mentioned above). Even a relatively insignificant 
incident can act as a trigger that could cause disequilibrium in the system.  
The principles or a priori convictions of the various groups that might come into conflict and hence 
be intolerant of others seem to play an important role. People and groups entertain different sets of 
principles that flow from their religious persuasion and convictions (their respective “fishbowls”), 
and they live peacefully according to them on condition that they are not somehow confronted by 
an incongruous situation, on condition that some or other incident does not cause them alarm about 
the validity and viability of their personal convictions and principles. Confrontation seems to be the  
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key to the rise of (religious and other forms of)intolerance. As long as a person or a group is allowed 
to live peacefully according to their principles and convictions we might expect them to be calm and 
their system to be in equilibrium.  A confrontational incident might disturb this equilibrium and 
hence result in intolerant behaviour and attitudes. Put differently, the principles might lie latently in 
the background of an individual or a group, but a certain confrontational incident (a certain casuistic) 
might bring it to the fore. How a person responds to such a confrontational incident will depend on 
the “contents” of his or her “fishbowl” (see section 1 above) and expectancy filters (see section 4 
above).  As mentioned in those two sections, how a person will engage with the world, with 
confrontation and systemic imbalance, will depend to a large extent to how s/he views the world 
and other people. 
14. © The questionnaire 
A few notes about the questionnaire that follows below: 
1. The preceding conceptual and theoretical framework lends conceptual and theoretical 
support and substance to the items which together now form a provisional questionnaire with which 
to probe the degree of religious tolerance displayed by a respondent, and on the basis of which a 
religious tolerance profile of a person or a group can be constructed. 
2. The items, as they have been phrased in the course of the argument outlined above, are 
much too difficult and complicated in their current form for application in a questionnaire to be 
completed by teachers, student teachers and the students or pupils in their care. This became 
evident when the original questionnaire was given to a number of well educated adults to respond 
to. Although they were able to respond adequately to each item, they found the formulation thereof 
too theoretical-academic and hence too complicated. This explains why a further edition of the 
questionnaire had to be drafted (see Section 14 below). This section contains in essence the thrust 
of the items of the original questionnaire but pains were taken to make the items more 
understandable and easier to respond to by the target audience. 
3.  Readers of this monograph are encouraged to attempt responding to the original 
questionnaire. This exercise will help them decide whether the questionnaire indeed measures what 
it is intended to measure, in other words whether it possesses the necessary content and construct 
validity. 
4. The items following each theoretical section above overlap in some cases, even to a 
considerable extent. This is because different theoretical perspectives lead to similar questionnaire 
items. This problem has to be addressed in the final formulation of the questionnaire. 
4.  Please read the remark at the end of the questionnaire, i.e. after the interpretation, and 
after first having completed the questionnaire. 
Here is the more simplified version of the questionnaire: 
1. To which religion do you belong? If you belong to a mainstream religion such as Christianity, 
the Muslim faith, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism then please write the name of the 
religion in the space provided. If you do not belong to a mainstream religion, please write a 
short phrase in which you describe your religious stance, e.g. “I believe in a form of 
spirituality that is not associated with any mainstream religion”.  
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2. Please respond to the statement: “I live very strictly according to the tenets and 
prescriptions of my religion and world view” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally 
agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
3. Please respond to the statement “I am always and acutely conscious of my religious 
convictions and beliefs whenever I do something or have to make a choice in my life” by 
marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree 
to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
4. Which of the following views of the world is typical of how you personally view and 
approach the world and other people? Mark the response that describes your basic view of 
the world, and your attitude towards the world and other people most appropriately: 1. I 
feel safe and secure; I do not see the world and other people as a threat to me or my 
existence. 2.  I concentrate on my own affairs, and have very little to do with other people 
and their needs; I am concerned about my own welfare in this world. 3. I cannot be 
bothered about the world and other people; I expect nothing from life or other people; one 
has to make your own fortune in life. 4. I would like to be close and friendly to other people, 
but at the same time I am fearful of them and what they could do to me. 
 
5. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I am 
willing and prepared to associate myself with a set of values that has universal currency, a 
set of values, principles and norms that people say is true and valid for all people in the 
world, for all religions and world views in the world”. Please choose one of the following 
options: 1. I completely, fully agree  2. To a fairly large degree 3. Only to a limited degree 4. 
Not so much 5. Not at all   
 
6. Please respond to the statement: “I am prepared to live by values that are supposedly valid 
for all people in the world, irrespective of their personal religion and life and world view but 
I think I will need to reinterpret them according to my personal religion and world view”. 
Mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a 
certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
7. Please respond to the statement: “A value that does not flow from my own, personal 
religion and world view is worthless as a guideline for my life”. Please mark one of the 
following:1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. 
Totally disagree 
 
8. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
prefer values that are simple, have nothing to do with any religion or world view, that all 
people can agree with because they are formulated in very general terms, and will not lead 
to divisions and conflict among people”. 1 I strongly agree with this statement 2. I agree 
with the statement to a certain degree 3. I find this statement fairly acceptable.  4. I 
disagree with the statement to some extent. 5. I completely disagree with the statement. 
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9. Please respond to the following statement by marking with a cross one of the options that 
follow: “I prefer to deal with other people on the basis of values that are generally 
acceptable to all people, and not on the basis of my own religious and life view values which 
tend to make me different.” 1. Totally agree with the statement 2. Agree to a large extent 3. 
I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree to a certain extent   5. I totally disagree  
 
10. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
could not care less what other people think and do; I feel comfortable around them when 
they act according to the dictates of their religion and world view; it does not matter to me 
what people think and do in terms of their religion; other people, their ideas and actions do 
not bother me at all”. 1. I totally agree with this statement 2. I agree with this statement to 
a certain extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree with this statement to a 
considerable degree 5. I totally disagree with this statement. 
 
11. Please respond to the following statement by marking the option that represents your view 
the most accurately: “The well-being of society and of the individuals that make up society 
depends on my being tolerant towards them, their ideas, their religion and their beliefs”. 1. 
I completely agree 2. I largely agree 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5 I do not agree at all. 
 
12. Please respond to the following statement by marking the most appropriate response that 
follows: “I just tolerate things in others that I do not like and will never accept”. 1. I fully 
agree 2. I agree to a large extent 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I completely disagree 
 
13.  Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I can 
place myself in the shoes of a person who holds a religion and world view that is completely 
different from mine and which I shall never accept as my own religion or life view.” 1. I fully 
agree with this statement 2. I agree to a certain extent 3. I agree 4. I do not  agree to a 
considerable extent 5. I do not agree at all. 
 
14.  Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “My 
natural inclination is to trust other people”. 1. Fully agree 2. Agree to a considerable extent 
3. Agree 4. Disagree to a considerable extent 5. Totally disagree. 
 
15. Which TWO of the following views of others are most applicable to you as a person? (1) My 
confidence in my own moral beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their 
beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own beliefs is high. (4) I believe in a 
unified society with a single set of shared values.  Mark ANY TWO in the spaces provided: 1 
2 3 4. 
 
16. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe 
that my religion is the only true one, and that all others are false. (2) I believe that all 
religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the 
truth the way we do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same 
God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and 
circumstances. (4) I believe in sincere dialogue with all other religions because I think my 
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own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience.  Mark ONE in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3 4. 
 
17. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe 
that all that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom, and that he or she should be 
allowed to believe in whatever makes sense to them. (2) I believe that people cannot follow 
the whims associated with the idea of individual freedom but that they should adhere to 
the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. The religious views of others should 
nevertheless be respected. (3) I believe that a person should live and behave in accordance 
with values that are not strictly religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, tactful, 
pleasant and not opposing.   Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
 
18. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so 
strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not feel at 
home in my community and even in my country; I feel dissatisfied with the government of 
this country and with all people in charge; I dislike all people who do not see things my way; 
I wish I could move elsewhere where people approached daily life the way I see it. (2) I feel 
totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I cannot be bothered 
whether Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or New Agers governed this country. I just 
go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that 
such participation does not bring me in conflict with some of my basic religious convictions. 
I am prepared to vote for a government that does not deviate too much from my religious 
convictions. Although I do not always feel comfortable in my community and in this 
country, I do not wish to move elsewhere. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
 
19. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so 
strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not think 
that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people are just too great 
for that. I think people also do not trust one another sufficiently to live peacefully together. 
(2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together. People are 
just people, and there is very little that keeps them apart. People should be more trustful of 
others. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious 
convictions is possible on condition that every member of society respects the differences 
around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. Mark ONE in 
the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
 
20. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong 
to a religious group with very strong convictions. Everything that we do in my church, 
synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution is so defined in terms of dogmas and 
doctrines that it is difficult for me to deal with people who do not belong to the same 
religious group or institution. I have to be inward thinking because I cannot understand the 
religions of other people, and I do not think they can understand my religion. (2) I do not 
belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I regard myself as non-
religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I do not belong to 
any form of organised or institutional religion, but I see myself as religious since I adhere to 
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a form of spirituality in which I try to connect with a higher force that could give direction to 
my life. I think all people are involved in such a spiritual search for a higher force in their 
lives; some only do it within some or other religion, others find such institutionalised 
religion an obstacle in their search. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, 
synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution, and although we worship according to 
certain dogmas and confessional documents, we feel ourselves free to interact with other 
people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them. Although I feel myself 
religiously different from other people, I treat them with respect and dignity. Mark ONE in 
the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4. 
Interpretation key 
1.  This  item informs the researcher whether the respondent belongs to a mainstream 
religion, to a form of spirituality not associated with any mainstream religion or to no 
religion at all – as far as the respondent is concerned (according to the literature, no 
person is ever actually without religion (Gray, 2009: 2; Peck, 2006: 108)). This item 
reveals the nature of the personal “fishbowl” (life and worldview orientation) of the 
respondent. 
 
2. Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist 
attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (based on 
Bennett’s
32
 work). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of 
being situated in a religio-relative orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 
or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live 
in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her 
own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, 
including the views of other people.   
 
3.  A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of 
being situated in a religio-centric orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). A 4 or 5 response could 
be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in religio-relative 
orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the 
respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” 
and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to 
exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other 
people.   
 
4.  1 indicates a balanced and secure world view. This person is not fearful of engaging with 
the world or with other people; he or she trusts others and the predictability of the world, 
and is generally open to the world. This person might be tolerant of others and their 
views.  2 is indicative of a pre-occupied life and world view; this is an inward looking 
person, who is not concerned about the welfare of others or of the world in general. This 
person is so concerned about him- or herself that tolerance of others and their views 
does not come into play. 3 This person is disconnected from the world, expects nothing 
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from others or the world. This disconnection could be indicative of a mentality in which 
tolerance plays no significant role. 4. This person leads an ambivalent life; he or she is 
both fearful of the world and of others but also aspires to be close to others. Fear could 
lead to intolerant behaviour; on the other hand, the wish for closeness could lead to 
exaggerated tolerance of others and their views. 
 
5.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would indicate that the respondent is not at all or at least not fully 
committed to some or other exclusive confessional stance far as his or her religious 
orientation is concerned. He or she is prepared to share a set of values that is supposedly 
universally applicable to all people. A 4 or 5 response will be indicative of the opposite, 
namely that the respondent is so committed to some or other confessional religious or 
life and world view stance and perspective that he or she does not find it possible or 
viable to share values, principles and norms with others of a different religious and / or 
life and world view conviction. 
 
6.  A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of the fact that the respondent seems to be 
prepared to live by generally accepted and supposedly universally valid values, norms 
and principles but also feels the need to reinterpret those values and norms in terms of 
his or her private religious stance and life and worldview.   A 4 or 5 response could be 
seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1. 
 
7.  A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of (full) commitment to a personal religion and 
life and world view.   A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 
response in item 3.1. 
 
8.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a respondent preferring to operate with 
minimalist, general values, values that have been thinly formulated. This person seems to 
pave the way for getting along with others on the basis of rather generally shared 
values.  A 4 or 5 response would indicate that the respondent prefers values that are 
maximally, thickly formulated in terms of his or her religious and life and world view 
convictions. Respondents who opt for a 4 or a 5 seem to be more likely to be more 
conscious of their own religion and life and worldview rooted value system, and hence 
also more aware of differences between his or her value system and those of others 
whose value systems might be rooted in different religions and world views. 
 
9. Responses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the respondent sees him- or herself as preferring 
values that are relatively devoid of content or that are universal though contextually 
filled and meaningful. The respondent seems to prefer to operate in the “valley of 
relative value emptiness” in order to get along with most other people, irrespective of 
their value stances. Responses 4 and 5 might be indicative of a respondent who prefers 
not to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” but rather with values that are 
more or less conceptually filled with meaning and content. The value stance of such 
respondents is likely to be rooted in a pertinent religious, faith or life and worldview 
commitment. 
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10.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is more or less completely 
tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different religious persuasion. He 
or she may even be suspected of an “anything goes” attitude, and hence might belong in 
Bennett’s categories IV and VI. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is 
not prepared to be quite as tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of 
different persuasion, and hence could belong in Bennett’s categories I, II or III. 
 
11.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is religiously and otherwise 
tolerant of others and their ideas. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who 
is (fairly) intolerant of others and their ideas. 
 
12.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a fairly tolerant person whereas a 4 or 5 
response would be indicative of a fairly intolerant person. 
 
13.  A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of a person with moral imagination and who might be 
tolerant of the religious views of others. A 4 or 5 response is indicative of a respondent 
with very little or no moral imagination and who could be quite intolerant of others and 
their religious views. 
 
14.  A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of the fact that the respondent is a trusting person and 
therefore probably tolerant of others. A 4 and 5 response is indicative of the fact that the 
person is not naturally inclined to trust others and therefore might be fairly intolerant. 
 
15.  These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, 
it may be (a) because his or her own confidence is his or her own moral beliefs is low, or 
(b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their beliefs however 
wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or her 
confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society 
with a single set of shared values. 
 
16. 1. This response will be indicative of an exclusivist and hence probably intolerant 
attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of an inclusivist and hence probably intolerant 
attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a religious pluralist and hence probably 
tolerant attitude. 4. This response will be indicative of a dialogical pluralist and hence 
probably tolerant attitude. 
 
17. 1. This response will be indicative of a liberal and hence probably tolerant attitude. 2. 
This response will be indicative of a stance rooted in some holy book but that the 
religious views of others should be respected. This is indicative of a tolerant attitude. 3. 
This response will be indicative of a secular and hence probably tolerant attitude. 
 
18. 1. This response will be indicative of a person not wishing to enter or be part of a social 
contract and hence will probably be tolerant of others. 2. This response will be indicative 
of a person with a totally laissez faire attitude and who could be regarded as totally 
tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person 
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with a balanced view, willing to enter into a social contract on certain conditions, and 
hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
 
19. 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2. This response will 
be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This 
response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully 
with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant 
towards others and their religious views. 
 
20. 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2 and 3. These 
responses will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their 
religious views.   4. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, 
willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be 
conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
Remark: Initial application of the above questionnaire in a small-scale pilot study revealed two of its 
characteristics: 
1. It is too difficult and complicated in its current format for persons without the necessary 
conceptual and theoretical background to decide on the appropriate responses. To address 
this problem a simplified version of the questionnaire was developed for teachers, student 
teachers and learners, students, pupils in the last two years of school (typically grades 11 
and 12 / standards 9 and 10)(Section 14). 
2. The initial results show that at least four profiles with respect to religious tolerance could be 
drafted on the basis of the questionnaire: 
2.1 A respondent with a totally intolerant stance is able to mark the items in such a way that 
his or her total religious intolerance will be clearly demonstrated. 
2.2 The same goes for a person with the opposite stance as far as religious tolerance is 
concerned; items can be marked in such a way that his or her total religious tolerance 
can be demonstrated. 
2.3 According to the pilot study, by far the most respondents seem to mark the items that 
show his or her adherence to a strong personal value system while at the same time 
being tolerant of others and their religious views. 
2.4 Some respondents mark the items in such a way they show their adherence to a strong 
personal value system accompanied by a spirit of relative intolerance of other views. 
3. These impressions will have to be tested with larger groups of respondents. 
 
4. The following is an example of the responses of one of the persons in the very initial pilot 
study: 
Item Response 
number 
Response in words Religious tolerance profile 
1 Christianity  This person belongs to the Christian faith 
or religion 
2 2 Agree to some extent Religio-centric person 
3 1 Totally agree Religio-centric and values maximally filled 
with content 
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4 1 Secure Balanced and secure world view 
5 3 Only to a limited degree Not an exclusivist stance with respect to 
religion 
6 2 To some extent Prepared to live by universal values 
7 1 Totally agree Fully committed to own religion 
8 4 Disagree Aware of differences among people 
9 3 Acceptable Prepared to work with contextually filled 
universal values 
10 3 Acceptable A tolerant person 
11 1 Completely agree A tolerant person 
12 1 Completely agree A tolerant person 
13 4 Do not agree This person does not have much moral 
imagination 
14 3 Agree This is a trusting person 
15 3 and 4  This person’s confidence in own beliefs is 
high, and he believes in a unified society 
16 4  This person is a proponent of dialogical 
pluralism 
17 2  This person’s views are rooted in a Holy 
book 
18 3  This person is willing to enter into a social 
contract on certain conditions 
19 3  This person has a balanced view; is willing 
to live peacefully with others on certain 
conditions 
20 4  This person has a balanced view; is 
tolerant of others and prepared to live 
with them on certain conditions 
 
The fourth column, if read from top to bottom, embodies the tolerance profile of this particular 
person: he is a Christian who is fairly religio-centred in his value stance, whose views are rooted in 
the Holy Book of Christianity (the Bible), who prefers to apply values that are maximally filled with 
life and worldview content, who feels balanced and secure in his dealings with other people and 
their values, who does not entertain an exclusivist view of his religion, is prepared to live by 
universally recognised values despite being firmly anchored in and committed to his own Christian 
religion (hence supports the tenet of universally recognised though contextually filled values), is a 
trusting and tolerant person though without strong moral imagination (he finds it difficult to place 
himself in the shoes of others), is confident in his own beliefs but also believes in a unified society, is 
an exponent of dialogical pluralism (prepared to interact and dialogue with adherents to other 
religions), and is prepared to conditionally enter into a social contract with others and to live 
peacefully with them. 
This is the profile of a single respondent. The tolerance profile of a group of respondents, say a class 
of Grade 11 students at a certain school, can be determined in the same way.  
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15. © Questionnaire for teachers, student teachers and Grade 11 
and 12 learners 
1. To which religion do you belong? (If you do not belong to any mainstream religion, please 
describe your religious stance in a few words.) 
2. “My religion is very strong, and I am expected to live very strictly according to it.” [Mark one 
of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I 
agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
3. “I am always strongly conscious of my religion in everything that I do.” [Mark one of the 
following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I 
disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
4. Here are four statements. Mark the one that is most applicable to you. 1. I feel safe and 
secure; other people and what they think are not a threat to me. 2. I am mostly concerned 
with myself; I cannot be bothered about other people and what they think and do. 3. I 
expect nothing from other people and also nothing from life; one has to make your own 
fortune. 4. I would like to be friendly with other people but at the same time I am afraid of 
them and what they could do to me. 
5. “I am willing and prepared to live according to a set of values that all people can share and 
that is not peculiar to one religion only.”  [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with 
this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I 
totally disagree] 
6. “I am willing and prepared to live according to a set of values that all people can share, but I 
shall always interpret them according to my own religion.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I 
strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a 
certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
7. “A value that does not flow from my own religion and view of life is useless as a guideline for 
my life.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a 
certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
8. “I prefer to values that do not have anything to do with any religion. Values should not lead 
to divisions and conflict among people.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with 
this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I 
totally disagree] 
9. “I prefer not to apply values that will make me different from all other people. That is why I 
do not like religious values.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this 
statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally 
disagree] 
10. “Other people are free to live according to their own religious values; the values of other 
people do not bother me at all.[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this 
statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally 
disagree] 
11. “The well-being of society depends on how tolerant we are with one another and with the 
other person’s religious values and views.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree 
with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 
5. I totally disagree] 
54 
 
12. “I just tolerate things that others say and do but I shall never be able to accept the things 
they think and do.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I 
agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
13. “I can place myself in the shoes of person whose religion, world view, values and ideas are 
completely different from mine.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this 
statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally 
disagree] 
14. “I am naturally inclined to trust other people.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree 
with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 
5. I totally disagree] 
15. Mark any TWO of the following that you think are most applicable to you: (1) My confidence 
in my own religious beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their beliefs 
however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own beliefs is high. (4) I believe the society in 
which I live should have only a single set of shared values.  Mark ANY TWO in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3 4. 
16. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe 
that my religion is the only true one; all others are false. (2) I believe that all religions contain 
some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the truth the way I do in 
my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same God / god / gods and that 
they only differ from one another because of local conditions and circumstances. (4) I 
believe in dialogue with all other religions because I think my own religion and all others will 
be enriched by the experience.  [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.] 
17. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) All that 
counts in life is a person’s individual freedom; everyone should believe what he or she 
wants. (2) The idea of individual freedom is wrong; people should live according to the 
principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. (3) A person should live and behave in 
accordance with values that are not religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, 
tactful and pleasant.   [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.] 
18. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so 
strongly about my personal religious convictions that I do not feel at home in my own 
surroundings. (2) I feel totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I just 
go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that 
such participation does not bring me in conflict with religion. [Mark ONE in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3.] 
19. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I do not 
think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people are just too 
great for that. (2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together. 
People are just people. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different 
religious convictions is possible on condition that every member of society respects the 
differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. 
[Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.] 
20. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong to 
a religious group with very strong convictions; we cannot tolerate others’ way of thinking. 
(2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I am non-religious. I 
just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I try to connect with a higher 
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force that could give direction to my life. I think all people are searching for such a spiritual 
search for a higher force in their lives. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, but 
despite this, we feel ourselves free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues 
and differences with them. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4. 
16. Concluding remarks 
Each of the items in the questionnaire above can be traced back to one or more of the theoretical 
viewpoints that preceded it. This enables the administrator of the questionnaire to interpret the 
responses to each item. By plotting a respondent’s responses to each of the 20 items the 
investigator will be in a position to see whether a respondent is basically religiously tolerant in his or 
her dealings and relationships with others of a different religious persuasion. Not only will such 
graphs show where each individual respondent lies in terms of being religiously tolerant or 
intolerant but it will also show where an entire group of respondents lies on the basis of their 
aggregate response in terms of each item and of the questionnaire in its entirety.  
Two further steps will have to be taken before the questionnaire can be administered with 
confidence to samples of respondents: (a) a pilot study with a few selected respondents has to be 
done to rectify any shortcomings and mistakes; and (b) the questionnaire should be edited to ensure 
that it actually measures religious tolerance and that each item and the various options therein are 
understandable to both teachers, prospective teachers and pupils (students, learners). 
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Preface 
 
This monograph forms part of the output of a research project about the issue of religious tolerance 
among educators, particularly teachers and their students or pupils. A series of articles on religious 
tolerance has already been published or is currently in press, each covering only a specific facet of 
the problem. It was envisaged right from the outset that not only conceptual and theoretical 
investigations would be launched into the matter of religious tolerance in education but that 
empirical work should also be done, in the form of a comparative study of how the 203 member 
states of the United Nations have been dealing with religious differences and with religion 
(education), and in the form of a questionnaire that could probe the degree of religious tolerance 
displayed by educators (teachers) and student teachers, and the children in their care. This explains 
the origin of this monograph. It covers a number of conceptual and theoretical aspects regarding 
religious tolerance that normally would not be discussed in disparate journal articles, despite their 
importance for establishing the conceptual and theoretical substratum for a questionnaire. In this 
monograph, each of the items of the proposed questionnaire flows from a specific conceptually and 
theoretically developed viewpoint, enabling researchers to acquire a detailed picture of the extent 
to which educators and their students are tolerant of the religious views of others of a different 
religious persuasion. 
The findings after the eventual application of the questionnaire will be of the greatest import for 
practising teachers and their pupils as well as for student teachers, in mono-religious,  multi-
religious, purported non-religious, post-religious,  secular and / or post-secular
1
 settings (Taylor, 
2007; Miedema, 2012). The findings will inform the former that there is a wider world outside of 
their particularist setting for which they have to prepare their students, and it will assist them to 
devise the necessary strategies for helping their students to cope with the challenges of multi-
religionism. It will also enable them and their pupils to pre-empt the possible dangers of religious 
exclusivism, inclusivism and hence intolerance.  Those in multi-religious and the other settings 
mentioned above, in turn, might learn from the results of the survey that they live in a complex 
world for which they have to prepare their students; they will in the process also learn (how) to 
avoid the possible dangers of unprincipled tolerance and laissez faire relativism. 
I hereby express my gratitude to Dr Bram de Muynck, Lecturer at the Driestar Educatief, for the 
publication of this monograph, and especially to the panel of experts that he convened for the 
purpose of critically reviewing the manuscript. I also thank my colleagues Ferdinand Potgieter and 
Charl Wolhuter who critically reviewed the text of this monograph. I take responsibility for any 
mistakes and shortcomings remaining after this painstaking process and would welcome any advice 
for the improvement not only of this monograph but also of the questionnaire that it has given birth 
to. 
Hannes van der Walt 
                                                           
1
 “Post-secular” in this context refers to the period in which we now live, a period in which a variety of 
meaning choices, including choices of a religious or spiritual nature, is possible. 
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Port Elizabeth / Pretoria / Gouda 
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Measuring religious tolerance in education 
Towards an instrument for measuring religious tolerance among 
educators and their students worldwide 
The need for an instrument to measure religious tolerance2 
While his remark may sound cynical, Gray (2003: 12) is probably right in saying that humanity as 
such does not exist; there are only human beings driven by conflicting needs and illusions, and 
subject to every kind of infirmity of will and judgement. Because of this, human beings are unable to 
live together peacefully, and are often engaged in strife, whether on a personal, community or 
(inter-)national level. For some or other reason, people are either always in competition with one 
another or in conflict. Conflict can be caused by different interests, aspirations, gender, race, religion 
and faith. Alford (2009: 57) regards the latter, in the form of religious fundamentalism, as the cause 
of many of the world’s ills, including religious intolerance. 
A study of the role played by religious ideas in the great clashes between civilisations is instructive 
(Wright, 2010: 5). Even Christianity which generally regards itself as a balanced religion (with 
exceptions, of course) has not always been good. According to Van der Walt (2007: 159), the many 
heresies among Christians, injustice and even violence in the name of Christendom all through the 
past 2000 years clearly illustrate the fact that no faith is perfect and above criticism. Much of 
Christianity’s history since the 17
th
 century concurred with the rise of modernism, of which the 
Holocaust is emblematic.  
Despite unparalleled advances in almost every field of human endeavour, especially technology, our 
streets abound with the hungry and homeless, violence and war continue to plague us (Olthuis, 
2012: 2/7). Especially religious conflict is rife, as can be observed in the Middle East, North and West 
Africa, and of which the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 can be regarded as 
emblematic. No matter how promising the idea of non-oppositional differences with other people, 
the ever-present economy of violence makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to put into 
practice, says Olthuis. 
To further demonstrate the nature of the minefield in which we find ourselves with regard to 
religious violence and conflict, De Vos (2011) mentions that many passages in religious texts might 
appear inexplicable, demonstrably false, deeply hurtful, offensive and harmful to any reasonable 
person not blinded by his or her own cultural and religious commitments. According to him, many 
                                                           
2
Readers wishing to begin with a technical discussion of the meaning of “tolerance” could first read Sections 7 
and 8 of this monograph, particularly the second technical point where the word is semantically examined. 
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, “tolerance” can  mean any of the following: 1. the capacity to 
endure pain or hardship: endurance, fortitude, stamina; 2. sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices 
differing from or conflicting with one's own (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tolerance). 
(In)tolerance is an attitude with regard to, or response to a characteristic of an individuals or of a group; 
religious (in)tolerance, in particular is seen as an attitude that (a) flows from religious motives and/or (b) is 
directed at persons or groups from other religions. 
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passages in the Bible and the Quran may be interpreted as containing hate speech against women, 
gay men and lesbians, while other passages may be interpreted as inciting violence, either directly or 
indirectly, against women, gay men and lesbians.  Other examples of religious intolerance are the 
reactions of many people to the Rastafarian claim that partaking in the holy herb of cannabis will 
bring them closer to God, to the widespread practice among Muslims and Jews to cut off a part of a 
baby boy’s penis shortly after birth, and to the practice among Hindu school girls who attempt to 
wear nose studs in state schools in South Africa (De Vos, 2011b). 
The need for tolerance
3
 has not only increased because of an epidemic of hate crimes, but also 
because of daily social interactions that require treating one another with respect and dignity. 
(Religious) intolerance is most frequently reflected in classroom, hallway and playground insults
4
, 
angry outbursts, social cliques, put-downs and dismissals of others’ viewpoints during class 
discussions (cf. Gateways to Better Education, 2005: 1,2; Schweitzer, 2007: 89). 
The current strife in Syria, the recent “Arabic Spring” uprisings and the conflict between the Muslim 
north and the Christian south of Nigeria and Mali count as examples of religious (and ethnic) conflict. 
Peck (2006: 173) correctly points out that differences can exist between atheists and theistic 
believers as well as within religious groups. “We see dogmatism, and proceeding from dogmatism, 
we see wars and inquisitions and persecutions. We see hypocrisy: people professing the 
brotherhood of man killing their fellows in the name of faith, lining their pockets at the expense of 
others, and practicing all manner of brutality” (Peck, 2006: 184). In Wright’s (2009: 421) view, “the 
bulk of westerners and the bulk of Muslims are in a deeply non-zero-sum relationship, [and] by and 
large aren’t very good at extending moral imagination to one another”. Alford (2009: 57) concurs 
with him in saying that religious fundamentalism seems to be the cause of many of the world’s ills, 
the reason for this being that people tend to operate from a narrower frame of reference (world 
view) than what they are capable of, thereby failing to transcend the influence of their particular 
religion, culture, particular set of parents and childhood experience upon their understanding (Peck, 
2006: 180).  
Tensions and attitudes such as those just mentioned are understandable because of the importance 
of religion to every person. Religious tenets, convictions, attitudes and behaviours of people that 
contradict one’s own deepest religious convictions are not easily tolerated, and are often seen as a 
threat. On the one hand, Van der Walt (2007: 160, 162) avers, almost all religions preach love for 
one’s neighbour; on the other, violence is committed in the name of the very same religions. Large 
numbers of people on earth suffer from the scourge of intolerance (Wright, 2009: 5). In view of this, 
Needleman (2008: 99) despairingly concludes: “All we can say is that our religious ideals, our moral 
                                                           
3
 The contents of this paragraph pertain to violent societies such as those of South and West Africa. It is not as 
applicable to other societies, such as that of the Netherlands, where conflict does not necessarily rise from 
religious differences but rather from political and ethnical differences. The growing presence of immigrant 
groups (Moroccans, Antillians, Turks, Surinams and so on) has been the cause of conflict. In some cases, 
populistic politicians have ascribed the conflict also to religious differences by pointing fingers at, for instance, 
Islam. This is not done, however, on the basis of a pertinent Christian or other religious motive but rather to 
score political points. Academics in the Netherlands are therefore hesitant to ascribe this form of intolerance 
to religious differences. 
4
This monograph, as its sub-heading indicates, focuses on the situation in schools and broader pedagogical 
contexts. The problem of (religious and cultural) intolerance surfaces in all spheres of life, however. 
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resolves, our ideologies, our campaigns, however honourably conceived, have not prevented – and 
perhaps have even hastened – the arrival of our world and our lives at the rim of despair and 
destruction”. We find ourselves in the moral dilemma of, on the one hand, attempting to destroy 
one another, and on the other hand, to save one another (Grayling, 2010: 7). 
All of these conflicts, Wright (2010: 127) insists, demand a hermeneutic of understanding that is 
inseparable from moral obligation (cf. Levinas and Ricoeur). This has been recognised by humankind. 
From its very beginning, says Gray (2009: 11), moral philosophy has been a struggle to exorcise 
conflict among individuals and groups from ethical life. In the (ancient Greek) city, as in the soul, 
harmony has been the ideal. There has always been a search for harmony of values. The same can 
be said of politics, Comte-Sponville (2005: 13-14) avers. We need politics so that conflicts of interest 
can be resolved without violence, and so that the powers of humankind can be united rather than 
opposed. Comte-Sponville (2005: 15) goes so far as to define politics as the management of conflicts, 
alliances of balances and power without resort to violence or war, not simply among individuals but 
also in society as a whole.  Politics presupposes conflict, albeit governed by moral rules, 
compromises, albeit provisional, and eventually agreements on how to resolve disagreements. Also 
somewhat cynically, Hampshire (2003: 134) contends that political thought is no longer guided by 
the positive vision of what an ideal society should be like but rather on the negative vision, on what 
is wrong with society, and tries to remedy that. According to Hampshire (2003: 140-142), conflict 
resolution lies at the heart of political justice, and that demands conflict resolution mechanisms such 
as arbitration, a search of balance between conflicting interests and convergent reasoning. All these 
processes, he admits, are risky; they can go wrong. 
The above underscores the importance of investigating the problem of religious tolerance 
respectively religious intolerance, particularly in education. It is not our purpose in this monograph 
to enter into a discussion about how to actually resolve religious, cultural and political conflict
5
. The 
above merely provides background and rationale for our efforts in the rest of this paper to embark 
on the development of an instrument to measure the degree of religious tolerance (or intolerance, 
as the case may be) among teachers and their students (pupils). Leutwyler, Petrovic and Mantel 
(2012: 111) correctly point out that teachers are central actors in education; they are expected to 
provide equal educational opportunities to all children, irrespective of religious or cultural 
orientation. These authors refer to research on teacher competence that shows that “teachers’ 
personal dispositions are crucial for performing specific functions and tasks in teaching” and that 
these dispositions “correspond to deeply held beliefs, values and norms which are strongly anchored 
in individuals’ subjective theories
6
. These subjective theories may interfere with the normative 
claims inherent to the officially taught concepts how to teach productively in culturally diverse 
settings”. Because, as will be argued below, some of these privately held theories of teachers may 
impact on the degree of tolerance that teachers are prepared to display with respect to other 
                                                           
5
 It is important to note that there does not seem to be a necessary and linear connection or causal 
relationship between religiosity and intolerance. The possibility exists, however, as has been shown, that 
people may be intolerant on religious grounds of other individuals and groups. Empirical research is required 
to understand the extent of this phenomenon, and to devise a strategy to combat the problem.  
6
Life and world views, life concepts, see the discussion of the “fishbowl” below. These subjective theories 
represent the individuals’ cognitions about the world and their connected emotions, volitions and motivations. 
They express, therefore, the individuals’ understandings and interpretations of how the world functions; they 
express how individuals have constructed their world views, in other words: their realities (Leutwyler et al, 
2012: 111-112). 
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teachers and to children of a different religious orientation, we have to find ways and means to 
measure their dispositions in dealing with religious heterogeneity
7
. 
Once the degree of religious tolerance
8
 respectively intolerance has been measured attention can be 
paid to the issue of eradicating the scourge of religious intolerance (if indeed it exists, as we suppose 
it does). This has become necessary because of the much greater diversity in our societies than ever 
before and because of the religious intolerance under which many individuals and the world in 
general have been staggering of late.  The former “foreign” religions have in recent times become 
our “neighbour” religions. As the intermingling and contact increases, the potential for conflict also 
increases (Van der Walt, 2007: 154). The time has indeed come to “dance with diversity and value 
pluralism” in the form of having empathy with the other, and to enter into dialogue with the other 
(Schreiner, 2005: 13). 
Steps taken to draft an instrument to measure tolerance 
The end destination of the discussion in this monograph is the construction of a questionnaire 
regarding religious tolerance / intolerance based on a plausible theoretical foundation. Each item in 
the questionnaire should be traceable to a particular theoretical insight thereby ensuring construct 
and content validity for the entire questionnaire (see Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011: 188-189 for 
a detailed discussion of these forms of validity). As far as could be ascertained, no questionnaire 
based on theories such as the radical centre of value theory, modus vivendi theory, social 
imagination theory and several other similar theories exists, which underscores the necessity of not 
only developing such a questionnaire and also to theoretically justify every item therein.
9
 
The construction of the questionnaire on religious tolerance entails a number of distinctive steps
10
. A 
section of this monograph will be devoted to each of those steps. The discussion of each step will 
result in the formulation of one or more items that could become part of the final questionnaire. 
After working through the different steps, and after formulating the envisaged items for the 
questionnaire, all the items will be brought together in a separate final section (see the following 
diagram for a visual outline of the steps followed in the rest of this monograph).
11
 
                                                           
7
 The use of Bennett’s model in this study should not be construed that the stadia of cultural diversity, from 
ethnocentrism to ethnorelativism exactly coincide with the degree of religious tolerance or intolerance, as the 
case may be. The concept “cultural diversity” (at which Bennett’s instrument is aimed) has a broader meaning 
than “religion”. In a sense, culture can also embrace religion. Use was made of Bennett’s distinctions for the 
purpose of measuring the attitudes or perceptions regarding others, in the broadest sense of the word.  
8
 As mentioned, (in)tolerance need not be necessarily religiously inspired. This monograph is interested, 
however, in (in)tolerance that is indeed religiously inspired. 
9
The instrument to measure (religious) tolerance flowing from this monograph can be used for various 
purposes, for instance by someone interested in measuring religious tolerance in a culturally and religiously 
diverse setting, or by someone interested in measuring tolerance of this nature in a relatively religiously 
homogeneous setting. 
10
Tolerance can also be construed in psychological terms. It will become clear from the rest of this discussion 
that the instrument to measure tolerance is not of a psychological nature but rather of a religious 
philosophical nature. 
11
 The drafting and editing of an actual questionnaire on (religious) tolerance among school teachers and their 
students will of course require further processing.  
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The steps of constructing an instrument for measuring religious 
tolerance among teachers and students (pupils) worldwide 
1. Orientation: the personal “fishbowl” 
According to Olthuis (2012:  1/7
12
), the growing realisation that there are no innocent, unbiased 
ways of looking at the world, that everyone wears “glasses” and looks at the world through a 
peculiar lens,  window or frame, has given common currency to the idea of worldview. His view 
coincides with that of Hawking and Mlodinow (2010: 23) who came up with the following rather apt 
description of what has commonly become known as a life view, a worldview or a life and 
worldview: 
A few years ago the city council of Monza, Italy, barred pet owners from keeping goldfish 
in curved goldfish bowls. The measure’s sponsor explained the measure by saying that it is 
cruel to keep a fish in a bowl with curved sides because, gazing out, the fish would have a 
distorted view of reality. But how do we know we have a true, undistorted picture of 
reality? Might not we ourselves also be inside some big goldfish bowl and have our vision 
distorted by an enormous lens? The goldfish’s picture of reality is different from ours, but 
can we be sure it is less real?  
 
It is now generally acknowledged, Olthuis (2012: 1/7, 4/7) claims, that everyone comes outfitted 
with a wide array of faith-based pre-judgments, that everyone has built-in biases, and that 
knowledge is perspectival, world-viewish, rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, and 
never is universal or absolute. A world view is the pre-conceptual orienting lens or glasses in and 
through which people reach out to the world even as the world impinges on them. World-viewing or 
world-visioning, he is convinced, is a complex, developmental (as will be demonstrated below) and 
two-way looking process (also discussed below) (Olthuis, 2012: 4/7).  
Van der Walt’s (1999: 48 ff.) catalogue of the features of a life view casts light on the nature of a life 
and world view. A life and worldview is a way of looking at reality; it orientates a person and helps 
him/her to understand the world; it is a unity; it can be both descriptive and prescriptive; it demands 
full commitment; it is typically human; it is pre-scientific or pre-theoretical; it is a deep-seated 
source of action; it provides a definite view of reality but nevertheless remains fallible, and it evokes 
deeply felt emotions in the person. Important in Van der Walt’s (1999: 51-2) description of the 
structure of the fishbowl / the life and world view is his contention that a life and world view is a 
connection between a person’s faith and his or her practical everyday life. Each person believes in 
something; faith plays an important role in the lives of all people in that it gives direction to life. A 
person’s life view, Van der Walt maintains, gives hands and feet to a person’s faith, renders faith into 
something relevant for everyday life. In his words: A life view is a vision of faith for life. It also works 
in the opposite direction: a person forms a vision of life and then changes his or her faith 
accordingly: a vision of life for faith. Olthuis (2012: 4/7) agrees: as a person grows up, his or her 
experiences determine how he or she responds and acts to what they see and experience.  Put 
differently, a worldview is not only a vision of the world, but it is at the same time a vision for the 
world. 
                                                           
12
 This article is in electronic format. The page reference means “page 1 of 7”. 
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Hawking and Mlodinow’s metaphor is particularly apt in the case of religious attitude and viewpoint 
in that it reveals several things to us. Firstly, all people find themselves “swimming” inside their own 
respective religious and life and worldview “fishbowls”, in some cases for the span of an entire life 
without ever inquiring about the distortions created by the “glass sides” of the bowl or whether 
what is seen through the sides is “correct” by generally accepted standards or the standards of other 
people. Applied to religion, this could mean that a person “swims” within the confines of a fishbowl 
the size of, and the opaqueness of the sides of which are determined by a particular religion. He or 
she might have been born within that religion, grown up, been educated in terms of it, and now lives 
in accordance with its tenets without ever questioning the “correctness” or (the word is used 
advisedly) the “truth” of what is perceived through the sides of the fishbowl. 
Secondly, the metaphor underscores the fact that people might have a skewed picture of the reality 
outside, and would not know about their distorted view of reality, unless of course the distortions 
are pointed out to them by people looking in through the sides of their particular fishbowls.  This 
tells us that Socrates was correct in stating that the unexamined life is not worth living (Armstrong, 
2001:67). While we will never have any guarantees or warranties that we will gain a “more correct” 
or “truer” picture of reality by attempting to look at reality through the sides of other people’s 
fishbowls, we could get a better understanding of reality and of our own place therein by doing so. 
Put differently, we need to examine our own fishbowl perspective as well as those of others in order 
to see whether we could come to a better view and understanding of life and of the world. This 
means that we have to occasionally change our fishbowl perspective. As Peck (2006: 33) observed:  
…we are not born with maps; we have to make them, and the making requires effort. The 
more effort we make to appreciate and perceive reality, the larger and more accurate our 
maps will be. (…) the biggest problem of map-making is not that we have to start from 
scratch, but that if our maps are to be accurate we have to continually revise them. The 
world is constantly changing. (…) the vantage point from which we view the world is (also) 
constantly and quite rapidly changing. (…) We are daily bombarded with new information 
as to the nature of reality. If we are to incorporate this information, we must continually 
revise our maps
13
, and sometimes when enough new information has accumulated, we 
must make major revisions [to our map]. The process of making revisions, particularly 
major revisions, is painful…  
 
Each individual has a life-map that changes frequently without that individual’s knowledge or 
conscious collaboration, or is deliberately changed by the individual him-/herself, depending on his / 
her experiences with regard to the world around him / her. To return to the original metaphor: a 
person is occasionally compelled to change his or her fishbowl perspective because of his or her 
interaction with reality and because of self-reflection. In extreme cases, the change might be radical, 
analogous to jumping from a round fishbowl into a square tank.  
As mentioned, a world view is also a two-way bridge: a person’s perceptions might have an effect on 
the surrounding reality, and the person’s experiences in and with reality might impact on how 
he/she sees reality. Like a two-way bridge that carries traffic to and fro, a life view represents a 
                                                           
13
 In view of Peck’s over-all argument, this revision should not be construed to mean that individuals have to 
engage in some or other empirical verification process in order to arrive at a form of truth that could be shared 
by all other people, universally, Peck merely draws attention to the fact that each person should revise his or 
her map to a level where it most adequately provides a grasp of reality or provides a depiction of reality. 
12 
 
process through which a person’s daily experiences help him or her to either confirm, question or 
correct his or her faith. According to Peck (2006: 179), in endeavouring to create a life view map that 
conforms to the reality of the cosmos and a person’s role in it, as best as a human being can know 
that reality, a person must constantly revise and extend his or her understanding to include new 
knowledge of the larger world. A person must constantly change and adapt his or her frame of 
reference regarding reality and the larger world. There is, according to Peck (2006: 182), no such 
thing as a good hand-me-down religion and life and worldview; to be vital, to be the best of which a 
person is capable, a person’s religion and concomitant life and worldview should be a wholly 
personal one, forged entirely through the fire of his or her questioning and doubting in the crucible 
of his or her own experience of reality. It is by our implicit, often inarticulate awareness of our 
intuition, Olthuis (2012: 4/7) claims, by our bodily attunement, by our learned physical, emotional 
and moral reflexes, that we make our way in the world. Recognising the role of all our senses in 
finding our way in the world suggests that we would do well to talk of world orienting or world 
visioning rather than only world viewing. In saying this, he links up with views expressed by 
Heidegger and Gadamer: prejudgments are the frames, the pictures – the world views – from which 
and through which we see the world and make sense of it (Olthuis, 2012: 5/7). In a certain sense, a 
world view is not very stable because it is constantly changing, and – in the case of some people, 
even heterodox and eclectic – all features of a world view that postmodernists tend to exploit 
(Wright, 2010: 121, 123; Olthuis, 2012: 4/7). 
As one grows up and forms a religious perspective and / or a life-view, one tends to fill one’s life-
view with typical life-view content, among others convictions and assumptions about God / god, the 
world, the order in the world – including the place and duties of the human being – and about how 
all these entities cohere with one another. Everyone has an explicit or implicit set of ideas or beliefs 
as to the essential nature of the world (Peck, 2006: 174). No-one is able to live in a “fishbowl” 
defined by universal values only since such values are necessarily general and relatively 
indeterminate. As a person grows up and forms his or her life-map, he or she re-articulates the 
general or universal values in the language of norms. Norms, as Parekh (2000: 152) observes, relate 
values to conduct, indicate how the values are to be interpreted in a person’s life, and give them life-
view content. Norms in turn can be articulated in either the language of rights or that of duties and 
obligations. This entire process is at best only “incompletely conscious” (Peck, 2006: 174). As 
individuals, people decide which values would support their principles and hence to make part of 
their world view (i.e. internalise as their own).  
The values contained in a life and worldview place an imperative on a person to act in a manner 
consistent with what he or she regards as worth striving and living for, worth protecting, honouring 
and desiring (Nieuwenhuis, 2007: 9; Lusenga, 2010: 20). 
Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #1
14
: 
1.  With which religion do you associate yourself? If you associate yourself with a mainstream 
religion such as Christianity, the Muslim faith, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism then 
please write the name of the religion in the space provided. If you do not associate yourself 
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with any mainstream religion, please write a short phrase in which you describe your 
religious stance, e.g. “I believe in a form of spirituality that is not associated with any 
mainstream religion”.  
 
Interpretation of the response: This item informs the researcher whether the respondent 
associates him- or herself with a mainstream religion, with a form of spirituality not 
associated with any mainstream religion or with no formal religion at all – as far as the 
respondent is concerned (according to the literature, no person is ever actually without 
religion, however (Gray, 2009: 2; Peck, 2006: 108)).This item reveals the nature of the 
personal “fishbowl” (life and worldview orientation) of the respondent. 
 
2. Please respond to the statement: “I live very strictly according to the tenets and 
prescriptions of my religion and world view” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally 
agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist 
attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (based on 
Bennett’s
15
 work). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of 
being situated in a religio-relative orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 
response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or 
her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own 
worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the 
views of other people.   
 
3. Please respond to the statement “I am always and acutely conscious of my religious 
convictions and beliefs whenever I do something or have to make a choice in my life” by 
marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree 
to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist 
attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). 
A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in 
religio-relative orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to 
the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” 
and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it 
for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.   
2. Expectancy filters (theory) 
Olthuis (2012: 4/7) recently developed an interesting theory about how children learn to look at the 
world around them. According to him, world-viewing or –visioning is a complex, developmental two-
way learning process and a world view is the pre-conceptual orienting glass or glasses (referred to 
above as the “fishbowl” in which a person lives or learns to live) in and through which a person 
reaches out to the world even as the world impinges on him or her.  Under the guidance of their 
                                                           
15
See Section 6 for a detailed discussion of this aspect. 
14 
 
educators and through their educators’ eyes children develop expectancy filters that affect not only 
how and what they observe and experience but also how they respond and react to what they 
observe and experience.  In other words, Olthuis says, a worldview is not only a vision of the world 
but also a vision for the world. 
According to Olthuis (2012: 4-5/7), much of our relational knowledge is encoded in emotional 
meaning-patterns which act as expectancy filters or attachment filters that predispose from a 
certain point on how a person experiences relationships. This occurs automatically, without the 
person even being aware of it. Olthuis is convinced that a person would be aware of his or her 
experiences but not of the filter itself through which the person experiences. According to him, 
psychologists have identified at least four such expectancy or attachment filters. A person using a 
secure filter is able to trust others and is open to the world; a person with a pre-occupied filter is 
engrossed in efforts to get his or her own needs met and is inattentive to the needs of others; a 
person with a dismissing filter expects nothing of others and of the world, and tends to be 
disconnected from the self or others; a person with a fearful filter may need closeness with others 
and the world but at the same time is fearful of any closeness. If early formation is good enough, in 
other words if the attachment filters are ‘secure’, there will tend to be a ‘good enough’, continually 
recalibrating, mutually interactive fit between the explicit knowledge of a love-oriented, other-
affirming world view and the person’s implicit gut knowledge. There will develop a double two-way 
movement: the implicit and explicit world views will interact dynamically and integrate in a positive 
growth spiral. The expressed and confessed world views will not only find embodied resonance in 
the implicit gut knowledge but they will act to encourage, direct and support explicit rituals, routines 
and rhythms in daily life. In that way world-viewing can play an indispensable role in the coming into 
being of liturgies of love, both personally and interpersonally in the various relationships that a 
person might find him- or herself. 
If the formed expectancy filters are fearful, dismissive or pre-occupied rather than secure, there will 
be strong, if implicit, resistance to adopting and living out a love-oriented, other-affirming world 
view. More than that, Olthuis (2012: 5/7) maintains, there will be deep-seated impulses to thematise 
world views which justify and thus rationalise a person’s fears and dreads. Unless these resistances 
are worked through, adherence to the articulated world view will lead to half-hearted lip-service. 
These expectancy or attachment filters, Olthuis (2012: 4/7) is convinced, act below a person’s 
awareness level  but nevertheless give shape to how a person feels about him- or herself, and helps 
a person make sense of his or her life, God / god and others – in other words, it gives shape to a 
person’s life and world view. These filters, which can also be described as moods or patternings, 
form in early childhood experience and continue to play an indispensable and inextricable role in a 
person’s later efforts to explicitly thematise and conceptualise his or her life and world view.  
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #2: 
1. (2.1) Which of the following views of the world is typical of how you personally view and 
approach the world and other people? Mark the response that describes your basic view of 
the world, and your attitude towards the world and other people most appropriately: 1. I 
feel safe and secure; I do not see the world and other people as a threat to me or my 
existence. 2.  I concentrate on my own affairs, and have very little to do with other people 
and their needs; I am concerned about my own welfare in this world. 3. I cannot be 
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bothered about the world and other people; I expect nothing from life or other people; one 
has to make your own fortune in life. 4. I would like to be close and friendly to other people, 
but at the same time I am fearful of them and what they could do to me. 
 
Interpretation of the responses: 1 indicates a balanced and secure world view. This person is 
not fearful of engaging with the world or with other people; he or she trusts others and the 
predictability of the world, and is generally open to the world. This person might be tolerant 
of others and their views.  2 is indicative of a pre-occupied life and world view; this is an 
inward looking person, who is not concerned about the welfare of others or of the world in 
general. This person is so concerned about him- or herself that tolerance of others and their 
views does not come into play. 3 This person is disconnected from the world, expects nothing 
from others or the world. This disconnection could be indicative of a mentality in which 
tolerance plays no significant role. 4. This person leads an ambivalent life; he or she is both 
fearful of the world and of others but also aspires to be close to others. Fear could lead to 
intolerant behaviour; on the other hand, the wish for closeness could lead to exaggerated 
tolerance of others and their views. 
3. The radical centre of values (theory) 
In the culturally, including religiously, diverse and pluralistic societies and communities that can be 
found all over the post-Second World War world people have a desire, on the one hand, to pursue 
the interests of their own well-being, and  on the other, to provide room for diverse positions and 
lifestyles. It is difficult, therefore, to find a single successful recipe or formula for ensuring both 
individual and group well-being and peaceful coexistence in the rich and complex diversity of social 
and moral phenomena that modern society consists of (Grayling, 2010: 10). Because of this 
difficulty, many communities depend on politics, the state and government to resolve conflicts of 
interests without violence and war, and also to unite all the forces in the community (Comte-
Sponville, 2005: 15). To reach a consensus of the kind needed to create a peaceful community all 
those whose interests are at stake tend to engage in a deliberative process of hearing all sides 
(Hampshire, 2003: 134, 137, 139). Such negotiations and arbitration require not only mechanisms 
through which all sides can be heard fairly but also institutions that can balance all the competing 
interests and the moral will among the participants to engage in the deliberations and to work 
across frontiers and the barriers that create divides among them. The arbitration about values 
regarding well-being, the common good and peaceful coexistence should be done fairly and justly, in 
a methodological and rational way, as far as possible under the guidance of recognised institutions 
and according to generally accepted procedures. Such interactive dialogue could lead to the 
discovery of common values that could be widely shared and even considered to be valid for the 
public domain (Van der Walt, 2007: 156). 
A basic thesis of the radical centre of values theory that will be outlined in the rest of this Section is 
that, despite the diversity of interpretations of values that we encounter in the world, there is a core 
of universal values that all people can associate with and that they will find broadly acceptable 
(Alford, 2009: 57, 163). Awareness of such universal values requires that each person for a minute 
step back from themselves and their personal interests (Needleman, 2008: 108) and that they 
develop an attitude of not excluding others or proving that their way is the only true or acceptable 
way, but to give witness of how and why they see things as they do. In that way, Olthuis (2012: 3/7) 
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maintains, a person can invite all others to share their deepest feelings and convictions for mutual 
learning and benefit. He is convinced that the welfare of humankind (and the rest of reality, 
creation) depends on such interfaith negotiation. 
As far back as 1990, cultural philosopher Frederick Turner (1990: 85, 97) wrote about the need for a 
“solvent” that could serve as a common medium for all kinds of cultural information. If we transpose 
his ideas about such a “solvent” to the realm of religious differences, he in effect claims that we can 
assume that once the bonds that hold the religious ideas and faith commitments of individuals and 
religious groups locked in a solid configuration are “loosed” by the solvent, in this case a radical 
centre of values, the elements of religion, being basically human, will have the hooks and valences to 
permit them to build up new coherent systems not limited to one religion. As the human race 
recognises itself as a “we” it will paradoxically be more and more surprised by the otherness of what 
was once considered familiar in the respective own religions. Elsewhere (Turner, 1990b: 745), he 
expresses the hope that moral values may one day be less arbitrary and thus more negotiable than 
they are today; that is, that it may be possible to develop some universal moral values from an 
understanding of human nature.  
Needleman’s (2008: 108-109) “ethics of the threshold” is likewise a plea for the adoption of more 
permanent principles, in the sense of “universally accepted”. We need to find ways and means, he 
says, to be “outwardly in the street” in our actual lives, while somehow, or to some extent, also 
remaining inwardly in the theatre of the mind. Put differently, we need to step back from ourselves 
while wholeheartedly engaging our lives and answering its obligations. In his opinion, a new morality 
will emerge from this seemingly self-contradictory effort.  As in the case of Turner’s “radical centre 
of values theory”, Needleman’s “ethics of the threshold” attempts to avoid the excesses of both 
moral absolutism and moral relativism, and is therefore akin to Makrides’s (2012: 264, 266) notion 
of a bridge between what we are and what we wish to be in the light of the ethical and religious 
commandments that have formed the basis of every civilisation in the world (Needleman, 2008: 
109), namely a trans-confessional theory of religious tolerance or a constructive dialogue about it. 
Olthuis (2012: 2/7) expresses much the same sentiment by stating that in our pluralistic, multi-faith 
global village, the honourable and respectful embrace of difference is the greatest challenge facing 
our postmodern world. We urgently need, he says, to develop a model of non-oppositional 
difference, an economy in which power-over (with its opposition to the other) is replaced with 
power-with (mutual recognition, attunement and empowerment). In a sense, Wright (2010: 132) 
also refers to a radical centre or core of values by saying that a critical spiritual education will take, 
with equal seriousness, the integrity of our developing experiences, and the authority of the-order-
of-things that stands accessible, if always ultimately beyond our understanding. 
Talen and Ellis (2002: 36, 37) summarise the theory of the radical centre of values as follows. The 
theory departs from a belief in self-organising principles, i.e. the idea that the universe is not 
deterministic but is self-renewing and infinitely creative. On the other hand, it questions the 
postmodern assumption that does not take the discussion of substantive goods, such as morality, 
seriously. It therefore departs from the assumption that there are durable, time-tested truths and 
discoveries that have been, and continue to be, made about various forms of moral behaviour 
(including the moral behaviour that is referred to as “religious tolerance”). 
Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #3: 
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The following items for a questionnaire among teachers and their pupils regarding the degree of 
religious tolerance they display could flow from the above discussion of the radical value centre 
(theory):  
1. (3.1)Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
am willing and prepared to associate myself with a set of values that has universal currency, 
a set of values, principles and norms that people say is true and valid for all people in the 
world, for all religions and world views in the world”. Please choose one of the following 
options: 1. I totally, fully agree with this statement.  2. I agree with it to a fairly large degree 
3. I only agree to a certain degree 4. Not so much 5. Not at all   
 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response would indicate that the respondent is not 
at all or at least not fully committed to some or other exclusive confessional stance far as his 
or her religious orientation is concerned. He or she is prepared to share a set of values that is 
supposedly universally applicable to all people. A 4 or 5 response will be indicative of the 
opposite, namely that the respondent is so committed to some or other confessional religious 
or life and world view stance and perspective that he or she does not find it possible or viable 
to share values, principles and norms with others of a different religious and / or life and 
world view conviction. 
 
2. (3.2)  Please respond to the statement: “I am prepared to live by values that are supposedly 
valid for all people in the world, irrespective of their personal religion and life and world 
view but I think I will need to reinterpret them according to my personal religion and world 
view”. Mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. 
Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative  of the fact that the 
respondent seems to be prepared to live by generally accepted and supposedly universally 
valid values, norms and principles but also feels the need to reinterpret those values and 
norms in terms of his or her private religious stance and life and world view. A 4 or 5 
response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1. 
 
3. (3.3) Please respond to the statement: “A value that does not flow from my own, personal 
religion and world view is worthless as a guideline for my life”. Please mark one of the 
following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. 
Totally disagree 
Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of (full) commitment 
to a personal religion and life and worldview.   A 4 or 5 response could be seen as 
confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1. 
4. The expectancy filter of value orientation 
In addition to the four expectancy or achievement filters mentioned by Olthuis (2012), and discussed 
in Section 2 above, we can distinguish a fifth, namely the expectancy filter of value orientation. 
Under the influence and guidance of our teachers and other educators, we learn how to orientate 
ourselves with regard to the values available to us in the life-world with which we slowly but surely 
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get acquainted as we grow up. Since all values are loaded concepts that mean different things to 
different people (Van der Walt, 2007: 172) and therefore seldom come to us in the sanitised form as 
described in terms of the radical centre of values, in the form of “mere names or words” without any 
life and world view content, they have to be reinterpreted.  According to Zecha (2007: 57), the 
names of values appearing in the radical centre of values “are all wonderful words which may 
certainly designate important attitudes or activities; however, they do not give a useful account of 
what the pupil is expected to do when he/she has acquired clarity, communication, loyalty, respect, 
etc.  … It is [therefore] … important to explore with the students what these key-words (value words) 
entail”. Gray (2009: 38) agrees with this in saying that values have to be given content, otherwise 
they will remain empty. Nieuwenhuis (2010: 2) significantly adds that the basically contentless 
values embodied in the radical value centre have to be filled with life-conceptual content. To be able 
to do so, says Van de Beek (2010: 41), philosophers and ethicists have been agitating for the use of 
“thick value language”, meaning language filled with life and worldview content.  According to Van 
de Beek, empty values can become more meaningful by filling them with content from the heritage 
of one’s religious and life and world view tradition. This, he claims, is what people do in real life; 
people do not live according to the abstract values contained in the radical value centre but rather 
according to how those same values have been filled-in and coloured by their respective religions 
and world views. Filled-in values do greater justice to real life than the abstract values in the radical 
centre. Ramcharan (2008: 13) agrees. Individuals generally tend to create space for themselves; 
individual choices abound, also within the holistic order of religions; individuals tend to attach their 
own interpretations and connections to the greater ideas that they encounter. 
Van de Beek (2010: 41-42) then makes a most important point with regard to the theme of the 
tolerance measuring instrument that is to flow from this monograph, namely that the more a person 
tends to fill in his or her values with confessional, religious and life and world view content, the more 
likely he or she would be to differ in life attitude from others, and the more he or she might come 
into conflict with others with a different value orientation, with values filled in with content from 
other religious and world view traditions. The more a person’s values get filled in with life view and / 
or religious content, the more specific they become and hence increasingly exclusive. This 
exclusivity, he avers, could lead to living a very private religious life the values of which cannot be 
publicly tested because they pertain, per definition, to a value world that transcends the actual 
world in which we live. In saying this, Van de Beek echoes a view expressed by Swartz (2006: 565-6), 
namely that the life-conceptual filling-in that people do can be plotted on a continuum ranging from 
the “thin-public-minimal-narrow” end, i.e. those values which may be described as “legal”, to the 
“thick-private-maximal-broad” end of a continuum, i.e. those values that are considered to be 
“personal” and private, left to the conscience of the individual, with a range of positions in-between. 
According to Du Preez and Roux (2010: 12-16), an education system cannot operate optimally on the 
basis of values filled with life and worldview content because, they claim, such values smack of 
culturalism and particularism. Such completely life-conceptually filled-in values, they aver, “[are] 
often embedded in one particular narrative (i.e. a specific religious or cultural belief system) – a 
specific life-view perspective”. The reason why an education system cannot be based on such a 
perspective – according to them - is because of “the relativity of truths, not only between different 
religious beliefs, but also the varying interpretations and truths found in one religious 
denomination.” They agree with other scholars that “a value system that is based on only one 
particular religious or cultural view means that only one narrative is taken into account. That could 
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jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of the democratic education system in South 
Africa. Such “mono” approaches to values in support of education might even take the form of a 
revival of the highly contested and divided ideology, Christian Nationalist Education, which 
dominated the apartheid era…” 
In their effort to steer away from particularist, i.e. completely life-conceptually filled values, they 
argue as follows: “We should not be asking whose values should be promoted in education, since 
this might lead to particularist hostility. It would also be precarious to accept human rights values as 
univocal and not subjected to diverse interpretation. For this reason we will discuss the position of 
Bikhu Parekh in terms of this debate, because he produces an alternative way of thinking about this. 
His position may assist in pursuing values … that (are) both contextually recognised and justified on a 
universal level. His main thesis [which Du Preez and Roux support] is that humans could express 
their moral life in different ways, but that this does not exclude anyone from being judged according 
to basic universal values. He refers to the latter notion as “minimum universality” which represents 
an intermediate position between relativism (particularism) and monism (universalism).” 
The discussion so far illustrates how the fifth expectancy filter works. Wolhuter, Steyn, De Klerk and 
Rens to whose particularistic and confessional approach Du Preez and Roux (2010: 14) object, 
applied an expectancy filter in terms of which they availed themselves of Christian values, i.e. values 
filled with content from a Christian and Biblical life view perspective, to promote discipline in 
schools. Du Preez and Roux (2010: 15), on the other hand, seem to have operated with quite a 
different expectancy filter, namely that values should be filled with contextual content that would 
not jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of a democratic country.  Whereas Wolhuter 
et al made use of Christian values in the expectancy of promoting discipline in schools, Du Preez and 
Roux made use of contextually recognised and universally justified values to promote their 
expectations in a multicultural school and education setting.  
We shall return to this issue of value fullness and emptiness and of thick and thin value language in 
the discussion of the “Valley of relative value emptiness” (see Section 5 below).  We first need to 
attend to two further issues regarding this, the fifth expectancy filter that educators employ when 
dealing with children and / or young people. The first is that the expectancy filter of value 
orientation that a child grows up with can change over time, as we have seen in Section 1. A very 
small child could be subject to a certain expectancy filter of value orientation, but gradually learn to 
develop his or her own expectancy filter of value orientation, and could end up with a value system 
filled with world view content that might be somewhat or even radically different from that of his or 
her parents and other educators. Such changes are due to influences that impact on the person 
growing up and because of his or her constant examination of own life and existence.  
The expectancy filter of value orientation can also be seen working in one and the same person. 
Take the following example: a person who is both a parent of a very young child, a church going 
person, and an educationist charged with the task of planning a national education system might, as 
parent, employ an expectancy filter in the education of the child which could lead to the instilment 
of Christian religious and church values in the child while, on the other hand, as an education system 
planner he or she might apply an expectancy filter inspiring him or her to employ values that are 
more generally or universally recognised and would promote the ideals of democracy and 
multiculturalism. Ackerley (2008: 24) thus rightly remarked about a dichotomy between, on the one 
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hand, church- and temple- and personal, cultural, life-conceptually filled values, and on the other 
hand the universal aspirations regarding, for instance, human rights. The latter is not substantively 
meaningful among people of religious communities where, for many, their religious institutions are 
the context and the structure of their moral value systems. 
Naudé (2010: 11) draws our attention to the second issue, namely the importance of distinguishing 
between relativism which says that we are all different from one another but that we should respect 
those differences regardless of whether we find the values associated with them acceptable or not. 
Relativity on the other hand says that we are different but not to such an extent that we cannot live 
peaceably together and that we should respect and tolerate another’s views and values, come what 
may.  There is sufficient agreement about generally shared values that we can live by them and also 
weigh our individual, personal convictions and values against them. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #4: 
1. (4.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
prefer values that are simple, have nothing to do with any religion or world view, that all 
people can agree with because they are formulated in very general terms, and will not lead 
to divisions and conflict among people”. 1 I strongly agree with this statement 2. I agree with 
the statement to a certain degree 3. I find this statement fairly acceptable.  4. I disagree with 
the statement to some extent. 5. I completely disagree with the statement. 
Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a respondent 
preferring to operate with minimalist, general values, values that have been thinly 
formulated. This person seems to pave the way for getting along with others on the basis of 
rather generally shared values.  A 4 or 5 response would indicate that the respondent prefers 
values that are maximally, thickly formulated in terms of his or her religious and life and 
world view convictions. Respondents who opt for a 4 or a 5 seem to be more likely to be more 
conscious of their own religion and life and worldview rooted value system, and hence also 
more aware of differences between his or her value system and those of others whose value 
systems might be rooted in different religions and world views. 
5.  The “valley of relative value emptiness” 
The phrase “valley of relative value emptiness” is not meant as a derogatory term but rather as one 
that describes a stance in which the discussants attempt to transcend their personal life-
conceptually meaning-filled values for the sake of a more general ideal, for example the promotion 
of multiculturalism, human rights, peaceful coexistence or democracy. It is understandable that 
some people, in some circumstances, might opt for the application of such relatively life-
conceptually empty values. Education system planners, for instance, might find themselves in a 
position where they have to apply such universally recognised and acceptable values as those 
contained in the radical value centre discussed in Section 2 because of the demands of democracy, 
fairness, social justice, peaceful coexistence and the ideals of multiculturalism. One example of this 
can be found in the three-fold position described by Ackerley (2008: 38): 
For those moved by human rights violations, (this) book offers three things. First, I offer them 
a philosophical justification for the political legitimacy of their moral intuitions. Regardless of 
the spiritual, religious, and personal resources that motivate them to think about the rights of 
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all humanity, whether their own moral system is grounded in a transcendental divine power, 
in the power of good argument, or in the power of human relationships, the concern for 
human rights has universal authority to guide criticism. Second, I offer those working for the 
human rights of all of humanity a way to think about human rights that is dictated neither by a 
cultural nor by a political tradition, but has nevertheless a universal authority to guide 
criticism. Third, the book offers guidance in thinking about universal human rights so that 
human rights activism continues in ways that support the human rights of all of humanity by 
transforming the institutions and practices that condition the lives of all of humanity. 
It is clear from this brief exposition that Ackerley wishes to move his discussion of human rights 
values out of the context of life-conceptual meaning-filling into what has been described above as 
the “valley of relative value emptiness” where the discussion is characterised by “philosophical 
justification”, “political legitimacy”, people’s general “moral intuitions”, “universal authority”, not 
dictated by any “cultural or political tradition”, “the rights of all humanity” and so on.  
As mentioned above, because of working in the public domain of human rights theory, Parekh 
(2000) also went a short step further in the direction of filling values with meaning in his attempt to 
“contextually fill” certain values that are universally recognised and justified. His description of the 
process entails four steps, of which the first three pertain to values that are relatively contentless: 
First, universal values can be understood in a variety of ways ranging from the minimalist to the 
maximalist. Secondly, since these universal values are necessarily general and relatively 
indeterminate, they should as far as possible be articulated in the language of norms. Norms relate 
values to conduct, indicate how the values are to be interpreted, and give them content. Thirdly, we 
should not confuse values with particular institutional mechanisms; we should not be dogmatic 
about values, and we should not so identify the institutions that hold particularist values with the 
values that the values cannot be discussed and defended separately. In the fourth place, Parekh 
recognises the need for life-conceptual content-filling of values but clearly sees it as a matter for the 
personal or private sphere: since every society enjoys the moral freedom to interpret and prioritise 
the agreed body of universal values, we cannot condemn its practices simply because they are 
different from or offend against ours (Parekh, 2000: 152-153). There is an inevitable dialectical 
interplay, he admits (Parekh, 2000: 158), between the relatively thin universal values and the thick 
moral structures that characterise different societies. The universal values regulate the national 
structures even as the latter pluralise the values. 
As observed earlier, others, such as parents of very young children and educators teaching children 
in the context of a religious institution such as a church, mosque, synagogue or temple might feel 
themselves compelled to apply a value system that is completely filled in by the life and worldview 
of that particular religious denomination. Parekh’s (2000: 158) position of regulative or pluralist 
universalism will not appeal to them. 
There might also be others who, for reasons of their own, prefer not to bind themselves to any 
religious value orientation and opt for a relativist, pragmatic or even a more or less laissez faire value 
stance. A moderate form of this, as Grayling (2010: 7-8) noted, is moral relativism, i.e. the view that 
there are no universal truths about what is right and wrong, but rather what counts as such in each 
different society is determined by that society’s own traditions, beliefs and experience. There is no 
objective ground for deciding between them. The pragmatist, in turn, holds the attitude of “doing 
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something” in the morally right or acceptable “direction” as conceptualised by the community, 
without interfering too much with other legitimate and personally significant commitments and 
avocations (Grayling, 2010: 18). The laissez faire approach in turn is a “do nothing” approach, says 
Grayling (2010: 18-190); it holds that unless a person can achieve the utmost in terms of value-
driven actions and behaviour, let him or her do nothing, which “is the same thing as letting him be 
careless and indifferent”. 
The current postmodern attitude of value relativism / relativity is also characteristic of the “valley of 
relative value emptiness”. According to Parkin (2011: 154-155), people have an entire supermarket 
of values at their disposal, and its impact on the soul, on the inner self of disorganised and 
vulnerable individuals has become the criterion for choosing a value (De Botton, 2012: 95). 
According to Bower (2005: 181, 254), it is a tenet of the postmodern perspective that people 
“invent” and create meaning in regard to their identity, value and purpose. A system of beliefs (i.e. a 
modernistic grand narrative) that weakens individual responsibility stands in the way of the 
emergence of an open society and an adult world in which the principle of individual responsibility 
and the accountability that goes with it, is the basis of all human relationships. McGrath (2005: 218) 
concurs with Bower’s analysis: reacting to the simplistic overstatements of the Enlightenment, 
postmodernity has stressed the limits to human knowledge and encouraged a toleration of those 
who diverge from the “one size fits all” philosophy of modernity. The world in which we live is now 
seen as a place where nothing is certain, nothing is guaranteed, and nothing is unquestionably given. 
It has become fashionable, Needleman (2008: 61) contends, to deny the existence of absolutes in 
the ethical sphere: who is to say what is good or bad, right or wrong? What is good in one place or 
for one person may be bad in another place or for another person. All morality is seen as relative to 
time, place, ethnicity, religion, social class, nationality and so on. For many people of this day and 
age, experiences are immediately translated into simply what “feels good” or what “feels bad”. The 
postmodern zeitgeist, says Needleman (2008: 108), dispirits people with ethical cynicism and 
relativism. It reduces every viewpoint, every norm and conviction, however firmly believed by some, 
to a temporary phenomenon, an event of transient nature. Everything is seen as historically 
determined and historically relative, in other words, everything is relativised (Van der Walt, 2007: 
178).  
According to Olthuis (2012: 1/7), worldviews are nowadays frowned upon because they are 
considered euphemisms for ideologies with their dogmatism. We need, it is said, to move beyond 
such exclusivism into an era after worldviews (i.e. grand narratives). According to the postmodern 
stance, life is more than logic; there is a limit to knowledge and knowledge is never disinterested, 
neutral, a-temporal or a-spatial. There is no such thing as Universal Reason, and reason is never 
impartial; it is always in the service of wider and broader interests. All grand narratives that claim to 
explain everything have lost credibility (Olthuis, 2012: 3/7). According to Wright (2010: 122), some 
postmodernists even claim that ultimately we fail to obtain knowledge of reality because, at the end 
of the day, there is no such thing as reality, no actual order of things. The notion of reality only exists 
within our psychological conventions and linguistic contractions
16
. 
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Wright (2010: 123) correctly says that these thinkers fall in the epistemic fallacy of confusing reality with 
knowledge of reality. We have no grounds to deny the existence of reality simply because it is beyond our 
intellectual powers to fully comprehend it. 
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No person is completely a-religious or can live without a trace of life-conceptual content filling of his 
or her values. All people have faith in something. Gray (2009: 13) rightly comes to the conclusion 
that “secular thinkers imagined that they had left religion behind, when in truth they had only 
exchanged religion for humanist faith in progress”. For this reason, he regards contemporary 
humanism as a religion in its own right (Gray, 2009: 15). In view of this, Peck’s (2006: 174) advice to 
psychologists is to find out their patients’ religions even if they say they do not have any. The same 
applies for a life and worldview; every person has an explicit or implicit set of ideas and beliefs as to 
the essential nature of the world. It is nowadays widely acknowledged that all knowledge is 
perspectival, world view-ish, rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, rather than 
universal or absolute (Olthuis, 2012: 1/7). 
What all of the above means for a person who wishes to exist in the “valley of relative value 
emptiness” is that it takes a special effort to leave one’s religious convictions, assumptions and 
prejudgements behind and to contrive living according to those supposedly empty values that 
transcend all life-conceptual differences among people.
17
 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #5: 
1. (5.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking with a cross one of the options 
that follow: “I prefer to deal with other people on the basis of values that are generally 
acceptable to all people, and not on the basis of my own religious and life view values which 
tend to make me different.” 1. Totally agree with the statement 2. Agree to a large extent 3. 
I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree to a certain extent  5. I totally disagree  
Interpretation of the responses: Responses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the respondent sees him- 
or herself as preferring values that are relatively devoid of content or that are universal 
though contextually filled and meaningful. The respondent seems to prefer to operate in the 
“valley of relative value emptiness” in order to get along with most other people, irrespective 
of their value stances. Responses 4 and 5 might be indicative of a respondent who prefers not 
to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” but rather with values that are more or 
less conceptually filled with meaning and content. The value stance of such respondents is 
likely to be rooted in a pertinent religious, faith or life and worldview commitment. 
6. A tendency towards total tolerance of others, their religious 
persuasion and their values 
A person preferring to relate with people of different religious and life and world view persuasion on 
the basis of the relatively “contentless” values embodied in the radical value centre, with the bare 
minimum of religious or world view filling, with values couched in thin value language, with a 
(postmodern) relativistic value attitude, and with a pragmatic or even a laissez faire attitude with 
respect to religious and world view differences, could be assumed to be tolerant of other people and 
their religious convictions and assumptions. It should be noted, however, that since no person is 
ever without religion or without religious convictions and a life and world view, no person is ever 
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As mentioned, a person such as a scholar or a curriculum designer may periodically and temporarily, for 
purposes of scientific objectivity in a diverse setting, contrive to transcend his or her personal life view 
convictions et cetera, but such a stance is not viable as a consistent life-view, certainly not for a person of 
integrity (Nolan, 2009: 13). 
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likely to be without a value system on the basis of which he or she would, if the occasion arose, be 
intolerant of the views of people of different persuasion. Nevertheless, theoretical provision has to 
be made for the possibility of total tolerance, for an attitude of “anything goes”, for complete 
relativism, for total naivety.  Bennett (1993) arguably made similar provision by distinguishing in his 
developmental model stages V “Adaptation to difference” and VI “Integration of difference”. 
It is necessary to stress at this point that absolute tolerance of others and their views is not 
necessarily “wrong” or “incorrect”. Whether it is to be adjudged as wrong or incorrect will largely 
depend on the observer’s religious stance, as will now be explained with the help of Bennett’s (1993) 
developmental model in which he makes certain distinctions in terms of cultura sensitivities (for the 
purposes of this monograph and of the questionnaire that has to result from it, Bennett’s 
distinctions in the cultural domain will be transposed to religious sensitivities. The formal distinctions 
that Bennett made and categorised can be just as valid as categories regarding religious attitude):  
I. Denial of difference: a person in this category is unable to construe religious difference. 
His or her attitude could be characterised by benign stereotyping (well-meant but 
ignorant or naïve observations) and superficial statements of tolerance. This attitude can 
sometimes be accompanied by attribution of deficiency in intelligence or personality to 
religiously deviant behaviour. There is a tendency to dehumanise outsiders and to 
isolate them in homogeneous groups, which deprives the person from either the 
opportunity or the motivation to construct relevant categories for noticing and 
interpreting religious difference. The person’s intentional separation from religious 
difference protects his or her worldview (“fishbowl”) from change by creating conditions 
of isolation.  
II. Defence against difference: a person in this category recognises religious difference 
coupled with a negative evaluation of most religious variations; the greater the 
difference, the more negative the evaluation. His or her thinking is characterised by 
dichotomous us-them thinking and is frequently accompanied by overt negative 
stereotyping. He or she has a tendency towards religious proselytising of “other” 
religions
18
.  The person in this category possesses cognitive categories for construing 
religious difference as isolated by evaluating them negatively, thus protecting his or her 
own world view from change. His or her existing world view is protected by exaggerating 
its positive aspects compared to all other religions. Any neutral or positive statement 
about another religion may be interpreted as an attack on his or her own religion. 
III. Minimisation of difference: a person in this category recognises and accepts superficial 
religious differences such as rituals and eating customs, while holding that all human 
beings are essentially the same. The emphasis is on the similarity of people and the 
commonality of basic values. There is a tendency to define the basis of commonality in 
egocentric terms (since everyone else is essentially like us, just be yourself). There is also 
an emphasis in terms of similarity (after all, we are all human). The emphasis may be on 
commonality of human beings as subordinate to a particular supernatural being, religion 
or social philosophy (we are all children of God whether we know it or not). The own 
worldview is protected by attempting to subsume difference into what is already 
familiar (deep down we are all the same). 
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See discussion of inclusivism below. 
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IV. Acceptance of difference: a person in this category recognises and appreciates religious 
differences in behaviour and values. Acceptance of religious differences is regarded as a 
viable alternative solution to the organisation of human existence.
19
 This person 
operates on the basis of religious relativity, and begins to interpret phenomena within 
their different cultural or religious contexts. Categories of difference are consciously 
elaborated. He or she is able to analyse complex interaction in religion-contrast terms. 
He or she has the ability to see beliefs, values and other general patterns of assigning 
“goodness” or “badness” to ways of being in the world in their different cultural and 
religious contexts. 
V. Adaptation to difference: this person is able to develop communication skills that 
enable inter-religious communication
20
, and to make effective use of empathy
21
, or 
frame of reference shifting, to understand and be understood across religious 
boundaries. This person is able to consciously shift perspective into alternative religious 
world view elements and to act religiously in appropriate ways in those areas. He or she 
is also able to shift their behaviour completely into different religious frames without 
much effort. For this person, internalisation of more than one complete worldview is 
viable. Knowledge and behaviour are linked to conscious intention, and category 
boundaries (i.e. between religions) become more flexible and permeable. 
VI. Integration of difference: a person in this category is able to internalise a bi-religious or 
multi-religious frame of reference. He or she is able to maintain a definition of identity 
that is “marginal” to any particular religion, and sees the self as “in process”. He or she is 
able to use multiple religious frames of reference in evaluating phenomena, and is able 
to accept an identity that is not primarily based in any one religion. He or she is able to 
facilitate constructive contact between religions for the self and for others, and is willing 
to participate to some extent in a “marginal reference group”, where other marginals 
rather than religious compatriots are perceived to be similar
22
. World view and religious 
categories are seen as “constructs” maintained by self-reflexive consciousness (religions 
and individuals are “making themselves up”). 
Leutwyler et al (2012: 113) gives a brief summary of the meaning of Bennett’s developmental model, 
again “translated” by the author of this monograph into religious sensitivities
23
. Inter-religious 
sensitivity can be approached in terms of this six-tier model  in terms of religious attitude, from a 
religio-centric on the one hand, to a religio-relative attitude or view on the other.
24
 The first three 
levels refer to a religio-centric world view, and the last three to a religio-relative world view. People 
with the former world view experience their own religion as the only reference to construct their 
reality while the deeply held beliefs and behaviours from their primary socialisation remain 
unquestioned. They are seen as “just the way they are”. In contrast, individuals with a religio-relative 
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See the discussion of the social contract below. 
20
See discussion of dialogical pluralism below. 
21
See discussion of moral imagination, empathy and sympathy below. 
22
The “new reformation group” in South Africa could be seen as falling in this category. 
23
 The formal categories distinquished for cultural attitude by Bennett and now explained by Leutwyler et al 
are valid – in a formal sense, not in terms of content – for religious attitude categories. 
24
We are not so much concerned about the developmental aspects in this monograph. These aspects are by no 
means unimportant, however; they will have to be reckoned with in efforts to redress any shortcomings 
among teachers and pupils with respect to religious tolerance. 
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world view experience their beliefs and behaviours as only one organisation of reality among many 
other possibilities. This distinction has clear implications for religious tolerance among teachers and 
students. Teachers and students will have different images of religious differences and similarities 
and therefore about inter-religious education and dialogue if they are in a religio-centric stage of 
development or if they have developed a religio-relative perspective. It can be expected that 
teachers and students in the former stage of development will have a less tolerant view of others of 
different religious persuasion than those in the latter stage. 
The question that confronts us here is whether education systems world-wide are meeting the 
target for education to encourage “tolerance and respect for the religion of others” also included in 
official political statements. Religions have not disappeared, as some social scientists predicted; 
religion now exists in more differentiated and individualised forms. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, institutionalised religion has lost influence and relevance in society, and religiously 
plural settings in school and in the classroom have become more and more common (Schreiner 
,2005: no page number). The question is whether Schreiner  is correct in surmising that “teachers 
are getting sensible to the individualised form of religion of their pupils as the context and the 
content of teaching”. Are they indeed coming to grips with the religious diversity with which they 
are confronted in school and in class? Are they indeed as religiously tolerant as expected? What 
about the children whom they are teaching – are they as tolerant as could be expected of religious 
differences in others (i.e. their teachers, their school mates)? Or do we have the situation described 
by Leutwyler et al (2012: 116): “It may be assumed that the more or less appropriate policies in this 
regard are not implemented in daily teaching – precisely because they do not fit the teachers’ 
individual belief systems”. As far as South Africa is concerned, Du Preez and Roux (2010: 12) indeed 
found the following: “Early in our research project, it became evident that some teachers believe 
that discipline can only be maintained through the elevation of cultural values (particularism). One 
reason for this phenomenon could be that people in many instances see traditional, cultural values 
as preferable to emancipatory, human rights values. … An illustration of a particularist stance is 
illustrated (sic) by Wolhuter and Steyn and De Klerk and Rens who argue that acceptance of certain 
Christian values could promote discipline in schools.” Could it be that teachers teaching children 
from a particularist, religio-centric perspective might be more or less intolerant towards others 
adhering to other particularist or confessional orientations? The purpose of the questionnaire to be 
developed on the basis of this monograph is to establish whether or not this is indeed the case. 
As will be discussed in the following Section, religious tolerance as such is characterised by a number 
of technical considerations. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #6: 
1. (6.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
could not care less what other people think and do; I feel comfortable around them when 
they act according to the dictates of their religion and world view; it does not matter to me 
what people think and do in terms of their religion; other people, their ideas and actions do 
not bother me at all”. 1. I totally agree with this statement 2. I agree with this statement to a 
certain extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree with this statement to a 
considerable degree  5. I totally disagree with this statement. 
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Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is more 
or less completely tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different religious 
persuasion. He or she may even be suspected of an “anything goes” attitude, and hence might 
belong in Bennett’s categories IV to VI. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is 
not prepared to be quite as tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different 
persuasion, and hence could belong in Bennett’s categories I, II or III. 
7. The technicalities of religious and world view tolerance 
The first technical point about tolerance that has to be kept in mind is that the well-being of 
individuals and of their societies depends to a significant extent on the degree of tolerance that is 
displayed by all concerned (Gray, 2009:21; Strauss, 2009: 509). As stated at the beginning of this 
monograph, societies are today more diverse and pluralistic than ever, and religious and cultural
25
 
conflict has become a fact of life. Tolerance therefore can be seen as the key to living together in a 
society that harbours many different ways of life. Societies and their members have to search for the 
best ways of living together, and tolerance seems to be one of the attitudes most sorely needed to 
ensure the well-being of all concerned. Olthuis (2012: 5/7) correctly observes that people have to 
make sense of the diversity of cultures, religions and world views around them; from their different 
viewpoints (through the sides of their different “fishbowls”, as it were), they are called to negotiate, 
to work together for justice with compassion, for mercy with truth. 
The second technical point is that tolerance does not mean accepting a belief or a practice that one 
does not agree with. As two authoritative dictionaries show, tolerance refers to endurance and not 
necessarily to acceptance of what has to be endured. Tolerance refers to the act of being tolerant, in 
other words the capacity to endure something such as pain or hardship, to treat with indulgence and 
forbearance, and to accept that people tend to hold religious and world view opinions that differ 
from the established religion of a country (Sinclair, 1999) or from one’s own.  It could also refer to 
allowing the existence or occurrence of something that one dislikes or disagrees with without 
interference (Soames & Stevenson, 2008). What underlies tolerance, Grayling (2002: 9) correctly 
concludes, is the recognition that there is plenty of room in the world for alternatives to exist, and if 
one is offended by what other do “it is because one has let it get under one’s skin”. In contrast to the 
dictionaries mentioned above, Van der Walt (2007: 202-203) mentions acceptance of what has to be 
tolerated but he immediately qualifies such acceptance. Tolerance, he says, is the degree to which 
we accept things of which we disapprove; the degree with which we understand differences and 
learn how to differ from others, and does not preclude appreciation for what is good in other 
religions (for instance). As far as acceptance is concerned he qualifies his definition with the rider 
that we are not to tolerate everything with which we do not agree
26
 (which explains the use of “the 
degree to which” in his definition of tolerance above).  According to Boersma (2012), tolerance is a 
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Other factors, such as economics and population pressure, might also lead to forms of intolerance and 
violence. 
26
Boersma (2012) shares a similar sentiment. In his case, the matter is complicated by a linguistic problem. He 
writes in Dutch: “Kern van tolerantie is dat ik verdraag wat ik niet accepteer maar wel aanvaard”. The Dutch 
“accepteer” is derived from English “accept”. The Dutch word “aanvaar” also means “to accept”. Taken at face 
value, Boersma seems to say: “The core idea of tolerance is that I tolerate or forbear that which I do not accept 
but which I do accept”. However, in view of the rest of his exposition one has to conclude that “accepteer” has 
a different meaning from “aanvaar”: “accepteer” seems to mean something like “do not agree with”, so what 
Boersma in fact states is: “The core of tolerance is that I tolerate something that I cannot agree with but which 
I nevertheless accept”.  If this translation is correct, he seems to agree with Van der Walt (2007: 202-203). 
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concept with inherent tension
27
, in the sense that it causes pain and requires from the person having 
to tolerate a degree of violation of his or her value system
28
.  
The third technical point pertains to the extent to which one (or a society) should tolerate beliefs 
and actions that they prefer not to adopt. Put differently, to what extent can open societies tolerate 
the existence and the efforts of fundamentalist
29
 enemies of freedom, in other words, those people 
who tend to live with a value system that is filled with value content from their own personal and 
private religious and world view approach and commitment to the extent that they openly and 
contemptuously reject the values contained in the radical value centre referred to above or in the 
value systems of others whose value systems differ from theirs? To what extent must open societies, 
i.e. societies that tend to operate on the values contained in the radical value centre; values that are 
universally recognised but contextually understood, abandon their own habits of tolerance in order 
to deny the right of its fundamentalist enemies to exist? (Bower, 2005: 43). The answers to both 
these questions, according to Grayling (2002: 8), should be a resounding “No!”.  Tolerance, he says, 
should protect itself, and can do so by saying that anyone is free to moot a point of view but no one 
can force another to accept it. The only acceptable coercion in an open and democratic society is 
that of reason and argument. Members of an open society have only one obligation: the power of 
honest reasoning, of argument.  Grayling is convinced that “the reasonings of an open mind will 
come out in favour of what is good and true” (ibid.). 
The fourth technical point about religious and other forms of tolerance is that it depends on trust 
(Arielly, 2010; 127-128; Ilbury & Sunter, 2011: 73) and moral imagination. Tolerance depends on 
trusting the bona fides of all other members of society. If trust is broken for whatever reason, there 
can be no tolerance of the other’s beliefs or actions. A lack of trust also cramps our moral 
imagination, in other words our capacity to put ourselves in the shoes of the other person.  As will 
be indicated below, the notion of peaceful coexistence (a healthy modus vivendi) depends to a large 
extent on the degree of trust and moral imagination that prevail in a society. 
The fifth technical point pertains to the reasons why people are either tolerant or intolerant.  
Morton (1998: 167 et seq.) explains this in some detail. Most people, he says, are torn between 
tolerance of the values of other people, which may be based on ideas and preferences that they do 
not understand, and dislike of values that seem wrong, especially those that seem to involve cruelty 
or hatred. Different people resolve the conflict differently. Some people are extremely tolerant (as 
demonstrated above with reference to people with a totally relativist or laissez faire attitude) of 
other people’s values, allowing others to hold and follow those values that seem to them repulsive. 
Others are extremely intolerant (as also demonstrated above with reference to people with a 
militant fundamentalist and radically exclusivist attitude), thinking that others should not hold and 
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According to Boersma (2012), the Christian view of tolerance differs from the liberal view in that the latter holds that one 
has to tolerate the other out of respect for his or her freedom (as a human right). Christians do not believe that human 
beings possess such absolute freedom, and rather base their conception of freedom on love, as mentioned by 
Olthuis (see previous paragraph in this section). 
28
Boersma (2012) also distinguishes a “milder” form of tolerance, namely “gedogen”, to disapprove of 
something but to just look the other way. The English equivalent of “gedogen” might indeed be “to look the 
other way” or to endure. 
29
Living strictly according to certain dogmas and doctrines or a set of thick (content filled) values does not 
necessarily amount to being a fundamentalist. Adherence to such dogmas and doctrines also do not 
necessarily lead to violence and intolerance – as the rest of the discussion in this monograph will illustrate. 
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follow values that are from their point of view wrong. These different attitudes can be explained as 
follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence in his or 
her own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their 
beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or 
her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society with a 
single set of shared values. 
The final technical point that has to be kept in mind is that the concept of tolerance has recently 
undergone a shift, what Van der Walt (2007: 203) refers to as a secular down-scaling , a shift from 
tolerating the ideas and beliefs of others to tolerating others. This is due, in his opinion, to an ethics 
of politeness, courtesy and decency. In his opinion, this down-scaling is a result of modern-day 
(postmodern) relativism which seems to promote an ethic of gentility and studied moderation; a 
code of social discourse whereby “religious beliefs and political convictions are to be expressed 
discreetly and tactfully and in most cases, privately. Convictions are to be tempered by good taste 
and sensibility. It is an ethics that pleads “no offence”. The greatest breach of these norms is 
belligerence and divisiveness; the greatest atrocity is to be offensive and thus intolerant. 
Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #7: 
1.  (7.1)Please respond to the following statement by marking the option that represents your 
view the most accurately: “The well-being of society and of the individuals that make up 
society depends on my being tolerant towards them, their ideas, their religion and their 
beliefs”. 1. I completely agree 2. I largely agree 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5 I do not 
agree at all. 
Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is 
religiously and otherwise tolerant of others and their ideas. A 4 or 5 response would be 
indicative of a person who is (fairly) intolerant of others and their ideas. 
 
2. (7.2) Please respond to the following statement by marking the most appropriate response 
that follows: “I just tolerate things in others that I do not like and will never accept”. 1. I fully 
agree 2. I agree to a large extent 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I completely disagree 6. I 
have no opinion about this 
 
Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a fairly tolerant 
person whereas a 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a fairly intolerant person. 
 
3. (7.3) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
can place myself in the shoes of a person who holds a religion and worldview that are 
completely different from mine and which I shall never accept as my own religion or life 
view.” 1. I fully agree with this statement 2. I agree to a certain extent 3. I agree 4. I do not  
agree to a considerable extent 5. I do not agree at all. 
 
Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of a person with moral 
imagination and who might be tolerant of the religious views of others. A 4 or 5 response is 
indicative of a respondent with very little or no moral imagination and who could be quite 
intolerant of others and their religious views. 
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4. (7.4) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: 
“My natural inclination is to trust other people”. 1. Fully agree 2. Agree 3. Agree to a 
considerable extent 4. Disagree to a considerable extent 5. Totally disagree. 
 
Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of the fact that the respondent 
is a trusting person and therefore probably tolerant of others. A 4 and 5 response is 
indicative of the fact that the person is not naturally inclined to trust others and therefore 
might be fairly intolerant. 
 
5. (7.5) Which TWO of the following views of others is most applicable to you as a person? (1) 
My confidence in my own moral beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow 
their beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own moral beliefs is high. (4) I 
believe in a unified society with a single set of shared values.  Mark ANY TWO in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3 4. 
 
Interpretation of the responses:  These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a 
person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence is his or her 
own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow 
their beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) 
because his or her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a 
unified society with a single set of shared values. 
 
8. Some further technical distinctions 
According to Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 39), three formal views are usually distinguished as 
far as the relationships among religions are concerned, namely exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism 
(also see Van der Walt, 2007: 195). The weakness of this typology lies in its rather vague 
understanding of pluralism. Whereas today there seems to be consensus about the models or views 
of exclusivism, the pluralist view is described in many ways, ranging from a relativistic approach 
stressing the quality of all religions, to a dialogical approach stressing the need for dialogue in order 
to find religious truth. Vermeer and Van der Ven therefore decided to differentiate this three-way 
typology more closely by breaking down the pluralism model into two components, with the result 
that they began working with a four-way distinction within religious plurality: exclusivism, 
inclusivism, pluralism and dialogical pluralism. 
In its most extreme form, the exclusivist claim would be that only one’s own religion is absolutely 
and uniquely true and that all other religions are therefore false. A more open version of this view is 
one where the followers of one religious tradition admit that their religion is not the sole possessor 
of truth in all respects and that they may perhaps learn from other religious traditions. Such a more 
open version is, according to Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 39-40), also exclusivist as long as the 
adherents to a religion are not prepared to question their own basic beliefs in light of encounters 
with followers of other religions. People entertaining such a more open view of exclusivism might be 
prepared to work together with adherents to other religions for the sake of promoting some or 
other shared interest, but they do not feel the need to enter into a dialogue about matters of 
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religious truth or salvation because they feel that they are already in possession of the truth. 
Exclusivism is characterised by an unwillingness to enter into religious dialogue with followers of 
other religious traditions. Exclusivism is characterised by absolutism, uniqueness, emphasis on 
difference, particularism and exclusive view of truth (Van der Walt, 2007: 197). 
Like exclusivists, inclusivists maintain the truth and superiority of their own religious tradition, but 
differ from the former in that the other religious traditions are considered as products of divine 
revelation or as legitimate paths to salvation. This is mainly done by interpreting other faiths in 
terms of one’s own faith and by claiming that other faiths either originated from one’s own faith or 
will one day reach fulfilment in one’s own faith. The difference between exclusivism and inclusivism 
is only one of degree (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004: 40). Generally speaking, inclusivism is 
characterised by relativism, emphasis on similarities, egalitarianism, the equality of all faiths as far as 
truth claims are concerned, and the view that truth is relative (Van der Walt, 2007: 197). 
As far as the third view, pluralism, is concerned, the basic claim is not that all religions are equally 
valid because they all worship and believe in the same God, but rather from a phenomenological 
point of view it is argued that the essence of all religions lies in the human experience of the 
transcendent, and from an epistemological view it is claimed that the articulation of this basic 
experience in belief systems is always related to a particular cultural environment and therefore 
cannot claim absolute validity. Religious pluralism can take one of several forms. Parallel pluralism 
holds that all faiths promote certain parallel dogmas, for instance about evil; puzzle pluralism holds 
that every religion only possesses a fragment of the full and final truth (about, for instance, 
salvation); gradual pluralism holds that in some religions the final truth comes to the fore in a 
stronger way than in others (Van der Walt, 2007: 196). 
Pluralism not only claims on a phenomenological basis that all religions are based on one and the 
same religious experience but also on epistemological grounds that they are always related to 
specific cultural environments. On the basis of these two arguments, the conclusion is drawn that 
basically all religions offer an adequate picture of the Divine. Although this does not mean that there 
are no metaphysical and theological differences between religions, the emphasis in pluralism is on 
what is shared by the different religious traditions rather than on what separates them from one 
another (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004: 41-42). 
The fourth view, brought to the fore by Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 42-43), is dialogical 
pluralism which stresses the need for an inter-religious dialogue for the mutual enrichment of 
different religious traditions. This view attempts to address two shortcomings of exclusivism, 
inclusivism and pluralism, namely the lack of perspective exchange between religions, the ability and 
willingness to try to understand the other in terms of own religious preconceptions; also the second 
shortcoming that is of an epistemological nature: exclusivists claim that their religion is the only valid 
or true one among many, and the inclusivists attempt to reconcile different sets of incompatible 
beliefs. The possibility exists, Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 43-44) claim, that aspects of religious 
truth also can be found in other religions. Therefore, in order to avoid these difficulties, dialogical 
pluralists avoid all preconceptions about the truth or falsity of different religions and instead claim 
that religious truth can only be discovered in a dialogue between religions. At the core of dialogical 
pluralism is a particular understanding of inter-religious dialogue, namely as a communicative 
process in which people of several traditions enter into discussions about what is ultimately true and 
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of value in life. This dialogue consists of three distinctive phases, namely information exchange, 
perspective exchange and perspective coordination. Van der Walt (2007: 187) supports the notion of 
conducting a dialogue between the adherents of the different religions. In his opinion, such dialogue 
is of import for the sake of a just and peaceful society. The only condition for dialogue, he says, is 
that one should believe that all religions are not all the same, because if they were, dialogue would 
be without purpose. He also warns that one should not enter such a dialogue with an attitude of 
superiority and pride as if one held the monopoly on truth. In such a dialogue, the discussion is not 
about who is right, but what could be seen as the truth. The aim of the dialogue is to lessen the 
tension between the different religions and to promote a peaceful and just society. This cannot take 
place without mutual understanding and trust. The alternative, he correctly concludes, is 
misunderstanding, conflict and violent clashes. 
In Van der Walt’s (2007: 207-208) view, pluralism can easily deteriorate into intolerance. His 
argument runs as follows. Absolute (in the sense of consistent) relativism is impossible. If every 
religion were relative, then the (mild and radical) relativists would have to acknowledge that their 
own viewpoint itself is also relative. Since no-one can think consistently relativistically – for then 
such a person would simply have to keep quiet – the so-called relativists today defend their 
standpoint in an intolerant way. Their so-called tolerance thus means intolerance towards all who do 
not share their point of view. The religious tolerance for which their “tolerance” fought is destroyed 
– ironically – by the same “tolerance”. On close analysis, a “tolerance” which thinks relativistically 
about truth is by no means an example of “democracy” in the religious field. It creates the 
impression of being “enlightened” and very modest but in essence relativism is just as arrogant as 
the other religions which are blamed for being arrogant.  
Although Van der Walt (2007: 195) begins his outline of the different views of the relationship 
between religions with the usual distinction between exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism, he 
discusses a whole variety of positions with regard to these views.  He begins, for instance, by saying 
that the phenomenological method promotes a view that can be typified as “historicist relativism” 
since it undermines the rather absolute nature of all religions with its basic assumption that 
everything is relative. It propagates the modern secularist relativism which teaches that all religions 
are equally true or false, and that it makes no difference which one chooses to adhere to. In Van der 
Walt’s (2007: 189) opinion, relativist religious pluralism is, in spite of the fact that it opposes all kinds 
of religious dogma and absolutism, itself guilty of a hidden dogma, namely that all religions are in 
principle equal. 
Van der Walt (2007: 196) also distinguishes at least three forms of confessional particularism. 
Magnetic particularism holds that a dogma might work like a magnet that draws all other religions to 
it; healing particularism teaches that a dogma may work like a vaccine that can cure believers and 
hence can draw non-believers; imperial particularism teaches that a particular dogma is of the 
utmost importance and that no salvation is possible without adhering to it (an example of this is the 
Christian belief that Christ is the only source of salvation and that an intentional confession of belief 
in Christ is the only hope for salvation). 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #8: 
1. (8.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I 
believe that my religion is the only true one, and that all others are false. (2) I believe that all 
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religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the 
truth the way we do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same 
God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and 
circumstances. (4) I believe in sincere dialogue with all other religions because I think my 
own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience.  Mark ONE in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3 4. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of an exclusivist and hence 
probably intolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of an inclusivist and hence probably 
intolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a religious pluralist and hence probably 
tolerant attitude. 4. This response will be indicative of a dialogical pluralist and hence probably 
tolerant attitude. 
9. Three approaches to tolerance 
As indicated in Section 8 above, there seems to be many ways of attempting to be tolerant towards 
the religious views and dogmas of others, some of which might lead to more success than others in 
the resolution of conflict, the procurement of mutual trust, human well-being and peaceful human 
coexistence. Three broad life and world view (“fishbowl”, ”life map”) approaches can be 
distinguished among the plethora of approaches to the plurality currently prevailing in Europe and 
Southern Africa, the two regions in which the questionnaire to be developed on the basis of this 
monograph will be administered, namely liberalism, Christianity (indeed post-Christianity in some 
areas and among some people) and what has become known as secularism, liberal secularism or 
secular humanism. 
From a modern liberal viewpoint, Grayling (2010: 220) advises that society should learn how to 
manage less acceptable beliefs and behaviour by understanding their ill consequences and to 
encourage more acceptable behaviour by sweeping up the pieces and “otherwise being stoical”. In 
brief, says Schreiner (2005: 13), people have to show empathy to the other, enter into dialogue with 
them and acquire the competence of “dancing with difference” in the increasingly pluralist 
environments in which they find themselves. Gray (2003: 112) agrees with all of the above, and 
reiterates that “fugitive empathy” with other living things is the ultimate source of ethics.  Moral 
imagination is required, in other words the ability to put oneself in the shoes not only of relatives 
and good friends but also in those of rivals and enemies. Moral imagination implies efforts at 
understanding others from the inside
30
 (Wright, 2009: 418). 
Olthuis (2012: 2/7, 6/7) gives similar advice from a Christian perspective: Firstly, in ethical 
Postmodernism, difference is not the enemy, a threat, defect or deficit which needs to be controlled, 
but rather a challenge that has to be connected with, attended to and honoured. The proper relation 
to the other (different) person is deference rather than domination, condescension, dismissal or 
persecution. Genuine community is being together in difference and diversity, rather than 
marginalisation or fusion into sameness.   In Biblical terms, freedom does not mean “free from” but 
rather “free to” love and minister to the other. As God is with us (Emmanuel), so a person should be 
with others; people are called to suffer with others, not to fusion with others, not to abandonment 
of others, nor even the rescue or persecution of the other, but being with the other, suffering-with 
                                                           
30
See the discussion of modus vivendi below. 
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and celebrating-with. Reason, transformed by and in the service of love, will have an eye for 
difference not in order to close it down or to marginalise it, but in order to approach and connect 
with it, and let it be. Love, in Olthuis’s understanding, is not an auxiliary to the order of reason; there 
is only one order, he says, and that is the order of Love, with reason as one of its dimensions. In very 
practical terms he advises that the members of a society should develop an economy of love not to 
exclude others or to prove that their own way of life is the only true way, but to give witness of how 
and why - rooted in their own religious and life view (“fishbowl”) perspective – they see things the 
way they do, and how they conceive of justice and practise mercy. Along these lines and in this way, 
they invite others to share their deepest beliefs and convictions for mutual learning, benefit and 
well-being. Van der Walt (2007: 202) makes the same point by stating that religious and other forms 
of diversity will not disappear in this dispensation, therefore tolerance towards all other people is 
the only and right attitude. People need to find ways of living alongside one another without 
destroying one another and without ignoring or trivialising the differences among them.  The task of 
tolerance, he avers, is not to ignore or to trivialise differences but to “establish the right to differ”. 
Olthuis (2012) agrees with the position outlined a few years earlier by Van der Walt (2007: 
213).Tolerance based on a Biblical view is aimed at establishing the truth, and should always be 
modest and based on love. Tolerance from a Biblical perspective implies full involvement with the 
other and a sincere interest in the other; it is eager to know as much about the other as possible. 
True tolerance is never hesitant or sentimental; to endure things that one does not approve of takes 
strength and courage. 
Secularism, in turn, as Mohler (2008: 29-30) correctly observed, is a lifeview according to which 
humankind sees itself not only as liberated from the bonds of the church and other religious 
institutions but from all forms of theistic religion. In view of the fact, as already mentioned, that no 
human being is ever without religion and religious commitment, secularists mistakenly believe that 
religion and religious forms will disappear in due course, that history was driving toward the utter 
removal of belief in God, and that education, technology and affluence would lead to a massive 
civilisation-wide loss of belief; secularisation would be a global phenomenon, marked by the 
rejection of both the social functions and the symbolic nature of theistic belief.  Although it is 
unlikely that secularism will dominate life and the world on this massive scale, there are clear signs 
of it making progress, also in the form of atheism (Mohler, 2008: 15). According to Tripp and Tripp 
(2008: 15), secularism is a “godless culture”, a majority culture that interprets life “through 
unregenerate eyes and promotes its conclusions through various means, from advertising to 
education”. Instead of depending on guidelines flowing from theistic religious books and dogmas, 
secularists depend on other mediators of values such as entertainment celebrities, the social media 
and advertisements.  
The central message of secularism, according to Tripp and Tripp (2008: 17) is “me!”, and as a result 
of that it leaves humankind without transcendent values. The only values that remain are those of 
survival by whatever means that serves the lusts and the needs of the moment. Van der Walt (2007: 
213) regards the secular, including the liberal, approach to tolerance as “negative, since it can say 
nothing more but that one should not be uncivil, discourteous, impolite, tactless, unpleasant or 
opposing”. Boersma (2012) also finds the secular-liberal-humanist view of tolerance unacceptable. 
He does not accept the “enlightened” dogma that one should allow the other to enjoy his or her 
freedom because of freedom being regarded as an absolute value that entails respect for the value 
of living and let live, all of which is based on the dogma of human autonomy.  Liberal tolerance does 
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not include tolerance of those who deem themselves to be subject to some or other heteronymous 
force; the purpose of liberal tolerance is indeed the liberation of such persons. To this could be 
added that it is indeed a question to what extent a me-centred person would be willing to tolerate 
others in his or her struggle for survival in the new secular age that Mohler refers to. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #9: 
1. (9.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I 
believe that all that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom, and that he or she should 
be allowed to believe in whatever makes sense to them. (2) I believe that people cannot 
follow the whims associated with the idea of individual freedom but that they should adhere 
to the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. The religious views of others 
should nevertheless be respected. (3) I believe that a person should live and behave in 
accordance with values that are not strictly religious, such as to be civil, polite and 
courteous, tactful, pleasant and not opposing.   Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a liberal and hence 
probably tolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of a stance rooted in some holy 
book but that the religious views of others should be respected. This is indicative of a tolerant 
attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a secular and hence probably tolerant attitude. 
10. Willingness to enter into a social contract 
Peaceful coexistence in a community or a society depends on a social contract among the members 
of such a community.  The contract should provide room for diverse positions in society, and emerge 
from a joint decision of rational individuals. Antecedent to a social contract there are no principles of 
justice or agreement about expectations in force. Put differently, the emergence of a social contract 
among individuals who widely differ from one another in terms of background, religion, culture, 
customs and habits leads not only to a well-ordered society, to the well-being of all the contracting 
parties and to social justice for all concerned (Strauss, 2009: 510-511). Following Rousseau, Rawls 
(2007: 566-571) states that government is based on a social contract among free, equal and rational 
persons entering into a contract based on the principle of justice as fairness and for the well-being of 
all concerned. The contract leads to the adoption of certain rights and duties and to the measuring 
out of benefits for everyone. The basic structure of society should provide for the governing of the 
assignment of rights and duties and the distribution of social and economic advantages. 
Bower’s (2005: 226, 228) assessment of the Constitution of the United States of America gives a 
good idea of what a proper social contract could provide for all. In his opinion, that Constitution “is 
nothing if not a repository of human values [which] had a profoundly beneficial effect on the 
development of civil society, on the emergence of a trustworthy judiciary and on the achievement of 
freedom…”. Part of the social contract is also common law which, in his opinion, governs the affairs 
and relationships of people. Common law is the law of common practice, the law emanating from 
the wisdom of peoples who strive to regulate their relationships with one another on the basis of 
justice and decency. Common law was responsible, among others, for establishing the notion that 
the relationship between people was governed by agreed standards of probity, rather than the 
unfettered exercise of power. Nussbaum (2000: 5) adds to this that the governments of all nations 
should adhere to those principles that a bare minimum of respect for human dignity requires. She 
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refers to the social contract as “an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very 
different conceptions of the good”. The contract should therefore provide for treating each person 
as an end and none as a tool of others. According to Robeyns (2005: no page number), the 
capabilities approach worked out by Nussbaum and Sen forms a broad normative framework for 
what has been referred to above as a social contract among individuals, in other words for the 
evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, 
and proposals about social change in society.  Sen (2010: 245, 247) concurs with her in saying that it 
would be hard to understand why and how a person undertakes some of his or her activities without 
comprehension of his or her societal relations. Individual human beings with their various plural 
identities, multiple applications and diverse associations are quintessentially social creatures with 
different types of societal interactions. 
Now, after briefly having looked at the nature and purpose of the social contract among individuals, 
we can return to the core argument of this monograph, namely the issue of religious tolerance. The 
question is, which of the two groups referred to above, those with a rather “thick” or maximalist 
value orientation or those with a rather “thin” or minimalist value orientation would be most willing 
and ready to enter into a social contract with others and hence be more tolerant of others involved 
in the contract and their views? Of course, to ask this question is more of an academic exercise than 
of practical significance since all of us, whether we wish to do so or not, are party to a social contract 
as embodied in the Constitution of our countries and in the Government of the day. By far the 
majority of us conforms to the rules and stipulations of that contract, on the one hand because of 
understanding the benefits that might flow from the contract in terms of personal and communal 
well-being, justice and fairness, rights and duties, and on the other hand, out of fear of punishment 
in the form of imprisonment, fines and social sanction. There have been incidents, however, caused 
by pathological dissidents, such as Timothy McVeigh responsible for the Oklahoma Bombing and 
Anders Behring Breivik, responsible for the Norway massacre, who do not accept the authority 
vested in the government of the day on the basis of a social contract, who not only wish to opt out 
from the contract but also to show their dissatisfaction with the status quo.  
An academic exercise has the value, however, of revealing something of the dynamics of religious 
tolerance in our present-day diverse societies. It can be reasonably and arguably expected that those 
individuals who operate with relatively “thin” or minimalist values, such as those contained in the 
radical value centre or in the “valley of relative value emptiness”, those with a laissez faire attitude, 
who are willing to accept that “anything goes”, those with a totally relativistic value system, will 
more readily enter into a social contract. They readily enter because they do not feel very strongly 
about their value system; they are prepared to enter into an “overlapping consensus” with others 
with quite different value orientations because they expect that doing so will not affect their own 
value orientation in any way. For this group, values are “just wonderful names with very little life 
and world view content” as Zecha remarked. In terms of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model, the 
members of this group arguably belong in either category IV - those who accept difference, or in 
category V - those who adapt to difference, or in category VI - those who integrate difference. In 
terms of the distinctions in the previous section, a person in this group might be prepared to practise 
religious pluralism and / or dialogical pluralism, and may also be tolerant of others and their religious 
views. 
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The obverse can also be expected. Those who operate with “thick” or maximalist values might be 
less willing to enter into a social contract because of their awareness of the deep value rifts that 
exist between them and others of different religious or cultural persuasion.  The “thicker” or more 
maximalist their value system, the less likely they will be prepared to enter into such a contract. 
There is also the distinct possibility that those operating with a maximalist value system that borders 
on fundamentalism and fanaticism, those with a “toxic” religious orientation might refuse to enter 
into a social contract and prefer to resort to terrorist tactics to destabilise the extant social contract 
because of its being founded on values unacceptable to the dissidents.  Such destabilising tactics can 
be observed both internationally where terrorist groups, inspired by religious fervour, attempt to 
undermine the extant world order (September 11, 2001 is a case in point), and also nationally, 
where religious groups attempt to destabilise the national order of their country (Mali and the DRC 
are currently suffering from such attempts).  The members of these groups might also be totally 
intolerant of the religious views of other groups which they regard as enemies and as heathens. 
Their efforts will be more directed towards proselytising and missionary work rather than to 
tolerating others and their religious differences.  In terms of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model, 
such a radical group might belong in category I – total denial of differences among people (in terms 
of the distinction in the previous section, totally exclusivist (only my religion is true) or totally 
inclusivist (since only my religion is true, I have to convert all others to it), or category II – I have to 
defend myself against difference.  
 The person with a less “thick” or maximalist value orientation might fall in category III – I feel the 
need to minimize the differences between myself and others. Ideally speaking, such a balanced and 
worthy member of society should fall in the category of some value “thickness” or maximalisation, 
not in the extreme categories of fundamentalist intolerance or of radical relativistic tolerance. Put 
differently, he or she should ideally fall in Bennett’s categories III – minimisation of differences 
among people (the differences between myself and others are not all that important; we can talk 
about them and exchange ideas – dialogical pluralism), IV – acceptance of differences among people 
(people are different, and that is a fact of life, we have to live with it), and V – adaptation to 
difference (although I have to live with the differences among people, I can be myself and apply my 
own value system in the context of the social contract to which I am party). 
Bennett’s category I – denial of difference (I recognise only my own value system; all others either 
do not exist or are not valid) is the reserve of the totally intolerant. Category VI – integration of 
difference (my value system is not so important to me that I cannot associate myself with all other 
values; all values are equally valid) is also the reserve of the totally tolerant. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #10: 
1. (10.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel 
so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not feel at 
home in my community and even in my country; I feel dissatisfied with the government of this 
country and with all people in charge; I dislike all people who do not see things my way; I wish 
I could move elsewhere where people approached daily life the way I see it. (2) I feel totally 
comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I cannot be bothered whether 
Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or New Agers governed this country. I just go with the 
flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that such 
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participation does not bring me in conflict with some of my basic religious convictions. I am 
prepared to vote for a government that does not deviate too much from my religious 
convictions. Although I do not always feel comfortable in my community and in this country, I 
do not wish to move elsewhere. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a person not wishing to 
enter or be part of a social contract and hence will probably be tolerant of others. 2. This 
response will be indicative of a person with a totally laissez faire attitude, totally willing to 
enter into a social contract, and who could be regarded as totally tolerant of others and their 
religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to 
enter into a social contract on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally 
tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
11. Tolerance (and respect) a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence 
(a healthy modus vivendi) 
In his book The Open Society and its Enemies, first published in 1945, Karl Popper engaged with the 
task of defining the best available conditions under which humanity could live as a community, and 
with a diagnosis of the factors that would undermine the achievement of such conditions (Bower, 
2005: 25). Popper’s search, launched nearly seven decades ago, is still an ongoing one in the present 
day. Even today, different societies and individuals interpret, prioritise and realise values that could 
be considered to be universal (radical centre values) differently, and this is both inescapable and 
desirable (Parekh, 2000: 158). 
The answer to Popper’s quest is not simple and straightforward. Its formulation will depend in the 
final analysis on one’s societal relationship theory. For example, a person with a socialist, communal 
view of society might feel that some people in society should not be allowed to express or even to 
possess their own values, ideas and beliefs in the interest of creating or ensuring a society with 
shared values. In this case, it is clear that the possession of private values (et cetera) that may 
deviate from the norm in a hoped-for unified society will not be tolerated by the majority. More 
cynical socialists such as Marxists would be wary of social structures that seem to serve the powerful 
or a particular interest group in society, that manipulate and exploit the sense of fear of ordinary 
people, structures that (for instance) use religion as a tool of social control or as an “opiate for the 
masses”. 
If, on the other hand, one had a more liberal view of society one would accept and honour people’s 
right to personal, private and often dissident views, and hence would be more tolerant of such views 
in the interest of a positive modus vivendi. In this context, it would be important to reason with 
others who think and behave differently (cf. dialogical pluralism, as discussed above), and to be 
sceptical of others’ ideas and beliefs (Morton, 1998: 171). If one believed in total individualism, 
however, one could be one of the causes of society falling atomistically apart, with very few shared 
values on which to base a social contract. If one believed in Mills’ no harm principle, the only reason 
for preventing someone doing or believing something  is the potential harm that it could cause 
another or society as a whole. No one has the right to tell another how to be or how to act provided 
that such being and acting does no harm to others (Grayling, 2002: 8). The challenge here is to only 
allow what should be truly allowed and forbid what should be forbidden. The harm principle should 
therefore never be used arbitrarily (Morton, 1998: 170-171).  
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If, in turn, one approached society from a functionalist view one would be interested in what 
promoted the interests of society as a whole, what would make society “socially good”, or 
“collectively stronger”, “socially more vital”, “more alive and active”, what would promote social 
cohesion and productivity, generosity and social harmony (Wright, 2009: 43-44). 
What underlies tolerance in a diverse or pluralistic society is the recognition that there should be 
room for all kinds of alternatives to exist. Learning to tolerate is indeed one of the aims of civilised 
life (Grayling, 2002: 9). Human community benefits by permitting a variety of lifestyles to flourish 
because they represent experiments from which much might be learned about how to deal with the 
human condition (Grayling, 2002: 8). 
While we will never discover cast-iron rules of good conduct and the good life in our societies which 
will answer every question that might arise about how human beings can live peacefully and well 
together, the lack of absolute agreement on what peaceful coexistence means and requires should 
not discourage us from investigating and promoting the theoretical notion of a healthy modus 
vivendi (De Botton, 2012: 83). As mentioned, peaceful coexistence depends, in the first place, 
considerably on the amount of moral imagination that the members of a community are able to 
display, i.e. the capability of placing themselves in the shoes of another, be it friend or enemy. The 
process entails scouring one’s mind and memory for shared points of reference, the mutual 
validation of feelings and ideas, working towards a common goal or perspective, the virtual sharing 
of experiences, knowing the other from the inside, putting prejudice in abeyance and showing 
empathy and sympathy. The expansion of moral imagination forces one to see the interior of more 
and more people for what their interiors are, namely remarkably like one’s own. Like one’s own 
interior, says Wright (2009: 428), it is deeply coloured by emotions and passions; like one’s own it 
also colours the world (cf. the “fishbowl” metaphor) with self-serving moral judgment. 
Whatever transpires in a society, it should create and promote the conditions of the good life. 
Something that happens defeats this purpose when it violates human dignity, (self-)respect and 
tolerance of others, and when it renders its members incapable of leading the good life (Parekh, 
2000: 157). Certain agreed-upon values should be respected by all in society, and each society 
should be free to find the most effective way to popularise and realise the values on which its social 
contract is founded (Parekh, 2000: 156). This is where tolerance comes in. Since every society and 
every individual member thereof enjoy the moral freedom to interpret and prioritise their values, 
their practices cannot and should not be condemned merely because they are different from or 
offend against one’s own (Parekh, 2000: 153). A healthy modus vivendi indeed rests on the 
assumption that people have so many things in common that they should be able to realise their 
ideals and goals through mutual support and cooperation, and this requires tolerance of the 
religious and other characteristics that members of a society might have. Through a healthy modus 
vivendi every member has an equal opportunity to develop his or her potential, or to protect the 
environment (Ramcharan, 2008: 53). 
Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, it should neither be expected nor 
desired that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life. Whatever one’s 
obligations to others (also reciprocally), each has the right to his or her own way (Schneller, 2011: 
190). What one might expect from others is the moral qualities of honesty, truthfulness, decency, 
courage and justice coupled with the intellectual qualities of thoughtfulness, strength of mind, 
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curiosity and the communal qualities of neighbourliness, charity, self-support as well as the political 
qualities of commitment to the common good, respect for law, responsible participation, 
helpfulness, cooperativeness and respect for others (Schneller, 2011: 175). Tolerance and respect 
seem to go hand in hand in the establishment of a healthy modus vivendi. Diversity needs respect 
(Christian Science Monitor, 2005: 8). Any attempt at coercion unglues the respect that holds a 
diverse society together.  
True tolerance, as observed in the previous section of this monograph, does not originate in 
opportunism which tolerates other religions merely for its own profit or for the sake of a superficial 
form of coexistence. It rather takes a sincere interest in the other(‘s religion) and is eager to know as 
much of it as possible (Van der Walt, 2007: 213). Honest and sincere interest and respect for others 
and their capabilities can indeed lead to happiness, the provision of space for one another and also 
to social justice as fairness. According to Valenkamp (2011), the philosopher Kant claimed that the 
actual practising of a healthy modus vivendi among diverse people requires a certain “push from 
behind”. The love commandment, as expressed in the various forms of the Golden Rule (see Comte-
Sponville, 2005: 8-10 for a discussion of the various versions of the Rule), is not the true ground for 
morality, Kant claims, but it provides the necessary flow, the inspiration to provide space for one 
another; it provides the stimulus to recognise-in-the-other-the–same-needs, to such an extent that 
the members of a society ought to do what the Golden Rule demands, i.e. to love one’s neighbour as 
oneself. People need to create societies in which differences can be recognised and conflicts 
resolved, where their forces can be united, not because all human beings are good and just, but 
because they are not; not because they are united, but so that they have a realistic chance to 
become united (Comte-Sponville, 2005: 15). 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #11: 
1. (11.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) 
I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do 
not think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people in a 
community are just too great for that. I think people also do not trust one another 
sufficiently to live peacefully together. (2) I think people should just find ways and 
means to live peacefully together in a community. People are just people, and there is 
very little that keeps them apart. People should be more trustful of others. (3) I think 
that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious convictions in the same 
community is possible on condition that every member of society respects the 
differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. 
Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant 
person. 2. This response will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and 
their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, 
willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be 
conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
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12. Grand narratives and the new spirituality 
As mentioned in Section 10 above, those with a rather “thick” or maximally life-conceptually filled 
value system might be reluctant to be tolerant of the religious and cultural views of those of 
different persuasion than themselves. The thesis there was that the “thicker” or maximalist a value 
system becomes, the more aware its adherents would be of the depth of the rifts between their own 
value system and those of others of different religious or cultural persuasion, to the extent that they 
might reach a point where they feel they have to dissociate them from the social contract with 
others. It could be argued, however, that this is highly unlikely among rational and sane individuals. 
Most people understand and welcome the profits that could be made by entering into the social 
contract and living according to values and principles about which consensus had been reached. 
However, there is a possibility
31
 that rational and sane individuals socially bonded together in what 
has been termed “a grand narrative” or “totalising system” (McGrath, 2005: 219) of whatever 
nature, could be less tolerant of others, their ideas and beliefs than those outside of such a “grand 
narrative”. Members of a mainstream church, for instance, could feel conscience bound by the 
dogmas and the confessions of their organisation, and hence not free to be tolerant of deviant 
views. This is because, apart from the fact that each individual member of such an institution comes 
with a set of in-built pre-judgments and biases, he or she is a member of an institution with a certain 
agreed-upon set of dogmas or ideologies which make it difficult for members to be tolerant of other 
views not consonant with those of the institution. In many cases, the personal “fishbowl” 
perspective of the members have been affected or coloured by the ideologies or dogmas of the 
institution as a grand narrative. As Olthuis (2012: 3/7) remarked, grand narratives tend to claim to 
be able to explain everything. This claim, as we have seen in the discussion of postmodernism above, 
has today lost much of its credibility. 
Although, as Makrides (2012: 250-251) correctly observed, the grand narratives of modernism have 
not been totally replaced by postmodernism, there is a strong tendency away from the grand 
narratives and their relative dominance over the thoughts and behaviour of their adherents. People 
understand nowadays that despite the claims of the grand narratives, people only know partially, 
not totally. The image of the all-knowing mind is slowly but surely being replaced by the image of the 
searching mind in and through a complex world, where answers are more likely to be wrong than 
correct.  
In contrast to the search for spirituality within the context of a grand narrative, such as a particular 
religion, church or other religious institution, there is a resurgence of interest in non-mainstream 
religion and spirituality, in the realm of the transcendent. There has been a concomitant breakdown 
in the social and religious cohesion formerly experienced in the context of grand narrative monoliths 
such as churches and mainstream religions (McGrath, 2005: 219, 263). Spirituality is now widely 
seen, also in educational context, as something fundamental to the human condition, something 
that transcends ordinary everyday experience and is concerned with the search for identity and 
meaning in response to death, suffering, beauty and evil. Spirituality may be encountered in our 
beliefs, sense of awe, wonder and mystery, feelings of transcendence, search for meaning and 
purpose, self-knowledge, relationships, creativity, feelings and emotions, and could be rooted in 
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Attention is drawn to the word “possibility”; not all of those attached to some or other grand narrative may 
feel themselves so conscience bound to the extent that they might be intolerant of others’ views.  
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curiosity, imagination, insight and intuition (Wright, 2010: 130). According to Julian (2002: 10), the 
base of spirituality is the notion of serving a higher purpose, but in Welch’s (1997: 84) opinion, 
spirituality has in practice been reduced to a feeling of the infinite, an inarticulate ecstasy before the 
wonders of the self or of nature, on an experience of the ineffable. Modern spirituality therefore has 
no hell, no doctrine, no substance; it is all about feeling. 
Kourie’s (2006: 22-23) definition of spirituality is quite different: spirituality refers to the deepest 
dimension of the human person; it refers to ultimate values that give meaning to one’s life, whether 
one is religious or not. Spirituality refers to one’s ultimate values and commitments, regardless of 
content. De Muynck’s (2008: 7) definition is similar to that of Kourie: spirituality is the manner in 
which one – by orientating oneself to a source – relates his or her beliefs and experience of 
inspiration and / or transcendence, more or less methodically, to the actual practice of life. 
The purpose of this section is neither to give a full depiction of modern-day spirituality (which is very 
difficult to do because of the nebulousness of the concept) nor to evaluate it in any detail. Suffice it 
to say that, as Mohler (2008: 89) observed, spirituality has risen as a replacement for identification 
with organised religion. It is a new non-theistic form of belief that can range from the New Age 
movement to the various quests for spirituality that mark popular culture and fit personal taste. 
Instead of, as expected, religiousness disappearing, it has been resurrected in another form, that of 
spirituality (Van der Walt, 2007: 150). 
The implications of the above for religious tolerance are clear. The more one is immersed in the 
doctrines, dogmas, structures of a mainstream religion that act as a grand narrative that binds the 
conscience of its members, the less likely one would be to be tolerant of the religious views and 
beliefs of others of different religious persuasion. The opposite might also be true: the more one is 
immersed in the nebulous ambience of some or other form of “new” spirituality, the more one is 
likely to be tolerant of others’ views. 
Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #12: 
1. (12.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) 
I belong to a religious group with very strong convictions. Everything that we do in my 
church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution is so defined in terms of 
dogmas and doctrines that it is difficult for me to deal with people who do not belong to 
the same religious group or institution. I have to be inward thinking because I cannot 
understand the religions of other people, and I do not think they can understand my 
religion. (2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I 
regard myself as non-religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging 
them. (3) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutional religion, but I see 
myself as religious since I adhere to a form of spirituality in which I try to connect with a 
higher force. I think all people are involved in such a spiritual search for a higher force in 
their lives; some only do it within some or other religion, others find such 
institutionalised religion an obstacle in their search. (4) I belong to a religious group 
such as a church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution, and although we 
worship according to certain dogmas and confessional documents, we feel ourselves 
free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them. 
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Although I feel myself religiously different from other people, I treat them with respect 
and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4. 
Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant 
person. 2 and 3. These responses will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of 
others and their religious views.4.This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced 
view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be 
conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
13. Preliminary conclusion: (Religious) tolerance a “moving 
phenomenon” 
The discussion so far seems to suggest that (religious and other forms of) tolerance can be regarded 
as a “moving phenomenon” and hence very difficult to delineate, circumscribe in general terms or 
define. The discussion also proves that it has many facets and ramifications, and that one and the 
same aspect might be based in quite different theoretical perspectives. The term “tolerance” has, 
therefore, to be seen as a phenomenon with various nuances. 
(Religious and other forms of) tolerance pertain(s) to a certain moment in time; it seems to be a 
matter of a specific moment in question. Groups of quite different religious or life and world view 
persuasion might live peacefully together for many years, even centuries, and may be said to be 
quite tolerant of the other and its beliefs and convictions.  A relatively minor incident, such as the 
accidental death of a child at the hands of a member of the another (religious) community, may then 
spark a bout of severe (religious) intolerance - even conflict - that might last for years thereafter. 
Another incident, for example, a child saved from drowning by a member of the opposing group 
might terminate the violence, and lead to another prolonged period of (religious) tolerance. This can 
be practically illustrated with reference to the situation in Kiev, the capital city of the Ukraine in 
February 2014. The refusal of the president to sign an agreement with the European Union sparked 
a bout of severe intolerance and violence among the populace. The violence only ended when the 
president was deposed. Tolerance – in the political realm, in this instance - became the order of day 
once again.  
The degree of (religious and other forms of) tolerance experienced in a community depends on the 
degree of equilibrium in the system. The various groups of which a society is composed seem to be 
tolerant of one another if all the checks and balances are in place, when certain tendencies are 
effectively counterbalanced by others. 
Intolerance seems to need a spark or trigger to come to life. The relative peace and quiet and 
tolerance in a community characterised by potential for conflict can be broken by a single incident 
which acts as a spark or a trigger (see the examples mentioned above). Even a relatively insignificant 
incident can act as a trigger that could cause disequilibrium in the system.  
The principles or a priori convictions of the various groups that might come into conflict and hence 
be intolerant of others seem to play an important role. People and groups entertain different sets of 
principles that flow from their religious persuasion and convictions (their respective “fishbowls”), 
and they live peacefully according to them on condition that they are not somehow confronted by 
an incongruous situation, on condition that some or other incident does not cause them alarm about 
the validity and viability of their personal convictions and principles. Confrontation seems to be the  
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key to the rise of (religious and other forms of)intolerance. As long as a person or a group is allowed 
to live peacefully according to their principles and convictions we might expect them to be calm and 
their system to be in equilibrium.  A confrontational incident might disturb this equilibrium and 
hence result in intolerant behaviour and attitudes. Put differently, the principles might lie latently in 
the background of an individual or a group, but a certain confrontational incident (a certain casuistic) 
might bring it to the fore. How a person responds to such a confrontational incident will depend on 
the “contents” of his or her “fishbowl” (see section 1 above) and expectancy filters (see section 4 
above).  As mentioned in those two sections, how a person will engage with the world, with 
confrontation and systemic imbalance, will depend to a large extent to how s/he views the world 
and other people. 
14. © The questionnaire 
A few notes about the questionnaire that follows below: 
1. The preceding conceptual and theoretical framework lends conceptual and theoretical 
support and substance to the items which together now form a provisional questionnaire with which 
to probe the degree of religious tolerance displayed by a respondent, and on the basis of which a 
religious tolerance profile of a person or a group can be constructed. 
2. The items, as they have been phrased in the course of the argument outlined above, are 
much too difficult and complicated in their current form for application in a questionnaire to be 
completed by teachers, student teachers and the students or pupils in their care. This became 
evident when the original questionnaire was given to a number of well educated adults to respond 
to. Although they were able to respond adequately to each item, they found the formulation thereof 
too theoretical-academic and hence too complicated. This explains why a further edition of the 
questionnaire had to be drafted (see Section 14 below). This section contains in essence the thrust 
of the items of the original questionnaire but pains were taken to make the items more 
understandable and easier to respond to by the target audience. 
3.  Readers of this monograph are encouraged to attempt responding to the original 
questionnaire. This exercise will help them decide whether the questionnaire indeed measures what 
it is intended to measure, in other words whether it possesses the necessary content and construct 
validity. 
4. The items following each theoretical section above overlap in some cases, even to a 
considerable extent. This is because different theoretical perspectives lead to similar questionnaire 
items. This problem has to be addressed in the final formulation of the questionnaire. 
4.  Please read the remark at the end of the questionnaire, i.e. after the interpretation, and 
after first having completed the questionnaire. 
Here is the more simplified version of the questionnaire: 
1. To which religion do you belong? If you belong to a mainstream religion such as Christianity, 
the Muslim faith, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism then please write the name of the 
religion in the space provided. If you do not belong to a mainstream religion, please write a 
short phrase in which you describe your religious stance, e.g. “I believe in a form of 
spirituality that is not associated with any mainstream religion”.  
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2. Please respond to the statement: “I live very strictly according to the tenets and 
prescriptions of my religion and world view” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally 
agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
3. Please respond to the statement “I am always and acutely conscious of my religious 
convictions and beliefs whenever I do something or have to make a choice in my life” by 
marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree 
to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
4. Which of the following views of the world is typical of how you personally view and 
approach the world and other people? Mark the response that describes your basic view of 
the world, and your attitude towards the world and other people most appropriately: 1. I 
feel safe and secure; I do not see the world and other people as a threat to me or my 
existence. 2.  I concentrate on my own affairs, and have very little to do with other people 
and their needs; I am concerned about my own welfare in this world. 3. I cannot be 
bothered about the world and other people; I expect nothing from life or other people; one 
has to make your own fortune in life. 4. I would like to be close and friendly to other people, 
but at the same time I am fearful of them and what they could do to me. 
 
5. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I am 
willing and prepared to associate myself with a set of values that has universal currency, a 
set of values, principles and norms that people say is true and valid for all people in the 
world, for all religions and world views in the world”. Please choose one of the following 
options: 1. I completely, fully agree  2. To a fairly large degree 3. Only to a limited degree 4. 
Not so much 5. Not at all   
 
6. Please respond to the statement: “I am prepared to live by values that are supposedly valid 
for all people in the world, irrespective of their personal religion and life and world view but 
I think I will need to reinterpret them according to my personal religion and world view”. 
Mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a 
certain extent 5. Totally disagree 
 
7. Please respond to the statement: “A value that does not flow from my own, personal 
religion and world view is worthless as a guideline for my life”. Please mark one of the 
following:1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. 
Totally disagree 
 
8. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
prefer values that are simple, have nothing to do with any religion or world view, that all 
people can agree with because they are formulated in very general terms, and will not lead 
to divisions and conflict among people”. 1 I strongly agree with this statement 2. I agree 
with the statement to a certain degree 3. I find this statement fairly acceptable.  4. I 
disagree with the statement to some extent. 5. I completely disagree with the statement. 
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9. Please respond to the following statement by marking with a cross one of the options that 
follow: “I prefer to deal with other people on the basis of values that are generally 
acceptable to all people, and not on the basis of my own religious and life view values which 
tend to make me different.” 1. Totally agree with the statement 2. Agree to a large extent 3. 
I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree to a certain extent   5. I totally disagree  
 
10. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I 
could not care less what other people think and do; I feel comfortable around them when 
they act according to the dictates of their religion and world view; it does not matter to me 
what people think and do in terms of their religion; other people, their ideas and actions do 
not bother me at all”. 1. I totally agree with this statement 2. I agree with this statement to 
a certain extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree with this statement to a 
considerable degree 5. I totally disagree with this statement. 
 
11. Please respond to the following statement by marking the option that represents your view 
the most accurately: “The well-being of society and of the individuals that make up society 
depends on my being tolerant towards them, their ideas, their religion and their beliefs”. 1. 
I completely agree 2. I largely agree 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5 I do not agree at all. 
 
12. Please respond to the following statement by marking the most appropriate response that 
follows: “I just tolerate things in others that I do not like and will never accept”. 1. I fully 
agree 2. I agree to a large extent 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I completely disagree 
 
13.  Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I can 
place myself in the shoes of a person who holds a religion and world view that is completely 
different from mine and which I shall never accept as my own religion or life view.” 1. I fully 
agree with this statement 2. I agree to a certain extent 3. I agree 4. I do not  agree to a 
considerable extent 5. I do not agree at all. 
 
14.  Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “My 
natural inclination is to trust other people”. 1. Fully agree 2. Agree to a considerable extent 
3. Agree 4. Disagree to a considerable extent 5. Totally disagree. 
 
15. Which TWO of the following views of others are most applicable to you as a person? (1) My 
confidence in my own moral beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their 
beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own beliefs is high. (4) I believe in a 
unified society with a single set of shared values.  Mark ANY TWO in the spaces provided: 1 
2 3 4. 
 
16. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe 
that my religion is the only true one, and that all others are false. (2) I believe that all 
religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the 
truth the way we do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same 
God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and 
circumstances. (4) I believe in sincere dialogue with all other religions because I think my 
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own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience.  Mark ONE in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3 4. 
 
17. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe 
that all that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom, and that he or she should be 
allowed to believe in whatever makes sense to them. (2) I believe that people cannot follow 
the whims associated with the idea of individual freedom but that they should adhere to 
the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. The religious views of others should 
nevertheless be respected. (3) I believe that a person should live and behave in accordance 
with values that are not strictly religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, tactful, 
pleasant and not opposing.   Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
 
18. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so 
strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not feel at 
home in my community and even in my country; I feel dissatisfied with the government of 
this country and with all people in charge; I dislike all people who do not see things my way; 
I wish I could move elsewhere where people approached daily life the way I see it. (2) I feel 
totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I cannot be bothered 
whether Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or New Agers governed this country. I just 
go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that 
such participation does not bring me in conflict with some of my basic religious convictions. 
I am prepared to vote for a government that does not deviate too much from my religious 
convictions. Although I do not always feel comfortable in my community and in this 
country, I do not wish to move elsewhere. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
 
19. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so 
strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not think 
that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people are just too great 
for that. I think people also do not trust one another sufficiently to live peacefully together. 
(2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together. People are 
just people, and there is very little that keeps them apart. People should be more trustful of 
others. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious 
convictions is possible on condition that every member of society respects the differences 
around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. Mark ONE in 
the spaces provided: 1 2 3. 
 
20. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong 
to a religious group with very strong convictions. Everything that we do in my church, 
synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution is so defined in terms of dogmas and 
doctrines that it is difficult for me to deal with people who do not belong to the same 
religious group or institution. I have to be inward thinking because I cannot understand the 
religions of other people, and I do not think they can understand my religion. (2) I do not 
belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I regard myself as non-
religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I do not belong to 
any form of organised or institutional religion, but I see myself as religious since I adhere to 
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a form of spirituality in which I try to connect with a higher force that could give direction to 
my life. I think all people are involved in such a spiritual search for a higher force in their 
lives; some only do it within some or other religion, others find such institutionalised 
religion an obstacle in their search. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, 
synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution, and although we worship according to 
certain dogmas and confessional documents, we feel ourselves free to interact with other 
people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them. Although I feel myself 
religiously different from other people, I treat them with respect and dignity. Mark ONE in 
the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4. 
Interpretation key 
1.  This  item informs the researcher whether the respondent belongs to a mainstream 
religion, to a form of spirituality not associated with any mainstream religion or to no 
religion at all – as far as the respondent is concerned (according to the literature, no 
person is ever actually without religion (Gray, 2009: 2; Peck, 2006: 108)). This item 
reveals the nature of the personal “fishbowl” (life and worldview orientation) of the 
respondent. 
 
2. Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist 
attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (based on 
Bennett’s
32
 work). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of 
being situated in a religio-relative orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 
or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live 
in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her 
own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, 
including the views of other people.   
 
3.  A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of 
being situated in a religio-centric orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). A 4 or 5 response could 
be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in religio-relative 
orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the 
respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” 
and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to 
exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other 
people.   
 
4.  1 indicates a balanced and secure world view. This person is not fearful of engaging with 
the world or with other people; he or she trusts others and the predictability of the world, 
and is generally open to the world. This person might be tolerant of others and their 
views.  2 is indicative of a pre-occupied life and world view; this is an inward looking 
person, who is not concerned about the welfare of others or of the world in general. This 
person is so concerned about him- or herself that tolerance of others and their views 
does not come into play. 3 This person is disconnected from the world, expects nothing 
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See Section 6 for a detailed discussion of this aspect. 
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from others or the world. This disconnection could be indicative of a mentality in which 
tolerance plays no significant role. 4. This person leads an ambivalent life; he or she is 
both fearful of the world and of others but also aspires to be close to others. Fear could 
lead to intolerant behaviour; on the other hand, the wish for closeness could lead to 
exaggerated tolerance of others and their views. 
 
5.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would indicate that the respondent is not at all or at least not fully 
committed to some or other exclusive confessional stance far as his or her religious 
orientation is concerned. He or she is prepared to share a set of values that is supposedly 
universally applicable to all people. A 4 or 5 response will be indicative of the opposite, 
namely that the respondent is so committed to some or other confessional religious or 
life and world view stance and perspective that he or she does not find it possible or 
viable to share values, principles and norms with others of a different religious and / or 
life and world view conviction. 
 
6.  A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of the fact that the respondent seems to be 
prepared to live by generally accepted and supposedly universally valid values, norms 
and principles but also feels the need to reinterpret those values and norms in terms of 
his or her private religious stance and life and worldview.   A 4 or 5 response could be 
seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1. 
 
7.  A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of (full) commitment to a personal religion and 
life and world view.   A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 
response in item 3.1. 
 
8.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a respondent preferring to operate with 
minimalist, general values, values that have been thinly formulated. This person seems to 
pave the way for getting along with others on the basis of rather generally shared 
values.  A 4 or 5 response would indicate that the respondent prefers values that are 
maximally, thickly formulated in terms of his or her religious and life and world view 
convictions. Respondents who opt for a 4 or a 5 seem to be more likely to be more 
conscious of their own religion and life and worldview rooted value system, and hence 
also more aware of differences between his or her value system and those of others 
whose value systems might be rooted in different religions and world views. 
 
9. Responses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the respondent sees him- or herself as preferring 
values that are relatively devoid of content or that are universal though contextually 
filled and meaningful. The respondent seems to prefer to operate in the “valley of 
relative value emptiness” in order to get along with most other people, irrespective of 
their value stances. Responses 4 and 5 might be indicative of a respondent who prefers 
not to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” but rather with values that are 
more or less conceptually filled with meaning and content. The value stance of such 
respondents is likely to be rooted in a pertinent religious, faith or life and worldview 
commitment. 
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10.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is more or less completely 
tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different religious persuasion. He 
or she may even be suspected of an “anything goes” attitude, and hence might belong in 
Bennett’s categories IV and VI. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is 
not prepared to be quite as tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of 
different persuasion, and hence could belong in Bennett’s categories I, II or III. 
 
11.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is religiously and otherwise 
tolerant of others and their ideas. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who 
is (fairly) intolerant of others and their ideas. 
 
12.  A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a fairly tolerant person whereas a 4 or 5 
response would be indicative of a fairly intolerant person. 
 
13.  A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of a person with moral imagination and who might be 
tolerant of the religious views of others. A 4 or 5 response is indicative of a respondent 
with very little or no moral imagination and who could be quite intolerant of others and 
their religious views. 
 
14.  A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of the fact that the respondent is a trusting person and 
therefore probably tolerant of others. A 4 and 5 response is indicative of the fact that the 
person is not naturally inclined to trust others and therefore might be fairly intolerant. 
 
15.  These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, 
it may be (a) because his or her own confidence is his or her own moral beliefs is low, or 
(b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their beliefs however 
wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or her 
confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society 
with a single set of shared values. 
 
16. 1. This response will be indicative of an exclusivist and hence probably intolerant 
attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of an inclusivist and hence probably intolerant 
attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a religious pluralist and hence probably 
tolerant attitude. 4. This response will be indicative of a dialogical pluralist and hence 
probably tolerant attitude. 
 
17. 1. This response will be indicative of a liberal and hence probably tolerant attitude. 2. 
This response will be indicative of a stance rooted in some holy book but that the 
religious views of others should be respected. This is indicative of a tolerant attitude. 3. 
This response will be indicative of a secular and hence probably tolerant attitude. 
 
18. 1. This response will be indicative of a person not wishing to enter or be part of a social 
contract and hence will probably be tolerant of others. 2. This response will be indicative 
of a person with a totally laissez faire attitude and who could be regarded as totally 
tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person 
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with a balanced view, willing to enter into a social contract on certain conditions, and 
hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
 
19. 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2. This response will 
be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This 
response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully 
with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant 
towards others and their religious views. 
 
20. 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2 and 3. These 
responses will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their 
religious views.   4. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, 
willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be 
conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views. 
Remark: Initial application of the above questionnaire in a small-scale pilot study revealed two of its 
characteristics: 
1. It is too difficult and complicated in its current format for persons without the necessary 
conceptual and theoretical background to decide on the appropriate responses. To address 
this problem a simplified version of the questionnaire was developed for teachers, student 
teachers and learners, students, pupils in the last two years of school (typically grades 11 
and 12 / standards 9 and 10)(Section 14). 
2. The initial results show that at least four profiles with respect to religious tolerance could be 
drafted on the basis of the questionnaire: 
2.1 A respondent with a totally intolerant stance is able to mark the items in such a way that 
his or her total religious intolerance will be clearly demonstrated. 
2.2 The same goes for a person with the opposite stance as far as religious tolerance is 
concerned; items can be marked in such a way that his or her total religious tolerance 
can be demonstrated. 
2.3 According to the pilot study, by far the most respondents seem to mark the items that 
show his or her adherence to a strong personal value system while at the same time 
being tolerant of others and their religious views. 
2.4 Some respondents mark the items in such a way they show their adherence to a strong 
personal value system accompanied by a spirit of relative intolerance of other views. 
3. These impressions will have to be tested with larger groups of respondents. 
 
4. The following is an example of the responses of one of the persons in the very initial pilot 
study: 
Item Response 
number 
Response in words Religious tolerance profile 
1 Christianity  This person belongs to the Christian faith 
or religion 
2 2 Agree to some extent Religio-centric person 
3 1 Totally agree Religio-centric and values maximally filled 
with content 
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4 1 Secure Balanced and secure world view 
5 3 Only to a limited degree Not an exclusivist stance with respect to 
religion 
6 2 To some extent Prepared to live by universal values 
7 1 Totally agree Fully committed to own religion 
8 4 Disagree Aware of differences among people 
9 3 Acceptable Prepared to work with contextually filled 
universal values 
10 3 Acceptable A tolerant person 
11 1 Completely agree A tolerant person 
12 1 Completely agree A tolerant person 
13 4 Do not agree This person does not have much moral 
imagination 
14 3 Agree This is a trusting person 
15 3 and 4  This person’s confidence in own beliefs is 
high, and he believes in a unified society 
16 4  This person is a proponent of dialogical 
pluralism 
17 2  This person’s views are rooted in a Holy 
book 
18 3  This person is willing to enter into a social 
contract on certain conditions 
19 3  This person has a balanced view; is willing 
to live peacefully with others on certain 
conditions 
20 4  This person has a balanced view; is 
tolerant of others and prepared to live 
with them on certain conditions 
 
The fourth column, if read from top to bottom, embodies the tolerance profile of this particular 
person: he is a Christian who is fairly religio-centred in his value stance, whose views are rooted in 
the Holy Book of Christianity (the Bible), who prefers to apply values that are maximally filled with 
life and worldview content, who feels balanced and secure in his dealings with other people and 
their values, who does not entertain an exclusivist view of his religion, is prepared to live by 
universally recognised values despite being firmly anchored in and committed to his own Christian 
religion (hence supports the tenet of universally recognised though contextually filled values), is a 
trusting and tolerant person though without strong moral imagination (he finds it difficult to place 
himself in the shoes of others), is confident in his own beliefs but also believes in a unified society, is 
an exponent of dialogical pluralism (prepared to interact and dialogue with adherents to other 
religions), and is prepared to conditionally enter into a social contract with others and to live 
peacefully with them. 
This is the profile of a single respondent. The tolerance profile of a group of respondents, say a class 
of Grade 11 students at a certain school, can be determined in the same way.  
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15. © Questionnaire for teachers, student teachers and Grade 11 
and 12 learners 
1. To which religion do you belong? (If you do not belong to any mainstream religion, please 
describe your religious stance in a few words.) 
2. “My religion is very strong, and I am expected to live very strictly according to it.” [Mark one 
of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I 
agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
3. “I am always strongly conscious of my religion in everything that I do.” [Mark one of the 
following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I 
disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
4. Here are four statements. Mark the one that is most applicable to you. 1. I feel safe and 
secure; other people and what they think are not a threat to me. 2. I am mostly concerned 
with myself; I cannot be bothered about other people and what they think and do. 3. I 
expect nothing from other people and also nothing from life; one has to make your own 
fortune. 4. I would like to be friendly with other people but at the same time I am afraid of 
them and what they could do to me. 
5. “I am willing and prepared to live according to a set of values that all people can share and 
that is not peculiar to one religion only.”  [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with 
this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I 
totally disagree] 
6. “I am willing and prepared to live according to a set of values that all people can share, but I 
shall always interpret them according to my own religion.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I 
strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a 
certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
7. “A value that does not flow from my own religion and view of life is useless as a guideline for 
my life.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a 
certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
8. “I prefer to values that do not have anything to do with any religion. Values should not lead 
to divisions and conflict among people.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with 
this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I 
totally disagree] 
9. “I prefer not to apply values that will make me different from all other people. That is why I 
do not like religious values.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this 
statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally 
disagree] 
10. “Other people are free to live according to their own religious values; the values of other 
people do not bother me at all.[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this 
statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally 
disagree] 
11. “The well-being of society depends on how tolerant we are with one another and with the 
other person’s religious values and views.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree 
with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 
5. I totally disagree] 
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12. “I just tolerate things that others say and do but I shall never be able to accept the things 
they think and do.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I 
agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree] 
13. “I can place myself in the shoes of person whose religion, world view, values and ideas are 
completely different from mine.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this 
statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally 
disagree] 
14. “I am naturally inclined to trust other people.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree 
with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 
5. I totally disagree] 
15. Mark any TWO of the following that you think are most applicable to you: (1) My confidence 
in my own religious beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their beliefs 
however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own beliefs is high. (4) I believe the society in 
which I live should have only a single set of shared values.  Mark ANY TWO in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3 4. 
16. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe 
that my religion is the only true one; all others are false. (2) I believe that all religions contain 
some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the truth the way I do in 
my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same God / god / gods and that 
they only differ from one another because of local conditions and circumstances. (4) I 
believe in dialogue with all other religions because I think my own religion and all others will 
be enriched by the experience.  [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.] 
17. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) All that 
counts in life is a person’s individual freedom; everyone should believe what he or she 
wants. (2) The idea of individual freedom is wrong; people should live according to the 
principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. (3) A person should live and behave in 
accordance with values that are not religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, 
tactful and pleasant.   [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.] 
18. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so 
strongly about my personal religious convictions that I do not feel at home in my own 
surroundings. (2) I feel totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I just 
go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that 
such participation does not bring me in conflict with religion. [Mark ONE in the spaces 
provided: 1 2 3.] 
19. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I do not 
think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people are just too 
great for that. (2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together. 
People are just people. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different 
religious convictions is possible on condition that every member of society respects the 
differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. 
[Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.] 
20. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong to 
a religious group with very strong convictions; we cannot tolerate others’ way of thinking. 
(2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I am non-religious. I 
just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I try to connect with a higher 
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force that could give direction to my life. I think all people are searching for such a spiritual 
search for a higher force in their lives. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, but 
despite this, we feel ourselves free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues 
and differences with them. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4. 
16. Concluding remarks 
Each of the items in the questionnaire above can be traced back to one or more of the theoretical 
viewpoints that preceded it. This enables the administrator of the questionnaire to interpret the 
responses to each item. By plotting a respondent’s responses to each of the 20 items the 
investigator will be in a position to see whether a respondent is basically religiously tolerant in his or 
her dealings and relationships with others of a different religious persuasion. Not only will such 
graphs show where each individual respondent lies in terms of being religiously tolerant or 
intolerant but it will also show where an entire group of respondents lies on the basis of their 
aggregate response in terms of each item and of the questionnaire in its entirety.  
Two further steps will have to be taken before the questionnaire can be administered with 
confidence to samples of respondents: (a) a pilot study with a few selected respondents has to be 
done to rectify any shortcomings and mistakes; and (b) the questionnaire should be edited to ensure 
that it actually measures religious tolerance and that each item and the various options therein are 
understandable to both teachers, prospective teachers and pupils (students, learners). 
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Religious Diversity and Religious Identity in the
Netherlands†
HERMAN L. BECK
Abstract
The subject of this paper is the question of whether the Netherlands, in the past and at
present, can be characterized as a mono-religious or as a religiously diverse society.
After defining the concept of “religious diversity” in this paper, a brief overview of the
religious situation in the Netherlands during the Middle Ages, the Dutch Golden
Age (1600–1700) and the years following World War II will provide an answer
to this question. Attention will also be paid in passing to the concept of (religious)
“tolerance”. The question of what is the situation in the Netherlands will be dealt
with on the basis of three questions from the introduction: (1) How much religious
diversity can a society take? (2) What is the impact of religious diversity? (3)
How do the Dutch people react to an increase in religious diversity? Are they
right to consider religious diversity as the consequence of immigration, which they
primarily associate with Muslims? As afterthought I will argue for accepting reli-
gious pluralism in circumstances of religious diversity.
Dutch Media Headlines
Random headlines of recent news items in the Dutch written media:
Prison sentences for trafficking through Sikh temple in Amsterdam
Police raid Santo Daime church in Amsterdam during service
Amsterdam Urchins become Radical Salafi-Jihadist Muslims
Order of the Transformants Alleged to be a Sex Sect
Stop Subsidizing Controversial Gülen Movement
Scientology: Anatomy of a Frightening Cult
Numerous other examples can be added from the Dutch media publications.
Introduction
Most Dutchmen have probably never even heard of these religious groups mentioned in
the headlines. Given the incredible variety of these groups, a complete knowledge of the
religious map of the Netherlands is almost impossible. For example, in the year 2000,
†This contribution is a translated and elaborated adaptation of the Teylers Society
Lecture held on 27 February 2011 in Teylers Museum, Haarlem, which was published
in a very limited edition by Teylers Stichting and distributed among its friends and
sponsors.
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there were approximately 350 different religious communities in Amsterdam alone.1 In
Europe, however, Amsterdam’s position is hardly unique. At the beginning of the third
millennium, for example, Berlin accommodated more than 360 religious communities.2
The Swiss cities of Basel and Zürich are known to house more than 370 different religious
groups.3 The dynamics in the religious field are enormous: changes and new develop-
ments take place constantly. Religious ideologies and religious movements are formed,
find their niche in Dutch society, and sometimes disappear again. If any attention is
paid to them at all, it is usually biased reporting.
The indeterminate number of religious groups and lack of familiarity with their teach-
ings and the way of life they preach, combined with the fact that they are shown in a nega-
tive light, has generated concern and questions among part of the Dutch population.
“How much religious diversity can a society take?”4 “What is the impact of religious
diversity?”5 “How do people react to the increase in religious diversity?”6 Such questions
are regularly asked, in many different formulations, both in the Netherlands and in other
Western societies.
Definition of the Problem, Research Question and Design
Many Dutch people think that religious diversity in the Netherlands is a recent phenom-
enon. They consider it to be a deviation from and an infringement of the Dutch norm,
and experience it as a problem.7 Consciously or otherwise, a large part of the Dutch
population nurtures the ideology that Dutch society has always been a monoculture
with one religion.8 True, its identity may be based on a Judeo-Christian-humanist heri-
tage, but from a religious point of view, it has been forged into a solid, uniform unity.
Religious diversity, however, is at odds with and erodes that norm. As a result, religious
diversity is a threat to the national identity of the Netherlands and to its moral order with
norms and values that have been fostered for centuries.9 According to many Dutch
people, religious diversity is the consequence of immigration, which they primarily
associate with Muslims.10 This immigration and its accompanying problems seem to
have caused a change in mentality in the Netherlands. Not only have measures been
taken to restrict immigration from “Muslim countries”, proposals have also been made
that purport to limit the religious freedom of Muslims, which implies intolerance
against them.
During my stay as a visiting professor at Venice International University in the autumn
of 2010, and coming from the Netherlands my colleagues from Germany, Israel, Italy,
Japan, and the USA pointedly asked me: “Whatever is the matter with the Dutch?”11
They referred to reports in the media on statements by Dutch politicians and opinion
makers who wanted to ban “Islamic clothing” and the building of new mosques in the
Netherlands. My colleagues could not reconcile such plans with the liberal reputation
which, in their view, the Netherlands had enjoyed since the seventeenth century. For cen-
turies, the Netherlands has been considered one of the most tolerant and pluralist
societies in Europe.12 The ability to accept (religious) diversity has long been considered
one of the main virtues of the Dutch people.13
The subject of this paper is to explore the question whether the Netherlands, in the past
and at present, can be characterized as a mono-religious or as a religiously diverse society.
After defining the concept of “religious diversity”, a brief overview of the religious situ-
ation in the Netherlands in the Middle Ages, the Golden Age and the years following
World War II will offer an answer to this question. In passing, attention will be paid to
the concept of (religious) “tolerance”. The question of “what is the matter with the Neth-
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erlands” will be dealt with on the basis of the three questions from the introduction: (1)
Howmuch religious diversity can a society take? (2) What is the impact of religious diver-
sity? (3) How do people react to an increase in religious diversity? Do they experience it as
a threat or as enrichment? As afterthought I will argue for accepting religious pluralism in
circumstances of religious diversity.
Religious Diversity
According to contemporary religious scholars, religious diversity is part of the human
condition and constitutes the norm rather than the exception. They hold the view that
religious diversity has traditionally been characteristic of and inherent to Europe and
America, because both continents have always known immigration throughout their
history.14 Religious diversity has always played an important role as co-shaping the
form and content of Western culture and Western identity.15 Most religious scholars
use religious diversity, or the synonyms religious plurality, religious pluralism and religious
multiformity, as a descriptive concept indicating that, in a certain demarcated area or
within a particular society, different religions or forms of religions occur side by side.
More nuances can be introduced by referring to interreligious diversity when two or
more different religious systems with differing religious images and ritual practices and
experiences are concerned, and of intrareligious diversity when there are different
groups or movements from the same religious tradition with differing religious images
and ritual practices and experiences.16 However, one rarely comes across these
nuances in the literature. They are often referred to in combination with the concept
of religious pluralism, which should not be used as a synonym of religious diversity but
must, on the contrary be sharply differentiated from this term.17
Religious Diversity in the Netherlands
The Middle Ages and the Golden Age
As regards the Dutch context, the view of religious scholars is corroborated by historical
data. Through the centuries, the Netherlands has had religious diversity, also in periods
in which the Roman-Catholic church was the state church or when the Dutch
Reformed Church (gereformeerde kerk) was the public (i.e. the official) and privileged
church.18 In their classic work, De lage landen bij de zee: Een geschiedenis van het Neder-
landse volk [The Low Countries by the Sea. A History of the Dutch People], dating
from 1934, Jan and Annie Romein show—particularly in the chapters “Geest and
gedachte in de middeleeuwen” [Spirit and Thought in the Middle Ages] and “Calvi-
nisme en libertinisme” [Calvinism and Libertinism]—how large the religious diversity
was in the Netherlands in the Middle Ages (500–1500 A.D.) and the Golden Age
(1600–1700 A.D.).19 Thus, they refute the current opinion that “Church and Christian-
ity in the Middle Ages reigned supreme.” They describe the fight to the bitter end of the
“Church” against remnants of the “heathen” Germanic (and possibly even older) reli-
gion and convincingly show that the witch hunts and the persecution of heretics may
have been part of that struggle.20 Jan and Annie Romein also discuss Protestantism
as the new dominant religious factor in the Golden Age in the Netherlands, after and
next to Catholicism. They emphasize that members of the Dutch Reformed Church,
the Calvinists, were only one main stream among many other main streams and numer-
ous side streams.21
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The Calvinist Protestants played a prominent role in their Iconoclastic Fury of 1566 in
stirring up the rebellion against the Spanish rule of the Netherlands, the resulting struggle
for independence, and the ultimate establishment of the Republic of the United Nether-
lands in 1588. The Union of Utrecht of 1579 is regarded as the Republic’s “foundation
charter” and is a kind of “treaty for joint defence between the contracting states”.22 In the
context of religious diversity, Article 13 of the “foundation charter” is of special rel-
evance. This article stipulates that no one in the seven provinces (regions or states)
that have united under the Union of Utrecht may be prosecuted on account of his reli-
gion. The article breathes the same spirit as the treaty of religious freedom proposed
by William of Orange (1533–1584 A.D.), who dedicated himself to enabling Protestants
and Catholics in the Republic to live together peacefully.23 However, considerable differ-
ences existed among the seven provinces on how to interpret and apply Article 13 of the
Union of Utrecht. In fact, every province was free to act as it saw fit in matters of reli-
gion.24 In practice, this Article was generally interpreted in the sense of freedom of con-
science rather than of religion. In the privacy of the home, everyone was more or less free
to practice their faith as they saw fit. In the public domain, however, people had to give
due consideration to the view and the rules of the state church of the Calvinist Protes-
tants. This meant, for example, that all worship of denominations other than that of
the state church had to be hidden from direct view and was forced to go “underground”,
a development that gave rise to the clandestine church (schuilkerk), a church that is lit-
erally concealed.25 Around 1620 the city of Haarlem had 11 clandestine churches: 7
for the Catholics, 3 for the Mennonites and 1 for the Lutherans. Around the same
time, Amsterdam had even more than twice that number of clandestine houses of
worship.26 It must be mentioned, however, that the Netherlands already had an advocate
of full freedom of religious worship in this period, in the person of Dirk Volckertszoon
Coornhert (1522–1590 A.D.). His contemporaries therefore considered his Synodus
van der Conscientiën Vrijheydt [Weighing the Freedom of Conscience] from 1582 as
“the most complete formulation of the idea of tolerance in Holland and perhaps even
in the whole of Europe”.27
Religious Diversity and Tolerance
Tolerance or Toleration
In the Middle Ages and in the Dutch Golden Age (1600–1700 A.D.), the Netherlands
was a country with great religious diversity, even though—with the exception of the
Jews—mainly intrareligious diversity was concerned. In this respect, my colleagues at
Venice International University from Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, and the USA were
correct. But was the Netherlands—as my colleagues assumed—also one of the most tol-
erant countries in Europe, an opinion that was already held in the eighteenth century,
incidentally?28 The answer turns on the definition of tolerance. How must that tolerance
be understood if religious freedom in the daily, public life of the Golden Age Netherlands
in fact did not exist? The dominant and authoritative position of the Calvinist Protestant
religion had been institutionalized in their church, which had become the privileged state
church of the Netherlands, even though the Calvinist Protestants were a minority among
the population. This religious minority had it in its power to make it pretty difficult for
others, such as the Catholic majority in the province of Holland, to practice their reli-
gion.29 It is true that other denominations did enjoy freedom of conscience, but were
obliged to worship in secrecy. As long as they did so, the Calvinist Protestants adopted
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a more or less tolerant attitude towards dissenters such as Lutherans, Remonstrants, and
Mennonites, who, as a result, were able to achieve a rather comfortable standard of
living.30 From about 1615, even Jews in Amsterdam enjoyed almost a full right to
public worship.31
The Dutch word tolerantie means both tolerance and toleration. In the context of reli-
gion, the difference between these two words can perhaps best be conveyed by adding an
adjective: “active” tolerance and “passive” toleration, respectively. “Passive” toleration is
the political concept that stands for a government policy of reluctantly permitting or
turning a blind eye to public worship. “Passive” toleration is inclined to neutrality and
distance and thus to a certain form of indifference towards the person or practice that
is being tolerated.32 “Active” tolerance is rather a “moral” concept that implies a particu-
lar attitude or disposition of an individual or of a group of individuals who accept other
individuals or groups of individuals with different religious convictions and/or practices
and in their religious difference as equals.33 In common parlance, “tolerance” has
more positive connotation for many people than “toleration”, among other things
because “tolerance” embodies a certain ideal of engagement and “toleration” emphasizes
the power imbalance between the “tolerator” and the person who is being tolerated.34
Thus defined, there was passive toleration in the Golden Age rather than active tolerance,
perhaps with the exception of individuals like Coornhert. The government, in the person
of the stadholder (stadhouder is a function roughly comparable to England’s sixteenth
century Lord Lieutenant) or in the institution of the States General (the supreme auth-
ority and the central government of the northern Netherlands after they successfully
revolted against the Spanish king and his domination), imposed toleration on the
Dutch Reformed Church. There were two reasons for this policy. First, there was
concern that intolerance might harm the unity and welfare of the Republic. To force
all citizens of the Republic to religious uniformity by ordering them to accept the ortho-
doxy of the Dutch Reformed Church as the state church would without a doubt have led
to more dissention, more fierce resistance, and further fragmentation.35 Second, the
economic growth and economic prosperity of the Republic would profit from a policy
of tolerance. After all, the Republic depended on trade in which non-Calvinist merchants,
both from the Netherlands and abroad, played an important part. There was also fear that
intolerance would lead to emigration of religious dissenters, who were crucial to the
economy of the Republic.36
It seems therefore that political and economic reasons inspired the pragmatism of
passive religious toleration in the Golden Age Netherlands. The adherents of the
various religions and denominations obviously attached such importance to their own
religious identity that it appeared more sensible and more profitable to the magistrate
to accept the existing religious diversity through freedom of conscience and thus a
“living together in fragments”37 than to try and establish a uniform, mono-religious
state. This living together in fragments is also known as omgangsoecumene or “informal
religious co-existence” and is characteristic of the Netherlands.38 However, there was
no full freedom of religion until the privileged position of the Dutch Reformed Church
was ended in 1796 and after the constitutional reform of 1848, in which freedom of reli-
gion was adopted.39
Religious Diversity in Post World War II Netherlands
This brief historical overview of the religious diversity in the Middle Ages and the Golden
Age shows that the view of many Dutch people is untenable that religious diversity in their
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country is a new phenomenon and that Dutch society has always been mono-cultural and
mono-religious. It also shows that the Republic’s religious policy during the Golden Age
was founded on passive toleration on the basis of freedom of conscience, whereas my
non-Dutch colleagues at Venice International University thought that active tolerance
on the basis of freedom of religion was so characteristic of the Netherlands. Their view
of the Netherlands as one of the most tolerant and pluralist societies in Europe therefore
needs to be put into perspective.
Like other Western countries after World War II, the Netherlands was faced with
increasing modernization. This phenomenon can be described as a process of differen-
tiation, rationalization, individualization and domestication.40 This process led, among
other things, to the development of science and technology and to the “institutionalisa-
tion of principles such as constitutional government, moral autonomy, secularism,
democracy, human rights and the equality of citizens”.41 As a result of this moderniz-
ation, Dutch society, which was organized on the basis of religious or political ideologies,
evolved into a secularized society. The division of religious and political groups in so-
called “pillars” is known as “pillarization”.
The Netherlands were characterized by pillarization (verzuiling in Dutch) from the last
quarter of the nineteenth century until the 1970s.42 It is considered to be the typical
Dutch answer to religious diversity. During this period, the Netherlands was modelled
on a pattern of four vertical, parallel pillars, next to a number of other small religious
and political or ideological groups. Each pillar was founded on a particular religious or
secular ideology or philosophy of life and had its own schools, newspapers and other
media, trade unions, political parties, etc.43 Pillarization has been called “a form of
social segmentation aimed at stabilising Dutch society”.44 Its function was to end or
prevent conflict between indigenous religious and political groups.45 Pillarization also
indicates that religious diversity is not a recent phenomenon in the Netherlands.
During the years of Pillarization, (non-)religious identity seemed so fundamental and dis-
tinctive for the Dutch that also, at that time, a “living together in fragments” was accepted
as a solution to the informal co-existence of believers, dissenters, and non-believers in
one country. Just like in the Golden Age, the Pillarization period seems to have been
one of passive toleration rather than active tolerance.
One of the effects of modernization, secularization, was late to come to the Netherlands
and slow to develop, but ultimately seems to have taken root more thoroughly than in
other Western countries. The Christian religion lost much of its importance as a key
factor of social cohesion in the public domain as a result.46 Modernization and secular-
ization thus contributed, on the one hand, to the de-Pillarization of Dutch society but, on
the other hand, resulted in a further increase of the already existing religious diversity.47
Other developments closely associated with modernization and secularization also
played an important role in the growth of religious diversity in the Netherlands. Indivi-
dualization brought the freedom to experiment with religious alternatives. This led to
growing awareness that adhering to a faith, practicing a religion, following religious-
ethical precepts, and participating in religious and ritual practices was a matter of individ-
ual choice.48 Practicing the religion of one’s parents or ancestors was no longer a matter
of course. It was possible to shop on the religious market and to choose from a large and
diversified supply of religions and degrees of religiosity. Membership of and identification
with a particular religion or religious group was founded on an autonomous, personal
preference.49 Religiosity and belief did not necessarily require membership of a particular
religious community.50 Individual religious bricolage was a real possibility. Given a
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person’s lifestyle and self-tailored identity, a matching religion was chosen or created.51
Atheism also became a viable alternative.
Immigration also contributed to the growth of religious diversity in the Netherlands
after World War II. Until 1975, the Dutch government held the official view that the
Netherlands was an emigration rather than an immigration country. From the end of
the 1950s, Dutch prosperity and a shortage of cheap labour led to a stream of economic
migrants to the Netherlands. In addition to immigrants who settled in the Netherlands
for economic reasons, there were also those who had political or educational motives.
As a result of this immigration, the religious diversity in the Netherlands grew further.
Given the principle of the separation of church and state, the religious factor played a
marginal role at best in the Dutch government policy concerning immigrants until the
1990s, even though many of them came from “Muslim” countries such as Turkey and
Morocco. The government was not interested in their religious identity, and their reli-
gious disparity was treated with certain indifference. During the first decades of their
presence in the Netherlands, these immigrants were successively called “guest
workers”, “economic migrants”, “non-Western foreigners”, and “members of a cultural
and/or ethnic minority”. In this period, it was the ethnicity rather than the religion as an
identity marker that played a dominant role in the public discourse of government and
immigrants.52 A minority policy was developed that was aimed at fighting discrimination,
racism, and deprivation and at stimulating the ideal of a multicultural society.53 The
ideology behind this ideal was inspired by the Canadian minority policy that propagated
multiculturalism as the attitude of mutual appreciation, recognition, and active support
of cultural differences, and equal opportunities for all cultural and ethnic groups in the
country.54
How much Religious Diversity can a Society Like the Netherlands Take?
In the course of the first decade of the third millennium, the government seems to have
abandoned the ideology of multiculturalism in its minority policy which, according to
some opinion makers and politicians, had become a disaster.55 There is more attention
for religious diversity now, but usually mistakenly associated with the Muslim presence
in the Netherlands. The figures for 2010 in the Jaarrapport Integratie [Annual Report
on Integration] of Statistics Netherlands show that the Dutch population is estimated
at 16,575,000 people, 13,215,000 of whom are regarded as native. The 3,359,000
foreigners are distinguished into 1,501,000 Western foreigners and 1,858,000 non-
Western foreigners. Of the latter group, 883,000 people, given their background, will
in all probability have an Islam-related identity. The other 975,000 non-Western
foreigners originate from countries where Christianity or a religion other than Islam is
dominant.56
In publications from 1996 and 2006, more attention was drawn to the position and
problems of non-Western Christians in the Netherlands.57 On the basis of these publi-
cations and estimates made by migrant platform “Samen kerk in Nederland” (Together
Church in the Netherlands), set up in 1997, and Cura Migratorum (Care for the
Migrants), that was discontinued in 2005, it was argued that between 600,000 and
700,000 non-Western Christians were staying in the Netherlands in 2006.58 Again,
Amsterdam can be referred to as an example. As mentioned above, in the year 2000 it
accommodated approximately 350 different religious communities, among them 70
Christian migrant denominations which gathered for worship in 160 different places in
the capital.59 In addition to non-Western Christian migrants, divided over a myriad of
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Roman-Catholic and Protestant groups, Western Christian migrants are living in the
Netherlands who, depending on their country or region of origin, are Roman-Catholic,
Old Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox (Bulgarian, Greek, Russian and the like), one of the
many Protestant denominations or Mormon.
Also as a result of immigration from Israel, the number of Jews in the Netherlands
increased to approximately 52,000 persons in 2009.60 However, Judaism in the Nether-
lands is no more a uniform community than are Christianity or Islam. The same holds
for Hinduism and Buddhism, religions originating in the Indian subcontinent; its
adherents in the Netherlands belong to many different movements. A third religion
that hails from India is Sikhism, which, according to its website, has approximately
12,000 adherents in the Netherlands.61 One of the monotheist religions with a fewer
number of followers in the Netherlands is, for example, the Bahá’í faith, originating
from Iran.62
It is impracticable and unnecessary to enumerate all religions, all religious groups, and
all forms of religiosity extant in the Netherlands. It has become sufficiently clear that the
Netherlands has enormous religious diversity—both inter-religious and intra-religious.
The 350 different religious communities in Amsterdam in the year 2000 prove this. It
has also been shown that the view of the prominent sociologist of religion José Casanova
that, as regards continental Europe, “immigration and Islam are almost synonymous”
does not apply, at least not to the Netherlands.63 How much religious diversity a
society like the Netherlands can take is a question that cannot yet be answered. It is
known, though, that “an ‘excess’ of diversity… gives rise to problems in the field of
social cohesion and trust”.64 According to some scholars, cultural diversity and social
cohesion are incompatible concepts.65
The Impact of Religious Diversity
The Netherlands has always had religious diversity, and this diversity has greatly
increased after World War II. What is the impact of religious diversity on and in a
country like the Netherlands? Of course it cannot be denied that negative reports on
non-Islamic religions and religious groups, as suggested by four of the six media head-
lines mentioned in the opening section, have also led to some concern in Dutch
society. However, such concern usually does not last very long. The main reason that
many people experience religious diversity as a serious problem and a continuing
source of concern is the presence of adherents of Islam in the Netherlands.
The primary association—an unjustified one, incidentally, as has been shown—of reli-
gious diversity withMuslim presence, however, conceals that the problems that are attrib-
uted to them may be the consequence of religious diversity in general rather than being
the consequence of the Muslim presence. Research has shown that religious diversity can
indeed lead to various problems in a society, for example, problems concerning (feelings
of) safety, security, and social cohesion, issues around (national and other forms of) iden-
tity, the moral order, norms and values, and claims relating to the veracity of this or that
religion.66 Because of the association with Islam andMuslims, a number of problems that
may be related to religious diversity in general is explained on the basis of “Islamic”
examples. On the one hand, these examples show that actual, real, objective problems
are concerned because large groups of people experience them as deviating from and/
or contrary to the social norm; on the other hand, they show that the problems are also
related to subjective feelings, prejudices, and stereotypes.67 It must be emphasized that
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what is said about Islam in this context applies mutatis mutandis to religious diversity in
general.
Islamization: The Danger and the Perceived Threat
Contemporary events such as 9/11 (2001), the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November
2004, and other bloody terrorist attacks involving Muslims have confirmed and
reinforced the image of Islam as an “aggressive, violent, and expansionist religion” in
the eyes of many Dutch people. As a result, large sections of the Dutch population are
afraid of “the danger of Islam”. They fear the Islamization of the Netherlands. A few
people therefore think that, with the Muslims residing here, the “Trojan Horse” has
been let in.68
However, there is no attention for the fact that this negative image of Islam and
Muslims is partly based on centuries-old prejudices and stereotypes. The role which a
number of Western opinion makers and politicians from the last quarter of the twentieth
century have played in the revival and/or continuation of these prejudices and stereotypes
is easily overlooked. It has been forgotten that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9
November 1989, various prominent Western politicians declared, orally and in writing
that no longer communism but Islam and Islamic fundamentalism were the new
enemy of the West.69 The Western world apparently has a political interest in an
enemy image of Islam.
The “Incompatibility” of the Islamic Identity with the Dutch Identity
It is remarkable that the Turks and Moroccans in this country who, as mentioned above,
had successively been called “guest workers”, “economic migrants”, “non-Western
foreigners”, and “members of a cultural and/of ethnic minority” were primarily identified
as Muslims after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The debate on minorities and multicultural-
ism became “Islamized”, which may have been the reason that the Dutch policy of multi-
culturalism is considered to have failed. To achieve better integration into Dutch society,
Turks andMoroccans were expected to give up their “Islamic identity”. In a speech made
in Lucerne on 6 September 1991, Frits Bolkestein (b. 1933), the then leader of the Dutch
Liberal Party, was one of the first who addressed this topic. An “Islamic identity” was
obviously thought to be incompatible with the “Dutch identity”.
Apparently, the seeds of Bolkestein’s view needed time to germinate in Dutch soil,
where individualization was still rampant. Following World War II the idea had taken
root after all that a clear-cut and well-delineated group identity implied the exclusion
of others and of the “Other”. Too great an emphasis on the individual character of the
group carried the risk of racism, the greatest evil of all, as the recent war had shown. Indi-
vidualism became the norm and being different was celebrated in the ideal of multicul-
turalism.70
Around the turn of the millennium, a change seemed to have taken place. Society
became selfish and uncaring, norms and values became blurred, extreme individualiza-
tion and intolerance increased;71 these and other negative social developments are a
source of great concern to the Dutch government and population. They fear the
erosion of social solidarity and disintegration of social cohesion. With campaigns like
“Society, that means you” by SIRE,72 the government has tried since 1998 to make
the population aware again of its own responsibility in this context and thus to re-establish
the community feeling. Here and there, a causal link is made between the loss of both
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social solidarity and social cohesion and the so-called “Islamization of Dutch culture”.
The call for a return to and restoration of the “Dutch identity” sounded louder at the
end of the 1990s than at the beginning of that decade.73
What constitutes that “Dutch identity” is unclear. After all, since World War II, the
Netherlands has changed dramatically from a:
. pillarized society on a religious and ideological basis into a secularized, frag-
mented society;
. people with norms and values that were shared by the whole community into
a society of individuals who think they can determine their own norms and
values and who expect to be accepted as they are;
. country with a government that focused on solidarity and looking out for each
other into a country with a government that emphasizes self-help and the
ability of individuals to manage for themselves;
. nation focused on its own country into an EU member state, as a result of
which national interests are often at odds with the common interests of the
European community at large.
These developments—and many more can be mentioned—have led to the feeling that
people are living in a fragmented country without social cohesion and without an identity
of its own. The sense of community on the basis of a shared identity must be rekindled.
The search for and the rediscovery of the “Dutch identity” confirm theories propagating
that identity is a process of identification and disassociation, a process of inclusion and
exclusion, a process in which the role of the other is equally important as the own role,
since it is defined in relationship to the other.74 One thing is very clear: the “Dutch iden-
tity” is completely different from and incompatible with the “Islamic identity”. The ideal
projected onto the past proves useful here: the “Dutch identity” is founded in the mono-
culture of olden days, with shared norms and values originating from a joint Judeo-Chris-
tian-humanist heritage. Opposite this “rediscovered” Dutch identity, that is the
guarantee for social cohesion, “the” Islamic identity is projected as a massive, uniform,
monolithic unity that is a threat to social cohesion. There is no attention for the great
variety of currents, sub-currents, and counter-currents existing among Muslims in the
Netherlands.
The Alleged “Incompatibility” of Islam with Dutch Norms and Values
People living in the Netherlands who hold on to Islam and their “Islamic identity” are
denied by populist leaders and opinion makers the ability to agree with and abide by
the norms and values accepted in the Netherlands. According to these populist leaders
and opinion makers this inability is caused by the absolute loyalty to the umma, the
Islamic religious community, and the blind obedience to the shari’ah, the religious law
of Islam, which every Muslim is expected to follow to the letter. As a result, Muslims
are regarded with distrust. They are suspected of failing to recognize the authority of the
Dutch state and of being after power in the public domain.75 It is interesting that, in the
past, Jews and Roman-Catholics were mistrusted for more or less the same reason: the
primary loyalty of a Jew was alleged to be with the “People of Israel” or the “Jewish
Nation”, and that of a Roman-Catholic with “Rome” (remember ultramontanism!).
In some circles, it is feared that the Muslims in the Netherlands are not only out to isla-
mize the country but want to introduce the shari’ah as well. Democracy, the state under
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the rule of law, human rights, fundamental principles like equality, etc., are feared to be at
risk. Women are again threatened with subordination. Dutch people who are not and do
not wish to become Muslims must fear that that they will become second-class citizens in
their own country. Conflicts over norms and values may erode the unity of the traditional
(Judeo-Christian) system of norms and values, causing social cohesion to disintegrate
further.76
How do People React to the Increase in Religious Diversity?
The examples given on the basis of Islam show that a situation of religious diversity
can indeed lead to feelings of uncertainty, fear, and distrust, to a disintegration of
social cohesion and to the emergence of what Job Cohen, the former mayor of Amsterdam,
called “a society of ‘strangers’”. However, the question is whether only religious
diversity is to be blamed for this. Paraphrasing Cohen, it can be argued that this
society of strangers has not only come about as a result of religious diversity, but
mainly as a consequence of the disintegrating aspects of five important developments
in the past 40 years: individualization, democratization, privatization, globalization,
and secularization.77
Religious Diversity—as a Stimulus for Social Cohesion
Some Dutch people perceive religious diversity as a threat because it can be accompanied
by problems. In the past, the government and the state church as well as the rest of the
population have reacted to these problems with passive toleration. Economic motives
were at the basis of this attitude. The consequence of this policy proved to be a
“society in fragments”, but everyone living in the Netherlands was able to retain their
own religious identity. However, even merely passive toleration seems to be non-existent
in present-day Holland! It is true that the Netherlands is now a secular state and the
government needs to adopt an impartial attitude in matters of religion and philosophy
of life, but still some politicians want Muslims to give up their “Islamic identity”. The
restrictions concerning immigration, clothing, life style, etc., imposed on people from
“Muslim countries” are pervaded with the same spirit of intolerance.
The following three things seem to be deliberately ignored here:
(1) Muslims form part of the religious diversity of the Netherlands. As argued
in the previous section, this religious diversity is not the source of the pro-
blems in the Netherlands, at least not the only one. Expecting Muslims to
give up their “Islamic identity” and applying the above-mentioned restric-
tions make Muslims into scapegoats and injures their human dignity.
(2) Especially for migrants, a religious identity can be a source of consolation
and stability. Religious identity offers security, something to go by in the
strange, new environment, and might thus be helpful in adapting to
changed and changing circumstances.78 For Muslim migrants—and this
also applies to other immigrants—their religious (Islamic) identity
becomes more important and their religious commitment is greater in
their country of residence than it was in their country of origin.79
(3) Every person has more than one identity.80 It is not for outsiders to decide
what “Islamic identity” is and what a Muslim is capable of on the basis of
that “Islamic identity” or not. On the one hand, it is true that identity is
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attributed and on the other hand, it is also acquired. It is possible for
Muslims to adopt an “Islamic identity” that is completely compatible
with the norms and values accepted in the Netherlands.81 Moreover,
neither identity nor norms and values are a static and neat unity; they are
dynamic and in constant flux.
It is a well-known fact that religious identity as an identity marker can strongly contribute
to the social cohesion of a group. History has shown that, in a situation of religious diver-
sity, appreciation of that religious diversity and tolerance of the religious disparity is a
better stimulus for social cohesion between groups than coercion toward religious uni-
formity by making people give up their religious identity.82 Another historical fact is
that the social cohesion in a community is most at risk if one group is convinced that it
does not need the other groups.83
Conclusion
The common identity of and therefore the social cohesion between the various religious
communities and groups will benefit from the general acceptance of the principle of reli-
gious pluralism. Religious pluralism is an ideological, normative, and dynamic concept,
which presupposes, accepts, and appreciates religious diversity.84 It is an ideological
concept, because it presumes that the adherents of the different religions (interreligious
pluralism) or denominations within the same religion (intra-religious pluralism) communi-
cate with each other. This communication must lead to interaction with and mutual rec-
ognition as fellow citizens whose religion is legitimate. Religious pluralism implies
engagement of believers.85 They must be aware of each other’s religious commitment
and dedicate themselves to a mutual relationship that goes beyond relativism and
purely passive toleration.86 In this way, religious pluralism can contribute to a peaceful
society. It is normative, because is recognizes the adherents of all religions as equal citi-
zens. It is true that it rejects the absolute truth claim of one particular religion, but it
does not slip back into religious relativism. More than that, combating all forms of dis-
crimination forms an integral part of religious pluralism which, in this way, stimulates
everybody to become full members of society. After all, religious pluralism is dynamic
because, being aimed at religious tolerance and freedom of religion, it stimulates peaceful
co-existence in a situation of religious diversity. Thus, religious pluralism contributes to
an environment with optimal conditions for democracy to flourish.87 Embracing religious
pluralism as a fundamental principle, not merely paying lip service to it, but realising it in
daily practice, religious diversity can contribute to enriching a society that transcends a
living together in fragments.
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Abstract 
Religious tolerance in Islam can be looked at from two perspectives:  firstly, the 
theory of religious tolerance particularly propounded in the Qur’an; secondly, the 
practices of religious tolerance exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad and his 
Successors. Islam as a religion consists of certain principles that deal with its 
adherents and non-adherents. Some of these principles are very fundamental for 
Muslims, who raise a question as to what extent Islam allows its adherents to 
tolerate others in matters that affect these fundamental principles. This question 
is very much relevant to multi-racial and multi-religious Malaysia which has its 
experiences of harmony among its various religious communities, reducing 
tension within the society. This article discusses all these dimensions of religious 
tolerance with special reference to Malaysia, concluding that tolerance can be 
achieved only when there is a mutual understanding amongst the members of a 
society and an eagerness to respect each other’s rights. 
 
Keywords: Religious Tolerance, The Qur’an, Multi-Religious, Malaysia, 
Harmony. 
 
Abstrak 
Toleransi agama dalam Islam boleh dilihat dari dua perspektif: pertama, teori 
toleransi agama yang diajukan dalam al-Quran; keduanya, pengamalan toleransi 
agama dicontohi oleh Nabi Muhammad (saw) dan para pengikutnya. Islam 
sebagai agama, mengandungi prinsip-prinsip tertentu untuk berurusan dengan 
penganutnya dan bukan penganutnya. Beberapa prinsip-prinsip ini adalah sangat 
asas bagi umat Islam, yang menanyakan soalan seperti sejauh manakah Islam 
membenarkan mereka bertolak ansur dengan orang lain dalam perkara-perkara 
yang memberi kesan kepada prinsip-prinsip asas mereka. Soalan ini sangat 
berkaitan dengan negara Malaysia yang berbilang kaum dan berbilang agama 
dan mempunyai pengalaman keharmonian di kalangan masyarakat pelbagai 
agama, mengurangkan ketegangan dalam masyarakat. Artikel ini 
membincangkan semua dimensi toleransi agama dengan rujukan khas terhadap 
Malaysia, menyimpulkan bahawa toleransi hanya boleh dicapai apabila terdapat 
satu persefahaman di kalangan ahli masyarakat dan kesungguhan untuk 
menghormati hak masing-masing.  
    
Kata Kunci: Toleransi Agama, Al-Quran, Berbilang Agama, Malaysia, 
Keharmonian. 
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Introduction:   Meaning of Tolerance 
 
Tolerance has been widely accepted as a virtue related to 
human conduct.  It deals with all aspects of human life: religious 
affairs, sexual practices, free expression and ethnic matters. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, tolerance is the capacity to 
tolerate something in which the verb ‘to tolerate’ means to allow 
the existence or occurrence of something without authoritative 
interference.  It also means to sustain and endure.  It might involve 
dislike or disapproval of the thing tolerated.  The word in Arabic 
which is widely used to denote tolerance is “tasÉmuÍ”.  The root 
form of this word has two connotations: generosity (jËd wa karam) 
and ease (tasÉmuÍ).  Thus the term is quite different from the 
English use of the word tolerance, “Where tolerance indicates a 
powerful, grudgingly bearing or putting up with others who are 
different, the Arabic term denotes generosity and ease from both 
sides on a reciprocal basis.”1  According to Muzammil Siddiqi 
there are also other words that have similar meanings, such as 
“Íilm” (forbearance) or “cafw” (pardon, forgiveness) or “ÎafÍ” 
(overlooking, forbearance).2 Tolerance is an attitude of someone 
towards others which involves two parties.  It could be tolerance of 
someone towards his own self or towards others, which is more 
common than the first.  Tolerance happens in the situation in which 
conflicting disagreement occurs between two individuals or groups 
and when there is no way for each of them to abandon their own 
concept in order to accept the concept of the other group.  As a 
concept, tolerance means “respect, acceptance and appreciation of 
the rich diversity of world’s cultures, forms of expression and ways 
of being human”.3  It is, as put by Barbara Herman, “offered as a 
reasonable strategy of response to a wide range of moral 
disagreements in circumstances of pluralism”.4  The core of the 
concept of toleration is “the refusal where one has the power do so, 
                                                 
1 Abdel Haleem, Muhammad, Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Styles, 
London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999, p.73. 
2 www.crescentlife.com/spritually/tolerance_islamic_perspective.htm. 
3 Siddiqi, Muzammil, retrieved from www.crescentlife.com/spritually/tolerance 
islamic_perspective.htm 
4 Barbare Herman, Pluralism and the Community of Moral Judgement in 
‘Toleration An Elusive Virtue’ ed. David Heyd, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1996, p.61. 
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to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds 
objectionable.”5     
According to Charles Teague, “the most pervasive problem 
involves the relationship not in context of family or humanity but 
religious communities and the broader society in which they exist.” 
6 Chaumont claims that “the primary fact of religious life in our 
time is its plurality.  Race, ethos, history, and geography are some 
of the factors that pluralize human societies and set the stage for 
conflicts that may be violently acted out or sublimated in myriad 
ways.  Among all possible factors, the diversity of religion is the 
one that creates the most subtle responses to the many differences 
that fragment the human communities of this world.”7 With regard 
to this article, it will focus only on religious tolerance from Islamic 
perspective.  
 
Islam and Tolerance 
 
Tolerance is a basic principle of Islam.  It does not mean a 
lack of principles, or lack of seriousness about one’s own 
principles.  It does not mean that a Muslim should neglect his own 
obligations. Tolerance, according to Islam, does not mean that its 
members believe that all religions are the same.8 However, what 
are the areas of tolerance? The Islamic conception of tolerance is 
similar to what UNESCO conceives of it: tolerance is: 
 Consistent with respect for human rights, the practice 
of tolerance does not mean toleration of social injustice or 
the abandonment or weakening of one’s convictions. It 
means that one is free to adhere to one’s own convictions 
and accepts that others adhere to theirs.  It means accepting 
the fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their 
appearance, situation, speech, behaviour and values, have 
                                                 
5 John Harton, Toleration as a Virtue in ‘Toleration An Elusive Virtue’ ed. David 
Heyd, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 29. 
6 Teague, Charles, ‘Freedom of religion: the freedom to draw circles’ in 
Religious Traditions and the limits of tolerance, USA: Anima Publication, 1988, 
p. 21. 
7 Robert Jules Chaumont, ‘How Tolerant Can A Unificationist Be’, in Religious 
Traditions and the limits of tolerance, USA: Anima Publication, 1988, pp. 43-44. 
8 Siddiqi, Muzammil, retrieved from www.crescentlife.com/spritually/tolerance 
islamic_perspective.htm 
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the right to live in peace and to be as they are.  It also means 
that one’s views are not to be imposed on others.9  
Based on these principles, tolerance deals with four issues: 
the dignity of human beings, the basic equality of all human beings, 
universal rights and fundamental freedom of thought, conscience 
and belief.  The basis for these elements is recognised in the 
Qur’an, exemplified in the Prophet Muhammad’s tradition and 
acknowledged in Islamic Law. 10   
Currently, Islam has been misunderstood by some people as a 
religion which promotes violence and terrorism.  This 
misunderstanding is essentially based not on the established 
principles in Islam, but on some examples presented by those who 
claim to be among Muslims. In regards to the legitimacy of the 
concepts and guidance, Islam as a faith must be understood from its 
main sources which are the Qur’an, the word of God, and the 
sunnah or the practice of the Prophet Muhammad.  Right 
understanding of Islam is very significant to understand the issue of 
religious tolerance in Islam.  Muslims are urged to adhere to their 
beliefs and actions according to these two sources and not to follow 
other than these otherwise they are considered misguided by the 
appeal of their own desires. 
Among many things that everyone should know about Islam 
is its dimensions.  Its goals are to secure and develop the human 
beings in five basic areas: the life, the family and children, the 
mind, the freedom of faith, and the rights of ownership in case of 
private or public property. In other words, these elements of Islam 
are belief (caqÊdah) worship (cibÉdah), ethics (akhlÉq) and laws 
(sharÊcah).  As for the first two, they are not imposed on non-
Muslims.  This is consistent with the teachings of the Qur’an 
revealed in both its Meccan and Medinan chapters.  The verses 
“And had your Lord willed those on earth would have believed, all 
of them together.  So, will you then compel mankind until they 
become believers” (10:99) and “there is no compulsion in religion” 
(2:256) do not tolerate non-Muslims grudgingly, but welcome them 
to live in a Muslim society.11 In parallel to this, Islam does not 
impose alms-giving (zakÉt) and participation in jihÉd on non-
                                                 
9 www.freewebs.com/duisoc/tolerance.htm 
10 Ibid. 
11 Abdel Haleem, op. cit, p. 75. 
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Muslims, though these two considerably contribute to the resources 
and the security of the state.  The reason is that these two are 
considered as solely religious duties, hence confined only to 
Muslims.  However, as for ethics, its principles are not different 
from those of other religions.  All religions emphasise on virtues 
such as justice (cadl), mercy (raÍmah), performance of good deeds 
(iÍsÉn), love (maÍabbah), modesty (ciffah), bravery (shajÉcah), 
generosity (sakhÉ’) cooperation (al-tacÉwun) and disapprove of 
vices such as adultery (zinÉ), injustice (zulm), deceit  (ghishsh), 
consumption of orphan’s property  (akl mÉl al-yatÊm), and 
harshness to the weak   (al-qaswah calÉ al-ÌucafÉ’).  As for the legal 
system of Islam, only certain aspects are applicable to non-Muslims 
in order to organise and harmonise the fabric and structure of a 
society. However, regarding family laws, non-Muslims are free to 
choose either to follow Islamic law or to adhere to the teachings of 
their own religion. Thus non-Muslims have a right to have their 
own civil court pertaining to their religious matters.12   
After having considered these ideas, I would like to elaborate 
on Islamic tolerance of other religions.  In discussing this, the 
article would be confined to the issue of Islamic tolerance of non-
Muslims in an Islamic state. 
To begin with, I would like to refer to the question, why non-
Muslim minorities living in the Islamic states have to follow the 
constitution which is based on the Islam?  Does this not contradict 
human freedom, or deny the freedom of religion to others which is 
upheld in Islam?  The answer to this is that living in the Islamic 
state but ignoring its right to implement its teachings and 
fundamental principles for the sake of minorities is in fact to 
oppose the principle of freedom for Muslims who must adhere to 
their religious teachings when they are the majority in the state.  
This concept of respecting the rights of the majority by the 
minorities is accepted even by democracy.  However, this right 
should be followed with the condition that the Islamic state should 
not be unjust towards the rights of non-Muslim minorities.13  
Islam divides non-Muslims into: firstly, those who show 
antagonism against Muslims, and secondly, those who show 
                                                 
12 See: Al-QaraÌÉwÊ, YËsuf, al-AqallÊyyyÉt al-DÊnÊyyah wa al-Hill al-IslÉmÊ, 
Beirut:  Mu’assat al-Risalah, 2000. Pp. 13-15. 
13 Ibid. 
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peacefulness towards Muslims.  With regards the first, Islam has 
laid down certain criteria on how to deal with them and this is 
discussed extensively in the chapter of jihÉd and siyar of Islamic 
jurisprudential works.  Pertaining to the second group of those who 
live in the Islamic state, Islam regards them as its citizens and 
satisfies their rights.  The classical term for this group was ahl-
dhimmah, those who are under protection.  Therefore, non-
Muslims are not second class citizens, thus in our contemporary 
situation, even though this term does not intend to imply derogation 
(dhamma or tanqÊÎ), the use of this term could be altered to non-
Muslims in the Islamic state.14 
Human freedom and equality are fundamental in any 
democracy.  Islam regards that human beings are of equal in status.  
The Qur’an reiterates that all men, though they are divided into 
nations and races, share certain characteristics.  These identities are 
origin, responsibility, utilization of the resources and destiny.15  
Human beings are equal as they descend from the same father, i.e. 
Adam.  What differentiates one man from the other is his fear of 
God and good deeds.  Islam considers “human dignity” 
fundamental for its ideology, or in other words, its principles for its 
way of life.   Verse 17:71 of the Qur’an  has shown that all the 
children of Adam have been granted “dignity” by their Creator 
without any difference, and this human dignity has to be secured 
and maintained by His guidance and laws by the Muslim teachers 
and authorities, and should never be subject to compulsion. 
According to FatÍÊ UthmÉn16, “the human dignity is 
comprehensive; it encompasses all the human dimensions: spiritual, 
moral, intellectual and physical.”   
Apart from realizing that all human beings are the same in 
origin which constitutes their dignity, what helps Muslims to be 
tolerant of non-Muslims is that they are taught to realise that 
differences in religions happen because of the will of God who 
confers on man freedom to choose his own belief. In verses 18:29 
and 10: 99 of the Qur’an Muslims are asked to be just and to have 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Berghout, Abdul Aziz, ManÉhij al-Dacwah, Kuala Lumpur: Aslita Sdn Bhd, 
2003, p. 260. 
16 OthmÉn, Mohamed FatÍÊ, ‘Modern Democracy  and the Concept of Shura’ in 
Islam and Tolerance, ed. Alhabshi, syed Othman Syed, and Hassan, Nik 
Mustapha Nik, Kuala Lumpur: IKIM, 1996, pp. 99-101. 
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good ethics and fight against injustice even if it is against non-
Muslims.17 
God has created people to be different and they will always 
remain different not only in their appearance, but also in their 
beliefs and it is up to each person whether to become a believer or 
not.18  Thus, Islamic tolerance of non-Muslims in matters of 
religion is that non-Muslims are allowed to perform their beliefs 
and religious duties, and live according to their customs, even if 
they are forbidden in Islam.  If Jews believe that they should not 
work on Saturday, they should be allowed to do so because it is 
related to their religion.  Similarly for Christians, if they believe 
that they should go to church on Sunday they cannot be prevented 
from doing so.  Hence, the Islamic state should be tolerant of non-
Muslims in matters regarding their religion even though they 
contravene with Islamic beliefs. Even though the Islamic state 
within its power is able to prevent non-Muslims from doing certain 
things in order to be in line with the ideology of the state, it still 
allows them to enjoy some of the things which are allowable in 
their religions as long as this does not harm the state and the 
society.  Thus, even though the Christians are not ordered to drink 
wine and eat pork, they are not prevented from doing so because 
this is allowed in their religion.19  
This toleration of non-Muslims is also seen in their right to 
bring up their children on their own faith.  The right connected with 
the actual exercise of ritual worship implies the right to educate, to 
assemble and to organize activities.  The right to educate their 
children concerns religion only, not the civil or public life of the 
Islamic state as a whole, of which they are members.  Hence the 
Islamic state should grant non-Muslim children the right to have 
lessons on their religion at school, but not the right to run their own 
schools, unless such schools conform in terms of the curriculum 
and general spirit to the public schools.  This is because the 
demands of national integration do not allow any system to 
                                                 
17 See: Al-QaraÌÉwÊ¸op. cit., pp. 39-41. 
18 See: Abdel Haleem,  op. cit., p. 75 
19 See: Al-QaraÌÉwÊ, op. cit., p. 33; See: Abdel Haleem, op. cit., p. 75. 
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contribute to the fragmentation or dissolution of the unity of the 
state.20  
Islam has shown its tolerance towards non-Muslims within 
the scope which does not require interference from the state.  It is 
up to the Muslim societies to show their tolerance of the adherents 
of different religions.  The Qur’an insists that a son should respect 
his parents who are not Muslims. The verse 31:15 of the Qur’an 
praises those who feed the prisoners including the non-Muslim 
prisoners (76:8) and allows Muslims to spend their money even on 
non-Muslims (2:272). 
The constitution of Medina during the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad encouraged cooperation and solidarity in a plural 
society consisting of Muslims, Christians, Jews and others.  
Though the constitution was violated at a certain point by the 
Jewish treachery, it was nonetheless a remarkable effort to put into 
actual practice the universal ideas of the Qur’an.  The Prophet 
forged a treaty with the Christian monks of NajrÉn.  The people of 
NajrÉn were given pledge that their religious rights will be 
protected and the sanctity of their monastery will be preserved 
provided they too showed respect for Islam and the emerging 
Muslim community.  AsmÉ’ bint AbÊ Bakr was ordered by the 
Prophet to maintain good relations with her mother who was a 
disbeliever.  The Prophet used to visit the people of the Book, 
welcomed their visits, visited the sick among them, received 
presents from them and gave assistance to them.  The people of the 
Book on some occasions were allowed to perform their prayer in 
the Muslim mosque in Medina.  During the time of the Caliph 
cUmar, he maintained the same attitude.  On one occasion, it is 
reported that he gave the order that one Jewish family would 
receive a permanent charity benefit from the public treasury (bayt 
al-mÉl).  Even though he was hit to death by a non-Muslim, he 
gave a will to his successor to do good to non-Muslims in the 
Islamic state.21  
cUmar also showed how tolerantt he was through his 
treatment of the Jews and Christians of Byzantium after the 
                                                 
20 See: FÉrËqÊ, IsmÉÑÊl R., ‘The Rights of non-Muslims under Islam: Social and 
Cultural Aspects’ in Muslim Communities in non-Muslim States, London: 
Islamic Council of Europe, 1980, pp. 56-60. 
21 See: Al-QaraÌÉwÊ, op. cit., pp. 32-36. 
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conquest of its territories.  The text of the treaty of the surrender of 
Jerusalem was written by MucÉwiyah and was signed by 
Sophronious, the Patriarch of the city, on behalf of the Christians.  
Among many things the treaty guaranteed, the safety of person and 
property, the right to practise their non-Islamic religions, and to 
preserve whatever public institutions they had such as churches and 
schools which were usually attached to the churches.22 
  In Spain where Muslims ruled from 711 until the fall of 
Granada in 1492, the three Abrahamic communities – Christians, 
Jews and Muslims – lived in great harmony for long periods of 
time.  Andalusia, as an Islamic Spain, was known “an exemplar of 
religious tolerance.  It also produced a flowering of science, arts 
and letters.”23 Contrary to this was what happened when the 
Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella seized Granada from the 
Muslims in 1492.  Thousands of Jews and Muslims were either 
killed or expelled in waves because of religious persecution.  “Like 
Spain, Muslim rule in India was also tolerant and compassionate.  
Aurangzeb was very accommodative towards non-Muslims in his 
Empire.  He employed the largest number of Hindus in the highest 
echelons of administrative and military service.”24  
  Adam Smith states that the Islamic states did not try to 
enforce Islamic religious identity onto other religions; rather they 
opted to be tolerant to the extent that some Muslim Caliphs went to 
the festivals of the non-Muslims and non- Muslims were allowed to 
construct their places of worship.  It is reported that al-Layth ibn 
Sacd and cAbd Allah ibn Luhaycah, the second century Hijri 
Muslim scholars, viewed the construction of churches as part of the 
state’s development, arguing that some of the churches in Egypt 
were constructed during the time of the Companions of the Prophet 
and their Successor.25  
This attitude of Muslim leaders towards non-Muslims who 
lived in their society was so outstanding that Muslim societies 
                                                 
22 See: FÉrËqÊ, op. cit., pp. 56-60. 
23 Jeffrey Lee, 1993, cited in Chandra Muzaffar, 1996, p. 140.  See Muzaffar, 
Chandra, ‘Tolerance in the Malaysian Political Scene’ in Islam and Tolerance, d. 
Alhabshi, syed Othman Syed, and Hassan, Nik Mustapha Nik, Kuala Lumpur: 
IKIM, 1996. 
24 Chandra Muzaffar, op. cit., pp. 140-1. 
25 See: SharÊf, cUmar, Muzhakkirat fi Nizam al-Hukm wa al-Idara fi al-Dawlah 
al-Islamiyyah, Cairo: Matbaca al-Sacida, 1979, p. 133. 
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came to be regarded as outstanding models of inter-ethnic, inter-
religious harmony and good relations within the historical 
surroundings in which they operated; in the words of Seyyid 
Hosein Nasr,  
In the case of Islam it is particularly interesting that it 
is the only religion before the modern era which had 
confronted every major religious tradition of mankind with 
the exception of Shintoism and the American Indian 
religions.  It had encountered Christianity and Judaism in its 
birthplace, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Mithraism in 
Persia, Shamanism, which in its Asian form is a sister 
religion of Shintoism and the North American religions, in 
central Asia and Mongolia, the native African religions 
south of the Sahara and, of course, Hinduism and Buddhism 
in India and eastern Persia. 26   
Before taking up the next discussion, it is important to stress 
here that there is a limit to the concept of tolerance.  Muslims’ 
tolerance of non-Muslims is bound with their Islamic teachings.  
They are under the obligation not to dilute their religious teachings 
in keeping with whatever practices or campaigns appear in the 
society around them.   They are under a religious obligation to 
cooperate with other people who work to maintain what is good but 
not to do what is wrong as stated in the Qur’an, “Aid one another in 
what is good and pious, do not aid one another in what is sinful and 
aggression.” (5:2) 27 
 
Malaysia and its Experiences in Dealing with Multi Religious 
Society28 
 
It is vital to have a clear perception of Malaysian history to 
understand the issue of tolerance in Malaysia.  Located on the 
south-eastern edge of the Asian continent, Malaysia, formerly 
known as Malaya, comprises a peninsula and two states (Sarawak 
and Sabah) on the island of Borneo in the South China Sea. 
Malaysia is ethnically diverse, with a population of about twenty 
                                                 
26 Chandra Muzaffar, op. cit., pp. 138-9. 
27 See: Abdel Haleem, op. cit., P. 80. 
28 The study on the practice of religious tolerance in Malaysia focuses on certain 
issues since its independence day until 1990. 
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million on the peninsula comprising approximately 55 percent 
Malays, 34 percent Chinese, 10 percent Indian, and less than one 
percent of other ethnic groups including aborigines (orang asli), 
Europeans, and Eurasians.  The religious demography of the 
peninsula is also complex: based on 1980 data about 56 percent are 
Muslims, 32 percent Buddhist-Taoists, 8 percent Hindus, 2 percent 
Christians, and 2 percent Sikhs’ Baha’is, animists, atheists, or 
religiously anonymous.29  
The Malays were recognized as the earliest community who 
settled in Malaysia.  Before the coming of Islam, the majority of 
them believed in Hinduism and Buddhism.   According to some, 
Islam arrived in Southeast Asia in the 13th century through traders 
from the Arab and India who came to Malaysia in the next century.  
Islam was established in Melaka in the 15th century.  These traders 
successfully managed to convert the local people and the rulers to 
Islam.  The Malay rulers who adhered to Hinduism turned to accept 
Islam and gradually devised an initiative to amend some of the 
local laws to be in line with Islamic law.  
As for the Chinese, their mass settlement in Malaya took 
place after 1800 under the support of British administration.  
British commercial development, particularly in tin mining, 
speeded up the migration of Chinese entrepreneurs and labourers.30  
As regard to the introduction of Buddhism to the Malay Peninsula 
during the first five centuries C.E., it is closely linked to 
Indianization and early state formation.  From the late twelfth 
century through fifteenth century, Islam spread steadily through the 
Indonesian archipelago, and by the end of the fifteenth century the 
Malay rulers of the Indianized maritime trading states had all 
converted to Islam. Buddhism reappeared on the peninsula with the 
advent of immigrant Chinese labourers in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 31 
As for the Indians, “their contacts with the Malaysian 
peninsula can be traced to pre-Christian times, but trading and 
cultural activities increased during the early centuries of the 
                                                 
29 See: Lee, Raymond L.M. and Ackermann, Susan E., Sacred Tensions 
Modernity and Religious Transformation in Malaysia, US: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1997, P. 58. 
30 Ibid, p. 58. 
31 Ibid, p. 58. 
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Christian era.  It was during this period that Hindu ideas were 
immersed into the cultural structure of the Malay kingdoms.  
Hinduism in contemporary Malaysia is practised mainly within the 
Indian community.  From the latter half of the nineteenth century 
until the eve of World War II, the modern Indian migrant to 
Malaya was chiefly an unlettered labourer, the majority originated 
from South India, coming into the country to work for a pittance on 
some plantation or government project.  Between 1840 and 1940 
about four million Indians arrived in colonial Malaya; they were 
mostly low-caste Tamils and untouchables.” 32  
According to Muzaffar, the vast demographic transformation 
which colonialism created did not in any way revolutionise the 
nature of these polities.  For the Chinese and Indian immigrants of 
the early decades of the last century remained on the outside of 
these societies: they were part of the economic enclaves created by 
colonial rule.  Neither the colonial administration nor the Malay 
rulers regarded them as citizens.  It was only after the Second 
World War that the situation began to change dramatically.  A lot 
of Chinese and Indians were conferred citizenship rights on a very 
liberal basis.  Their children were even bestowed automatic 
citizenship in the 1957 Constitution of independent Malaya which 
at least reduced the tension among them about their status.33   
Their incorporation into the Malayan and later Malaysian 
state transformed the very character of the society.  It was no 
longer an exclusive Malay community.  Malaysia had become a 
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society.  This 
pluralism could be a reason for Malaysia to gain its secular 
Constitution although Islam is the official religion of the 
Federation.34  In the process, the Malays who once set up the nation 
had become a community among communities.35  Nevertheless, the 
Malays are still the most important ethnic group in Malaysia and 
Islam, and the Malay’s ethnicity is vital for the Malays’ identity. 36  
In term of language used in educational system at school level, the 
                                                 
32 Ibid. p. 58. 
33 See: Muzaffar, op. cit., P. 122. 
34 For reasons why Malaysia was made a secular state, see: Hashimah,op. cit. pp. 
33-4.  
35 See: Muzaffar, op. cit., P. 123. 
36 For reasons why Malaysia was made a secular state, see: Hashimah,op. cit., 
pp. 33-4.  
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Malay language has been accepted as the national and official 
language of the land.  However, vernacular primary school 
education in Chinese and Tamil has been allowed as an optional 
medium.  Although this school system is for these two races, it 
accepts the enrolment of the Malay students.   All religious ethnic 
activities were assisted financially and morally by the government.  
Hock describes the way of independence as:  
 
a constitution that would satisfy the British that the 
rights and privileges of all the communities were 
safeguarded.  The essence of bargains was the 
acceptance by the non-Malay leaders that the Malays, 
as the indigenous race, were entitled to political 
dominance, while in return the Malay leaders 
recognized that the socio-economic pursuits of non-
Malays should not be infringed upon. 37 
 
It is interesting to note that religion was adopted as a basis for 
the Malay ethnic boundary which, according to the constitution, the 
Malay is one “who professes the Muslim religion, habitually 
conforms to Malay customs”.  This, according to Hashimah, “was 
merely to give a legal recognition to the position that existed 
before, that is, to equate Malay with Muslim”. 38  
The government took various steps to accommodate the 
needs of the new multi-racial religious society.  Apart from 
building mosques for Muslims, the government established the 
Islamic Centre under the patronage of the national mosque which 
was officially opened in 1965 to strengthen the government’s role 
pertaining to the administration of Islam in Malaysia.39  The 
Malaysian Pilgrims Management and Funds Board (MPMF) was 
formally established in 1962 as a body for centralizing Muslims’ 
savings for the pilgrimage. Another institution, the Malaysian 
Islamic Economic Development Foundation was established by the 
prime minister in 1976 as a trust to collect donations, which are 
invested largely in properties, shares, and securities.  Among these 
multi-million-dollar institutions was the Islamic Bank launched in 
                                                 
37 Oo Yu Hock, 1990, p. 28. 
38 Hashimah, op. cit., p. 119. 
39 Lee, op. cit. p. 43. 
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1983 and later has emerged as a dynamic banking alternative in the 
commercial world. 40  The NEP (New Economic Policy) which was 
established in 1970 generally created a wide range of opportunities for 
different sections of the Malay community.  It improved socio-
economic ethnic imbalances in the economy, thereby enhancing 
Malay consciousness of greater economic control through a system of 
special privileges, and later became “an economic and political 
context that accelerated the rationalization of Islam.”41 
Non-Muslims in Malaysia are given rights to exercise their 
religious obligations.  As for Buddhism, besides the construction of 
the temples, a great number of Buddhist associations were established 
such as the Penang Buddhist Association (PBA) in 1925, Buddhist 
Missionary Society (BMS) in 1961, Malaysian Buddhist Meditation 
Center (MBMC) in 1968, Malaysian Buddhist Institute and Young 
Buddhist Association of Malaysia (YBAM) in 1970.42 
Hindus in Malaysia are free to celebrate their religious festivals.  
More than one hundred Hindu temples were established in Malaysia. 
The celebration of Thaipusam is done in Kuala Lumpur in which its 
followers will march to Batu Caves.  They also established several 
movements and centres for their religious activities.  The Malayan 
Tamil Pannai (MTP) was set up in 1948 in Kuala Lumpur and 
Tiruvarul Tava Nerik Manram (TTNM) in 1962.43  
As for other religions, for example Christianity, “unlike Islam, 
Buddhism, and Hinduism, which have clear-cut links with specific 
ethnic identities, the Christian identity in Malaysia lacks any explicit 
connection with particular ethnic groups.  Christianity in Malaysia 
cuts across the boundaries separating the Chinese, Indian, Eurasians, 
aborigines”44 and lately a few Malays.  Nevertheless, thousands of 
churches have been constructed throughout Malaysia. 
As for the administration of religious activities in Malaysia, it is 
as Lee states: 
 
unlike some countries in Asia that have centralized 
government agencies for the administration of religion, 
for example Indonesia, Malaysia has no such agency.  
Islam in Malaysia is administered separately from the 
                                                 
40 Lee, op. cit. p. 54. 
41 Lee, op. cit. p. 63.. 
42 Lee, op. cit. p. 107. 
43 Lee, op. cit. p. 114. 
44 Lee, op. cit. p. 38. 
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non-Islamic religions.  Constitutionally, federal and 
state control of Islamic legislation and administration 
is separate.  Each of the eleven states of the peninsula 
has its own legal enactment pertaining to the 
administration of Islamic law (sharrca).   The 
provisions of these enactments authorize the 
traditional ruler of each state to assign members of the 
religious council (majlis agama), the Islamic 
judiciary, functionaries of mosques, and registrars of 
Muslim marriages and divorce and to direct the 
Islamic judiciary on matters concerning legal 
procedures without contravening the substantive law 
of sharica.   The federal parliament has no legal 
jurisdiction over Islamic legislation and 
administration in the individual states except in the 
Federal Territory.  Islamic bureaucracy at the federal 
level is controlled by a religious council through the 
offices of the Federal Territory Islamic Affairs 
Department.  A national council for Islamic affairs is 
also located within the Federal Territory.  This 
council, headed by the prime minister, was formed in 
1968 to coordinate the administration of Islam 
through the participation of representatives from each 
state, although some states, such as Johor, Kedah, and 
Pahang, are not involved.  The national council cannot 
interfere directly with Islamic matters at the state 
level, but it can in its advisory capacity exercise 
limited influence on their course of development.45 
 
In addition to this, each region in Malaysia has a religious 
department which controls the administration of the affairs and has 
its own ruling council.46 
In dealing with the non-Muslims, the government faces a 
different set of problems.  Islamic religious department also 
implemented a number of specific laws to control the Muslim 
moral such as khalwat (close proximity). Although it is limited to 
Muslims but has raised concerns among non-Muslims whether they 
                                                 
45 Lee, op. cit. p. 39. 
46 Lee, op. cit. p. 137. 
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will be affected by the law since an attempt was done in 1989 by 
the state of Selangor to amend its Islamic laws to include 
prosecution of non-Muslim khalwat lawbreakers.47 
 
Conclusion 
 
Islam advocates tolerance.  It provides not only theories, but 
comes with exemplified models.  Certain intolerant acts performed 
by some individual Muslims cannot be the basis to deny the policy 
of tolerance that exists in Islam. Acts of intolerance could be based 
on a misunderstanding of Islamic teachings.  However, in 
promoting tolerance, Islam has its limits within the boundaries set 
by the sharÊcah.  Even though Islam cannot accept things that 
contradict its fundamental beliefs and teachings, it has its own 
solution in dealing with situations and all types of encounters.  
Regarding the situation in Malaysia, even though the government 
has tried its best to accommodate the needs of the multi-religious 
society, there is still a room for improvement. 
 
                                                 
47 Lee, op. cit. p. 137. 
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A
 
BSTRACT
 
Using data from the World Values Surveys, this study examines changing values
in Turkey and shows that rising religiosity and intolerance can be traced back to 1995 and
have become more visible during the AKP’s rule. Moreover, Turks are found to be the most
religious of all the societies compared in the study. Findings suggest that Turkish voters are
likely to continue being attracted to political parties like the AKP in the future, which would
have important implications for Turkey’s relations with its traditional friends in the West.
 
Introduction
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, significant socioeconomic and political develop-
ments have taken place in Turkey. One of these developments is the emergence of
Islamist-oriented political parties as a credible choice for voters despite repeated
attempts by the military and its laicist partners to keep the Islamists out of power.
The rise of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) and its closure by the Constitu-
tional Court, followed by the similar fate of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP)
exemplify this conflict. With the split of the FP into two alternative political parties,
the conservative Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) and the Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Turkish electoral politics entered a new
chapter. The AKP managed to attract many supporters from the traditional center-
right as well as the conservative elements of the traditional right of the political
spectrum and swept into power in the 2002 national elections. The party has
managed to fend off challenges from the Turkish military and continued to repeat its
electoral victories, albeit with sizeable decline in its voter support base, in 2007 and
in 2009. How is it possible that Turkish voters gave such overwhelming support to
an Islamist-based political party? What changes in the social values of the public
made it possible for the AKP to maintain its grip on political power? Could it be that
the policies of AKP since 2002 have served as a catalyst to move the Turkish public
toward conservative social values that might have even greater implications for
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Turkey’s domestic development and foreign relations in the future? These questions
are not easy to answer. This study attempts to provide some insight into these devel-
opments by examining rising conservatism, measured in the form of religiosity, and
its impact on tolerance and democratic values based on data obtained from the
World Values Survey (WVS). The analysis attempts to present this in the context of
comparison with other countries that are members of the European Union, as
Turkey represents the most challenging case of candidacy in EU history.
 
Conservatism, Religiosity, and Tolerance as Changing Social Values
 
Several significant surveys have shown that religiosity is a sound measure of
conservatism in Turkey.
 
1
 
 Çarko
 
[GBREVE]
 
lu and Kalaycıo
 
[GBREV]
 
lu in their 2009 study and Toprak
et al. in 2008, provide an in-depth overview of the causes and consequences of
conservatism. The latter study found that growing societal cleavages in Turkey are
reflected by women wearing the headscarf in order to pressure secularists to
conform to religious Islamic practice, for example. Çarko
 
[GBREV]
 
lu and Kalaycıo
 
[GBREV]
 
lu
carried out complex statistical analysis and found that conservatism in Turkey is a
product of a different set of complex and multidimensional factors that can be
explained by psychology and social psychology. They found that while men are
more authoritarian, intolerant, and old-fashioned (dimension-1 of conservatism),
women tend to be more state interventionist, religiously liberal, and supportive of
the status quo (dimension-2).
 
2
 
 They also found that partisan preferences had a
limited significance on conservatism, but the left-right ideological scale appeared to
be significant, showing that as people moved to the ideological right they became
more authoritarian, old-fashioned, and religious—though not any more state inter-
ventionist—than others. Moreover, their findings demonstrate that happier people
seem to be more conservative and religious.
 
3
 
 Probably the most significant finding
of this part of their study is captured in the following statement: 
Among the different measures of conservatism, the first dimension […]
captures authoritarianism, old fashioned and intolerant tendencies. These
tendencies seem to increase as anomie, political inefficacy, lack of self-esteem,
intolerance, and interpersonal trust and happiness increase. As Turkish society
plunges into a mind-set defined by these indicators, it is likely that the resulting
political regime will be faced with demands and pressures to maintain an
oppressive authoritarian regime that looks to the past rather than the future.
 
4
 
Given Turkey’s desire to join the European Union (EU), it is important to compare
these findings with trends observed in other EU countries. For the EU, increase in
tolerance is indeed a declared goal—one that has taken a front-row seat on the EU’s
agenda following troubling riots and clashes across several member states in the
2000s. The specific relationship between religion and intolerance has been widely
proposed in studies of right-wing authoritarianism, in popular discourse, and
because religion is one of the main markers of ethnic identity for many cultures. A
g˘ g˘
g˘ g˘
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number of studies have explored potential relationships in religiosity and values of
tolerance in Europe, observing and testing a variety of explanatory hypotheses.
One relevant study on tolerance in Europe tested the effect of religiosity on anti-
Semitism to see if anti-Semitism in the Netherlands was a product of the
exclusionary doctrine of Christianity. The authors found that there was a positive,
albeit somewhat weak relationship, between Christian religiosity and religious
anti-Semitism.
 
5
 
 However, the authors found that Catholic religiosity had a link to
secular anti-Semitism, while members of Protestant sects did not differ from aver-
age Netherlanders. The authors found a much more powerful secular predictor of
effect on anti-Semitism; they found that a variable on perspective, “narrow
perspective,”
 
6
 
 accounted for 52 percent of the relationship between Christian
beliefs and religious anti-Semitism, while religious beliefs accounted for less than
15 percent. They also found that secular anti-Semitism was also largely a product
of a narrow perspective, with 70 percent of the variance in secular anti-Semitism
accounted for by the perspective variable versus 13 percent associated with
Christian religion.
 
7
 
 The implication of their analysis is that the relationship
between Christian religiosity and anti-Semitism was driven by narrow perspective.
While the authors documented a positive and significant relationship between
Christian beliefs and anti-Semitism, they established that the relationship was
more of narrow perspective mediated slightly by values of a Christian religiosity.
Their analysis notes the relationship among fundamentalist religiosity, authoritar-
ian personalities, and a narrow worldview that contributes to antipathy for groups
outside the mainstream.
Another study conducted on the Netherlands hypothesized that religiosity should
have a nonlinear negative effect on intolerance. The authors theorized that those who
“live” their faith will reject ethnic bias, while only those who claim an affiliation
without being a core believer or adhering to a particularistic faith will show positive
correlations with intolerance.
 
8
 
 The authors conducted a multilevel regression analy-
sis of types of religious beliefs and behaviors as well as of Protestant and Catholic
sects of Christianity. Their conclusions were that Christians tended to show more
support for prejudice than non-religious people or persons of other faiths. (However,
in the predominately Christian countries studied, other groups are the groups outside
the mainstream). They also found that ethnic intolerance was positively associated
with religious attendance. However, they found a strong indication that the kind of
religiosity practiced mattered. They found negative relationships between intoler-
ance, both doctrinal beliefs, and importance of religion in respondents’ lives, but also
found a positive relationship between intolerance and religious particularism. The
results seem to support a common-sense notion that those who practice a religion that
values tolerance will be more tolerant but those who adhere to an exclusionary inter-
pretation of their faith will tend to be less tolerant. The study shows the importance
of using a multidimensional factor for religiosity, as the type of religiosity and the
manner in which it is practiced changes the sign of the association with intolerance.
The authors do caution that the non-Christian religious individuals in their study of
European countries are members of outlying groups and therefore unlikely to express
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intolerance towards the minority group to which they belong, a problem that persists
in this study too. Minority religious respondents seemed to not answer the religious
denomination questions on the survey. Finally, and significantly to this study, the
authors found that the religious heterogeneity of the countries in the study had a
strong positive effect on prejudice, as did economic conditions. Questions about
ethnic bias may be more salient to those with out-groups toward whom misanthropic
feelings can be directed.
These findings of the multilevel study by Scheepers et al. partially refute and
partially support earlier studies on religiosity and bias in Europe.
 
9
 
 A 1990 study of
racism and religiosity in Holland found that there was some association with
prejudice among casual church members and those who attended frequently, but
that the trend reversed among individuals who participated in church functions and
associations.
 
10
 
 They also found that the positive association between nationalism
and religious participation almost completely suppressed the relationship between
faith and bias. A 1999 follow-up study that extended the investigation to cross-state
comparisons concluded that nationalism had a much more powerful effect on bias,
and that the relationship between religion and bias may be spurious to that of nation-
alism and prejudice.
 
11
 
 Finally, Maurice Gesthuizen, Tom van der Meer, and Peer
Scheepers completed a test of Putnam’s thesis that ethnic diversity and social capital
appear to have an inverse relationship, with tentative findings that the presence of a
social safety net in wealthy European countries ameliorates much of the “economic
threat” argument for the existence of links between income and intolerance.
 
12
 
Patterns of Intolerance
 
Studies for the European Monitoring Centre on Xenophobia and Racism by
Coenders, Lubbers, and Scheepers were able to make a detailed examination of
ethnic exclusionism. They found a variety of concepts that were embedded in
notions of intolerance and ethnic exclusionism. The study focused on attitudes
towards migration, but the hypothesis suggested in their analysis is interesting to a
broader discussion of tolerance. The summary report discussed the impact of
national GDP and competition over resources may have on the level of ethnic exclu-
sionism.
 
13
 
 Subsequent analysis of the 
 
European Social Survey 2002-2003
 
 found the
country-level characteristics GDP and unemployment rates had a significant rela-
tionship to resistance to ethnic diversity. However, their hypothesis regarding
competition for resources was reversed at the national level. Higher national unem-
ployment was associated with lower resistance to diversity rather than higher.
Perhaps the salience of the issue was lower as workers did not tend to flock to other
low-employment countries.
In order to investigate the change in values as a function of religiosity, this study
uses survey data over the several waves of the WVS and constructs a series of
indicators using responses from the surveys as observed indicators. The changes in
post-materialist values, tolerance, and religiosity are examined individually then as
part of regression models to try and isolate the partial correlations between religion
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and intolerance while controlling for individual demographics and changes between
waves 1 and 5 of the WVS.
 
WVS Data and Cross-National Comparison of Religiosity in Turkey
 
The World Values Surveys (1990-2005) and its predecessor, the European Values
Survey (1981), provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human
life, from religion to politics to economic and social life.
 
14
 
 This survey originated
from the work of Ronald Inglehart at the University of Michigan and is conducted
every five years by leading social scientists around the world and is the most
comprehensive study of its kind.
 
15
 
 The project director for Turkey is Yılmaz Esmer
of Bahçe
 
[SCEDIL]
 
ehir University in Istanbul. The basic premise of the WVS is that socio-
economic development results in profound changes in the basic human values that
shape politics. With respect to this study’s focus on religiosity and social values
change, Inglehart-Welzel’s values map is important.
 
16
 
 This map reflects the fact that
a large number of basic values are closely correlated; they can be depicted in just
two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation. These include the traditional/secu-
lar-rational and survival/self-expression values. Together, these two dimensions
explain more than 70 percent of cross-national variance.
The traditional/secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast among
societies over religion. More traditional societies place greater emphasis on religion
while more secular-rational ones do not. Inglehart and Welzel also found that a wide
range of values are associated with this dimension. For example, societies near the
traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to
authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject
divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. They tend to have high levels of national
pride coupled with a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values
have the opposite preferences in all of these areas.
The second key dimension of cross-cultural variation is linked with the transition
from industrial society to post-industrial societies, which bring a polarization
between survival and self-expression values.
 
17
 
 Their basic argument maintains that
unprecedented accumulation of wealth in advanced societies over the course of the
past generation resulted in a greater portion of the population taking survival for
granted. These people shifted their priorities from an overwhelming emphasis on
economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-
being, self-expression, and quality of life. Inglehart and Baker found that people’s
values shifted from traditional toward secular-rational in almost all industrial societ-
ies.
 
18
 
 Furthermore, reflecting that modernization is not a linear phenomenon, they
found that there is a shift from survival values to self-expression values when these
societies move from industrial to post-industrial economies.
Inglehart’s research shows that a key component of this transformation is the
polarization between materialist and post-materialist values. That is, a cultural shift
is occurring among generations who have grown up in an environment where
survival is taken for granted. In these cases, self-expression values place higher
s¸
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priority on such issues as environmental protection, diversity, and tolerance (includ-
ing towards gays and foreigners), teaching such values to children, increased inter-
personal trust, and increased demand by people for participation in economic and
political decision-making.
Given the significance of these findings, the analysis of Turkish society begins by
expanding the Inglehart-Welzel map from the last two waves to all waves of WVS.
The resulting map (Figure 1) displays a vivid picture of trends along the survival/
self-expression and traditional/secular-rational values for Turkey and some EU
member states.
 
Figure 1. Values MapSourc : European Values Survey (1981) and World Values Survey (Waves 1990-2005).
 
The values map shows a general trend in the selected EU countries moving from
survival to self-expression and traditional to secular-rational values since 1981.
Spain, which joined the EU in 1986, clearly shows movement in these directions over
a 25–year period. The Dutch and French are even further down the self-expression
Figure 1. Values Map.
Source: European Values Survey (1981) and World Values Survey (Waves 1990-2005).
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and secular-rational values line. The British and Italian data show progress along
self-expression values while holding fairly steady in the mid-range of traditional/
secular-rational values. The Czechs, who represent one of the newest members of the
EU, display strong secular-rational values with a mix of survival/self-expression
values. The two countries that display strong traditional values and strong survival
values are Poland and Turkey. In both countries secular values are not found even
though Poland was ruled under a communist system for four decades and Turkey has
had a laicist political system since 1923. Furthermore, in both cases values associated
with economic and physical survival dominate. Results from Turkey confirm
Kalacıo
 
[GBREV] lu’s findings on voter realignment in Turkey since 1994 that indicate that
the entire electorate shifted to the right of the ideological spectrum.
 
19
 
 This observa-
tion is further confirmed by data obtained from the WVS across five waves, shown
in Figure 2.
 
Figure 2.
 
Voter Realignment in TurkeySourc : World Valu s Survey and European Values Survey.
Religious Practices and Attitudes in Turkey
 
Religiosity is measured through different questions in the WVS. Figure 3 shows
results for Turkey over five WVS waves. An analysis of variance indicates that
there are significant (
 
p
 
<.05) changes in means over the waves for each of the values;
g˘
Figure 2. Voter Realignment in Turkey.
Source: World Values Survey and European Values Survey.
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except for “confidence in mosque,” there is no clear pattern in institutional (confi-
dence or attendance) or personal religious indicators. The 1990 wave indicates
lower aggregate religiosity in Turkey; the 1995 wave indicates a return to more reli-
giousness, with an anomalous increase in mosque attendance by women. Finally,
there is a mixture of changes in the latest two waves indicating a decreased intensity
of religious adherence.
 
Figure 3. Indicators of Religiosity in Turkey (Mean Values)
 
In light of the mixed nature of the religiosity indicators and the unique interac-
tions of religion, gender, and politics in Turkey, religiosity factors were derived
from the indicators illustrated above. Figure 4 illustrates the shifts in mean values of
religiosity over the various waves of the WVS. Results illustrate a profound shift
Figure 3. Indicators of Religiosity in Turkey (Mean Values).
Figure 4. Religiosity by Wave (1 = least and −1 = most).
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towards more intense religiosity in 1995 (measured by importance of God) and a
drift back towards less religiosity by 2007 showing similar association with the
attendance and gender measure.
 
Figure 4. Religiosity by Wave (1 = least and 
 
−1 = most)
 
Religiosity Factors for Turkey
 
Often, studies have used attendance at religious services as an instrumental variable
for religiosity. As recognized in more recent studies, this practice is generally
flawed.
 
20
 
 It is particularly flawed for societies such as Turkey’s, which have a compli-
cated mix of religious beliefs and practices as well as traditional Islam’s restriction
against women’s participation in public religious life. In light of the complex nature
of religiosity in Turkey, a factor analysis was conducted to reduce a variety of features
of religiosity into a manageable number of variables. Using principal axis factoring
(which is more robust to challenges of normality than maximum-likelihood) and a
promax rotation (which allows for correlated factors), an exploratory factor analysis
was conducted on the questions provided in the WVS that touch on religious practices
and importance. Figure 5 provides results of the factor analysis.
 
Figure 5.
 
Pattern Loadings of Religiosity FactorsAs these results demonstrate, the derivation of two factors for religiosity is partic-
ularly important for Turkey, as the difference in beliefs and practice is apparent.
Turkish religiosity, as that of many Muslim cultures, is bifurcated around issues of
gender and practice. The unique variances labeled on the lines connecting the latent
variables with observed responses show factor loadings. This shows the direction
and size of unique correlations to the underlying concept. The double-headed arrow
linking both factors illustrates the 0.24 correlation between the factors.
Figure 5. Pattern Loadings of Religiosity Factors.
 18
 
B. A. Ye ilada & P. Noordijks¸
 
In order to allow ease of interpretation and to adjust for skewed results reflecting
the high average level of religious belief in Turkey, the variables for questions
asking respondents about the importance of God and the importance of religion in
their lives were transformed by taking the natural log of the scores and aligning the
scales to reflect low scores with intense religiousness. To account for the dramatic
effect of gender on attendance, two separate observed variables for attendance were
used: one for male attendance and another for female; in all waves except 1995
female attendance is inversely related to other indicators of religious activity and
belief.
The factor analysis function in SPSS (Statistics Package for Social Sciences)
derives new compound variables from the pattern loadings shown in Figure 5 above.
Table 1 provides regression coefficients for religiosity. The latent factors are labeled
as Import of God (importance of God) and Attend-Gender (attendance and gender)
religiosity.
As one can see from both the pattern loadings in Figure 5 and the factor regres-
sion coefficients in Table 1, both factors are centered at 0 with a scale from -2 being
perfectly religious to +2 being an indicator of a non-religious person. The second
factor, attendance and gender, allows for the inclusion of traditional women who are
both religious and do not attend mosque more frequently than on religious holidays.
The male scores for the attendance and gender factor are very closely correlated
with the importance of God indicator; the female scores are less closely aligned with
those scores as female attendance is less closely aligned with religiosity than it is
with men.
To provide further insight into the changing relationship between the factors and
other indicators of religiosity the correlations of the two factors with the other reli-
gion questions over the past four waves of the WVS are given in Figures 6 and 7.
 
Figure 6. Religion Correlations with Attendance Religiosity by Wave
 
7 sity Indicator Correlatio s with Importance of God Factor by Waves
 
Results in Figure 6 show the diminishing relationship between the gender and atten-
dance-based religiosity and other indicators of religious belief. By the 2005 wave, the
confidence in churches factor (religious leadership, 
 
Diyanet 
 
[SCEDIL] leri Ba
 
[SCEDIL] kanı
 
[GBREV] ı
 
) had all
but faded in any relationship with the factor derived from institutional attendance
controlled for gender. In contrast, the table below shows the persistent relationship
between the importance of God factor and the various indicators from which it is
composed. All the correlations are significant (
 
p
 
<.05) across all the waves.
I˙s¸ s¸ g˘
 
Table 1.
 
Factor Regression Coefficients for Religiosity
Factor Regression Coefficients (Bartlett Regression) Import of God Attend-Gender
Important child qualities: religious faith 0.145
 
−
 
0.007
Confidence: Churches 0.183
 
−
 
0.012
Ln (relig imp) 0.425
 
−
 
0.004
Ln (god_imp_) 0.218 0
attend_by male 0.305 0.585
attend_by female 0.186
 
−
 
0.434
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Figures 6 and 7 show the changes in the relationship between religion indicators
and the attendance-driven factor, while the relationship between the importance of
God factor and its constituents are consistent in its correlations but varied in its
magnitude.
Next, the relationship between religiosity and traditional-secular and survival/
self-expression values was examined, given how Turkey stood apart from other EU
countries on these scales, shown in Figure 1 above. Figures 8 and 9 provide the
results of these correlations.
 
Figure 8. Religiosity by Traditional-Secular
 
9 Surv val/-Self-Expression
 
Values
 
Religious beliefs and practices are part of the observed variables used by Welzel and
Inglehart to estimate their factors for traditional-secular values. What is interesting
in Figure 8 is the diminished relationship between attendance-based religiosity and
Figure 6. Religion Correlations with Attendance Religiosity by Waves.
Figure 7. Religiosity Indicator Correlations with Importance of God Factor by Waves.
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the traditional-secular measure. The correlations are positive because both the Ingle-
hart-Welzel measure of traditional-secular and this study’s measure of religiosity
scale the measures in the following way: Religious/Traditional 
 
--
 
 Nonreligious/
Secular. The positive correlation means that people who are more religious are more
likely to also be traditional.
Results in Figure 9 indicate a very weak relationship between this study’s
measures of religiosity and the Welzel-Inglehart measure of survival/self-expression
values. The correlations are only significant in the 2000 wave. Interestingly, the rela-
tionship between religiosity and survival/self-expression flips in the 2000 wave, for
which there is data confirming earlier observations in Figure 1. Speculatively, the flip
may be because of the survival/self-expression scores for secular men in particular
Figure 8. Religiosity by Traditional-Secular.
Figure 9. Religiosity by Survival/-Self-Expression.
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who were affected by the financial crisis of 2000–2001 and also represent most of the
nonreligious individuals in the attendance-based measure.
 
Social Tolerance and Religiosity in Turkey over Four Waves of the WVS
As with other relationships with religiosity discussed in this study, the relationship
between religiosity and intolerance seems to have peaked in 1994. Using a scale
derived from responses to a series of questions regarding the desirability of a
neighbor from one of several categories, some gauge of social tolerance is
obtained and tested against a respondent’s religiosity. The question asked of
respondents is whether they would not want to have a member of certain groups as
neighbors. The five groups indicated in Figure 10 were included. The survey
dataset codes affirmative responses as 1 and negative responses as 2. The
responses to the groups below were summed to get the intolerance (Intol) variable.
Hence, lower values are associated with more intense intolerance and higher
values with tolerance.
Figure 10. Intolerance in TurkeyResults provide a look at both the means of the constituent groups for the intoler-
ance variables and also the overall mean of intolerance for each wave. There has not
been a clear pattern of greater tolerance in Turkey. Instead, there was a period of
greater tolerance in 1990, followed by a retrenchment and a slow return to slightly
higher levels of tolerance.
Interestingly, the movement in the tolerance means parallels that of the impor-
tance of God religiosity factor but not so much the practice-driven attendance-based
religiosity measure. The results of a simple Pearson correlation test for each of the
waves reinforces observations of Scheepers et al. on the importance of measuring
different dimensions of religiosity.21 The correlations in Table 2 show a steady rela-
tionship between the importance of God religiosity factor and tolerance. The pattern
of positive correlations means the more religious an individual, the less tolerant
Figure 10. Intolerance in Turkey.
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(s)he seems to become. Attendance-gender driven religiosity, on the other hand,
shows no correlation only in the 1990 wave, and associations hover around the
threshold of statistical significance in the remaining waves.
Next, the relationships between intolerance and the two measures of religiosity
were explored using a series of regression models, which control for several covari-
ates of social tolerance and religiosity as well as the difference in main effects for
each wave. The final model tests the null hypothesis that there has been no change
in the relationship between religiosity and intolerance during the four waves
included in this analysis. Grand-mean centered interaction terms were used to
discover changes in the slope of religiosity terms over the waves. This is in keeping
with standard practice to avoid problems of multicolinearity.22 The data are
presented in Table 3 using standardized coefficients to enable easier comparisons of
the relative magnitude of each independent variable’s coefficient.
In all three models, self-positioning on the political scale, educational attainment,
and income all have statistically significant coefficients. They all move in the direc-
tion expected by the literature on social tolerance and post-materialist values. By
model 3, one standard deviation shift rightward in political self-alignment is associ-
ated with a 0.107 standard deviation decline in social tolerance. Inversely, increased
education and increased income are both associated with improvements in social
tolerance. In model 3, controlling for differential slopes among the religiosity indi-
cators in addition to the demographics, the standardized coefficient for education is
0.23. The standardized coefficients for the effects of income are much lower, 0.09,
but significant at p<0.05.
What is interesting from the demographics variables is that in model 1, with the
attendance gender-based indicator omitted, men (the reference case) tend to be less
tolerant than women. A 0.043 shift in the intercept for women is observed in model
1, with smaller, non-significant shifts in the other two models when the gender-
attendance religiosity is included and mediates the gender effect.
The importance of God indicator does have a strong and changing relationship
with social tolerance. However, it is not a linear relationship, as the association
intensifies significantly between waves 1 (1990) and 2 (1995), then by wave 4
(2005) seems to be returning to the same levels as wave 1. In model 1, the impor-
tance of God has a significant positive standardized coefficient of 0.19, indicating
that in aggregate over the waves an increase in religiousness is associated with
social intolerance.
Table 2. Religiosity and Tolerance Correlations by Wave
Correlations with Tolerance 1990 1995 2000 2005
Importance of God Religiosity (−2=very religious, 
2=nonreligious)
.3** .315** .325** .317**
Gender and Attendance-Based Religiosity .02 0.1** 0.09** .130**
**=p<.05 N=961 N=808 N=959 N=957
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The addition of slope differences (the interaction terms) for each of the waves
allows for the examination of change in the relationship of the importance of God
religiosity and tolerance over time. What the model 3 standardized coefficients indi-
cate, similar to the correlations in the table above, is that the effect of this form of
religiosity does indeed change between waves. The reference slope from wave 1 is
0.125. The wave 2 interaction term has a significant standardized coefficient of
0.079, indicating the slope is 0.079 greater in wave 2 than in wave 1. Likewise, the
slope in the wave 3 interaction term is 0.053, indicating a 0.178 increase in tolerance
for each standard deviation shift toward intensified religiosity in that wave. Finally,
by the 2005-2007 wave, the difference term, 0.024, is no longer significantly differ-
ent from that of wave 1.
The gender-attendance religiosity variable is more difficult to interpret in its rela-
tionship to social tolerance. For men, the gender-attendance variable is closely
correlated to the importance of God indicator, while for women, the relationship
between faith and attendance is more ambiguous. The data shows that women who
are both very devout and traditional, and those who are casually observant, tend to
only go to mosque on holidays. The survey conducted in December-January 1995-
1996 provided a strong break from that pattern, with many more religious women
reporting frequent mosque attendance. Further complicating analysis is the suppres-
sion effect that high correlation of the attendance-gender indicator has with the
Table 3. Tolerance by Religion- Standardized Model Coefficients
Model 1, R2.202 Model 2, R2.204 Model 3,R2.209
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Intercept 4.96 0 5.00 0 5.04 0
Sex 0.043 .008 0.028 .411 0.023 .489
Self-positioning in political scale −0.105 0.200 −0.109 0. −0.107 0.00
Highest educational level attained 0.243 0 0.227 0 0.227 0
Scale of incomes 0.090 0 0.1 0 0.091 0
Importance of God and religion 
religiosity
0.19 0 0.192 0 0.126 0
Gender-attendance-based religiosity −0.005 058 −0.016 0.657 −0.071 0.02
wave 3 dummy −0.010 0.617 −0.01 .622
wave 4 dummy 0.005 0.713 .001 0.956
wave 5 dummy 0.053 0.011 .045 0.032
wave3_impgod 0.079 0.00
wave4_impgod 0.053 0.014
wave5_impgod 0.024 0.278
wave3_attend 0.026 0.255
wave4_attend 0.010 0.669
wave5_attend 0.06 0.021
Y=INTOL, N=3129
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importance of God indicator for men (0.9), while for women it has a much lower
correlation.
While interpretation of these coefficients is difficult, insight can still be gleaned
from the changes in standardized coefficients between the models. The attendance-
gender variable, when used with the importance of God variable, measures the rela-
tionship between religious women and social tolerance. In model 2, the slope of
gender-attendance religiosity is confounded by the changes in slope over the waves
that are revealed in model 3. In model 3, the reference wave’s (1990) standardized
slope of gender-attendance is a surprising −0.071, which indicates that social toler-
ance increased among women who were more religious but less frequently attended
mosque services than their peers with average education and political and economic
characteristics. That unique effect weakened over the next two waves, and the 2005-
2007 wave indicates a significant (p=0.021) direct association between intolerance
and attendance-gender, with a slope of 0.06. Whatever the unique circumstances
that existed in the reference 1990 wave concerning privately religious women seems
to have faded by 2005.
Conclusions
Analysis in this study clearly shows that the Turkish public has become more
conservative (traditional on the Inglehart-Welzel factor of the traditional-secular/
rational scale) during the period of 1995 to 2005. The findings indicate that this
is not a phenomenon that started with election of the AKP in 2002. It is a trend
that can be traced to 1995 and has intensified toward more conservatism since
then. That is, while the Turkish public has not become more religious during the
last six years, religiosity has become more apparent and visible during the AKP’s
rule. This confirms findings of others, such as Esmer’s and Kalaycıo[GBREV] lu and
Çarko[GBREV] lu’s studies in 2009, respectively.23 At the same time, a slight but signifi-
cant shift in survival-self expression values was observed: a regressive shift from
1990 to 2000 followed by a slight return toward more self-expression in 2005.
However, Turkish performance on these scales is far below levels observed in EU
countries with the exception of Poland. These findings support Kalaycıoglu’s
voter realignment hypothesis,24 which maintains that since 1994 the Turkish elec-
torate as a bloc has moved to the right of the political spectrum. Such a trend
makes it easier for parties like the AKP to capture these conservative-leaning
voters.
With respect to the Inglehart-Welzel values map, it was found that self-position-
ing on the political scale, educational attainment, and income all have significant
coefficients across the four waves. They all move in the direction expected by the
literature on social tolerance and post-materialist values. It was also observed that
religiosity is a complex matter for Turks and shows significant variation based on
gender.
The findings show a strong but tapering association between the importance of
God religiosity and tolerance. The pattern of positive correlations means the more
g˘
g˘
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religious an individual is the less tolerant (s)he seems to become. The attendance-
gender driven religiosity, on the other hand, shows a strong reversed correlation in
the 1990 wave, and then associations taper to hovering around the threshold of
statistical significance until the last wave, where religiosity is correlated with intol-
erance. Results from model 1 demonstrate that there is a significant difference in
this relationship based on gender. Men tend to be less tolerant than women. Yet
there is more to this than meets the eye. The gender-attendance religiosity is more
difficult to interpret in its relationship to social tolerance. For men, the gender-
attendance variable is closely correlated to the importance of God indicator, while
for women the relationship between faith and attendance is more ambiguous.
Women who are both very devout and traditional, and those who are casually
observant, may only go to mosque during holidays. Further complicating analysis is
the suppression effect high correlation of the attendance-gender indicator has with
the importance of God indicator for men (0.9), while for women it has almost no
correlation.
While there is a persistent correlation between the importance of God measure of
religiosity and intolerance, the effects of religiosity on intolerance appears to be
returning to the lower level of correlation observed in 1990. There was a weaker
correlation between religiosity and intolerance in 2005 wave than in the previous
two waves. The latest wave also showed the highest level of social tolerance, along
with lower levels of importance of religiosity than in the previous two waves. Two
reinforcing phenomena seem to be occurring here: (1) Turkish society is getting
slightly more tolerant while becoming more religious, and (2) the relationship
between belief in God religiosity and social tolerance is weakening.
The findings here suggest that Turkish society is far from values observed in
many EU member states with respect to religiosity and Inglehart and Welzel’s
values map. Such findings certainly raise questions concerning implications of
increased conservatism and religiosity for Turkey’s future socioeconomic and polit-
ical development as well as its foreign relations. Moreover, causal factors behind
these results need further analysis (e.g., urbanization, political and economic crisis,
external shocks like the war on terror). Much of these questions are beyond the
scope of this paper. However, it can be concluded that given the trends observed in
this study Turkish voters are likely to continue being attracted to political parties
like the AKP for the foreseeable future. This trend fits the policy priorities of the
current AKP government quite well. Success of the AKP, or any other similar party,
in capturing and keeping this support would depend on the party’s ability to provide
sufficient response to their aspirations.
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Despite similarities between sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and
religious intolerance, investigators do not routinely investigate these intolerant
beliefs simultaneously. The purpose of this project was to create a brief, psycho-
metrically sound measure of intolerance reflecting these 6 constructs. Data from
existing measures (Attitudes Toward Women Scale, Neosexism Scale, Modern and
Old-Fashioned Racism Scale, Modern Homophobia Scale, Frabroni Scale of
Ageism, Economic Beliefs Scale, and M-GRISM) and from items created by the
authors were obtained from several college samples to create the Intolerant Schema
Measure (ISM). Results support the internal consistency, test–retest reliability, and
factor structure of the questionnaire. Expected relationships between measured con-
cepts, social dominance, social desirability, and across key demographic groups
support the validity of the instrument.jasp_528 2321..2354
Intolerance toward others is an important problem in today’s society.
Prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are three facets of intolerance that
serve to oppress members of multiple minority groups (Lott & Maluso,
1995). More specifically, the intolerance of “other”—or those who are
somehow different from a majority group—is a belief that allows for injustice
and inequality between groups of people. When we are intolerant of others at
the individual level, it maintains systematic oppression and ultimately
silences the oppressed group (Lott & Maluso, 1995).
There are many forms of intolerance, including sexism, racism, sexual
prejudice (a preferred concept and term, in comparison to homophobia;
Herek, 2000), ageism, classism, and religious intolerance. While intolerance is
1Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Allison C. Aosved, Pacific
Islands Health Care System, 459 Patterson Road, Honolulu, HI 96819. E-mail:
Allison.aosved2@va.gov or to Patricia J. Long, Department of Psychology, University of La
Verne, 1950 Third Street, La Verne, CA 91750. E-mail: plong2@ulv.edu
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often named as a single entity, there aremultipleminority groups in theUnited
States that may experience injustices based on their personal characteristics.
Women may lose privileges on the basis of sexism; individuals with various
ethnicities and races may lose opportunities as a result of racism; and indi-
viduals who define themselves as gay, lesbian, bisexual, queer, or transsexual
may experience discrimination as a result of sexual prejudice. Similarly,
inequality may be experienced by older adults and the poor as a result of
ageism and classism, and religious intolerance may lead to bias against
members of certain practicing faiths. Given that, in each instance, individuals
experience prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination on the basis of personal
characteristics, wemay ask if individuals who endorse intolerance toward one
group are more likely to endorse intolerance toward multiple groups.
There are several theoretical positions suggesting that multiple forms of
intolerance are related. Over 50 years ago, Allport (1954) suggested that
individuals who demonstrate prejudice against a group likely have a rigid,
intolerant cognitive style that results in prejudice toward multiple groups or
topics. Similarly, Adorno and colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) developed a psychoanalytic theory regarding the
relationship between personality and prejudice with their authoritarian per-
sonality theory. Social dominance theory also suggests that it is normative to
believe certain groups should be dominant over other groups (Sidanius et al.,
Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004). Social dominance theory further posits that
all forms of group-based oppression (e.g., sexism, racism, sexual prejudice)
are special cases of the human tendency to form hierarchies based on group
membership (Sidanius et al., 2004). One component of social dominance
theory is the idea that individuals vary with regard to their social dominance
orientation, or the degree to which they desire group-based dominance
(Sidanius et al., 2004).
While the aforementioned theories suggest that there may be an underly-
ing construct, such as general intolerance toward “other” or social domi-
nance orientation, there is also evidence to suggest that there are unique, but
related facets or forms of intolerance. For example, a study previously con-
ducted with one of the data sets employed for this project found that the
constructs of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious
intolerance were strongly interrelated (Aosved & Long, 2006). A number of
additional studies are available showing strong associations between both
sexism and racism (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Sidanius, 1993; Swim, Aikin, Hall, &
Hunter, 1995) and between sexual prejudice and sexism (e.g., Agnew,
Thompson, Smith, Gramzow, & Currey, 1993; Campbell, Schellenberg, &
Senn, 1997; Polimeni, Hardie, & Buzwell, 2000; Raja & Stokes, 1998; Steven-
son & Medler, 1995). Given the theoretical similarities between these
constructs, it is striking that researchers do not typically examine multiple
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intolerant beliefs simultaneously. One possible explanation for this may be
the lack of a short questionnaire that assesses sexism, racism, sexual prejudice,
ageism, classism, and religious intolerance.
With regard to the question of how best to measure multiple forms of
intolerance in an empirical investigation, many investigators rely on several
independent survey measures with Likert-type response scales (Campbell et
al., 1997; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Finnerty-Fried, 1982; Greene & Herek,
1994; McHugh & Frieze, 1997). In fact, there are a number of self-report
surveys designed to measure the individual constructs of sexism, racism,
sexual prejudice, and ageism (Campbell et al., 1997; Dovidio & Gaertner,
1991; Finnerty-Fried, 1982; Greene &Herek, 1994; McHugh & Frieze, 1997).
There are fewer instruments designed to measure classism and religious intol-
erance. Specifically, there is one measure of classism and one measure with a
subscale for religious intolerance documented in the literature (Godfrey,
Richman, &Withers, 2000; Stevenson &Medler, 1995). While most measures
of intolerant beliefs assess only one intolerant belief (e.g., sexism alone),
Godfrey et al. developed the one notable exception to this with the Modified
Godfrey–Richman ISM Scale (M-GRISMS). The M-GRISMS is a 50-item
self-report survey that assesses racism, religious intolerance, sexism, and
heterosexism with the same instrument (Godfrey et al., 2000). While the
M-GRISMS is an important tool for assessing multiple forms of intolerance,
researchers would benefit from a broader measure of intolerance that assesses
additional domains of intolerance (e.g., ageism, classism), as well as a
measure that provides a global index of general intolerance toward others.
With regard to measures of global intolerance, Adorno et al. (1950)
conceptualized prejudice and ethnocentrism as stable personality traits and
developed the Fascism Scale (or F Scale) to measure this trait. Adorno et al.’s
work led to more recent measures of the construct of authoritarianism (e.g.,
Altemeyer, 1998; Billings, Guastello, & Rieke, 1993; Rattazzi, Bobbio, &
Canova, 2007). While measures such as the F Scale or the Right Wing
Authoritarian (RWA) Scale (Altemeyer, 1998) assess the global construct of
authoritarianism, this construct is similar to intolerance, yet different (e.g.,
authoritarianism focuses on adherence to social norms, disdain for norm
violators, and uncritical adherence to authority, as opposed to intolerance
toward people who are different or minority group members). Finally, exist-
ing measures of authoritarianism do not measure multiple forms of intoler-
ance toward specific minority groups.
Given the absence of strong tools measuring both an overall index of
intolerance and a number of the unique aspects of this construct, it is the
purpose of the present study to create a measure of intolerance that reflects
the broad construct of intolerance, as well multiple specific dimensions of
intolerance, including sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and
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religious intolerance. Several existing longer measures of each of these sin-
gular constructs were identified in the research literature, including the Atti-
tudes Toward Women Scale (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973), Neosexism
Scale (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995), Modern and Old-Fashioned
Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986), Modern Homophobia Scale (Raja &
Stokes, 1998), Fraboni Scale of Ageism (Fraboni, Saltstone, & Hughes,
1990), Economic Beliefs Scale (Stevenson & Medler, 1995), and the religious
intolerance items from the M-GRISMS (Godfrey et al., 2000). Data from
each of these, as well as additional items created by the authors to assess
classism and religious intolerance, were obtained from large samples of
college students. The Intolerant Schema Measure (ISM) was developed from
participants’ responses to these instruments. Preliminary support for the
reliability and validity of the new scale is examined in multiple samples.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Sample 1. Participants were 523 college students (325 females, 198 males)
who were recruited from a research participant pool at a large midwestern
university during an academic semester for a study on student attitudes.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 55 years (M = 20.5 years, SD = 3.5).
The majority of individuals reported that they had never been married
(90.9%; n = 467); 5.6% (n = 29) reported that they were married or cohabi-
tating; 1.2% (n = 6) reported that they were divorced or separated; and 2.3%
(n = 12) reported themselves in the “other” category (9 participants failed to
report marital status).
The majority of participants were European Americans (82.6%; n = 432);
3.1% (n = 16) were African Americans; 1.7% (n = 9) were Latinos or Hispan-
ics; 4.8% (n = 25) were Native Americans; 5.4% (n = 28) were Asian or Asian
Americans; and 2.5% (n = 13) placed themselves in the “other” category.
Socioeconomic status (SES) was assessed using the two-factor index of social
position (this index considers both education and occupation in assigning an
SES;Myers & Bean, 1968) and ranged from lower to upper class. The average
participant fell into the middle class.
The majority of participants were heterosexual (98.8%; n = 514); 0.4%
(n = 2) were gay men or lesbians, 0.6% (n = 3) identified themselves as
bisexual; and 0.2% (n = 1) were undecided/questioning (3 participants failed
to report sexual orientation). Finally, the majority of participants were Prot-
estants (68.6%; n = 358); 13.6% (n = 71) were Catholics; 2.9% (n = 15) were
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Buddhist, Muslim, or Hindu; 3.3% (n = 17) were agnostic or atheist; 0.2%
(n = 1) were Wiccan or pagan; 8.2% (n = 43) were nonaffiliated; and 3.3%
(n = 17) identified themselves as “other” (1 participant failed to report a
religious affiliation).
Sample 2. A second independent sample of 475 college students (181
females, 294 males) was recruited at the same large midwestern university in
a subsequent academic semester from a research participant pool for a study
on student attitudes. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 54 years (M = 19.8
years, SD = 2.9). The majority of individuals reported that they had never
been married (91.4%; n = 412); 4.2% (n = 19) reported that they were married
or cohabitating; 0.9% (n = 4) reported that they were divorced or separated;
and 3.5% (n = 16) reported themselves in the “other” category (24 partici-
pants failed to report marital status).
The majority of participants were European Americans (84.8%; n = 403);
2.1% (n = 10) were African Americans; 2.7% (n = 13) were Latinos or His-
panics; 4.0% (n = 19) were Native Americans; 5.3% (n = 25) were Asian or
Asian Americans; and 1.1% (n = 5) placed themselves in the “other” category.
SES was assessed using the two-factor index of social position (Myers &
Bean, 1968) and ranged from lower to upper class. The average participant
fell into the middle class.
The majority of participants were heterosexual (97.9%; n = 463); 0.8%
(n = 4)were gaymenor lesbians; 0.6% (n = 3) identified themselves as bisexual;
and 0.6% (n = 3) were undecided/questioning (2 participants failed to report
sexual orientation). Finally, the majority of participants were Protestants
(65.9%; n = 313); 12.6% (n = 60) were Catholics; 1.3% (n = 6) were Buddhist,
Muslim, or Hindu; 3.2% (n = 15) were agnostic or atheist; 0.4% (n = 2) were
Wiccan or pagan; 0.2% (n = 1) were Jewish; 11.4% (n = 54) were nonaffiliated;
and 5.1% (n = 24) identified themselves as “other.”
Measures
Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS). The 15-item short version of the
AWS (Spence et al., 1973) was developed to measure attitudes toward the
rights and roles of women. The AWS (the original, Spence & Helmreich,
1972; and the short version, Spence et al., 1973) is over two decades old, yet
continues to be the most commonly used measure of gender-related attitudes
toward women (McHugh & Frieze, 1997; Spence & Hahn, 1997), although it
has been suggested that the AWSmeasures old-fashioned sexism, rather than
subtler, modern sexism (McHugh & Frieze, 1997).
The AWS includes items such as “There should be a strict merit system in
job appointment and promotion without regard to sex,” and “The intellectual
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leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.” Respon-
dents rate the items on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3
(strongly agree). Items are summed to create a total score ranging from 0 to 45.
Higher scores reflect more negative attitudes toward women.
Internal consistency has been demonstrated for the 15-item short version
of the AWS (Spence et al., 1973). Specifically, Daugherty and Drambrot
(1986) found a Cronbach’s alpha of .85 for the 15-item version. Internal
consistency for the scale was calculated, after collapsing Samples 1 and 2
together, resulting in an alpha of .81. The 15-item version has a 3-week
test–retest reliability of .82 and .86 for men and for women, respectively
(Daugherty & Drambrot, 1986). The validity of the scale has also been
supported, as the short form is almost perfectly correlated with the original
version (Loo & Logan, 1977; Smith & Bradley, 1980; Spence & Hahn, 1997).
In addition, the construct validity of numerous other measures of sexism,
attitudes toward women, and attitudes toward gender roles have been estab-
lished by their strong correlations with the AWS (e.g., Tougas et al., 1995).
Neosexism Scale. The Neosexism Scale (NS) was developed to measure
the construct of modern sexism, or the conflict between negative attitudes
toward women and egalitarian values (Tougas et al., 1995). Sample items
include “Women shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted,” and
“Due to social pressures, firms frequently have to hire underqualified
women.” Responses are rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally
disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Scores are calculated by averaging the ratings of
the 11 items, and higher scores indicate greater levels of sexism.
The 11-item NS has demonstrated good internal reliability (a = .81), and
corrected item-total correlations range from .10 to .76 (Campbell et al., 1997;
Tougas et al., 1995). Internal consistency for the scale was calculated after
collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting in an alpha of .82. Further-
more, principal components analysis reveals that the scale is unidimensional
(Campbell et al., 1997). Construct validity of the NS has also been supported,
as it is correlated with the Modern Sexism Scale, the Attitudes Toward
Feminism Scale, and the Women’s Movement Scale (Campbell et al., 1997).
Modern Homophobia Scale (MHS). The 46-item MHS (Raja & Stokes,
1998) was used to assess sexual prejudice, and measures both attitudes
toward lesbians and attitudes toward gay men. This is a strength, given that
many previous sexual prejudice scales have not referred specifically to lesbi-
ans or gay men, but have referred instead to “homosexuals” in general. In
addition, the MHS was developed to update existing sexual prejudice scales
in an attempt to tap into modern, subtler forms of sexual prejudice.
Both lesbian (MHS-L; 24 items) and gay men (MHS-G; 22 items) sub-
scales are scored from the instrument, and each reflects respondents’ institu-
tional sexual prejudice, personal discomfort, and beliefs that homosexuality
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is deviant and changeable. Sample items include “I wouldn’t mind working
with a lesbian,” and “I welcome new friends who are gay.” Responses are
rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (do not agree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Scores for each subscale are calculated by averaging subscale items, and
lower scores indicate higher levels of sexual prejudice.
The 46-item MHS has demonstrated good internal consistency, with
alphas of .95 for both the MHS-L and the MHS-G subscale (Raja & Stokes,
1998). In addition, internal consistency for both the MHS-L and MHS-G
subscales was calculated after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting
in alphas of .91 and .95, respectively. There is also evidence to support the
construct validity of the MHS (Raja & Stokes, 1998). For example, the
MHS-L and the MHS-G correlated significantly with Hudson and Ricketts’
(1980) Index of Homophobia (Raja & Stokes, 1998).
Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale. The 14-item Modern and Old-
Fashioned Racism Scale contains two 7-item subscales that measure old-
fashioned and modern racism (McConahay, 1986). The Old-Fashioned
Racism Scale contains items that tap into pre-1965 civil rights issues related to
equal rights for minorities and stereotypes related to those same issues. The
Modern Racism Scale was created in an attempt to measure racial attitudes
after 1965 and includes items that are less blatant (McConahay, 1986). In
addition, the modern racism items tap into the idea that modern racism is
founded on abstract principles of justice and generalized negative feelings
toward racial minorities that are related to political and racial socialization,
rather than personal competition or experiences with racial minorities.
A sample old-fashioned racism item is “Black people are generally not as
smart as Whites”; while a sample modern racism item is “Blacks are getting
too demanding in their push for equal rights.” Responses were rated on a
5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Scores
for each scale are calculated by summing the ratings of the seven items in each
scale. Scores range from 7 to 35, with higher scores indicating higher levels of
both modern and old-fashioned racism.
Although McConahay’s (1986) instrument is focused on attitudes toward
African Americans, the focus of the present study is racial prejudice against
any ethnic minority group. Therefore, minority was substituted for Black in
each item, as per Ducote-Sabey (1999).
Internal consistency of theModern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) was
demonstrated with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .82. In addition, internal
consistency was demonstrated for the Old-Fashioned Racism Scale, with
alphas ranging from .75 to .79 in various samples (McConahay, 1986).
Ducote-Sabey (1999) calculated internal consistency for the minority modi-
fication to this scale and reported alpha coefficients of .77 and .63 for the
Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scales, respectively. Internal consistency
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for the scale was calculated after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, result-
ing in a Cronbach’s alpha of .80 and .70 for Modern Racism and Old-
Fashioned Racism, respectively.
Fraboni Scale of Ageism. The Fraboni Scale of Ageism (FSA) is a 29-item
scale that was developed to measure the affective and cognitive components
of ageism (Fraboni et al., 1990). Sample items include “Complex and inter-
esting conversations cannot be expected from most old people,” “It is best
that old people live where they won’t bother anyone,” and “I sometimes
avoid eye contact with old people when I see them.” Responses are rated on
a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree).
Per scoring instructions from Fraboni et al. (1990), scores for each
response were recoded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5
(strongly disagree). Unanswered items were scored as 3 (neutral). Scores for
the scale were calculated by summing the ratings of the 29 items. Scores
ranged from 29 to 145, with higher scores indicating lower levels of ageism.
Internal consistency was demonstrated with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86
(Fraboni et al., 1990). Internal consistency for the scale was calculated after
collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting in an alpha of .84. In addition,
a significant negative correlation between the FSA and a measure of accep-
tance of others supports the construct validity of the FSA (Fraboni et al.,
1990).
Modified Economic Beliefs Scale (M-EBS). The M-EBS is a modified
version of the Economic Beliefs Scale (Stevenson &Medler, 1995), which was
designed to measure classism (i.e., attitudes toward the economically disad-
vantaged). The original scale contained eight items. In the version used for
the present study, the original items were retained, and seven additional items
were created. Sample items from the original scale include “People who stay
on welfare have no desire to work,” and “Equal educational opportunities
exist for all people in our society.” Sample items that were created include
“Poor people are lazy,” and “If given the chance, a poor person would be able
to keep a job.”
Responses were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to
5 (strongly disagree). Scores for the scale were calculated by summing the
ratings of the 15 items. Scores ranged from 15 to 75, with lower scores
indicating higher levels of classism. The internal consistency reliability coef-
ficient for the original measure was .77 (Stevenson & Medler, 1995) and .85
for the modified version used in the present study.
Religious Intolerance Scale (RIS). Because there were no existing mea-
sures of religious intolerance that assess attitudes toward multiple religious
groups at the time the present study was begun, the RIS was developed. The
nine-item scale was developed using five items from Godfrey et al.’s (2000)
measure of prejudice (i.e., M-GRISMS) and four additional items that were
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created. Sample items from Godfrey et al.’s study include “Jewish people are
deceitful and money-hungry,” and “Muslims are more treacherous than
other groups of religious people.” Sample additional items include “Many of
the social problems in the U.S. today are due to non-Christian religious
groups,” and “Wiccan and pagan people practice thinly veiled evil.”
Responses were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to
5 (strongly disagree). Scores for the scale were calculated by summing the
ratings of the nine items. Scores ranged from 9 to 45, with lower scores
indicating higher levels of religious intolerance. The alpha for the measure in
the collapsed sample was .79.
Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability (MCSD) Scale–Short Form C. The
MCSD scale was developed to measure the desire of individuals to present
themselves in a favorable manner (Reynolds, 1982). The MCSD Short Form
contains 13 True–False items. Sample items are “I have never intensely
disliked anyone,” and “I never resent being asked to return a favor.”
Responses were rated as socially desirable (0) or not socially desirable (1), and
then were summed to result in a total score ranging from 0 (all socially
desirable responses) to 13 (no socially desirable responses). Higher scores
indicate lower levels of social desirability.
The internal consistency coefficient of the MCSD Short Form with the
Kuder–Richardson Formula 20 was .76 (Reynolds, 1982). Internal consis-
tency for the scale was calculated after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together,
resulting in an alpha of .70. In addition, the validity of the scale has been
supported, as there are statistically significant correlations between the
MCSD Short Form and the standard version of the MCSD scale, as well as
the Edward Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982).
Life Experiences Questionnaire (LEQ). We used the LEQ (Long, 2000)
solely to gather demographic information. The questionnaire is a self-report
measure.
Procedure
All participants in each sample were recruited from a research participant
pool (consisting of participants enrolled in Psychology classes, Marketing
classes, or both), and all received course credit for their participation. Par-
ticipants took part in small 1-hr group testing sessions, and all responses were
kept confidential and anonymous. After they gave their informed consent,
participants completed the questionnaire packet, which included all of the
measures presented in random order.
For a number of participants, responses to individual items were missing.
Values for missing data were imputed using the average response of the entire
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sample to the missing item. However, if a participant failed to complete a
measure entirely, or left more than 25% of the items blank, his or her data for
that particular measure were not included.
Results
Initial Scale Construction
Given that it was the purpose of this study to create a short measure of
intolerance that reflects the multidimensional nature of sexism, racism, sexual
prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance, data from the AWS,
NS, MHS, M-EBS, FSA, and RIS were converted to a similar response
format to allow comparability. The majority of the instruments employed a
5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5; therefore, this scale was chosen
as the standard.
The MHS, RIS, FSA, and M-EBS were reverse-scored to ease interpret-
ability, such that in each case, 1 reflected low levels of the intolerant belief
system and 5 reflected the greatest levels of the belief system. The AWS was
rescored such that the original responses were changed from 0 to 1, 1 to 2, 2
to 4, and 3 to 5. The NS was rescored such that original responses were
changed from 1 to 1, 2 to 2, 3 to 2, 4 to 3, 5 to 4, 6 to 4, and 7 to 5. The
MOFRS items required no rescoring. Permission was obtained from the
authors of the AWS, NS, MHS, M-EBS, and M-GRISMS to use their items
in our study. (The authors of the FSA and MOFRS could not be located.)
The initial pool of 146 items from the AWS, NS, MHS, M-EBS, FSA,
RIS, and MOFRS were considered for inclusion in the to-be-created scale.
Factor coefficients from a factor analysis of all items across both samples
(Aosved, Long, Voller, & Borja, 2006), corrected item-total correlations,
variability of item responses, and meaningfulness and redundancy of items
were considered in selecting the 54 total items (9 for each of the 6 proposed
subscales) to be included in the Intolerant Schema Measure (ISM). Items
selected appear in the Appendix.
Factor Structure of ISM
Employing the first sample of 523 college students, the 54 items of the new
ISM were subjected to a factor analysis using the principal components
method with varimax rotation. As would be desired, inspection of eigenval-
ues, scree plot, and interpretability (Cattell, 1966) suggested that the data
were best explained by six factors. The rotated factor pattern with each item’s
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Table 1
Factor Loadings for ISM Items and Subscale Descriptors: Sample 1
Item
Factor 1:
Sexual
prejudice
Factor 2:
Classism
Factor 3:
Sexism
Factor 4:
Racism
Factor 5:
Ageism
Factor 6:
Religious
intolerance
RMHSL-7 .77 .12 .15 .08 -.08 .11
RMHSL-19 .75 .09 .14 .12 -.07 .13
RMHSL-21 .70 .13 .06 .12 .05 .13
RMHSL-23 .68 .08 .14 .02 .01 .16
RMHSG-3 .72 .14 .32 .12 .06 .10
RMHSG-4 .70 .12 .36 .14 .07 .10
RMHSG-9 .77 .10 .18 .18 -.02 -.00
RMHSG-18 .71 .05 .19 .11 .04 .11
RMHSG-22 .61 .19 .32 .21 -.00 .09
RAWS-5 .26 .16 .55 .07 -.01 .18
RAWS-8 .20 .06 .60 .09 .08 .14
RAWS-9 .32 .15 .61 .10 .08 .09
RAWS-13 .28 .11 .52 -.04 .12 .15
RAWS-15 .24 .07 .61 .06 .10 -.00
RNS-3 .13 .06 .60 .28 .14 .10
RNS-6 .14 .08 .63 .23 .14 -.00
RNS-7 .09 .09 .63 .35 .16 .06
RNS-8 .00 .04 .60 .26 .13 .08
MOFRS-5 .06 .24 .13 .54 .11 .11
MOFRS-4 .09 .11 .04 .44 -.02 .06
MOFRS-8 .13 .28 .16 .62 .01 .02
MOFRS-9 .25 .22 .18 .44 .07 .13
MOFRS-10 .14 .18 .29 .65 .17 .14
MOFRS-11 .11 .08 .04 .57 .17 .09
MOFRS-12 .08 -.02 .04 .51 .02 .20
MOFRS-13 .14 .18 .20 .69 .11 .09
MOFRS-14 .06 .16 .27 .73 .13 .07
RFSA-5 -.02 .00 .15 .06 .49 .07
RFSA-7 .04 .06 .23 .14 .45 .16
RFSA-8 -.03 .14 .00 .14 .53 .08
RFSA-13 -.03 .09 .18 .02 .50 .08
RFSA-15 -.00 -.00 .11 .15 .61 .03
RFSA-16 .04 .02 -.03 -.01 .58 .02
RFSA-20 -.03 .02 .06 .06 .66 .01
RFSA-21 .03 .07 .01 .03 .76 .03
RFSA-27 .04 .05 .07 .01 .70 .02
RRIS-1 -.41 -.00 .26 -.07 .09 .42
RRIS-2 -.21 .13 .20 .05 .06 .60
RRIS-3 -.02 .06 .18 .28 .18 .59
RRIS-4 .27 .11 .09 .16 .08 .67
RRIS-5 .18 .17 .08 .22 .10 .65
RRIS-6 .43 .13 .04 .01 .01 .54
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loading on the six factors is reported in Table 5. Items reflecting sexual
prejudice showed substantial loadings (> .40) on the first factor. Items reflect-
ing classism loaded substantially on the second factor, while items reflecting
sexism loaded on the third factor. Items loading substantially on Factors 4, 5,
and 6 reflected racism, ageism, and religious intolerance, respectively. The six
factors together accounted for 25.9% of the variance.
To replicate this factor structure, a confirmatory factor analysis was
conducted employing the second sample of 475 college students. Again, the
results suggest that the data were best explained by six factors. The rotated
factor pattern with each item’s loading on the six factors is reported in
Table 2. Items reflecting sexual prejudice showed substantial loadings (> .40)
on the first factor. Items reflecting classism loaded substantially on the
second factor, while items reflecting sexism loaded on the third factor. Items
Table 1 Continued
Item
Factor 1:
Sexual
prejudice
Factor 2:
Classism
Factor 3:
Sexism
Factor 4:
Racism
Factor 5:
Ageism
Factor 6:
Religious
intolerance
RRIS-7 .41 .12 .04 .10 -.01 .50
RRIS-8 .31 .20 .02 .13 .09 .63
RRIS-9 .24 .10 .06 .15 .07 .56
RMEBS-1 .11 .72 .08 .10 .03 .12
RMEBS-2 .08 .74 .09 .13 -.04 .05
RMEBS-3 .05 .57 .06 .06 .16 .22
RMEBS-5 .14 .69 .11 .07 .07 -.01
RMEBS-6 .11 .76 .01 .22 -.03 .05
RMEBS-7 .07 .72 .07 .09 .07 .07
RMEBS-8 .09 .38 .11 .11 .16 .08
RMEBS-9 .13 .61 .05 .19 .16 .22
RMEBS-13 .08 .50 .08 .15 -.02 .06
Eigenvalues 12.29 4.11 3.11 2.41 2.19 1.75
% variance 6.0 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.5
Cronbach’s a .92 .85 .85 .83 .78 .80
M 2.87 3.03 2.08 2.15 1.86 2.59
SD 1.10 0.73 0.79 0.70 0.55 0.68
Mdn 2.89 3.00 1.89 2.11 1.89 2.67
Quartile3 3.78 3.44 2.67 2.67 2.22 3.00
Quartile1 2.00 2.56 1.44 1.56 1.44 2.11
Range 1–5 1–5 1–4.89 1–4.78 1–4.56 1–4.78
Note. Factor coefficients > .40 appear in boldface for ease of interpretation. RMHSL/
G = rescaled Modern Homophobia Scale; RAWS = rescaled Attitudes Toward Women Scale;
RNS = rescaled Neosexism Scale; MOFRS = Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale;
RFSA = rescaled Fraboni Scale of Ageism; RRIS = rescaled Religious Intolerance Scale;
RMEBS = rescaled Modified Economic Beliefs Scale.
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Table 2
Factor Loadings for ISM Items and Subscale Descriptors: Sample 2
Item
Factor 1:
Sexual
prejudice
Factor 2:
Classism
Factor 3:
Sexism
Factor 4:
Racism
Factor 5:
Ageism
Factor 6:
Religious
intolerance
RMHSL-7 .75 .07 .11 -.13 .11 .10
RMHSL-19 .70 .05 .14 -.02 .18 .16
RMHSL-21 .70 .04 .10 .02 .15 .13
RMHSL-23 .62 .12 .23 .01 .14 .16
RMHSG-3 .70 .09 .19 .17 .19 .12
RMHSG-4 .70 .05 .27 .16 .21 .16
RMHSG-9 .73 .03 .16 .08 .18 .11
RMHSG-18 .64 .06 .32 .01 .19 .18
RMHSG-22 .61 .06 .24 -.05 .23 .21
RAWS-5 .20 .14 .58 .09 .10 .07
RAWS-8 .27 .16 .50 .20 .06 .18
RAWS-9 .20 .10 .59 .27 .02 .10
RAWS-13 .29 .07 .54 .09 .06 .17
RAWS-15 .18 .12 .56 .02 .22 .20
RNS-3 .18 .14 .52 .10 .27 .06
RNS-6 .07 .12 .66 .09 .26 .13
RNS-7 .04 .09 .70 .18 .27 .03
RNS-8 .10 .07 .55 .27 .17 .02
MOFRS-5 .06 .28 .25 .06 .52 .12
MOFRS-4 .16 .09 .03 .01 .45 .03
MOFRS-8 .06 .19 .25 .02 .66 .22
MOFRS-9 .35 .11 .06 .16 .59 .03
MOFRS-10 .25 .16 .23 .14 .62 .13
MOFRS-11 .20 .14 .15 .31 .37 -.01
MOFRS-12 .21 -.04 .10 .22 .47 -.05
MOFRS-13 .03 .15 .27 .05 .71 .17
MOFRS-14 .10 .13 .20 .12 .74 .18
RFSA-5 .13 .09 -.01 .54 .06 .03
RFSA-7 .06 .14 .03 .56 .03 .17
RFSA-8 -.04 .14 .05 .43 .02 .18
RFSA-13 .03 .02 .17 .63 .12 .00
RFSA-15 .05 .12 .20 .64 .10 -.01
RFSA-16 .00 -.04 .01 .65 .09 -.01
RFSA-20 -.09 -.04 .23 .55 .10 -.00
RFSA-21 .01 .06 .11 .70 .07 .07
RFSA-27 -.09 -.02 .14 .65 .00 .06
RRIS-1 -.51 -.14 .15 .09 .18 .16
RRIS-2 -.28 .06 .16 .16 .14 .56
RRIS-3 -.02 .10 .17 .23 .13 .63
RRIS-4 .14 .10 .16 .06 .02 .68
RRIS-5 .15 .13 .19 .10 .21 .68
RRIS-6 .42 -.02 .08 -.05 -.01 .60
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loading substantially on Factors 4, 5, and 6 reflected ageism, racism, and
religious intolerance, respectively. The six factors together accounted for
26.2% of the variance.
Minimal differences were noted in the factor loadings in Samples 1 and
2. Ageism items loaded on Factor 5 in Sample 1, but on Factor 4 in Sample
2. Similar content was noted in each factor, however. Small individual item
loading differences were also seen across the factor structures, none of
which affected general factor interpretability: MOFRS-11 loaded on racism
only in Sample 1; RIS-1 loaded on both sexual prejudice and religious
intolerance in Sample 1, but only on sexual prejudice in Sample 2; RIS-7
loaded on both sexual prejudice and religious intolerance in Sample 1, but
only on religious intolerance in Sample 2; and MEBS-8 loaded on racism
only in Sample 2.
Table 2 Continued
Item
Factor 1:
Sexual
prejudice
Factor 2:
Classism
Factor 3:
Sexism
Factor 4:
Racism
Factor 5:
Ageism
Factor 6:
Religious
intolerance
RRIS-7 .35 .11 .05 .05 .04 .66
RRIS-8 .31 .10 -.04 .16 .10 .61
RRIS-9 .14 .03 .04 -.06 .07 .55
RMEBS-1 .12 .70 .02 .03 .22 .05
RMEBS-2 -.00 .67 -.04 -.01 .20 .08
RMEBS-3 .09 .58 .04 .22 .05 .12
RMEBS-5 .01 .67 .20 -.06 .03 .06
RMEBS-6 .12 .73 .08 .01 .17 .08
RMEBS-7 .09 .71 .04 .17 .11 .07
RMEBS-8 .06 .58 .22 .11 .01 -.01
RMEBS-9 .09 .68 .08 .15 .16 .03
RMEBS-13 .02 .59 .17 -.04 -.05 .09
Eigenvalues 12.25 4.17 3.32 2.50 2.21 1.71
% variance 5.7 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.8
Cronbach’s a .92 .86 .84 .82 .84 .78
M 3.08 3.22 2.28 1.99 2.30 2.65
SD 1.08 0.76 0.80 0.64 0.75 0.67
Mdn 3.11 3.22 2.22 1.89 2.22 2.78
Quartile3 3.89 3.67 2.89 2.22 2.78 3.11
Quartile1 2.22 2.78 1.67 1.56 1.67 2.22
Range 1–5 1–5 1–5 1–5 1–5 1–4.56
Note. Factor coefficients > .40 appear in boldface for ease of interpretation. RMHSL/
G = rescaled Modern Homophobia Scale; RAWS = rescaled Attitudes Toward Women Scale;
RNS = rescaled Neosexism Scale; MOFRS = Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale;
RFSA = rescaled Fraboni Scale of Ageism; RRIS = rescaled Religious Intolerance Scale;
RMEBS = rescaled Modified Economic Beliefs Scale.
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Despite these minor differences, the six factors appeared stable across the
two samples. The six factors reflect Sexual Prejudice, Classism, Ageism,
Sexism, Racism, and Religious Intolerance. Items loading on sexual prejudice
reflect prejudiced attitudes and personal discomfort with gay men and lesbi-
ans (e.g., “I don’t mind companies using openly lesbian celebrities to adver-
tise their products”) and negative attitudes toward legal or policy issues
affecting gay/lesbian/bisexual/transsexual (GLBT) individuals (e.g., “Gay
men want way too many rights”). Classism reflects stereotypes about indi-
viduals in poverty (e.g., “Poor people are lazy”), as well as negative attitudes
toward people of low socioeconomic status (SES). Ageism reflects a combi-
nation of negative stereotypes about elderly individuals (e.g., “Most old
people would be considered to have poor personal hygiene”) and personal
discomfort with older adults (e.g., “I don’t like it when old people try to make
conversation with me”). Sexism reflects negative stereotypes about women’s
roles (e.g., “The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in
the hands of men”) and policy issues (e.g., “Over the past few years, women
have gotten more from the government than they deserve”). Racism reflects
negative attitudes toward policy issues (e.g., “It was wrong for the United
States Supreme Court to outlaw segregation in its 1954 decision”) and preju-
diced attitudes toward racial minorities (e.g., “Over the past few years, racial
minorities have gotten more economically than they deserve”). Finally, reli-
gious intolerance reflects negative stereotypes about various religious groups
(e.g., “Christians are intolerant of people with other religious beliefs”).
Internal Consistency of the ISM
Cronbach’s coefficient alphas were examined across each subscale under
consideration (i.e., sexual prejudice, classism, sexism, racism, ageism, and
religious intolerance), as well as for an overall composite score within each
sample. Alphas were fairly large in each case, ranging from .78 to .92 in each
sample (see Tables 1 and 2). Internal consistency of all 54 items across the
subscales was also assessed and was quite high. Cronbach’s alpha was .93 in
each sample.
Preliminary Investigation of Criterion-Related Validity of the ISM
In order to examine the validity of the ISM scale, Samples 1 and 2 were
collapsed. Both samples were collected from the same university research
participant pool in successive semesters. Prior to collapsing these two
samples, comparisons across demographic factors and other variables of
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interest were conducted. The results of these comparisons suggest that
Samples 1 and 2 did differ on some dimensions (e.g., age, SES). Validity
analyses conducted separately for each group reveal the same pattern of
results, however. Therefore, for simplicity, we report the results from the
collapsed group only. This allowed for a larger sample size and greater power
in examining expected relationships among variables.
Subscale scores across the six dimensions of the ISM were created by
averaging the nine items falling within each dimension. A total ISM score,
reflecting overall intolerance, was created by averaging all 54 items. For each
subscale and the total, higher scores reflect greater intolerance. Descriptive
statistics for each subscale are provided in Tables 1 and 2. Within Sample 1,
the mean participant total score was 2.43 (SD = 0.53), with a range from 1.13
to 4.30 (Quartile1 = 2.06, Mdn = 2.41, Quartile3 = 2.83). Similar total scores
on the ISM were seen in Sample 2. The mean participant score was 2.59
(SD = 0.53), with a range from 1.02 to 4.39 (Quartile1 = 2.22, Mdn = 2.59,
Quartile3 = 2.93).
Given previous research literature showing that different forms of intol-
erance are related (e.g., Agnew et al., 1993; Aosved & Long, 2006; Campbell
et al., 1997; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Polimeni et al., 2000; Raja & Stokes, 1998;
Stevenson & Medler, 1995), it was expected that the subscales of the ISM
would be similarly related. Significant relationships were seen among all
subscales (all ps < .0003; see Table 3). Each subscale was also significantly
correlated with a total ISM score calculated by averaging the 54 scale items
(all ps < .0001; see Table 3).
Correlations between the ISM subscale scores and the full original instru-
ment scores were also examined to investigate the scale’s criterion-related
Table 3
Intercorrelations of ISM Subscales
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Sexual
prejudice
—
2. Classism .32 (983) —
3. Sexism .53 (990) .34 (990) —
4. Racism .45 (987) .43 (989) .56 (993) —
5. Ageism .11 (982) .22 (983) .33 (987) .29 (985) —
6. Religious
intolerance
.40 (986) .33 (987) .40 (989) .40 (988) .24 (986) —
7. Total score .76 (982) .64 (983) .78 (987) .76 (985) .48 (991) .66 (986)
Note. p = .0001. Sample sizes appear in parentheses.
2336 AOSVED ET AL.
validity. It was expected that ISM subscales would be strongly related to full
instruments, as the new scale was designed to do this with a reduced number
of items. The results support this idea (see Table 4). The sexual prejudice
subscale was significantly correlated with both the lesbian women (r = -.90,
p = .0001) and the gay men (r = -.95, p = .0001) subscales of the MHS. The
sexism subscale was significantly correlated with both the AWS (r = .83,
p = .0001) and the NS (r = .83, p = .0001). The racism subscale was signifi-
cantly correlated with the Modern (r = .90, p = .0001) and Old-Fashioned
(r = .84, p = .0001) Racism scales; and the ageism, religious intolerance, and
classsism subscales were correlated with the Fraboni Scale of Ageism
(r = -.88, p = .0001), the RIS (r = .99, p = .0001), and the MEBS (r = -.96,
p = .0001), respectively.
Criterion-related validity was also explored by examining ISM subscale
score differences among key demographic subgroups. For example, based on
previous findings, itwas expected thatmembers ofminority raceswould report
less racism than would Caucasians. Similarly, it was expected that men would
report more sexism than would women. Likewise, gay men, bisexual men and
women, and lesbians were expected to report less sexual prejudice in compari-
son to heterosexual individuals. The results provide support for these ideas.
Men (M = 2.51, SD = 0.78) reportedmore sexism on the ISM than did women
(M = 1.85, SD = 0.68), t(967) = 14.34, p = .0001; heterosexuals (M = 2.98,
SD = 1.09) reported more sexual prejudice on the ISM than did GLBT
individuals (M = 1.57, SD = 0.59), t(16.8) = 9.39, p = .0001; and Caucasians
(M = 2.25, SD = 0.73) reported more racism on the ISM than did members of
other racial groups (M = 2.06, SD = 0.71), t(990) = 3.00, p = .003. Correla-
tions were also examined between classism and SES, with the idea that greater
classismmight be associatedwith greater wealth; and between ageism and age,
with the idea that greater ageism might be associated with lower age. Neither
correlation reached conventional levels of significance, however (see Table 4).
Finally, the relationships between ISM scores and social desirability
were examined (see Table 4). Small but significant correlations were seen
between social desirability and classism, sexism, racism, ageism, religious
intolerance, and the total score reflecting that greater social desirability was
associated with reporting less of each of these traits. A larger, significant
correlation was also seen with sexual prejudice, suggesting that those indi-
viduals reporting greater need to present themselves in a positive way
reported greater levels of sexual prejudice. This finding is noteworthy, as it
indicates the possibility that sexual prejudice may be a culturally
sanctioned—or socially desirable—form of prejudice. Thus, in general, as
social desirability increases, endorsement of intolerance decreases, with the
exception of sexual prejudice, where endorsement of this form of intolerance
increases as social desirability increases.
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Study 2
Method
Participants
Participants were 115 college students (84 female, 30 male, 1 did not
identify gender) who were recruited at a small liberal arts university on the
West Coast from undergraduate psychology and sociology classes for a study
on student attitudes. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 55 years (M = 22.0
years, SD = 6.2). The majority of individuals reported that they had never
been married (79.1%; n = 87); 14.6% (n = 16) reported that they were married
or cohabitating; 2.7% (n = 3) reported that they were divorced or separated;
1 participant (0.9%) reported being widowed; and 2.7% (n = 3) reported
themselves in the “other” category (5 participants failed to report a marital
status).
Participants were ethnically diverse, representing the small private uni-
versity from which they were recruited. The largest percentage of participants
(40.9%, n = 47) were Latinos; 33.0% (n = 38) were European Americans;
13.0% (n = 15) were African Americans; 1.7% (n = 2) were Native American
or Pacific Islanders; 2.6% (n = 3) were Asian/Asian Americans; 5.2% (n = 6)
were biracial; and 3.5% (n = 4) placed themselves in the “other” category.
SES was assessed using the two-factor index of social position (Myers &
Bean, 1968) and ranged from lower to upper class. The average participant
fell into the middle class.
The majority of participants were heterosexual (96.5%; n = 111); 2.6%
(n = 3) were gay men or lesbians; and 0.9% (n = 1) was undecided/
questioning. Finally, the largest percentage of participants were Catholics
(39.8%; n = 45); 32.7% (n = 37) were Protestants; 0.9% (n = 1) were Jewish;
3.5% (n = 4) were Buddhist, Muslim, or Hindu; 8.8% (n = 10) were agnostic
or atheist; 11.5% (n = 13) were nonaffiliated; and 2.7% (n = 3) identified
themselves as “other” (2 participants failed to report a religious affiliation).
Measures
Intolerant SchemaMeasure. The 54-item ISM scale, developed in Study 1
and described previously, measures the constructs of sexism, racism, sexual
prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance and provides an overall
index of general intolerance toward non-majority groups. Responses are rated
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
A total intolerance scale can be calculated by averaging the ratings of all
54 items, after reverse-scoring selected items. Scores for the sexism, racism,
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Table 5
Factor Loadings for ISM Items and Subscale Descriptors: Study 2
Item
Factor 1:
Sexual
prejudice
Factor 2:
Ageism
Factor 3:
Classism
Factor 4:
Sexism
Factor 5:
Religious
intolerance
Factor 6:
Racism
ISM 1 .78 -.03 .07 .02 -.13 .03
ISM 7 .61 -.01 -.02 .22 .15 .06
ISM 13 .49 -.01 .15 .01 .02 .19
ISM 19 .61 .05 -.01 .03 -.15 -.00
ISM 25 .69 .11 .03 .31 -.16 .15
ISM 31 .66 -.03 -.11 .29 -.12 .05
ISM 37 .77 .10 .12 .18 -.09 .01
ISM 43 .81 .09 -.03 .19 -.01 -.09
ISM 49 .80 .26 .11 .20 -.13 -.06
ISM 2 -.25 .12 .03 .03 .61 -.07
ISM 8 -.11 .19 .10 -.10 .66 .00
ISM 14 .30 .42 .32 .16 .30 .25
ISM 20 .39 .12 .18 .12 .26 -.05
ISM 26 .53 .13 .50 .11 .18 .13
ISM 32 .73 .03 .11 .13 .06 .00
ISM 38 .58 .45 .29 -.01 .04 -.03
ISM 44 .37 .21 .29 .08 .30 .33
ISM 50 .36 .24 .04 .12 -.12 .06
ISM 3 -.03 .17 .46 .17 .34 .30
ISM 9 -.01 -.03 .73 -.04 .15 .14
ISM 15 -.01 .21 .46 .06 .29 .05
ISM 21 .24 .37 .41 -.11 -.29 -.32
ISM 27 .21 .17 .64 .16 .04 -.09
ISM 33 -.04 .17 .72 .16 -.19 -.00
ISM 39 .02 -.06 .68 -.04 .08 -.20
ISM 45 .08 .34 .53 .15 .14 .14
ISM 51 .29 .40 .46 .15 .12 .05
ISM 4 .33 -.08 .15 .60 .18 .07
ISM 10 .04 .10 .49 .25 -.15 .21
ISM 16 .14 .24 .66 .28 -.09 -.06
ISM 22 .46 .15 .09 .24 -.23 .41
ISM 28 .28 .19 .21 .60 -.07 -.23
ISM 34 .23 .37 .09 .30 -.29 .43
ISM 40 -.09 .05 .10 .52 .07 .22
ISM 46 .19 .43 .49 .39 -.16 .08
ISM 52 .17 .31 .28 .60 -.18 .11
ISM 5 .34 .10 -.04 .51 -.14 .04
ISM 11 .31 .21 .03 .10 .12 .49
ISM 17 .44 .12 .07 .52 -.08 -.09
ISM 23 .23 .14 .15 .45 -.28 .11
ISM 29 .25 .39 -.05 .52 .25 -.26
ISM 35 .15 .17 .01 .60 .15 -.38
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sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance subscales are
calculated by averaging the nine items corresponding to each domain. Scores
range from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating greater levels of intolerance.
Descriptive statistics for each subscale are presented in Table 4. The mean
participant total score was 1.98 (SD = 0.44) and ranged from 1.13 to 3.13
(Quartile1 = 1.65, Mdn = 1.96, Quartile3 = 2.31).
Social Dominance Orientation Scale, Version 6 (SDO6; Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). The 16-item SDO6 was developed to measure “the extent to which one
desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups” (p. 742;
Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Scores reflect support for the
domination of certain socially constructed groups over other socially con-
structed groups, without defining which groups these are. Sample items
include “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups,” “It’s
OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others,” and “To get
ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.” Responses
are rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).
Table 5 Continued
Item
Factor 1:
Sexual
prejudice
Factor 2:
Ageism
Factor 3:
Classism
Factor 4:
Sexism
Factor 5:
Religious
intolerance
Factor 6:
Racism
ISM 41 .18 .07 .11 .71 .04 .12
ISM 47 .22 .39 .28 .56 -.01 .20
ISM 53 .22 .36 .26 .55 .13 .18
ISM 6 -.07 .63 .05 .13 .20 -.02
ISM 12 .08 .54 .06 .12 .36 .20
ISM 18 .05 .46 .08 .05 .17 -.36
ISM 24 .09 .60 .11 .15 -.17 .22
ISM 30 .24 .59 .12 .22 .10 .01
ISM 36 -.06 .67 .09 -.03 -.06 .17
ISM 42 .03 .62 .13 .10 .02 -.00
ISM 48 .16 .70 .13 .26 .08 -.13
ISM 54 .15 .74 .24 .07 .12 -.01
Eigenvalues 14.00 5.00 2.69 2.41 1.97 1.75
% variance 14.1 10.7 9.4 9.4 4.4 3.5
Cronbach’s a .89 .82 .80 .82 .70 .81
M 2.12 1.75 2.36 1.62 2.19 1.82
SD 0.81 0.48 0.64 0.54 0.55 0.59
Mdn 1.89 1.78 2.33 1.56 2.22 1.67
Quartile3 1.56 1.33 1.89 1.11 1.78 1.33
Quartile1 2.56 2.11 2.78 2.00 2.56 2.22
Range 1–4.33 1–3.33 1–4.22 1–3.22 1–3.44 1–3.78
Note. Factor coefficients > .40 appear in boldface for ease of interpretation. ISM = Intolerant
Schema Measure. ISM items are ordered so items cluster together meaningfully.
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Items are averaged (after reverse-scoring certain items) to create a total score,
with higher scores reflecting more support for the domination of certain
groups.
The SDO6 was developed across 45 samples from a number of nations.
Analysis shows the scale to measure a unitary concept, to have good internal
consistency (Mdn reliability across studies = .89), and to have good test–
retest reliability (.86 over a 1-month period). The studies reported by Sida-
nius and Pratto (1999) also provide support for its validity. Cronbach’s alpha
within this sample of 115 participants was .90.
Demographics questionnaire. We used a questionnaire to gather partici-
pants’ demographic information. The questionnaire is a self-report measure.
Procedure
All of the participants were recruited from psychology and sociology
courses, and the volunteers completed the described instruments during a
portion of their class time. Participants received no credit for their partici-
pation and were allowed to leave the classroom or simply not participate if
they preferred. All questionnaire responses were anonymous.
After they gave their informed consent, participants completed the ques-
tionnaire packet, which included the demographic instrument followed by
the ISM and the SDO6, which were counterbalanced in order. A subset of
previously surveyed classes was revisited 2 weeks after initial data collection.
A total of 84 participants who had participated in the first wave of data
collection completed the ISM for the purpose of assessing test–retest reliabil-
ity during this second wave of data collection.
Results
Factor Structure of ISM
The 54 items of the new ISM were subjected to a factor analysis using the
principal components method with varimax rotation. As would be desired,
inspection of eigenvalues, scree plot, and interpretability (Cattell, 1966) sug-
gests that the data were best explained by six factors. The rotated factor
pattern with each item’s loading on the six factors is reported in Table 4. The
six factors together accounted for 51.5% of the variance.
Items reflecting sexual prejudice showed substantial loadings (> .40) on
the first factor. Items reflecting ageism loaded substantially on the second
factor, while items reflecting classism loaded on the third factor. Items
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loading substantially on Factors 4, 5, and 6 reflected sexism, religious intol-
erance, and racism, respectively. This factor structure is similar to that found
in Study 1 (i.e., the factors reflected the same content areas), yet it differs in
that there was greater duplication of items across factors. For example, while
the expected ISM items load on sexual prejudice, so do some items thought
to reflect religious intolerance and sexism. Similarly, classism includes
expected items, but also items thought to reflect racism. Further, the factors
reflecting religious intolerance and racism were less cohesive in this sample.
While the factor loadings were less systematic in this sample, this may be
a reflection of the diversity of the group. In contrast with Samples 1 and 2 in
Study 1, the participants in Study 2 were much more ethnically and racially
diverse, and more diverse in terms of class and religion. Interestingly, from
the examination of scores on the ISM subscales (see Tables 1, 2, and 5), it
appears that participants in Study 2 reported less intolerance in comparison
to participants in both samples of Study 1. However, these differences must
be interpreted cautiously, as they were not tested statistically. As questions
on racism asked about beliefs toward “racial minorities,” and findings from
Study 1 show that racial minorities reported less racism than did non-racial
minorities, the findings of a less coherent Racism factor in this sample may
not be surprising.
Internal Consistency of the ISM
Cronbach’s alphas were examined across each subscale (i.e., sexual preju-
dice, classism, sexism, racism, ageism, religious intolerance), as well as for an
overall composite score. Alphas were satisfactory in each case, ranging from
.70 to .88 (see Table 5). Internal consistency of all 54 items across the sub-
scales was also assessed and was quite high. Cronbach’s alpha was .94.
Investigation of Criterion-Related Validity of the ISM
Again, it was expected that the subscales of the ISM would be related.
Significant correlations were found between all pairs of subscales (all
ps < .02; see Table 6). Each subscale was also significantly correlated with a
total ISM score calculated by averaging the 54 scale items (all ps < .0001; see
Table 6).
Correlations between ISM subscale scores and social dominance (total
scores on the SDO6) were also examined to investigate the scale’s criterion-
related validity. The results support the validity of the ISM (see Table 6).
While all correlations were significant, the strength of these relationships did
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vary across areas assessed by the ISM. Racism, as measured by the ISM,
showed the largest correlation with social dominance (r = .65, p = .0001).
Sexual prejudice, on the other hand, showed the weakest relationship with
social dominance (r = .30, p = .001). Overall, the total score from the ISM
was strongly related to social dominance (r = .64, p = .0001).
Criterion-related validity was also explored by examining ISM subscale
score differences among key demographic subgroups. Hypothesized group
differences were the same as described in Study 1, and the results provide
some support for each hypothesis. Men (M = 1.97, SD = 0.53) reported more
sexism on the ISM than did women (M = 1.50, SD = 0.49), t(112) = 4.43,
p = .0001; and Caucasians (M = 1.98, SD = 0.65) reported more racism on
the ISM than did members of other racial groups (M = 1.74, SD = 0.54),
t(113) = 2.08, p = .04. Heterosexuals (M = 2.14, SD = 0.82) reported slightly
more sexual prejudice on the ISM than did GLBT individuals (M = 1.58,
SD = 0.55), but this difference did not reach conventional levels of signifi-
cance. Similarly, correlations between classism and SES and between ageism
and age did not reach conventional levels of significance.
Test–Retest Reliability
A subset of initially surveyed classrooms was revisited 2 weeks after initial
data collection. A total of 84 participants (62 female, 22 male) completed the
ISM for the purpose of assessing test–retest reliability. Reliability was very
good across the total score (r = .90, p = .0001), as well as subscale scores
(sexism, r = .85, p = .0001; racism, r = .86, p = .0001; sexual prejudice, r = .91,
p = .0001; religious intolerance, r = .72, p = .0001; classism, r = .84, p = .0001;
ageism, r = .78, p = .0001).
General Discussion
This project reflects initial attempts to develop a brief self-report measure
assessing overall intolerance and containing subscales assessing sexism,
racism, sexual prejudice, religious intolerance, classism, and ageism. The
results provide support for a six-factor measure with preliminary evidence of
criterion validity. Specifically, the results indicate that all six constructs
included in the scale could be independently assessed and that each was
internally coherent. In addition, the results provide initial support for the
criterion validity of the subscales, as the subscale items were strongly corre-
lated with the full-length measures from which they were derived and showed
expected relationships with social desirability (significant, but small) and
social domination.
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Criterion validity for the subscales was further supported by group dif-
ferences on certain subscales. Specifically, men reported higher sexism, as
compared to women; Caucasians reported higher racism, as compared to
racially diverse participants; and heterosexuals reported higher sexual preju-
dice, as compared to gay, lesbian, and bisexual participants. Finally, the
results provide evidence for the test–retest reliability of the instrument.
It is notable that support for the psychometric strengths of this scale has
been demonstrated across multiple independent samples. Further, partici-
pants in the second study represent a fairly diverse group of college students
in terms of race, ethnicity, class, and religion. It is noteworthy that constructs
of intolerance could be uniquely identified within this sample (although
racism appeared to be somewhat less distinct in this sample). These results
suggest that while the magnitude of such beliefs may vary across samples,
intolerance can be identified in a variety of individuals with many different
personal characteristics.
Importantly, aside from theprimary scale development focus of the present
study, the results provide support for the idea that multiple types of intoler-
ance are unique and interrelated constructs, with some constructs being more
highly intercorrelated (e.g., sexism and sexual prejudice; sexism and racism)
than others (e.g., ageism and sexual prejudice). Specifically, the factor struc-
ture of the ISM and the validity checks conducted here suggest that there are
unique facets of intolerance (e.g., sexism, racism, sexual prejudice).
While the constructs studied here appear to be distinct from one another,
they are also strongly related to one another and to social dominance orien-
tation. The strong relationship between each ISM subscale score, the ISM
total score, and the SDO scale score indicates that there may also be an
underlying construct into which each of these variables taps. It is possible
that such an underlying construct is a more global type of intolerance, an
SDO, or some type of personality factor (e.g., authoritarianism) that was not
measured in the present study. In addition to the possibility of an underlying
construct, the findings here point to the likelihood that various intolerant
attitudes will co-occur. Thus, if someone holds one intolerant attitude, he or
she will likely hold multiple intolerant attitudes simultaneously.
The findings have important implications related to measurement of
oppressive attitudes in research, education, or clinical/intervention programs.
Given the high intercorrelations between the study variables, these findings
suggest that individuals who endorse one form of intolerance are likely to
endorse multiple forms, thereby supporting the need to assess multiple types
of intolerance, even when only one type of intolerance is the construct of
interest for a given study. Previously, there was only one measure designed to
measure multiple forms of intolerance simultaneously (M-GRISMS;
Godfrey et al., 2000).
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The M-GRISMS (Godfrey et al., 2000) is an innovative measure in that it
assesses multiple intolerant attitudes with one instrument, thereby reducing
participant burden. The ISM is quite similar to theM-GRISMS in that it also
allows for the assessment of sexism, racism, and religious intolerance with
one instrument. However, the ISM and the M-GRISMS differ in that the
latter measures heterosexism (i.e., institutional and policy decisions that deny
rights), while the former measures primarily sexual prejudice (i.e., negative
attitudes), in addition to policy issues. Also, the ISM includes two additional
subscales to assess classism and ageism. Thus, the development of the ISM
provides researchers, educators, and clinicians with an additional measure
for the assessment of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, classism, ageism, and
religious intolerance with 54 items (or six 9-item subscales).
The results of the present study provide preliminary support for the
ability of the questionnaire to measure six independent oppressive concepts
and support for the criterion validity and test–retest reliability of the ISM.
This new measure minimizes participant burden, as it contains only 54 items,
and at the same time allows for the assessment of six forms of intolerance.
The use of several rather large samples from different geographic
locations—as well as standardized, reliable, and valid measures for assess-
ment of the constructs of interest—represents an additional strength of the
current study.
However, there are also limitations to the current study. For example, the
use of college samples in the present studies limits the generalizability of the
findings. Specifically, only approximately 23% of the population attends
college (U.S. Census, 2000); thus, these findings are most relevant for that
group. Similarly, it is important to note that the ISM factor structure held up
very well with two predominantly Caucasian, Christian, and heterosexual
samples, but not as well with a more diverse sample. Thus, an important
limitation of this measure may be limited utility and generalizability to
diverse samples.
Also, importantly, all indicants of intolerance are based on self-report. It
is important to recognize that individuals may underreport such behaviors
(as suggested by our findings with social desirability here) or may not be
consciously aware of their own beliefs and how these beliefs impact their
behaviors. In spite of these limitations, the results from the present research
provide important implications for future research and interventions.
Additional research is needed to replicate these findings in additional
samples and with more varied and diverse populations. Further research
should also consider whether other intolerant beliefs (e.g., anti-fat attitudes,
intolerance of people with disabilities) would be appropriately measured
through additional subscales on the ISM. Similarly, exploring the role of
politics, upbringing, and personality characteristics in addition to intolerance
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might help to better understand the generally intolerant person and thereby
create improvements to the ISM.
It will also be important to provide further support for the psychometric
properties of the ISM, including both validity and reliability (e.g., adminis-
tration of the ISM and other measures of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice,
classism, ageism, and religious intolerance). In addition, it has been suggested
that prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are three facets of intolerance
that serve to oppress members of multiple minority groups (Lott & Maluso,
1995). The questionnaires used here are limited in their inclusion of items
tapping each of these domains (e.g., sexual prejudice questions assess prima-
rily prejudice; religious intolerance questions assess primarily stereotypes;
sexism questions assess primarily discrimination). Additional study would be
helpful implementing instruments that assess prejudice, stereotypes, and dis-
crimination content across each domain.
Finally, future investigations should explore the relationship between
intolerant belief systems and intervention efforts directed at reducing the
occurrence of such beliefs. Specifically, it was the goal of the present study to
create a measure that might ultimately be helpful for individuals conducting
research focused on oppression/intolerance or research that would benefit
from the inclusion of measures of intolerant attitudes (even when this may
not be a primary question). It is our hope that having a measure such as the
ISM will allow researchers to explore issues of intolerance when they might
not otherwise do so. We also hope that the ISM will be helpful for people
planning education and prevention programs related to reducing intolerance
and oppression and will allow for program evaluation when such work is
conducted.
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Appendix
Intolerant Schema Measure (ISM)
Instructions: Please indicate how descriptive each statement is of your beliefs
by circling the number that corresponds to your response. (1 = strongly
disagree to 5 = strongly agree)
1. MHSL-7: Marriages between two lesbians should be legal. (R)
2. RIS-1: Christians are intolerant of people with other religious
beliefs.
3. MEBS-1: People who stay on welfare have no desire to work.
4. MOFRS-5: I favor laws that permit racial minority persons to rent
or purchase houses, even when the person offering the property
for sale or rent does not wish to sell or rent to minorities. (R)
5. AWS-5: Women should worry less about their rights and more
about becoming good wives and mothers.
6. FSA-5: Complex and interesting conversation cannot be expected
from most old people.
7. MHSL-19: I don’t mind companies using openly lesbian celebri-
ties to advertise their products. (R)
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8. RIS-2: Catholics have a “holier than thou” attitude.
9. MEBS-2: Welfare keeps the nation in debt.
10. MOFRS-4: Racial minorities have more influence on school
desegregation plans than they ought to have.
11. AWS-8: It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive and for
a man to darn socks.
12. FSA-7: Most old people would be considered to have poor per-
sonal hygiene.
13. MHSL-21: I don’t think it would negatively affect our relationship
if I learned that one of my close relatives was a lesbian. (R)
14. RIS-3: Jewish people are deceitful and money-hungry.
15. MEBS-3: People who don’t make much money are generally
unmotivated.
16. MOFRS-8: Racial minorities are getting too demanding in their
push for equal rights.
17. AWS-9: The intellectual leadership of a community should be
largely in the hands of men.
18. FSA-8: Most old people can be irritating because they tell the
same stories over and over again.
19. MHSL-23: Lesbians should undergo therapy to change their
sexual orientation.
20. RIS-4: Atheists and agnostics are more self-centered than people
from other religious groups.
21. MEBS-5: Homeless people should get their acts together and
become productive members of society.
22. MOFRS-9: It is a bad idea for racial minorities and Whites to
marry one another.
23. AWS-13: In general, the father should have greater authority than
the mother in bringing up the children.
24. FSA-13: Old people don’t really need to use our community sports
facilities.
25. MHSG-3: I welcome new friends who are gay. (R)
26. RIS-5: Muslims are more treacherous than other groups of reli-
gious people.
27. MEBS-6: Too many of my tax dollars are spent to take care of
those who are unwilling to take care of themselves.
28. MOFRS-10: Racial minorities should not push themselves where
they are not wanted.
29. AWS-15: There are many jobs in which men should be given
preference over women in being hired or promoted.
30. FSA-15: It is best that old people live where they won’t bother
anyone.
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31. MHSG-4: I would be sure to invite the same-sex partner of my gay
male friend to my party. (R)
32. RIS-6: Wiccan and pagan people practice thinly veiled evil.
33. MEBS-7: If every individual would carry his/her own weight, there
would be no poverty.
34. MOFRS-11: If a racial minority family with about the same
income and education as I have moved in next door, I would mind
a great deal.
35. NS-3: Women shouldn’t push themselves where they are not
wanted.
36. FSA-16: The company of most old people is quite enjoyable. (R)
37. MHSG-9: It’s all right with me if I see two men holding hands. (R)
38. RIS-7: Many of the social problems in the U.S. today are due to
non-Christian religious groups.
39. MEBS-8: There are more poor people than wealthy people in
prisons because poor people commit more crimes.
40. MOFRS-12: It was wrong for the United States Supreme Court to
outlaw segregation in its 1954 decision.
41. NS-6: Women’s requests in terms of equality between the sexes are
simply exaggerated.
42. FSA-20: I sometimes avoid eye contact with old people when I see
them.
43. MHSG-18: Movies that approve of male homosexuality bother
me.
44. RIS-8: The Hindu beliefs about reincarnation results in people not
taking responsibility for their actions in this life since there is
always the next life.
45. MEBS-9: Poor people are lazy.
46. MOFRS-13: Over the past few years, racial minorities have gotten
more economically than they deserve.
47. NS-7: Over the past few years, women have gotten more from
government than they deserve.
48. FSA-21: I don’t like it when old people try to make conversation
with me.
49. MHSG-22: Gay men want too many rights.
50. RIS-9: Despite what Buddhist people may say, Buddhism isn’t
really a religion, but more of a philosophy.
51. MEBS-13: Most poor people are in debt because they can’t
manage their money.
52. MOFRS-14: Over the past few years, the government and news
media have shown more respect to racial minorities than they
deserve.
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53. NS-8: Universities are wrong to admit women in costly programs
such as medicine, when in fact, a large number will leave their jobs
after a few years to raise their children.
54. FSA-27: I personally would not want to spend much time with an
old person.
Note. MHSL/G = Modern Homophobia Scale Lesbian/Gay (Raja & Stokes,
1998); RIS = Religious Intolerance Scale (Items 1–5 originally developed by
Godfrey et al., 2000, and included in M-GRISMS); MEBS = Modified Eco-
nomic Beliefs Scale (Items 1–3 and Items 5–8 originally developed by Steven-
son & Medler, 1995); MOFRS = Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale
(McConahay, 1986); AWS = Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Spence &
Helmreich, 1972); FSA = Fraboni Scale of Ageism (Fraboni et al., 1990);
NS = Neosexism Scale (Tougas et al., 1995). Subscale scores are calculated by
averaging the 9 items (resulting in a range from 1 to 5, with higher scores
indicating higher intolerance). A total score is calculated by averaging all 54
items. (R) = reverse-scored item.
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Abstract
Questions of multiculturalism give rise to lively and important debates in many
countries and in many spheres of life. Diversity is considered desirable and
necessary for the development of secure ethnic identities and positive intergroup
relations, but is also challenged for being inequitable and a threat to social
cohesion. After considering conceptions of multiculturalism and relevant country
differences, the paper discusses social psychological research on multicultural
attitudes and the effect of multiculturalism on intergroup relations. Subsequently,
three issues are addressed that are central in debates about multiculturalism and
that present additional topics for social psychological research. The first concerns
the importance of intragroup processes, the second the nature of religious identity
and Islam in particular, and the third issue relates to tolerance and civil liberties.
How to incorporate immigrant minorities and how to deal with cultural
diversity? That is a question that is hotly debated in many societies and
in all kinds of settings, such as cities, neighbourhoods, organizations and
schools. One answer to this question is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism
comes in many variations but in one way or another they all focus on
differences and the benefits of diversity. As a principle, multiculturalism
emphasizes equality between and respect for the pluralism of cultures and
group identities. Multiculturalism is argued for in terms of positive
intergroup relations and ‘productive diversity’ claiming that it represents
an important national, organizational or commercial asset. It would also
represent a crucial condition for learning and for the development of
cultural competence (Fowers & Davidov, 2006). Multiculturalism has also
been criticized, for example, for supporting orthodox in-group factions,
ignoring internal diversity, as well as legitimizing illiberal internal rules
and in-group oppression, particularly of women and children (Barry,
2001; Okin, 1999; Reich, 2002). Furthermore, it has been suggested
that multiculturalism can lead to reified and essentialist group distinctions
that promote group stereotyping and negative out-group feelings and that
endangers social unity and cohesion in society (e.g. Brewer, 1997). Thus,
multiculturalism is offered by some scholars as the solution to incorporating
immigrants and managing cultural diversity (e.g. Parekh, 2000), while for
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others it is in itself an exacerbating cause of conflict (e.g. Huntington,
2004).
What do social psychologists have to say about all this? What kind of
multicultural issues do social psychologists examine and what has received
less attention? This paper will first discuss some country differences that
can have implications for social psychological findings. Then, a short
overview of the existing social psychological research on multiculturalism
is given with an emphasis on multiculturalism attitudes and intergroup
relations. Subsequently, I will discuss three topics that are central in
debates about multiculturalism but less so in social psychological research
on cultural diversity: intragroup processes, religious identity and tolerance.
Many of the research examples that I will give are concerned with the
Dutch context. One reason is that most of our research is conducted
in this country. Another reason is that the most overt and ambitious
European experiment in multiculturalism was developed in the
Netherlands but the recent retreat of multiculturalism is also most evident
in this country ( Joppke, 2004).
Multi-Multiculturalisms
‘Multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’ are ubiquitous terms. They are
heard in political debates, in the language of ethnic group leaders, in local
government strategies and budgets, in educational settings, in health care,
in popular media, in commercial marketing and in scientific publications.
The widespread use of the terms ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’ can
be seen as marking a significant change in the discourses in which
societies, schools, organizations, and so on, describe and understand
themselves. However, given the wide range of actors, contexts, interpre-
tations and usages of these terms, it is apparent that there is no single view
or strategy implied. Multiculturalism can mean many things and can refer
to practices, policies, attitudes, beliefs and ideologies. The different
meanings and interpretations has led to the use of adjectives for
distinguishing between forms of multiculturalism, such as ‘critical and
difference’ multiculturalism (Turner, 1993), ‘cosmopolitan and pluralist’
multiculturalism (Hollinger, 2000) and ‘liberal and illiberal’ multiculturalism
(Appiah, 2005).
In addition, policies and ideologies regarding diversity, minorities and
culture vary greatly from one society to another (see Baubock, Heller, &
Zolberg, 1996). Societies do not have the same history, the same
collective representations of the nation and the same minority groups.
These differences can affect processes of integration and people’s attitudes.
Social psychological research has shown, for example, that evaluations of
multiculturalism and the endorsement of minority rights are influenced
by categories of minority groups and the ways in which they are defined
(Augoustinos & Quinn, 2003; Verkuyten, 2005a). Not all minority groups
282 Social Psychology and Multiculturalism
© 2007 The Author Social and Personality Psychology Compass 1/1 (2007): 280–297, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00011.x
Journal Compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
are perceived to have equal moral claims. Multicultural recognition and
rights is considered a more appropriate demand for ‘involuntary’ groups
(original inhabitants, descendents of slaves, refugees) than for immigrant
workers. These immigrants would have waived their demands and rights
by voluntary leaving their country of origin. Self-determination implies a
personal responsibility for one’s situation and position. Therefore,
multiculturalism and minority rights tend to be endorsed less in relation
to immigrant workers than in relation to involuntary minorities.
In the beginning of the 1970s, multiculturalism developed into an
explicit political strategy in Canada that was formalized in the Multiculturalism
Act in the 1980s. The idea spread to other immigration countries such as
Australia and the USA, and multiculturalism developed into an official
government policy term in the former but not in the latter country. In
Australia, the multicultural ideology and policy started to develop in the
mid-1970s and was directed against the idea of assimilation of immigrants
and the, at the time, existing White Australian Policy. In the USA, the
debate on multiculturalism is influenced by the civil rights movement,
affirmative action policies, the ‘cultural wars’ in universities and education
more generally, and minority-focused identity politics and politics of
recognition.
Canada, Australia and the USA are settler societies or traditional countries
of immigration. These countries are largely composed of immigrants and
(in part) cultural diversity is a defining characteristic of these nations.
Particularly in Canada and Australia, there have been attempts to equate
‘national’ with ‘multicultural’. This implies the possibility of a positive
association between national identification and the endorsement of
multiculturalism. In contrast, in most European countries, there is a
long history of established majority groups and issues of integration and
cultural diversity are relatively novel. Immigration does not play a role in the
national self-image making it more difficult for immigrants to be included
and to ‘belong’. European multiculturalism is not so much an identity
option for society as a whole but has always been for immigrants and ethnic
minorities only. This means that in European countries, there is more often
a negative association between national identification and multiculturalism
(Verkuyten, 2005b). Furthermore, cross-national acculturation research
has found a positive association between national and ethnic minority
group identification in settler countries, but a negative association in
non-settler, European societies (Phinney, Berry, Vedder, & Liebkind, 2006).
However, there are also important differences between European
countries. For example, it has been argued that in France there is little
room for multiculturalism because the republican ideology focuses on
individuals as citizens and tries to ‘make Frenchmen out of foreigners’
(Withol de Wenden, 2004). In contrast, countries such as Great Britain
and the Netherlands have taken a more supporting view on diversity. As
early as 1968, the British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins made a famous
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speech in which he advocated a model of integration ‘not as a flattening
process of uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal
opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Vertovec, 1998, 29).
A state-sponsored ‘race relations’ industry emerged, backed by anti-
discrimination legislation, and an emphasis on racial equality. Race was
adopted as a category to address minority group disadvantages and
was also meant to include immigrants of the Indian Subcontinent.
In the Netherlands, a policy of multiculturalism was adopted in the
1980s in response to the increased influx of ‘foreigners’. The recognition
that many ‘guest worker’ migrants would remain in the country led to a
policy for ‘integration with retention of the own identity’ (Entzinger,
2003, 63). Dutch policies saw immigrants according to their group
membership and not primarily as individuals. The ‘pillarization’ tradition
of institutionalized pluralism provided a wide range of cultural opportu-
nities and group rights, such as local voting rights for non-nationals and
public funding of Islamic schools. However, much has changed since the
1980s. The previous ‘ethnic minorities policy’ has gradually been replaced
by a policy of civic integration with an emphasis on knowledge of Dutch
society and command of the Dutch language (Entzinger, 2003). In public
debates, multiculturalism has been described as a ‘drama’ and a ‘failure’,
and assimilation has been proposed as the only viable option (e.g.
Schnabel, 2000). This change in political and ideological discourse can
have an impact on attitudes towards minority groups and on the patterns
of group identification among these groups (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005).
Multiculturalism Attitudes
Social psychologists have tended to examine multiculturalism in terms of
attitudes and ideologies. Empirical studies on multicultural attitudes
indicate that the general support for multiculturalism is not very strong
among majority groups in many Western countries. Apart from Canada
where majority members have been found to favour multiculturalism (e.g.
Berry & Kalin, 1995), studies in other countries have found moderate
support, such as in Australia, (e.g. Ho, 1990) and the USA (e.g. Critin
Sears, Muste, & Wong, 2001; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2006), or
low support, such as in Germany, Switzerland, Slovakia and the Netherlands
(e.g. Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Pionkowski, Florack, Hoelker,
& Obdrzáek, 2000; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998; Zick, Wagner,
van Dick, & Petzel, 2001).
Multiculturalism is not only about the majority group accepting and
recognizing minority groups, but implies acceptance and recognition on
the part of minorities too. Some studies have examined the endorsement of
multiculturalism among ethnic minority group members. In many (European)
countries, multiculturalism is typically seen as identity threatening for
the majority group and identity supporting for minority groups. For
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minority groups, multiculturalism offers the possibility of maintaining
their own culture and obtaining higher social status in society. Majority
group members, on the other hand, may see ethnic minorities and their
desire to maintain their own culture as a threat to their cultural dominance
and group identity. Following social psychological theories that emphasize
the role of group status and interests in the dynamics of intergroup
relations (e.g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), it can be
expected that groups are more in favour of multiculturalism when they see
gains for themselves. Hence, it is likely that multiculturalism appeals more
to ethnic minority groups than to majority group members, who in turn
endorse assimilation more strongly. Several studies in different countries
have confirmed this expectation (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006;
Verkuyten, 2005a, b, c; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006; Wolsko et al., 2006),
including a study examining multicultural attitudes among majority and
immigrant groups in 21 European countries (Schalk-Soekar, 2007). This
group difference in attitudes towards multiculturalism is even stronger among
majority and minority individuals who identify relatively strong with
their own ethnic group (e.g. Simon, 2004; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004;
Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006).
This difference in attitudes towards multiculturalism can lead to
problematic relational outcomes. A lack of reciprocal attitudes and beliefs with
minority groups favouring multiculturalism and majority groups putting
more emphasis on assimilation may hamper the realization of a positively
diverse and equal society. Acculturation research has traditionally focused
on immigrants’ cultural changes and acculturation strategies (Berry, 2006).
The outcome of the acculturation process depends not only on the
immigrants’ attitudes but also on the host society’s preferences and ideas
about what immigrants should do. In their interactive acculturation model,
Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, and Senecal (1997) argue that intergroup
relations between immigrants and majority groups are best predicted by
the relative fit of immigrant strategy preferences and host society strategy
preferences. According to this model, the fit can be consensual, problematic
or conflictual. Research has shown that an increased mismatch between
host and immigrant preferred strategies yields more negative intergroup
relations (e.g. Pionkowski, Rohmann, & Florack, 2002; Zagefka &
Brown, 2002).
Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations
A central aim of multiculturalism is to provide and promote a context for
group acceptance and recognition. According to Berry (2006), multicul-
turalism tries to create a feeling of confidence among everyone living in a
plural society. This confidence involves a sense of trust and acceptance of
the other. In contrast, a lack of confidence implies feelings of threat and
increased rejection of out-groups. Thus, multiculturalism is expected to
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contribute to favourable intergroup relations. There is supporting evidence
for this in educational settings (e.g. Hogan & Mallott, 2005) and also in
social psychological research. Using survey data in the USA, Wolsko et al.
(2006), for example, found that people who endorse multiculturalism
see ethnic groups as more different from each other, but at the same
time, view ethnic out-groups in a more positive manner. Thus, the group
thinking inherent in multiculturalism seems to promote perceived group
differences as well as a reduced tendency to evaluate the in-group more
positively than the out-group. This latter association differs, however,
between majority and minority groups. The endorsement of multi-
culturalism was associated with lesser evaluative bias for majority group
participants than for ethnic minorities. Furthermore, in two studies
in the Netherlands, it was found that the more strongly ethnic minority
members endorsed the ideology of multiculturalism, the more likely they
were to evaluate the in-group positively. In contrast, the more the Dutch
majority participants endorsed multiculturalism the more likely they tended
to be to evaluate the out-group positively (Verkuyten, 2005b).
These associations do not tell us anything about causal effects. A few
experimental studies have directly examined the effects of multiculturalism
on intergroup relations. Wolsko and colleagues (2000), for example, exam-
ined the impact of exposure to multicultural and colour-blind ideologies
on intergroup judgements among white participants in the USA. They
found stronger stereotyping and greater use of category information in
their multicultural condition compared to colour-blindness. In addition,
compared to the control participants, there was less pro-white attitudinal
bias in both ideological conditions. Richeson and Nussbaum (2004)
also studied white participants, examining them for automatic and
explicit forms of racial attitudes. Participants exposed to a message endorsing
colour-blindness showed greater racial bias on both forms of racial
attitudes than those exposed to a message endorsing a multicultural perspective.
Both these studies were limited to white participants and the American
context. In two studies in the Netherlands, an experimental questionnaire
design was used in which multicultural and assimilation ideology were
made salient in separate conditions (Verkuyten, 2005b). Multicultural
recognition emphasizes a positive view of cultural maintenance by ethnic
minority groups and acknowledges the distinctive identities of these
groups. Hence, it can be expected that exposure to multicultural messages
affects majority group members’ out-group evaluation and minority
group members’ in-group evaluation particularly. Thus, the minority
group participants were expected to show more positive in-group
evaluation in the multicultural experimental condition than in the
assimilation condition. In contrast, the majority group participants were
expected to show less positive out-group evaluation in the assimilation
condition than in the multicultural condition. The results of both studies
were in agreement with the expectations. Hence, for both groups of
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participants, multiculturalism was related primarily to the evaluation of
the ethnic minority group rather than the majority group. This is in
agreement with the multiculturalism discussion in the Netherlands and in
other West European countries that focuses on the identity and societal
position of ethnic minority groups.
These findings indicate that multiculturalism can have positive effects
on intergroup relations, particularly for the evaluation of ethnic minority
groups. However, multiculturalism raises many additional issues that have
received less attention of social psychologists. Intragroup processes, the
role of religious identity and (in)tolerance of concrete practices are among
the more important issues and present three directions for social psycho-
logical research on multiculturalism.
Intragroup Processes
Research on multiculturalism tends to focus on intergroup issues in which
minority group acceptance, recognition and positive evaluation are key
terms. This is in agreement with social psychological perspectives, such as
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), social dominance theory
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and system justification theory ( Jost & Banaji,
1994), that are centrally concerned with relations between groups that
differ in position, status or power. However, multiculturalism has important
intragroup implications and is fuelled by dynamics inside cultural
communities. Group identities are fundamentally shaped by interactions
with co-ethnics and by discourses about ethnic and cultural authenticity
(Verkuyten, 2005c). Ethnic minority group membership involves issues of
in-group acceptance and support as well as in-group obligations and
pressures. Furthermore, multiculturalism has been criticized for supporting
and justifying conservatism and repressive in-group practices (e.g. Barry,
2001). The emphasis on cultural maintenance and equality of cultures and
the recognition of cultural diversity can legitimize, for example, the inequality
of women (e.g. Okin, 1999) and authoritarian and insular childrearing practices
(Reich, 2002).
In multiculturalism, a communitarian perspective is typically taken.
Constituent cultural communities would provide the central context
within which identities are shaped and the moral framework for self-
understanding is provided. Only through having access to their own
culture, the argument goes, people would have access to a range of
meaningful options and, therefore, would be able to develop a secure and
positive sense of self (Parekh, 2000). Hence, a particular group identity is
prioritized and the recognition of this identity would sustains feelings of
self-respect and self-esteem. But what about individuals that do not (want
to) identify with their ethnic minority group but emphasize personal
autonomy and individualism? For them, the group thinking inherent
in multiculturalism and the emphasis on cultural identities might be
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threatening. Individual mobility, for example, implies a disidentification
with the ethnic in-group and a focus on personal characteristics and
qualities as a basis of positive self-esteem. Among ethnic minority group
members, individualism has been found to be negatively related to the
endorsement of multiculturalism (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006). Fur-
thermore, in two experimental studies, it was found that multiculturalism
does provide an unfavourable context for low minority group identifiers
to feel good about themselves (Verkuyten, 2007a). Thus, multicultural
recognition has something to offer to high minority group identifiers but
appears to be threatening to the self-esteem of low group identifiers.
Multiculturalism is not only problematic for some minority individuals
but also tends to recognize and legitimize a particular version of group
cultures, one that holds sway in more traditional circles. The focus is on
cultural communities and their ‘essential’ or authentic group identity.
Social psychological research has shown that for ethnic minority groups,
a stronger endorsement of multiculturalism is associated with higher
perceived in-group essentialism (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). Cultural
essentialism allows multicultural notions to be used for claiming the right
to cultural identity and the recognition of fundamental differences. The
deconstruction of ethnicity and an emphasis on internal cultural hetero-
geneity is not very useful for those who want to make group claims and
mobilize around notions of cultural recognition and rights. As a result
‘many exponents of identity politics are fundamentalists – in the language
of the academy, “essentialists” ’ (Gitlin, 1995, 164), and ‘in basing itself on
relatively permanent groups ... [multiculturalism] mirror[s] the very
prejudices it opposes’ (Wrong, 1997, 298). In multiculturalist policies and
practices, there is a tendency of essentialist group thinking and to ignore
the internal diversity and the critical, but less powerful, voices within
communities. The notion of a singular ‘ethnic or cultural community’
belies the internal differences and tensions that exists and contradicts the
liberal ideal of individual choice and voice.
Thus, there are many important and interesting intragroup issues that
social psychologist can and should study when examining issues of
multiculturalism. Rather than taking cultural groups and identities for
granted social psychologists should examine how group understandings
are produced and shaped by various community members in a vibrant
field of identity debates and positions.
Religion
Discussions about multiculturalism and group rights often subsume the
question of religion under those of cultural diversity or explicitly exclude
religion from the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994). Multiculturalism
tends to exclude faith and faith identities (Modood & Ahmad, 2007), and
the same can be said about acculturation research. Questions of diversity,
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however, are increasingly questions of religious diversity. In particular,
Islam has emerged as the focus of immigration and diversity debates in
Europe (Zolberg & Long, 1999). This is illustrated by the Rushdie affair
in Britain, the headscarf controversy in France, the debate about the
Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, and the national debates
about Islamic schools and the place of other Islamic institutions, practices
and claims within the deeply embedded secularism of most liberal democ-
racies. It is clear that Islam has moved to the centre of debates and politics
in European countries and is at the heart of what is perceived as a ‘crisis
of multiculturalism’ (Modood & Ahmad, 2007). The Dutch majority, for
example, considers ‘unequal’ gender practices and some family practices
among Muslims as morally wrong, whereas Muslim immigrants reject the
corresponding ‘liberal’ practices of the Dutch (e.g. Sniderman & Hagen-
doorn, 2007). Both groups see the same differences in, for example,
family practices and values but evaluate these in opposite terms. A recent
nation wide survey showed that 50% of the Dutch as well as 50% of the
Muslim immigrants consider the Western and Muslim way of life as
opposites that do not go together (Gijsberts, 2005).
Religious differences are increasingly being seen as contradictory and
insurmountable. Muslim minorities know that the majority group reject
some of their values and practices and the majority group knows that
Muslims reject some of theirs. The result is a situation in which, for
example, more than half of the Dutch majority population declares to
have unfavourable opinions about Muslims (Pew Project, 2005), and more
than half of Dutch Muslims report to have clear negative feelings towards
Jews and non-believers (Verkuyten, 2007b). As Sniderman and Hagen-
doorn (2007, 26) conclude from their large-scale research ‘there are
parallel barriers of prejudice: a desire of many Western Europeans to hold
Muslims at a distance combined with a desire of Muslims to keep their
distance’.
Among a representative sample from the city of Rotterdam, Phalet and
Güngör (2004) found that Islam was considered ‘very meaningful and
important’ in one’s life by 87% of the Turkish and 96% of the Moroccan
population. In addition, around two thirds of the Turks and Moroccans
had a very strong Muslim identity. Furthermore, in two Dutch studies
(Verkuyten, 2007b; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007), it was found that around
half of the Muslim participants had the highest possible score on a Muslim
identification measure that consisted of six items that are commonly used
in social psychological research (e.g. ‘My Muslim identity is an important
part of my self ’, and ‘I identify strongly with Muslims’). Furthermore,
around 45% had the highest possible score on statements such as ‘the fact
that I am a Muslim is the most important thing in my life’, and ‘being a
Muslim is the only thing that really matters in my life’. These scores
indicate ceiling level group identification and shows that it can be
problematic to follow the standard practice in social psychological research
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and treat group identification as a continuous variable. For the great
majority of Muslims, Muslim identity is a given and not being a Muslim
is not a real option. The same has been found in studies in Brussels,
Belgium (Phalet, 2004), and in other European countries (Haddad &
Smith, 2001; Vertovec & Rogers, 1999).
The strong Muslim identification found is probably related to global
and national developments. The increased global tensions and divergences
between the Western and Islamic world forces European Muslims to a
position of having to defend and stress their religion. In addition, the
public condemnation of Islam and the plea for assimilation in the
Netherlands has increased the salience and importance of Muslim identi-
fication (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). Islamic immigrant groups face
high levels of threat to the value of their religious identity that leads to
increased in-group identification among these groups and a politicized
religious identity.
However, the total religious identification found is probably also related
to the nature of monotheistic religions in general, and Islam in particular.
Religion is often of profound importance to people’s lives and religious
groups are among the more salient buttresses of identity. As argued by
Seul (1999, 553), religions ‘supply cosmologies, moral frameworks,
institutions, rituals, traditions, and other identity-supporting content
that answers to individuals’ needs for psychological stability in the form
of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, self-esteem, and even self-
actualization’. Very strong Muslim identification among West European
immigrants was also found in the 1990s when the religious group tensions
were much less (e.g. Modood et al., 1997). In addition, being a Muslim
seems to imply a normative group commitment that is related to Islamic
religion. For many Muslims, the declaration of faith (Shahada) in front of
two witnesses symbolizes one’s belief and commitment to Islam: one
either is a Muslim who is committed to Islam or one is not. Religion is
about convictions and divine truths, and for most observant believers, the
core of the religious identity is non-negotiable making the idea of
religious changes or compromises an oxymoron.
The success of multiculturalism depends on the existence of a larger
society to which all groups belong. The recognition and valuing of group
identities requires a sense of shared commonalities. Thus, a key question
is whether it is possible to be at the same time a Muslim and a member
of a (European) nation. Are Muslims accepted as co-nationals and do they
want to belong? These questions are, of course, related because people
who feel accepted do more easily want to belong. For the majority group,
the question of loyalty to the nation is often central. Suspicions of
disloyalty or a lack of commitment of European Muslims show up
everywhere in society, in many countries, and seem to have a basis in
reality. Almost half of the non-Muslim Dutch majority believe that
Muslim immigrants are loyal to their country of origin and not to the
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Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). As a kind of mirror
image, around 50% of Dutch Muslims have been found to have low
identification with the Dutch, and around 40% showed high disidentification
in which a so-called oppositional identity is developed (Verkuyten & Yildiz,
2007). In addition, research has found that, for example, in Great Britain
and Germany, the great majority of Muslims consider themselves primarily
a Muslim rather than a citizen of their country (Pew Project, 2006).
Thus, many Muslim minorities wish to live in liberal Western societies
but not really be part of them. One important reason is that they feel
rejected and discriminated making them turn away from the society in
which they live and even the Western world in general. This seems
especially likely among young Muslims who have been born and raised,
and are fully integrated in society, but feel that they are not really accepted
and considered to belong (Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006). The patterns
of racist exclusion and ethnic nationalism in many European countries do
not make it easy to be a Muslim and a national at the same time. Another
reason is that some Muslims argue that their religious tenets conflict with
principles of a liberal democracy and, therefore, that they are not bound
by these principles. A ‘true’ Islam is defined in contrast to Western
thinking and a ‘true’ Muslim must distance him- or herself from the West.
There is a clear conflict within Muslim groups between a growing minority
that does not accept the norms of Western democracy and a moderate
majority that does (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, & Ja’far, 2007). There is also
growing evidence and concern about the increasing anti-Semitism and
intolerance of sexual freedoms and homosexuals among Muslims living in
Western countries (Schoenfeld, 2004). Compromises on the issue of
sexuality is unacceptable for many Muslims who want to maintain their
Islamic identities.
In Europe, questions of multiculturalism are increasingly questions of
religious differences, and Islam in particular. Social psychology has paid
relatively little attention to the nature of religious identity and to interre-
ligious relations (but see, for example, Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, &
Hewstone, 2006; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Rowatt, Franklin, &
Cotton, 2005; Verkuyten, 2007b). This is unfortunate because religion is
an important dimension for developing a positive social identity and
religion is an important factor in social divisions and conflicts in many
societies around the world. In addition, a study of religious identification can
make a contribution to our thinking about the important process of group
identification. For example, by questioning the standard practice of assum-
ing that group identification is a continuous variable or a matter of degree.
Tolerance
Social psychological research on multiculturalism tends to focus on
multiculturalism attitudes, stereotypes and intergroup attitudes. Typically,
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people are asked how they perceive and evaluate ethnic out-groups and it
is examined whether an emphasis on the importance of acknowledging
and respecting cultural diversity improves intergroup relations. Commen-
tators and politicians, however, express worries about the relationship
between democracy and multiculturalism. Cultural and religious pluralism
is identified as an important obstacle for democratization because people
can develop attachments to groups that are, in one way or another,
inimical to democracy. This would be symbolized by the debate on free
speech in relation to the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, the
fatwa against the British novelist Salman Rushdie, and the murder of the
Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. In Great Britain, a recent survey
showed that 28% of Muslim youth prefer to live under sharia law and 42%
agreed that sharia law is absolute and should not be interpreted to fit in
with Western values (Mirza et al., 2007). Furthermore, 56% agreed that a
Muslim women may not marry a non-Muslim, and 36% believed that
apostasy is forbidden and punishable by death.
The hotly debated questions and issues related to multiculturalism are
about concrete practices and actions. Should it be allowed that Sikhs wear
a turban rather than a helmet on construction sites or a crash helmet
when riding a motorcycle; should the practice of forced marriages among
some immigrant groups be accepted; should it be accepted that Muslim
teachers refuse to shake hands with children’s parents of the opposite sex;
should very light forms of female circumcision (sunna) be allowed; should
all images of pigs be banned from pictures in public offices because these
might offend Muslims’ feelings; should it be allowed that civil servants
wear a headscarf and that students wear a burqa or a niqab. It is around
these concrete questions that multiculturalism is put to the test and ways
of life can collide.
Social psychological research tends to focus on group perceptions and
evaluations, and on the endorsement of multiculturalism, assimilation and
colour-blindness as abstract ideological notions and principles. However,
as is well known from attitude research (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993),
principle considerations differ from (the lack of ) support for practical
implications and situations. Studies on political thinking and behaviour,
for example, show that people tend to support democratic rights in the
abstract but often do not endorse the same rights in concrete circum-
stances (see Vogt, 1997). It is one thing to endorse the freedom of speech
and demonstration in general, and another thing to apply these freedoms
to, for example, radical Muslim groups living in a secular or Christian
country. In trying to maximize the relevance and validity of research,
social psychology should examine how people perceive and reason about
these concrete issues. For example, by focusing on the topic of (political)
tolerance and by using questionnaires as well as experimental designs.
Tolerance can be conceptualized in various ways, such as the valuing
and celebrating of difference, the absence of prejudice and the putting up
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with something that one disapproves of or is prejudiced against. The latter
meaning of tolerance is a key condition for citizenship and democracy
(Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Tolerance for dissenting beliefs and practices
is not the absence of prejudice but rather a separate construct that
emphasizes forbearance and not begrudging other people their own ways.
Tolerance is an option when one dislikes something or someone and is
the opposite of discrimination; when one endures or refrains from action
although other’s beliefs and practices are disapproved of or rejected. This
kind of tolerance is crucial because it is the first and necessary step towards
civility and a foundation for a diverse and just society (Vogt, 1997). People
may disagree with one another, may have stereotypes and prejudiced
attitudes but should at least agree about how to disagree. Historically, the
concept of tolerance evolved from efforts to deal with the harmful and
violent effects of religious conflicts (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The presence
of a great number of Muslims in Western European countries has given
a renewed urgency to the idea of tolerance as a mechanism for dealing
with diversity.
It is often argued that freedoms and rights characterize Western
democratic societies and are of minimal concern to Muslims, or even
contradictory to Islam (see Turiel, 2002). The right-based morality of
Western societies would differ from the duty-based morality of Islam.
There are some empirical findings that seem to support this line of
thinking. These findings indicate that European Muslims are much less
tolerant for dissenting beliefs and practices and for freedom of speech than
non-Muslims. Among a representative sample from the city of Rotterdam,
it was found, for example, that 75% of the ethnic Dutch, but only around
10% of the Turkish and Moroccan Muslims, agreed that it should be
allowed that a magazine uses drawings and words to make God and
religion ridiculous (Phalet & Güngör, 2004). This suggests that, compared
to the ethnic Dutch, the two Muslim groups endorse core principles of
civil liberties much less.
However, for two reasons these kind of findings should be interpreted
with great care. First, developmental and political science research has
shown that tolerance is not a global construct. Tolerance depends on
whom, what and when people are asked to tolerate dissenting beliefs and
practices. For example, Wainryb, Shaw, and Maianu (1998) found that
adolescents tolerated the holding of beliefs about harmful practices more
than acting on these beliefs, and that they were more tolerant towards
dissenting information than dissenting moral values. The same has been
found in an experimental study among ethnic Dutch adolescents exam-
ining tolerant judgements of Muslims’ political rights and dissenting
beliefs and practices (Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007a). Participants took into
account various aspects of what they were asked to tolerate and the sense
in which they should be tolerant. The type of actor, the nature of the
social implication of the behaviour, and the underlying belief type all
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made a difference to the tolerant judgements. For example, the level of
tolerance was lower when the social implications were greater, and
participants were more tolerant of practices based on dissenting informa-
tional beliefs than on dissenting moral beliefs. Furthermore, participants
were more tolerant of people campaigning for public support for a
particular practice (e.g. differential treatment of sons and daughters) than
for the actual act itself.
The intergroup context is the second reason why findings on the
endorsement of civil liberties by Muslims should be interpreted with care.
In another study, we examined how non-Muslim and Muslim adolescents
living in the Netherlands reason about civil liberties, including free
speech, using concrete cases and publicly debated issues (Verkuyten &
Slooter, 2007b). The differences found between the Muslim and non-
Muslim participants were in agreement with their specific group positions
in Dutch society. The rejection of freedom of speech was stronger among
the Muslim than the non-Muslim participants when it involved offending
God and religion and when it concerned Islam. Their support for civil
liberties were quite similar to non-Muslims, however, when their religious
group was not at stake but involved, for example, general psychological
and physical harm. Thus, the results did not support the idea that
freedoms and rights are of little concern to Muslims or contradictory to
Islam (see also Turiel & Wainryb, 1998).
These findings for tolerance and civil liberties show that it is important
to examine the social reasoning behind the evaluation of cultural practices.
Social psychological research on multiculturalism tends to focus on
stereotypes and group evaluations. What is also needed, however, is an
understanding of the underlying criteria that people use to determine
whether particular acts and practices are acceptable. Social domain theory
(see Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2002), for example, proposes that people use
moral (e.g. fairness, justice), social–conventional (e.g. group norms,
traditions) and psychological (e.g. self-understanding, preferences) reasoning
to evaluate and reason about specific behaviours and situations. Hence, a
combination of social psychological intergroup theories and social
domain theory (see Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2005) might improve
our understanding of the many and hotly debated multicultural contro-
versies.
Conclusion
Multiculturalism is concerned with complex issues that involve many
questions and dilemmas. There are promises and there are important
pitfalls. Considering the psychological and social importance of ethnic and
racial identities, a focus on groups and group differences is understandable
and, to a certain extent, useful, for example, for improving intergroup
relations. It can, however, also lead to a situation in which these identities
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become overwhelming or unidimensional and society, out-groups and
in-groups oblige people to place this particular identity in the forefront
of their minds and make it central in their behaviour. Multiculturalism
can turn into an obsession with differences and group identities, leading
to a widening of divisions between groups and a hampering of individual
choices and opportunities.
Multiculturalism is about the delicate balance between recognizing
differences and developing meaningful communalities, between differential
treatment and equality, between group identities and individual liberties.
There are different kinds of diversity and different forms of multicultur-
alism that try to accommodate cultural differences. Some differences are
relatively easy to accept and to recognize, but others go against moral
convictions and basic premises of society. There are limits to pluralism and
moral diversity as there are limits to tolerance and what is acceptable.
Tolerance does not imply the relativism found in some forms of multicul-
turalism that celebrate diversity and argue that one should refrain from
value judgements in assessing other groups. Tolerance always has limits
and does not imply a full acceptance and valuing of all social practices of
other groups, such as potentially harmful activities, illiberal internal rules
and undemocratic actions.
The debate on the way to manage cultural diversity continues and
social psychologists increasingly try to make a contribution to these
debates. In doing so, it is important to examine not only ethnic and
cultural identities and intergroup relations, but also to focus on differences
within groups and intragroup processes, on the ways that religious
identities are understood and used in society and for organizing collective
action, and on people’s reasoning about tolerance and civil liberties related
to concrete dissenting practices and behaviours.
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Religious diversity and religious toleration
PHILIP L. QUINN
University of Notre Dame
Awareness of religious diversity is nothing new under the sun. The early
Christian martyrs were doubtless aware that others in the Roman Empire did
not share their religious beliefs. Yet it is arguable that awareness of religious
diversity has recently assumed qualitatively new forms. Among the factors
that might account for this transformation is the increased contact people now
have with religions other than their own. Modern technologies of travel and
communication foster interchanges between adherents of different religions.
Modern scholarship has made available translations of and commentaries
on texts from a variety of religious traditions, and cultural anthropologists
have recorded fascinating thick descriptions of the practices of many such
traditions. People who live in religiously pluralistic democracies have ample
opportunities to acquire personal familiarity with religions other than their
own without leaving home. It now is therefore harder than it once was to
hang onto negative stereotypes of or rationalize hostile reactions to the prac-
titioners of religions other than one’s own. But many people succeed in doing
so; increased contact often enough produces greater friction. News media
have bombarded us with the sights and sounds of religious conflict in Belfast,
Beirut and Bosnia. In Africa Muslims clash with animists, in India Hindus
and Muslims struggle bitterly, and in Europe Catholic Croats go to war with
Orthodox Serbs. The city of Jerusalem remains a focal point for religious
quarrels among Jews, Christians and Muslims. In the eighteenth century,
Kant complained that the history of Christianity could justify Lucretius’s
exclamation, tantum religio potuit suadere malorum!1 At the beginning of the
twenty-first century, support for Lucretius comes from several religions and
many parts of the world. The religions of the world may be able to understand
one another better now than ever before, but their ability to live together in
peace still has not yet been secured.
Recent philosophical work that is responsive to the contemporary chal-
lenge of religious diversity has centered in the areas of epistemology and
political philosophy. In epistemology, the main issue has been whether or
not, given what we now know about religious diversity, exclusivism remains
a defensible position. Exclusivism is the view that one religion is basically
correct and all the others go astray in one or more ways. It has several dimen-
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sions. Doctrinal exclusivism is the view that the doctrines of one religion are
mostly true while the doctrines of all the others, where there is conflict, are
false. Soteriological exclusivism is the view that only the path proposed by
one religion leads securely to the ultimate religious goal, salvation or libera-
tion. And experiential exclusivism is the view that the religious experiences
typically enjoyed by the adherents of one religion are mostly veridical and
conflicting experiences typical of all the others are nonveridical. It is, of
course, entirely consistent to accept exclusivism in one of these dimensions
while rejecting it in another. For example, some Christians who are doctrinal
exclusivists hold that salvation is available to devout members of other reli-
gious traditions, though such Christians often insist that, unbeknownst to
those outside Christianity, their salvation comes through Jesus Christ. Starting
from the observation that, as far as we can tell empirically, all the world
religions are more or less equal in their salvific efficacy, that is, their ability to
transform their practitioners from being self-centered to being centered on a
transcendent reality, John Hick has mounted a powerful attack on exclusivism
in all three dimensions. While admitting that religious diversity does, or at
least can, undermine the epistemic credentials of experiential or doctrinal
exclusivism to some extent, William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga have
replied with arguments aimed at showing that Christian exclusivism of some
sort continues to enjoy an epistemic status high enough to make it a rational
option even when religious diversity is taken into account. And other philos-
ophers have added their voices to the discussion of this issue.2 In my opinion,
the debate on this topic has more or less reached a stand off. The positions
that are live philosophical options have been fairly thoroughly mapped out,
and the main arguments for and against each of them have been developed in
some detail. I doubt that there is a realistic prospect of the issue which divides
exclusivists from their philosophical opponents being decisively settled or
even moved appreciably closer to a resolution by additional arguments.3
One might think of exclusivism of another kind as the chief problem
addressed by the response to religious diversity within contemporary polit-
ical philosophy. In this case, exclusivism is the view, advocated by several
liberal political philosophers, that religion ought to be excluded from the
public square in modern liberal democracies. More precisely, political exclu-
sivists hold that religious arguments should be excluded from the public
political discourse of religiously pluralistic democratic societies on certain
fundamental questions.4 Robert Audi has argued vigorously for a version of
exclusivism that includes a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support
any law or policy that restricts conduct unless one has and is willing to
offer adequate secular reason for such advocacy or support. Appealing to
grounds of fairness, Nicholas Wolterstorff has challenged Audi’s position
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and forcefully criticized the general exclusivist point of view of which it
is an instance.5 The most nuanced liberal exclusion of the religious so far
developed is contained in the political philosophy of John Rawls. According
to its ideal of public reason, which imposes a duty of civility, we are not
to introduce into public political discourse on constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrines, reli-
gious doctrines all being understood to be comprehensive, unless we satisfy
the proviso that we do so in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason
itself.6 My impression is that, unlike the debate about exclusivism in epistem-
ology, this dispute remains in flux to some extent and has not yet reached
a stand off. Confirming evidence for this impression may be derived from
the fact that Rawls has modified his position to allow that reasons drawn
from comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced
into public political discussions at any time subject to the proviso that in due
course reasons in compliance with the ideal of public reason are presented to
support whatever the comprehensive doctrines were invoked to support.7 To
be sue, the modified view still has a proviso attached, but it is more permissive
than the proviso of the original view and so is less likely to raise the hackles
of religious citizens of a democracy.
I confess I find it a bit odd that the main response to religious diversity
in recent liberal political philosophy has focused on the issue of whether or
not religious argument should be excluded from public discourse. Given the
widespread religious conflict mentioned previously, I cannot help thinking
that religious toleration is a more urgent global political issue and that the
rather narrow focus on religious discourse in liberal democracies is a bit
parochial. I have some ideas about factors that may contribute to explaining
the narrow focus, though they are somewhat speculative. One factor is fear of
divisiveness. It would be natural to search for moral grounds for constraints
on the use of religious arguments in the public square if one were afraid that
in a religiously divided society their use would be likely to be destabilizing.
Jeffrey Stout expressed such fear not so long ago. Arguing against Basil
Mitchell’s proposal that traditional theism be employed in order to revitalize
public discourse, Stout claims that ‘the risks of reviving religious conflict like
that of early modern Europe are too great’.8 I myself reckon that the proba-
bility of reigniting the Wars of Religion by including religious arguments in
public political discourse is quite low, and so I think that such fear, however
real it may be, is unrealistic. It seems to me that, even if the practice of reli-
gious toleration in Western democracies is no more than a modus vivendi, it is
supported both by the settled habits of religious citizens and by the weight of
their traditions to a degree that lends it great robustness. Another factor that
may play an explanatory role is complacency about the historical achieve-
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ments of political philosophy. It would be understandable if people saw no
need for new arguments to clinch the case for religious toleration because
they thought conclusive arguments were already available in the classic works
of liberal political philosophy. One might, for example, look to John Locke’s
work as a source of arguments for religious toleration.9 According to Locke,
religious persecution is bound to be ineffective and hence is irrational because
its goal is to get people to adopt different religious beliefs and people do not
have direct voluntary control over their religious beliefs. However, as Jeremy
Waldron has recently shown Locke’s case for this position falls apart under
critical scrutiny, and there is no way to reconstruct it to meet the objections.10
Or one might look to John Stuart Mill for an argument for religious toleration
that at least is successful by utilitarian standards.11 But David Lewis has
shown that Mill will lose his case if he argues against a clever utilitarian
religious Inquisitor.12 So complacency about the justification of religious
toleration is, I think, unwarranted.
My main aim in this paper is to broaden the focus of the discussion of
religious diversity in political philosophy to include arguments against reli-
gious intolerance. I shall not try to refurbish the arguments of Locke or Mill;
indeed, I shall depart altogether from the British historical tradition of liberal
thought. I shall instead exploit the historical resources of a continental tradi-
tion of liberal thought by examining arguments against religious intolerance
developed by Pierre Bayle and Immanuel Kant. I choose these particular
arguments for scrutiny because they enable me to reach a secondary goal,
which is to bring the discussion of religious diversity in political philosophy
into contact with the discussion in epistemology and to try to establish some
connections between them. The idea that there should be such connections
has been rendered intuitively vivid by Avishai Margalit. He draws attention
to the parable of the three rings, made famous in Lessing’s play Nathan the
Wise. In Margalit’s version of the story, a king leaves a legacy of three rings
in his three sons; one of the rings is of great value while the other two are
no more than good imitations. The religious analogy is clear. The king is
God; the real ring is revealed truth; and the three sons are Moses, Jesus and
Muhammad. Reflecting on the parable, Margalit points out that, apart from
the king, ‘no one else knows for certain which ring is the real one. This doubt
should lead to an attitude of “respect and suspect”, because it is possible that
the truth is in another religion’.13 It is precisely the connection Margalit sees
between epistemic uncertainty and the relatively tolerant attitude of respect
and suspect that interests me. I propose to explore that connection and to try
to clarify what its implications are through an examination of the arguments
of Bayle and Kant. I do not pretend to return a final verdict on the general line
of philosophical thought to which those arguments are meant to contribute.
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In this paper, I shall ignore some of the issues that have been prominent
in other recent treatments of toleration in political philosophy. I am not going
to investigate the topic of whether ordinary language marks a conceptual
distinction between toleration and tolerance. Nor do I plan to take a stand
on whether it is a necessary truth that one can only tolerate things one views
as bad or evil. I do not have a definition or an analysis of toleration to offer.
I shall work with an intuitive notion of religious intolerance that has within
its extension behaviors such as killing people for heresy or apostasy, forced
conversions and preventing people from engaging collectively in worship.
My interest here is restricted to the fairly specific topic of the ethical or moral
status of such intolerant behaviors.14
The remainder of the paper is divided into three part. In the first, I rehearse
arguments about the negative epistemic consequences of religious diversity.
The other two parts address the question of what impact the conclusions of
such arguments might have on further arguments against intolerance. The
second part subjects to critical analysis an argument by Bayle; the third does
the same to an argument of Kant.
1. Alston and others on religious diversity
William P. Alston acknowledges that religious diversity gives rise to an
epistemological problem for his view that experience of God confers prima
facie justification or beliefs about how God is manifested to the experiencer.
He defends this view from within the perspective of a doxastic practice
approach to epistemology.15 A doxastic practice is a practice of forming
beliefs together with a series of possible overriders for the prima facie justi-
fication a belief derives from having been generated by the practice. Doxastic
practices are to be evaluated, from an epistemic point of view, in terms of their
likelihood of producing true beliefs, that is, in terms of their reliability. Basic
doxastic practices, for example, sense perception, are socially established
practices whose reliability cannot be established in a noncircular manner.
Alston thinks it rational to grant prima facie acceptance to all basic doxastic
practices that are not demonstrably unreliable or otherwise disqualified from
rational acceptance. In other words, basic practices are innocent until proven
guilty. He also observes that a practice’s claim to rational acceptance is
strengthened if it enjoys self-support. When he turns his attention to the
religious realm, he supposes that each of the major traditions has within it
a practice of forming beliefs about how Ultimate Reality, whatever it may be,
manifests itself in or through religious experience. As he divides up the pie,
different religions have different experiential practices because the systems
of possible overriders vary so much from one religion to another. Among
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them is the Christian practice (CP). For Alston, CP is a basic practice that
is not demonstrably unreliable and derives self-support from, for instance,
the way in which its promises of spiritual development can be seen, from
within the practice, to be fulfilled in the lives of some of its practitioners.
However, he allows that other religious doxastic practices are basic too, are
also not demonstrably unreliable, and enjoy as much self-support as CP does.
In short, CP has rivals that are on an epistemic par with it, and this is why
religious diversity creates an epistemological problem for it. And, needless
to say, each of these rivals is in the same situation; CP’s problem is also a
problem for Buddhist practice (BP), Hindu practice (HP) and so forth. Does
this disqualify CP and its rivals from rational acceptance?
Alston thinks not. He does admit that religious diversity decreases the
justification its practitioners have for engaging in CP, but he denies that it
does so to such a degree that it is irrational for them to engage in it. His main
argument for this denial deploys an analogy with a counterfactual scenario
involving rival sense-perceptual doxastic practices. Imagine that there were,
in certain cultures, a socially established ‘Cartesian’ practice of construing
what is visually perceived as an indefinitely extended medium more or less
concentrated at various points, rather than, as in our ‘Aristotelian’ practice,
as made up of more or less discrete objects scattered about in space. Further
imagine that there were, in yet other cultures, an established ‘Whiteheadian’
practice in which the visual field is taken to be made up of momentary events
growing out of one another in a continuous process. Suppose that each of
these three practices served its practitioners equally well in their dealings
with the environment and had associated with it a well-developed physical
science. Suppose also that we were as firmly wedded to our ‘Aristotelian’
practice as we in fact are but were unable to come up with any non-question-
begging reason for regarding it as more accurate than either of the others.
Alston concludes that, absent any non-question-begging reason for thinking
that one of the other two practices is more accurate than my own, ‘the only
rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of which I am a master
and which serves me so well in guiding my activity in the world’.16 But
the sheerly hypothetical sense-perceptual scenario is precisely parallel to our
actual situation with regard to CP and its religious rivals. Hence, by parity
of reasoning, the rational thing for a practitioner of CP to do is to sit tight
with it and continue to form beliefs making use of it. And, again by parity of
reasoning, the same goes for practitioners of BP, HP and other uneliminated
rivals of CP.
Alston’s critics have argued that he has not established his conclusion.
Though he concedes that it is pragmatically rational for its practitioners to
sit tight with CP, William J. Wainwright contends that Alston has not shown
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it to be epistemically rational for them to do so. The fact that CP is socially
established, significantly self-supporting and not demonstrably unreliable is,
he grants, a good reason for regarding it as prima facie reliable. However,
the existence of rival religious experiential practices that are also prima facie
reliable is, he claims, a good reason for thinking that CP is prima facie
unreliable. It is epistemically rational to engage in CP if the good reason for
viewing it as prima facie unreliable neither counterbalances nor outweighs
the good reason for viewing it as prima facie reliable. It is not epistemically
irrational to engage in CP if the good reason for considering it prima facie
unreliable does not outweigh the good reason for considering it prima facie
reliable. According to Wainwright, the most Alston’s argument shows is that
the good reason for thinking that CP is reliable is not outweighed, in which
case engaging in it is not epistemically irrational. It does not show that it is
not counterbalanced, and so it does not show that engaging in CP is epistem-
ically rational. Wainwright therefore thinks the most Alston establishes is that
engaging in CP ‘is pragmatically rational, and not epistemically irrational’.17
My objection to Alston’s conclusion can be traced back to a disagreement
between us about the lesson to be derived from his sense-perceptual analogy.
As I see it, one way to explain the success of the three sense-perceptual
practices in the analogy is to suppose that each of them is reliable with
respect to the appearances the physical environment presents to its practi-
tioners, but none is reliable with respect to how the physical environment is
in itself. Hence it would be rational to modify the Aristotelian practice from
within so that the new outputs are beliefs about the appearances the physical
environment presents to its practitioners rather than beliefs about how the
physical environment really is independent of the practitioner. And, of course,
this Kantian turn would be equally rational for Cartesian and Whiteheadean
practitioners. So while I grant that sitting tight would be a rational option,
I deny Alston’s stronger claim that it would be the rational thing to do. By
parity of reasoning, then, I conclude that, though it would be rational for
practitioners of CP to continue to engage in it, it is not the only rational course
of action for them in light of the facts of religious diversity. It would also be
rational for them to revise CP in a Kantian direction and to make efforts to
get the modified practice socially established. And, again, the same goes for
practitioners of BP, HP and other religious experiential doxastic practices.18
Despite their disagreements on points of detail, Alston and his critics
concur in thinking that religious diversity has a negative impact on the justi-
fication for engaging in CP or its rivals such as BP and HP. At least for those
who are aware of it, religious diversity seriously diminishes the justification
for continuing to form beliefs in any of these ways. What remains in dispute is
whether justification decreases to the extent that there are rational alternatives
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to sitting tight with CP, for example, taking the Kantian turn, or even to such a
degree that it is epistemically not rational or irrational to continue engaging in
CP. In what follows I shall make use of the shared agreement that justification
for engaging in CP or any of its rivals is substantially decreased by religious
diversity; I shall not appeal to any of the disputed claims about the exact
extent of the decrease. Of course, experiential doxastic practices are not the
only sources of support for the systems of belief of the world religions. As
Alston reminds us, Christianity also purports to derive support from other
sources such as the arguments of natural theology, tradition and revelation,
which he takes to include divine messages to prophets, divine inspiration
of oral or written communications and divine action in history. However,
though additional sources may mitigate the epistemic problem of religious
diversity, they clearly cannot eliminate it. After all, some of the other sources
confront their own problems of religious diversity. The conclusions of the
metaphysical arguments of natural theology conflict with the conclusions of
impressive metaphysical arguments in nontheistic religious traditions. The
claims of the texts and traditions Christians take to be religiously authoritative
must be set against conflicting claims derived from the texts and traditions
to which non-Christians grant religious authority. And, as Hume’s essay on
miracles reminds us, Christian claims about divine action in history compete
with the claims of other religions about which historical events have decisive
religious significance. Moreover, as Alston insists, the various sources of
Christian belief are supposed to provide one another with mutual support and
to contribute to a cumulative case for Christianity. So when religious diversity
decreases the justification for relying on one of them, it also weakens the
others it is supposed to support as well as the cumulative case that rests on
all of them. Using a familiar metaphor, Alston summarizes his position this
way: ‘Though each of these considerations can itself be doubted and though
no single strand is sufficient to keep the faith secure, when combined into a
rope they all together have enough strength to do the job’.19 Fair enough, but
by the same token, when one or more stands is weakened or cut due to the
problem of religious diversity, the rope is weakened and its ability to keep the
faith secure is diminished. Thus, absent a special reason to think otherwise, I
shall assume that religious diversity has a negative epistemic bearing not only
on the beliefs that are outputs of CP but also on other parts of the total system
of Christian belief and that the same goes for rivals such as BP and HP and
the total religious belief systems for which they are sources.
It is worth noting in passing that even Alvin Plantinga, who is more
intransigent than some other defenders of Christian exclusivism, acknowl-
edges that awareness of religious diversity can and often does have a negative
epistemic impact on religious beliefs.20 According to his account of warrant,
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which is what, when enough of it is added to true belief, yields knowledge,
warrant is directly proportional to level of confidence in, or degree of strength
of, belief. Awareness of religious diversity therefore can and often does
decrease warrant by acting directly to reduce confidence in or strength of
belief. Indeed, it can even deprive one of knowledge. It is possible, Plantinga
thinks, that someone who would have had religious knowledge in the absence
of an awareness of religious diversity lacks knowledge in its presence because
of the reduction of confidence and hence warrant produced by that awareness.
However, Plantinga goes on to claim that this loss of confidence need not
happen and, even if it does happen, need not be permanent. As he sees it,
then, the reduction of warrant produced by an awareness of religious diversity
can be counteracted simply by a return of the confidence whose loss gave rise
to the reduction. Whether Plantinga is right about this last point depends, of
course, on whether his account of warrant is correct. Since his development
of that account is spread out over three rather large volumes, I cannot in this
paper even begin to address the issue of its correctness with the attention to
detail that would be needed to settle it.21 So I will leave it an open question
whether the negative epistemic impact to which awareness of religious diver-
sity gives rise can be counteracted in the simple way Plantinga thinks it can.
2. Bayle in defense of religious toleration
Born in 1647, Pierre Bayle was raised a Protestant in predominantly Roman
Catholic France. Both his father, Jean, and his older brother, Jacob, were
ordained ministers. When he went to study at the Jesuit Academy at Toulouse
in 1669, Pierre converted to Catholicism, but he returned to Protestantism
after eighteen months. Fearing persecution on account of his relapsed status,
he fled in Geneva in 1670. In 1675 he became a professor of philosophy at the
Protestant Academy of Sedan. The Academy was closed by royal decree in
1681, and he moved to Rotterdam, where he lived for a quarter of a century.
Persecution of Protestants by Catholics grew worse during these years. Jean
Bayle died in March 1685. On June 10, 1685, Jacob Bayle was arrested
and imprisoned. Pierre learned that he had indirectly caused his brother’s
arrest. Angered by criticism Pierre had published, the French authorities were
treating his brother as his surrogate because they could not reach him in
Rotterdam. Jacob was tortured, and his health was broken in an unsuccessful
attempt to compel him to renounce his religious loyalties. On October 22,
1685, the Edict of Nantes was revoked, and the persecution of Protestants in
France thereafter increased in intensity. On November 12, 1685, Jacob Bayle
died in prison. The following year Pierre published his most impassioned and
sustained defense of religious toleration.22
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Its full title is Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ,
‘Contrain-les d’entrer’ (Philosophical Commentary on These Words of Jesus
Christ, ‘Compel Them to Come In’).23 The words of Jesus referred to in
its title come from the Parable of the Great Dinner in the Gospel of Luke.
In the story, when the invited guests make excuses for not coming to the
dinner and even poor folk brought in from the neighborhood do not fill all
the places, the angry host says to his servant: ‘Go out into the roads and
lanes, and compel people to come in, so that my house may be filled’ (Luke
14:23). Starting at least as far back as Augustine, Christians used this verse
as a proof-text to provide biblical warrant for forced conversions. The first
part of Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary contains nine arguments against
interpreting the verse according to what Bayle describes as its literal sense,
by which he means the sense in which it can be used to serve this intolerant
purpose. Though it bills itself as a reply to objections to the arguments of
the first part, the second part also sets forth some of Bayle’s positive views
on religious toleration, including his historically influential doctrine of the
rights of an erring conscience.24 The nine arguments of the first part cover a
lot of territory. For example, one of them is a clever ad hominem (or, perhaps,
ad ecclesiam) argument. Bayle points out that if Christians who think Luke
14:23 justifies them in making forced conversions were honest about their
intentions, the rulers of non-Christian peoples such as the Chinese would have
reasonable grounds for excluding Christian missionaries from their realms.
Another should strike a sympathetic chord in the minds of readers of scrip-
ture who reject the practice of proof-texting. After arguing that Luke 14:23
should be interpreted in the light of its context, Bayle tries to show that
interpreting the verse in a way that supports forced conversion ‘is contrary
to the whole tenor and general spirit of the Gospel’ (p. 39). However, the
argument of greatest philosophical interest is one which combines morality
and epistemology. I shall concentrate on that argument.
According to Bayle, the general principle on which the argument rests
is ‘that any particular dogma, whether advanced as contained in Scrip-
ture or proposed in any other way, is false, if repugnant to the clear and
distinct notions of natural light, principally in regards to morality’ (p. 33).
As the reference to clear and distinct notions of natural light suggests, Bayle
is working with a Cartesian epistemology in which the epistemic status of
deliverances of the natural light is sufficiently high to guarantee their truth.
Examples he gives of deliverances of the natural light of reason that come
from outside morality are such truths as ‘that the whole is greater than
its parts; that if from equal things we take away equals, the results will
be equal; that it’s impossible that two contradictories be true; or that the
essence of a subject actually subsists after the destruction of the subject’
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(p. 28). We should, of course, view the last of these examples with suspi-
cion. It is tantamount to the thesis, which is in dispute between Platonists
and Aristotelians, that properties can exist uninstantiated. Still, in philosophy
three out of four is not a bad record, and the other examples make it clear
enough what sorts of propositions are supposed to be deliverances of the
natural light. So I think we should grant Bayle the principle that if a doctrine
is contrary to the natural light, then it is false.
At the beginning of the second chapter of the first part, Bayle tells us how
he proposes to make use of this principle. He says: ‘The literal sense of these
words is contrary to the purest and most distinct ideas of natural reason; it
is therefore false. The business now is only to prove the antecedent, because
I presume the consequence was sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing
chapter’ (p. 35). His argument will thus have the following form:
(1) If the words ‘Compel them to come in’, interpreted literally, yield a
proposition contrary to the natural light, that proposition is false.
(2) The words ‘Compel them to come in’, interpreted literally, do yield a
proposition contrary to the natural light.
(3) Hence that proposition is false.
We are committed to allowing Bayle to assume (1), because it is an instance
of the principle we have already granted him. So if he establishes (2), as he
has promised, he will be in a position to infer (3) from (1) and (2) by modus
ponens.
The argument for (2) has four steps. I shall quote the first and last of
them in full because I want to comment on each of them at some length.
Bayle first claims ‘that by the purest and most distinct ideas of reason, we
know there is a being sovereignly perfect who governs all things, who ought
to be adored by mankind, who approves certain actions and rewards them,
and who disapproves and punishes others’ (p. 35). His next point is that we
also understand by the natural light that the principal worship we owe to
the supreme being consists of inner acts of the mind. It would be as silly to
suppose that God would be pleased by mere external behavior, Bayle remarks,
as it would be to imagine that a king would regard as homage a situation in
which the wind posed statues in deferential postures by knocking them over
whenever he happened to pass by. It follows, Bayle then observes, that even
when worship involves exterior signs it must also include inner mental acts.
His fourth and final point is this:
It is evident then that the only legitimate way of inspiring religion is by
producing in the soul certain judgments and certain movements of the
will in relation to God. Now since threats, prisons, fines, exile, beatings,
torture, and generally whatever is comprehended under the literal signifi-
cation of compelling, are incapable of forming in the soul those judgments
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of the will in respect to God which constitute the essence of religion,
it is evident that this is a mistaken way of establishing a religion and,
consequently, that Jesus Christ has not commanded it (p. 36).
What are we to make of this argument?
I think that, as it stands, it is a mess. Consider first Bayle’s first step. It
is plausible to suppose he thinks that a Cartesian ontological argument is the
source of our knowledge of God’s existence from the purest and most distinct
ideas of reason (‘les plus pures et les plus distinctes idées de la raison’).25
But, unlike Descartes, we do not believe that the premises of a Cartesian
ontological argument are deliverances of the natural light. Indeed, even if,
unlike Kant, we think there is a valid ontological argument whose premises
are rationally acceptable, we do not believe they have an epistemic status
as high as the law of noncontradiction or other things that are supposed to
be known by the natural light.26 Cosmological arguments for the existence
of God are in the same boat.27 And so too, it seems to me, are all other
known arguments of natural theology. So I think Bayle’s first step is already
a misstep. It insures that he will not get to a conclusion, guaranteed by the
natural light, to which the interpretation of Luke 14:23 he wants to reject is a
contrary.
Consider now Bayle’s final step. He asserts that compulsive measures
are incapable of forming in the soul the judgments of the will in respect
to God, whatever they may be, that constitute the essence of religion (‘ne
peuvent pas former dans l’âme les jugements de volunté, par rapport à Dieu,
qui constituent l’essence de la religion’).28 We may be sure, I think, that if
compulsion really cannot produce the internal acts of mind that are essential
to true worship, then Jesus has not commanded compulsion, at least not for
this purpose. But is it evident by the natural light that compulsion in incap-
able of producing those interior acts? It seems not. It may be that religious
beliefs, for example, are not under the direct control of the will so that people
threatened with religious persecution cannot simply become converts by
deciding to do so. But even if compulsion is incapable of producing converts
in the short run, it may be effective in the long run in the manner imagined
in the distopian fiction of the twentieth century. Or perhaps Pascal was right
when he advised the libertine wagerer to attend mass and use holy water,
thinking that outward practice would eventually generate inward belief. If so,
compelling outward practice would be a rational means to the end of inducing
belief. Issues about whether or not various techniques of brainwashing will
produce changes in belief are empirical; we would not expect them to be
settled solely by the natural light of reason. Like Locke, Bayle is vulnerable
to empirical confutation on this point.
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After having raised similar objections to Locke’s view, Waldron remarks
that ‘what one misses above all in Locke’s argument is a sense that there is
anything morally wrong with intolerance, or a sense of any deep concern for
the victims of persecution or the moral insult that is involved in the attempt
to manipulate their faith’.29 This suggests that we would be doing Bayle a
favor if we substituted explicitly moral considerations for claims about the
efficacy of compulsion at this point in his argument. Even if compulsion of
certain sorts turns out to be effective in causing the inner mental acts that are
essential to religion, it may nevertheless be wrong to use it for that purpose.
We know that Bayle means to appeal to moral considerations sooner or later.
Near the beginning of the first chapter of the first part, he announces that he
is ‘relying upon this single principle of natural light, that any literal inter-
pretation which carries an obligation to commit iniquity is false’ (p. 28).
So maybe Bayle’s best bet is simply to insist that it is morally wrong to
use compulsion to produce the inner acts that are essential to religion. If he
does, he has available to him the following argument. According to the literal
interpretation of Luke 14:23, Jesus has commanded the use of compulsion to
produce those inner acts. This command carries with it an obligation to use
compulsion for that purpose, since commands of Jesus are divine commands
and so impose obligations. But the obligation to make such a use of compul-
sion is an obligation to commit an iniquity, because it is morally wrong to
use compulsion thus. Hence the literal interpretation of Luke 14:23 is false,
and so Jesus has not commanded the use of compulsion to produce the inner
acts essential to religion. This argument has the merit of giving Bayle the
conclusion he wants at the fourth step of his larger argument.
However, next we must ask about the epistemic status of the moral prin-
ciple we have allowed Bayle to assume for the sake of this argument. Is it
evident by the natural light that it is morally wrong to use compulsion to
produce the inner acts that are essential to religion? I doubt it. What is more,
I think Bayle himself could not consistently even hold that this principle
is true unless it is qualified by a ceteris paribus clause. This is because he
allows that God ‘may dispense with His own laws in certain cases’ (p. 121).
Indeed, he believes that God can dispense from the Decalogue’s prohibition
on homicide. There are, he affirms, circumstances that ‘change the nature of
homicide from a bad action into a good action, a secret command of God,
for example’ (p. 171). And he goes on to claim that such circumstances are
sometimes actual, that God sometimes does dispense from this precept (Dieu
dispense quelquefois de ce précepte).30 The cases Bayle has in mind are,
of course, the biblical stories in which God commands homicide. The most
famous of them is the akedah, the binding of Isaac, recounted in Genesis 22;
according to that story, which serves as the basis for Kierekegaard’s teleolog-
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ical suspension of the ethical, God commanded Abraham to slay his son.31
Since Bayle is prepared to make exceptions even to the prohibitions of the
Decalogue in such cases, he has left a loophole open to religious persecutors.
He cannot consistently deny at least the possibility that they are right if they
claim they have been dispensed from the principle that it is morally wrong to
use compulsion to make converts or claim they have received a secret divine
command to employ compulsion for this purpose. Proving a negative is often
very difficult, and I think the present case is one of the hard ones. I do not
see how Bayle could hope to prove that the religious persecutors have not, in
fact, been thus divinely dispensed or secretly divinely commanded.
In my opinion, though at this point I am going beyond anything to be
found in Bayle’s text, the best strategy for the defender of toleration is
to conduct the argument entirely in epistemic terms and not to make any
dubious appeals to the Cartesian natural light. The epistemic credentials of
two conflicting claims are to be assessed and then compared. One is a moral
principle to the effect that intolerant behavior of a certain kind is wrong;
the other is a conflicting religious claim about that intolerant behavior. The
applicable epistemic principle is that, whenever two conflicting claims differ
in epistemic status, the claim with the lower status is to be rejected. If it can
be shown that the epistemic status of the moral principle is higher than the
epistemic status of the conflicting religious claim, then the epistemic principle
licenses an inference to the conclusion that the religious claim is the one to be
rejected. It is fortunate for the defenders of toleration that the strategy depends
only on qualitative judgements of comparative epistemic status, for it seems
likely that we are incapable of discovering a precise quantitative account of
levels of epistemic status. It would be nice for the defenders of toleration if all
our moral principles to the effect that intolerant behavior of a certain kind is
wrong had the very highest epistemic status possible. But since there may be
few if any moral principles about the wrongness of intolerant behavior with
this status, it is again fortunate that the strategy still has a chance of success
even if it uses a moral principle with a somewhat less exalted epistemic status.
Yet the strategy does not guarantee success, because it does not preclude
the possibility that in some cases a religious claim supporting intolerant
behavior will turn out to have a higher epistemic status than a conflicting
moral principle. Hence the strategy does not beg the question against advo-
cates of religious intolerance, though the defenders of toleration will naturally
hope that it may serve at least to limit the scope of epistemically respectable
intolerance. And the epistemic consequences of religious diversity may have
a role to play, at least in some cases, in applications of the strategy that yield
successful arguments for religious toleration of one kind or another. It may
happen that a religious claim supportive of a certain sort of intolerance has a
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lower epistemic status than a conflicting moral principle favoring toleration
entirely or in large part due to the decrease in the religious claim’s status
resulting from an awareness of religious diversity.
To help fix ideas, let us return briefly to the issue that vexed Bayle. A
valid argument parallel to the one he offered that employs the strategy outline
above has the following shape:
(4) If the moral principle that using compulsion to produce the inner acts
essential to religion is wrong has a fairly high epistemic status and
the religious claim that using compulsion for this purpose is obliga-
tory because Jesus commanded it has a lower epistemic status, then the
religious claim is to be rejected.
(5) The moral principle that using compulsion to produce the inner acts
essential to religion is wrong does have a fairly high epistemic status.
(6) The religious claim that using compulsion for this purpose is obligatory
because Jesus commanded it does have a lower epistemic status.
(7) Hence, the religious claim is to be rejected.
The proposition expressed by (4) is an instantiation of the strategy’s
governing epistemic principle. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument,
that the moral principle cited in (5) does have a reasonably high epistemic
status but falls short of being evident by the natural light, absolutely certain
or anything similar. It is an intuitively plausible principle. And even if, strictly
speaking, it needs to be qualified by a ceteris paribus clause to handle things
like secret divine commands, the possibility of a violation of such a clause
is not at issue in the present context. Debate can then focus on the epistemic
status of the religious claim cited in (6). Some of Bayle’s own arguments
in the Philosophical Commentary bear on this question. If he is correct
in thinking that this religious claim is contrary to the tenor and spirit of
the Gospels, this consideration will do something to decrease its epistemic
status. But the religious claim is not without a certain amount of support. It
has behind it the authority of a tradition of Christian thought and practice
in which it is entrenched. I think considerations of religious diversity can
play a valuable role in defeating the epistemic authority of this tradition.
They do so indirectly by diminishing the epistemic rationality of the whole
Christian package or worldview of which the tradition is a part. And, since
Christianity itself is internally complex and contains competing traditions,
some of which are more tolerant than the Augustinian tradition that endorses
compulsion, such considerations also operate more directly to decrease the
epistemic status of that tradition in particular and hence of the religious claim
about what Jesus commanded embedded in it. By my lights, the total evidence
strongly support (6), and so I think the argument of which it is a premise is
sound.
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In a couple of ways, it is of course a weak argument. Even if it is
successful, it eliminates only one ground for the use of compulsion by the
religiously intolerant. However, if we are committed to the project of trying
to persuade the intolerant by arguments, it may be practically desirable to be
able to argue against their grounds for intolerance one at a time. In addition,
the argument does not aspire to eliminate the grounds of all forms of religious
intolerance at one fell swoop. But, again, it may be of practical importance
to be in position to argue against various form of intolerance piecemeal,
starting with the worst. The strategy I have outlined and illustrated can be
used repeatedly provided enough moral principles of fairly high epistemic
status can be mobilized for inclusion in the premises of its multiple imple-
mentations. So my illustrative argument should be understood as part of a
cumulative case against religious intolerance.
3. Kant on conscience and inquisitors
The argument by Kant I wish to consider is set forth in the fourth section
of the second part of the fourth book of his Religion within the Boundaries
of Mere Reason. In that section, he presents a doctrine of conscience. As he
defines it. ‘conscience is a consciousness which is of itself a duty’.32 The
definition poses for Kant the question of how a state of conscious awareness
can be an unconditional duty. In attempting to answer his question, Kant starts
from the moral principle, which he says needs no proof, that we ‘ought to
venture nothing where there is danger that it might be wrong (quod dubitas,
ne feceris! Pliny)’ (pp. 202–203).33 He takes it to be a consequence of this
principle that I have an unconditional duty to be aware that any action I want
to perform is morally right. I do not have to know, with respect to human
actions generally or with respect to all possible actions, whether they are right
or wrong. But concerning any action I propose to perform, ‘I must not only
judge, and be of the opinion, that it is right; I must also be certain that it
is’ (p. 203). Kant contrasts his view with probabilism, which he defines as
‘the principle that the mere opinion that an action may well be right is itself
sufficient for undertaking it’ (p. 203). As I see matters, the probabilist thinks
that I may go ahead with an action I propose to perform if I am aware that it
is probable that it is right. Holding us to a higher standard, Kant insists that I
may go ahead with an action I propose to perform only if I am aware that it is
certain that it is right. The comparison thus forces us to view the certainty at
stake in Kant’s claim as epistemic rather than merely psychological. I may not
go ahead with my proposed action if all I am aware of is strongly believing
or being utterly convinced that it is right. In short, I have a duty to be aware
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that it is epistemically certain that an action I propose to perform is morally
right before I perform the action. If I act in the absence of this awareness, I
act unconscientiously and hence violate this duty, even if the action I perform
is, in fact, right and so I violate no further duty in performing it. The demands
of conscience are therefore very strict according to Kant.
Kant supplements his brief and abstract treatment of his general views
on conscience with an application of his doctrine to a particular case of
some interest to the defenders of religious toleration. He asks us to imagine
an inquisitor whose exclusivist faith is so firm that he is willing to suffer
martyrdom for it, if need be, and who must judge the case of someone,
otherwise a good citizen, charged with heresy. If the inquisitor condemns
the heretic to death, Kant wonders, should we say that the inquisitor acted
in accord with an erring conscience or should we say instead that he acted
with a lack of conscience and hence consciously did wrong? Kant allows that
the inquisitor acted with firm conviction and for a reason. He builds it into the
case that the inquisitor ‘was indeed presumably firm in the belief that a super-
naturally revealed divine will (perhaps according to the saying, compellite
intrare) permitted him, if not even made a duty for him, to extirpate supposed
unbelief together with the unbelievers’ (p. 203).34 Could such an inquisitor
get off the hook by pleading to the lesser charge of acting in accord with
an erring conscience and so, as Bayle thought, acting within his rights. Kant
thinks not. His famous argument for this negative conclusion deserves to be
quoted in full. Kant says:
That to take a human being’s life because of his religious faith is wrong
is certain, unless (to allow the most extreme possibility) a divine will,
made known to the inquisitor in some extraordinary way, has decreed
otherwise. But that God has ever manifested this awful will is a matter
of historical documentation and never apodictically certain. After all, the
revelation reached the inquisitor only through the intermediary of human
beings and their interpretation, and even if it were to appear to him to
have come from God himself (like the command issued to Abraham to
slaughter his own son like a sheep), yet it is at least possible that on this
point error has prevailed. But then the inquisitor would risk the danger of
doing something which would be to the highest degree wrong, and on this
score he acts unconscientiously (pp. 203–204).
In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant returns to the case of the akedah, which
is alluded to in the second parenthetical remark in the passage quoted above,
in order to say more about Abraham’s epistemic situation. He there insists
that ‘Abraham should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: “That I
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ought not to kill may good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition,
are God – of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice
rings down to me from (visible) heaven.” ’35
According to Kant, then, Abraham cannot be epistemically certain that the
voice he hears comes from God. Hence he cannot be aware that it is certain
that killing his son is right or even obligatory. If he proceeds to kill his son, he
violates the duty of conscience to have such an awareness and so acts uncon-
scientiously. He thus displays a lack of conscience because he consciously
violates this duty. Moreover, Abraham can be certain that killing his son is
wrong unless, allowing for the most remote possibility, God commands it.
If he proceeds to kill his son, he also runs the very great risk of wrongly
doing so. Therefore if Abraham proceeds to kill Isaac, he surely violates a
duty to act conscientiously and most likely also violates a duty not to kill his
son. Similarly, Kant’s inquisitor cannot be epistemically certain that scripture
actually records a divine command to eliminate unbelievers along with their
heresies. So if he condemns the person accused of heresy to death, he surely
violates a duty to act conscientiously and most likely also violates a duty not
to kill people on account of their religious faith.
It is, I think, illuminating to view Kant as working with the epistemic
argumentative strategy I outlined in my discussion of Bayle. The inquis-
itor can be almost certain that it is wrong to kill people on account their
religious faith; he falls short of complete certainty only because he allows
for the remote possibility of a divine command to do so. But the inquisitor
cannot be anywhere close to certain that it is right or even obligatory to kill
unbelievers because God decrees it, since he cannot achieve anything close
to certainty that scripture expresses such a divine command. Hence the claim
that it is right or even obligatory to kill unbelievers is to be rejected. In order
to keep the subsequent discussion simple, let us set aside the complications
that Kant’s doctrine of conscience would introduce into this picture of the
basic argumentative strategy.
Difficulties with Kant’s use of this strategy are similar to those that arise
in the case of Bayle. Kant has a very optimistic view of the ability of human
cognitive faculties to deliver epistemic certainty about principles of moral
wrongness. Those of us who live in societies that are, morally speaking, less
homogeneous than his was may well reasonably be less optimistic than he
was on this score. It seems to me no accident that his examples, killing one’s
good son or killing people on account of their religious faith, are among
the most favorable cases for his position. Ignoring the remote possibility of
special divine commands, I am willing to grant that it is certain that killing
people for their religious faith is wrong. But I doubt that the principles of
wrongness that cover the full range of intolerant practices to which I am
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opposed can all achieve the lofty status of epistemic certainty, though of
course I believe they are all true. Consider, for instance, exile, which in
a passage quoted above Bayle offers as an example of compelling. Is it
really epistemically certain that sending people into exile or, more gener-
ally, expelling or excluding them from a political community because of their
religious faith is morally wrong? Is it certain that the magistrates of Calvin’s
Geneva would have done wrong if they had expelled Roman Catholics from
the city under conditions in which the exiles were compensated for lost prop-
erty? Is it certain that the elders of a contemporary Amish farming community
would do wrong if they excluded non Amish from their community? Living
in a religiously homogeneous community can realize some very important
values. It does not seem certain to me that it is always wrong, even apart
from special divine commands, to endeavor to defend or preserve such values.
Hence I think the argumentative strategy I am discussing will not rule out all
the forms of intolerance I oppose if it can only be successfully employed with
principles of moral wrongness that are epistemically certain or nearly so.
However, another difficulty becomes urgent if we envisage making use
of the strategy with principles of moral wrongness that fall a good deal
short of epistemic certainty. As traditionally conceived, God is omnipotent
or, at least, very powerful. It would thus seem to be within God’s power to
communicate to us a sign that transmits to the claim that God commands
some intolerant behavior, such as issuing threats to heretics, a fairly high
epistemic status. Kant, to be sure, would not have found this idea congenial.
Speaking rather dismissively, he insists: ‘For if God should really speak to a
human being, the latter could still never know that it was God speaking. It is
quite impossible for a human being to apprehend the infinite by his senses,
distinguish it from sensible beings, and be acquainted with it as such’.36
Suppose we concede to Kant that one who hears a booming voice resounding
from the visible heaven cannot be absolutely or apodictically certain that it
is God speaking, because, as the quoted remark suggests, some alternative
possibilities cannot be conclusively eliminated, so that one cannot know, in
some emphatic sense, that it is God speaking. It does not follow that hearing
such a voice cannot confer on the claim that God has commanded what it is
taken to command a fairly high epistemic status. Therefore it seems possible
for even sense-perceptual experience to bestow on the claim that an intol-
erant act is obligatory because it is divinely commanded an epistemic status
higher than that of a conflicting principle of moral wrongness that falls a
good deal short of certainty, in which case, according to the argumentative
strategy under consideration, it is the moral principle that is to be rejected.
What is more, if philosophers such as Alston are correct, as I think they
are, then divine commands can also be communicated to us by means of a
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kind of religious perception that is distinct from, though analogous to, sense
perception. And, other things being equal, this perceptual source can also
contribute to raising the epistemic status of the claim that an intolerant action
is obligatory because divinely commanded to a level in excess of a conflicting
principle of moral wrongness that is less than certain. So if we apply the
argumentative strategy in question to cases in which the moral principle we
appeal to has an epistemic status appreciably less than certainty, we cannot
guarantee that it will not lose out in competition with a conflicting religious
claim about an obligation imposed by divine command that has achieved a
higher epistemic status. In short, there is no good reason to deny that claims
about divine speech, communicated to us by means of sense perception or by
means of a distinctively religious sort of perception, can acquire a fairly high
epistemic status in some cases, other things being equal, a status elevated
enough to exceed that of conflicting moral principles.37
It is at this point, I think, that the epistemic consequences of religious
diversity can do something to advance the cause of religious toleration. The
existence of religious diversity will reduce the epistemic status of claims that
God has commanded and thereby made right or obligatory intolerant behavior
to a level below that which they would occupy were there no epistemic
consequences of religious diversity. So when the argumentative strategy we
are examining is applied to moral principles that are less than certain, it is
likely to succeed more often, given the epistemic consequences of religious
diversity, than it would otherwise. It is probably impossible to say with preci-
sion how many cases of success will be the result of this factor. And there is
no guarantee that, even with its assistance, the strategy will be successful for
all the cases in which the champions of religious toleration would like to have
strong arguments against intolerant individual actions and social practices.
What is the upshot? I have tried to show that there is an epistemic strategy
for arguing against various forms of religious intolerance to be found in the
neighborhood of arguments actually offered by Bayle and Kant. The strategy
involves attempting to establish that moral principles which support toleration
have a higher epistemic status than conflicting religious claims which support
intolerance. My objection to both Bayle and Kant is that they were exces-
sively sanguine about the epistemic prospects of moral principles. In light of
our greater experience with the reasonable moral disagreements of modernity,
it is not plausible for us to suppose that all the moral principles needed to
develop a case for a doctrine of religious toleration that is broad in scope
using the strategy will be evident by the natural light or apodictically certain.
But when the strategy is employed in cases of moral principles with a lower
epistemic status, it may well turn out, other things being equal, that religious
claims which support intolerance have a higher epistemic status than such
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moral principles do. Recent work in religious epistemology becomes relevant
at this point in the discussion. The negative epistemic impact of religious
diversity reduces the epistemic status of religious claims supporting intoler-
ance below what it would otherwise be. It thereby can contribute to improving
the success rate of the strategy when it is applied to construct piecemeal argu-
ments against religious intolerance of various kinds. Religious diversity thus
both creates the need for toleration and contributes to its epistemic grounds.
I do not claim to have exhausted the contributions Bayle or Kant can make
to contemporary philosophical discussions of religious toleration. It seems to
me their work is of lasting importance not only on account of its high quality
but also because they address the topic from within a broadly Christian reli-
gious perspective. Their arguments can speak on behalf of religious toleration
in a way religious believers may find sympathetic or, at any rate, so I hope. In
expressing this hope, I am clearly disagreeing with those who regard Bayle
and Kant as hostile to Christianity and to religion generally, skeptics at best
and unbelievers at worst. In this controversy, I side with those who have
argued that Bayle and Kant were believers, though not orthodox Christians
by various traditional standards.38 I think they were exploring, in ways from
which we still have something to learn, possibilities for religious existence
within modern pluralistic societies. If religious people today ignore what they
have to teach, they run the risk, as Robert M. Adams puts it, of blinding
themselves ‘to permanently important possibilities of religious life’.39 Since
I share with Adams the aspiration to be religious while living fully within
a religiously pluralistic cultural environment, I consider it valuable to look
to thinkers such as Bayle and Kant for lessons about how this might be
accomplished.40
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In this article, we present a theoretical approach to social discrimination on the one
hand and intergroup relations characterized by tolerance and plurality on the other
hand. Central to the analysis is the question ofhow members deal with intergroup dif-
ference. Ifthe outgroup's difference isjudged to be nonnormative and inferior, deval-
uation, discrimination, and hostility are likely responses toward the outgroup.
Judging the outgroup 's difference to be normative orpositive leads to acceptance and
appreciation of this group. Following self-categorization theory, the criteria-being
norms and values for judging intergroup differences-are derived from the
superordinate category that is perceived to include both groups. More specifically,
they are derivedfrom the prototype, or representation, ofthis inclusive category. So-
cial discrimination resultsfrom the generalization ofingroup attributes to the inclu-
sive category, which then become criteriaforjudging the outgroup. Tolerance, on the
other hand, is conceptualized as either a lack of inclusion ofboth groups in a higher
order category or as the representation of the inclusive category in such a way as to
also include the other group and designate it as normative.
Behavior between social groups has been for a long
time an important topic of social psychology. The in-
terest in this area of study might stem from a fascina-
tion with the psychological transformations of
individuals when they consider themselves to be mem-
bers of a social group, as well as an awareness of the
enormous societal consequences of intergroup behav-
ior. There is no doubt that intergroup phenomena like
social discrimination, prejudice, and hostility between
groups still constitute important problems and chal-
lenges, even in today's apparently more and more indi-
vidualized and "enlightened" society. In fact, one
might argue that these problems are today more urgent
than ever before, as, in the age of new communication
technologies, high mobility, and economic globaliza-
tion, diverse cultures and ethnic groups encounter each
other at an increasing rate.
Being conscious of these societal problems, social
psychological research has focused primarily on the
negative aspects and qualities of intergroup relations,
such as ethnocentrism, stereotyping, prejudice, and
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social discrimination, to suggest solutions derived
from scientific knowledge. In considering the societal
transformations, however, the question of how differ-
ent social groups may live positively together and
have positive relationships toward each other be-
comes more pressing and requires research to deal
more explicitly with the positive side of intergroup
relations. The concepts of tolerance and plurality that
designate positive qualities of relationships between
groups deserve scientific endeavors in their own
right. As prosocial behavior cannot be simply identi-
fied with lack of aggressive behavior (even though
research findings on both topics inform each other),
tolerance cannot properly be understood simply as a
lack of social discrimination. A common theoretical
perspective is needed from which both tolerance and
discrimination can be studied while considering their
special characteristics.
With regard to social discrimination, social psy-
chologists have tried to formulate its necessary condi-
tions and, hence, its essential underlying psychological
processes. Based on the findings of "mere" categoriza-
tion effects (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament,
1971), social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel
& Turner, 1986) constitutes here a major contribution.
However, according to recent research findings on the
so-called positive-negative asymmetry of social dis-
crimination (Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten,
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Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996), the same conditions as
those commonly studied in the positive domain do not
elicit social discrimination to the same extent when
negative rather than positive resources are to be aMo-
cated, or when negative rather than positive evaluative
attributes are to be assigned. Hence, the question con-
cerning the necessary conditions and processes of so-
cial discrimination has been raised anew.
We assume that the evaluation of intergroup differ-
ence is of critical importance for the quality of relation-
ships between social groups. Dissimilarity or
"foreignness" has a Janus-faced character as it may
elicit either attraction or aversion (Graumann, 1992;
Mummendey, 1993). When the outgroup's difference
is evaluated negatively, perhaps as a challenge or
threat to the ingroup's opinions and attributes and
hence to the ingroup itself, the outgroup should experi-
ence devaluation and discrimination. When the
outgroup' s difference is, however, evaluated posi-
tively, for instance as enrichment or as a variation that
in a more abstract sense still confirms the ingroup's
views, then the difference should be accepted and the
differing outgroup should be treated positively. Such a
general perspective would shift the attention from the
role of mere ingroup versus outgroup categorization to
the contents of these categories, their specific attrib-
utes, positions, and values and how these are evalu-
ated. It thus reflects a greater variety of possible
intergroup relationships; whereas the outgroup is per
definition merely outgroup (and thus different), its dif-
ference may be evaluated differently depending on the
specific context.
In this article we outline a concept of social dis-
crimination and tolerance between groups based on
assumptions about the psychological processes un-
derlying the evaluation of intergroup difference.
Turner's (1985; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994;
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987)
self-categorization theory (SCT) is the main theoreti-
cal background. In the following discussion, existing
approaches to intergroup behavior are briefly re-
viewed and the theoretically challenging findings of a
positive-negative asymmetry presented. We then fo-
cus on dealing with intergroup difference, starting
from the important role of categorization processes
and central assumptions of SCT. Based on the con-
cepts of inclusion and prototypicality, we finally
present our own approach to social discrimination
and tolerance that should form the basis of an empiri-
cal research program.
Approaches to Social Discrimination
In social psychological research, social discrimi-
nation is frequently operationalized as favoring one's
own group relative to a relevant outgroup. In contrast
to the usual research paradigms, however, the explicit
downgrading and relative disadvantaging of an
outgroup should be viewed as equally, if not more,
important. This is also expressed in Allport's (1954)
frequently quoted definition of social discrimination
as ... deny[ing] to individuals or groups of people
equality of treatment which they may wish" (p. 51).
This definition, furthermore, implies a discrepancy
between ingroup and outgroup concerning their ade-
quate evaluation and treatment, which we would seek
to further emphasize and regard as the core of the dis-
crimination phenomenon (Graumann, 1995; Otten &
Mummendey, in press): Social discrimination is an
ingroup's subjectively justified unequal, usually dis-
advantageous, evaluation or treatment of an
outgroup, that the latter (or an outside observer)
would deem unjustified. Definitions are, of course, a
matter of theoretical conceptualization; our theory
will be outlined in more detail in this article. In the
following we first discuss some developments of so-
cial psychological research on social discrimination.
Sherif's Functional Theory and
Tajfel's SIT
Based on the classic summer camp studies, Sherif
(1967) argued for a functional perspective on inter-
group behavior. From this viewpoint, the quality of in-
tergroup relations is a function of the perceived goal
interdependence between groups. A negative interde-
pendence of the groups involved (one group can
achieve its goals only to the detriment of the other
group's goals) is the basis for negative attitudes, hostil-
ity, and discrimination against the outgroup. Con-
versely, a positive interdependence (two groups have a
common goal or one group can achieve its goal only
when the other group also achieves its goal) leads to
positive attitudes and behaviors toward the outgroup. It
was demonstrated, however, in studies using the mini-
mal group paradigm (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel et
al., 1971), that for social discrimination to occur no
negative interdependence with regard to material goals
and resources was necessary (for reviews, see Brewer,
1979; Brown, 1995; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Wilder,
1986). These findings led Tajfel (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel
& Turner, 1986) to develop the tepets of SIT. SIT rests
on the assumptions that individuals derive part of their
self-concept, that is, their social identity, through be-
longing to social categories and that, in line with a mo-
tivation to evaluate oneself positively, they try to
achieve or maintain a positive social identity. The lat-
ter depends on social comparisons with a relevant
outgroup on relevant consensually valued comparison
dimensions that are favorable to the ingroup. Hence,
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social discrimination is understood to be an attempt to
establish the ingroup's positive distinctiveness relative
to the outgroup. For social discrimination to occur, no
realistic group conflict in Sherifs sense is necessary;
however, social competition for a relatively positive
evaluation of one's own group is crucial (Turner,
1975).
Concerning the possibilities of positive relation-
ships between social groups, SIT appears more pessi-
mistic than Sherif s (1967) functional theory because
the mere salience of a group context seems to imply, in
principle, social competition between the groups.
Thus, it is possible that a superordinate goal could even
enhance discriminatory tendencies (Skevington,
1980). On the one hand, a common goal brings both
groups closer together, but on the other hand, the two
groups' distinctiveness is thereby threatened. How-
ever, one could envisage a situation in which a division
of labor assigns to both groups different but comple-
mentary roles for the purpose of achieving a common
goal. In this way, a common goal may promote the es-
tablishment of shared values that may become the ba-
sis for a shared consensus on mutual inferiorities and
superiorities (Brown & Wade, 1987; Deschamps &
Brown, 1983; Turner, 1981).
Similarity and Dissimilarity
Between Groups
These considerations are based on the assumption
that the effect of superordinate goals and cooperation
is mediated by the perception of similarities and by the
processes of group formation; more specifically, the
formation of a higher order group that includes ingroup
as well as outgroup (Turner, 1981). Thus the discus-
sion leads, on a more abstract level, to the general role
of intergroup similarities and differences. According
to SIT, perceived similarities between groups may in-
crease tendencies to favor the ingroup, as they threaten
the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup that mem-
bers are motivated to establish. This hypothesis is con-
trary to the prediction derived from belief congruence
theory (Rokeach, 1960), which assumes that similarity
promotes interpersonal as well as intergroup attraction
and hence positive relationships, whereas perceived
dissimilarities or differences lead to devaluation and
discrimination against others (see also Bar-Tal, 1990;
Schwartz & Struch, 1989).
A number of studies investigating the impact of
similarities and differences between groups on group
behaviors and evaluations yielded rather ambiguous
results (Brown, 1984; Brown & Abrams, 1986; Diehl,
1988; Grant, 1993; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984;
Roccas & Schwartz, 1993; Turner, 1978). Various au-
thors tried to conceptualize the relation between inter-
group similarities and dissimilarities and intergroup
relation in more differentiated ways (Brown, 1984;
Diehl, 1988; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993). On the whole,
however, the findings remain inconsistent. We assume
that the problem requires intergroup similarities and
differences to be considered in terms of their contex-
tual meaning (see also Jetten, 1997).
As Turner (1981) also pointed out, the intergroup
background against which similarities are perceived
and cooperation is established is important. Similar-
ities and cooperation do not trigger attraction per se,
thereby reducing intergroup conflict, but rather
through a new definition of the situation in terms of be-
longing to a more inclusive category (see also
Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust,
1993; Worchel, 1986). In this respect, aspects of the
group history may be important, as they also shape the
salient intergroup context. For instance, in a study by
Worchel, Andreoli, and Folger (1977), cooperation
leading to failure increased attraction between two
groups, when these were not previously in a competi-
tive relationship to each other; however, it decreased
attraction when the groups' previous relationship was
a competitive one. Worchel (Worchel, 1996; Worchel,
Coutant-Sassic, & Grossman, 1992) argued generally
that group history and group development should be
taken more into account when analyzing intergroup re-
lations. However, even a "cross-sectional" perspective
requires a more differentiated analysis to reach a better
theoretical understanding of the meaning of intergroup
similarities and differences against the background of
a given social context. Is it only possible to reduce in-
tergroup conflict through reducing the differences be-
tween groups, through abandoning the former group
identities? Or is a positive relationship between
groups, despite their differences, possible? (see
Gaertner et al., 1993).
Answering these questions could contribute to a
social psychological conception of plurality and tol-
erance and, hence, add to the body of research that is
concerned with possibilities of positive intergroup re-
lations, for instance in the context of the contact hy-
pothesis (e.g., Brewer & Miller, 1984; Hewstone,
1996; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Vivian, Hewstone,
& Brown, 1997) or with regard to strategies of accul-
turation (e.g., Berry, 1984, 1992; Bourhis, Moise,
Perreault, & Senecal, 1997).
Positive-Negative Asymmetry of
Social Discrimination
Evaluations of intergroup similarity and difference
are, thus, an important aspect of intergroup behavior
and require further clarification and consideration in
the context of SIT. This notion is further stressed when
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linked to a second critical aspect of previous research.
Recent research calls into question interpretations of
the minimal group findings that were crucial for devel-
oping SIT and thus raises again the issue of which con-
ditions are essential for discriminatory behavior to
occur. Mummendey and colleagues (e.g., Blanz,
Mummendey, & Otten, 1995a, 1995b; Mummendey et
al., 1992; Otten et al., 1996) investigated whether find-
ings concerning allocations of positively valued re-
sources between groups could be replicated in the
empirically neglected domain of negative resources
and socially problematic behaviors. These studies
yielded the robust finding of a positive-negative asym-
metry of social discrimination: When aversive re-
sources (e.g., noise, unpleasant tasks, etc.) are
allocated between groups, or when groups are evalu-
ated on negatively valued dimensions, there is less dis-
crimination against the outgroup than in the positive
realm, particularly under clearly minimal conditions
(e.g., Mummendey et al., 1992; Otten et al., 1996). A
variety of explanations for this finding, in terms of
norms, information-processing, and category salience,
have been pursued and tested empirically and need not
be further discussed here (for a review, see
Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Most generally, the phe-
nomenon may be taken as a warning not to simply ex-
trapolate findings from the positive to the negative
domain. The meaning of earlier results, which were ac-
tually fundamental for the development of theories on
social discrimination, needs to be carefully reassessed
(Mummendey, 1995).
More specifically, what needs consideration is
whether ingroup favoritism (i.e., the relatively posi-
tive evaluation and treatment of the ingroup) and
outgroup antagonism (i.e., the explicit derogation and
aversive treatment of outgroups) should be conceptu-
ally differentiated from each other. Regarding
ingroup favoritism under minimal group conditions
in particular, it might be considered whether this ac-
tually constitutes a case of discrimination against the
outgroup rather than expression of solidarity with the
ingroup, or perhaps even an unreflected positive de-
fault, that is, a simple generalization from positively
valued (individual) self to ingroup (Cadinu &
Rothbart, 1996; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Gaertner et
al., 1993; Maass & Schaller, 1991; Otten, 1996).
Conversely, we need to answer the question of which
conditions are necessary, or sufficient, for the occur-
rence of outgroup antagonism. Real-life experiences
demonstrate that people do discriminate on negative
dimensions, and social discrimination is in fact usu-
ally understood as negative, disadvantageous, devalu-
ing, hostile, and aggressive treatment of an outgroup.
The studies by Mummendey and others (Blanz et al.,
1995a, 1995b; Mummendey et al., 1992; Otten et al.,
1996) show that ingroup favoritism involving alloca-
tion of negative stimuli can be observed under condi-
tions that imply, according to SIT (Tajfel, 1978;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986), a heightened motivation to
favor the ingroup (i.e., status-inferior minorities, high
identification); further, these conditions are more en-
riched than in minimal situations and thus better al-
low construction of some legitimization for the
differential treatment of ingroup and outgroup.
Consequences for Research on
Social Discrimination
From this research, we draw the important conclu-
sion that social discrimination in the sense of
outgroup antagonism requires, first, a sufficient moti-
vation to establish positive distinctiveness of the
ingroup and, second, a sufficient subjective legitima-
tion of the negative behavior against the outgroup.
On the one hand, social discrimination serves the
shared interests and socially defined group goals of
one's own group-among other things, the positive
evaluation of the ingroup. On the other hand, behav-
ior toward the outgroup needs to be consistent with
norms shared with other group members, and with
values that are socially defined as important for one's
group. The differences of the outgroup might, under
certain conditions, be seen as a challenge to the valid-
ity of ingroup norms and values, so that it appears
necessary and, from the ingroup's view, legitimate, to
evaluate and treat the outgroup negatively.
Interestingly, from these considerations we can in-
fer a twofold meaning of intergroup difference. Lack
of difference between the groups may increase the
motivation to establish a positive distinctiveness,
through differentiation and differential treatment in
favor of one's ingroup (see the previous discussion).
In contrast, perceived difference may be the basis for
legitimizing negative outgroup treatment, when the
difference is perceived as norm violation, deviance,
and inferiority, as an expression of a false perception
of the world and therefore a challenge to the
ingroup's views and identity-relevant values. The
perceived difference of the outgroup would thus have
two opposite effects on discriminatory tendencies:
one mediated by motivation (maintaining positive
distinctiveness) and the other mediated by legitima-
tion (defending identity-relevant values). This is not
to say, however, that motivation and legitimation are
independent from each other; rather, as we argue later
with respect to the projection process, in being moti-
vated to establish positive distinctiveness, group
members may construe a subjectively sufficient legit-
imation for outgroup antagonism.
In this article we do not further compare discrimi-
natory behavior based on positive versus negative
stimuli. To us, this distinction had, and may continue
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to have, high heuristic value in pointing to aspects
that may otherwise be rather neglected in intergroup
research. Findings regarding the negative realm of
social discrimination pointed to the necessity of legit-
imation processes for outgroup antagonism (which
may be also involved in, but maybe not necessary for,
instances of ingroup favoritism, as suggested previ-
ously). We elaborate here on the crucial role of sub-
jective legitimations for the occurrence of social
discrimination in the sense of conscious, deliberate,
and reasoned negative treatment of outgroups. Social
discrimination is thus understood as relatively nega-
tive treatment of the outgroup that is justified and le-
gitimized from the ingroup' s view, whereas it is
unjustified and illegitimate from the outgroup's view
(see Markovsky, 1991). This disagreement between
groups on evaluation and legitimation should be con-
sidered an essential defining criteria of social dis-
crimination (Graumann, 1995; Otten & Mummendey,
in press; see also Mummendey, Linneweber, &
Loschper, 1984; Mummendey & Otten, 1989). The
disagreement reflects intergroup difference, namely
the groups' differing views, norms, and perceptions
of the world (Schutz, 1972).
We assume that under certain conditions the
outgroup's difference puts into question the positions
and values, world views, and self-concepts of the
ingroup. The evaluation of intergroup difference
should, thus, play an important role for the phenome-
non of social discrimination (without denying the im-
portance of realistic group conflicts; Sherif, 1967).
Group members may experience perceived or expected
intergroup difference in itself as threatening their so-
cial identity, when the difference jeopardizes, from
their view, the validity, superiority, and positivity of
the group's central values and positions. They would
try to defend and maintain their identity through deval-
uation and hostility toward the outgroup. Hence, speci-
fying the essential conditions and processes
underlying evaluations of intergroup difference is an
important research goal.
Theoretical Contributions to Dealing
With Difference
Dealing with difference and deviance is of impor-
tance for various social psychological theories of
intragroup processes, and we can refer to these theories
when considering the role of intergroup difference for
social discrimination and tolerance. In the following,
various contributions and findings are briefly dis-
cussed. As will become apparent, all of them empha-
size a higher order inclusion of the differing parties as
the background on which differences are evaluated.
This is the fundamental premise for our own theoreti-
cal perspective, which originates from Turner's SCT
(Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987).
Deviance
With respect to opinion deviance of group mem-
bers, Festinger (1950) assumed in his theory of infor-
mal social communications that the less the deviant
person is perceived as a member, or is wished to be a
member, of one's group, the less the pressure toward
uniformity. Deviance here is not threatening or dis-
turbing unless there is some degree of inclusion of the
deviant within one's own group. Thus, as a third reac-
tion to opinion deviance-next to (a) the group influ-
encing the deviant or (b) the deviant influencing the
group-Festinger considered (c) the redefinition of the
group boundaries. The group may be redefined in a
way that excludes the deviant from the group (see
Schachter, 1951). Festinger (1950) made the further
assumption, supported by empirical evidence (e.g.,
Schachter, 1951), that as pressures toward uniformity,
agreement of opinions, and reduction of difference in-
crease, the more homogeneous and cohesive the group
is perceived to be: that is, the more salient the shared
categorization.
Social Influence
Via processes of social influence, the group may try
to change the deviant's position or, conversely, the de-
viant may try to change the group's position
(Festinger, 1950). A basic assumption underlying
SCT's conceptualization of social influence (Turner,
1987a, 1991) is that a precondition for a discrepant or
deviant opinion becoming influential is the expecta-
tion that there should be agreement. It is assumed that
this expectation is based on the perception of the per-
sons as equals, hence, on a perception of belonging to
the same social category. A person's deviation and dif-
ference of opinion is not unexpected when the person
is perceived as belonging to an outgroup and thus as
not being equal. However, the situation in which
equally categorized persons have different opinions
elicits subjective uncertainty, which the persons try to
reduce.
Returning to the level of social groups, the SCT as-
sumes that for a minority to influence a majority, a
shared categorization of minority and majority is a
necessary precondition (David & Turner, 1996;
Turner, 1991). A minority could exert influence only if
members of the majority consider it to be part of their
own group in the given social context. As a conse-
quence, a minority has to fight for the promotion of its
societal image to be potentially influential: It must be
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accepted as part of the larger society (cf. Hollander,
1960). On the other hand, the majority tries to label the
minority as deviant, different, sick, and so forth, in this
way explaining the latter's deviant views and main-
taining their own subjective validity.
Black Sheep Effect
With respect to deviance, the "black sheep effect"
(Marques & Paez, 1994) is also an interesting phe-
nomenon. According to this effect, an attractive
ingroup member is evaluated more positively than an
equally attractive outgroup member, whereas an unat-
tractive ingroup member is evaluated more nega-
tively than an equally unattractive outgroup member.
One explanation for this phenomenon refers to as-
sumptions of SIT and interprets the relatively stron-
ger devaluation of unattractive ingroup members as
resulting from the motivation to maintain a positive
ingroup image. The member's low attractiveness is
regarded as a deviation from the positive group norm,
and devaluing the member preserves the positivity of
the group. The low attractiveness of outgroup mem-
bers, however, does not threaten, but rather confirms
the positive ingroup norm.
Intragroup Attraction
In a similar vein, Hogg (1992, 1993) argued for a
conceptualization of group cohesiveness, or
intragroup attraction, on the basis of SIT and SCT.
He argued that attraction between group members
needs to be differentiated from interpersonal attrac-
tion. In contrast to interpersonal attraction that is
based on individual relationships and experiences be-
tween two persons, Hogg (1993) defined
"Inter-member attraction ... [as] depersonalized lik-
ing for an individual group member based on group
prototypicality" (p. 105). Members are evaluated on
the basis of belonging to the group, and the group's
prototype constitutes the relevant norm. Attractive-
ness of group members is a function of their
prototypicality for the group.
Implications for the General
Theoretical Perspective
Deviance of a person leads to pressures of the
group toward uniformity as long as he or she is per-
ceived to belong to the group. A deviant person, or
minority, if considered part of the larger group, elicits
uncertainty and has thus potential to exert influence.
An unattractive person is evaluated more negatively
as a member of one's positively represented ingroup
than as a member of a negatively evaluated outgroup.
An ingroup member is perceived to be less attractive,
the less he or she corresponds to the group's positive
prototype or representation. In all these instances, de-
viance or difference is evaluated against the back-
ground of a shared group membership; that is, the
extent to which a person belongs to that group as well
as the representation and image of that group. When
there is no inclusion in a common group, deviance is
less disturbing and can be "explained" through the
perception of belonging to a different social category.
A deviant person is designated as eccentric; a deviat-
ing minority are called lunatics. In fact, what exactly
is deviant is a function of the representation of the
common group: The prototype of the inclusive group
constitutes the norms by which it is possible to judge
what is different. If somebody is different and devi-
ates from the representation of the shared social cate-
gory, in other words, from the norms relevant in the
given context, he or she creates uncertainty and is de-
valued and rejected.
This discussion points to the important role of
superordinate categorization processes for the evalua-
tion of difference. SCT (Turner et al., 1987) offers it-
self as a theoretical framework for analysing the
conditions of positive versus negative evaluations of
intergroup difference. This theory continues the theo-
retical and metatheoretical tradition of SIT. As a theory
with a relatively large scope, it offers approaches for a
number of inter- and intragroup phenomena such as,
among other things, social discrimination and social
influence (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam,
& McGarty, 1994). In our opinion, SCT constitutes a
promising framework for an analysis of the relation be-
tween social discrimination and intergroup difference
and for elaborating the possibilities of a social psycho-
logical conception of tolerance.
SCT: Inclusion and Prototypicality
Concepts and Assumptions of SCT
Central to SCT is the assumption that persons de-
rive part of their self-concept from their membership
of social categories, hence, their self-categorization.
They consider themselves equal to, or interchange-
able with, other members of their own self-category
as opposed to members of other categories (Turner,
1987b). Self-categories vary in their level of inclu-
siveness. Persons may self-categorize themselves in
inclusive ways, for instance as human beings as op-
posed to other forms of life; or they may self-catego-
rize in less inclusive ways as members of social
groups, for instance Germans in contrast to Turks, or
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even less inclusively as individuals different from
other individuals, and so forth. Self-categories are,
furthermore, hierarchically related to each other, in
that social categories are compared to each other on
the basis of their shared next more inclusive social
category. Germans and Turks may be compared in
terms of their shared citizenship of Europe, in con-
trast to, for example, Asians; or two Germans may be
compared in terms of their common identification as
Germans, in contrast to Turks.
This hierarchical relation between social catego-
ries also plays an important theoretical role in inter-
group evaluations and social discrimination (Turner,
1987b). It is assumed that self-categories tend to be
evaluated positively (in the sense of a positive social
identity). The evaluation of self-categories is based
on comparisons with other relevant social categories.
Comparisons require comparability, residing in the
groups' identity on a higher level of abstraction. In
contrast to a popular saying, it is possible to compare
apples and pears with each other-however, only on
the basis of a shared superordinate category such as
fruit, which may be sweet, sour, juicy, aromatic, and
so forth. "[T]he comparison of different stimuli de-
pends upon their categorization as identical (the
same, similar) at a higher level of abstraction, and
takes place on dimensions that define their higher
level identity" (Turner, 1987b, p. 48). The super-
ordinate identity thus implies the relevant dimensions
for comparison. It also implies the value connotations
of the dimensions; that is, which positions on these
dimensions are positively valued. Attributes that are
prototypical for the (positively valued) superordinate
category are the positively valued positions. Hence,
the fundamental assumption is that a self-category
(the individual self, the ingroup) is evaluated more
positively relative to a comparison category (another
individual, an outgroup), the more relatively
prototypical it is perceived to be for the superordinate
category relevant in the given social context (cf.
Turner, 1987b, p. 59).
The, evaluation of ingroup and outgroup is, hence,
dependent on the superordinate category that is used to
define oneself in a more inclusive way. For example, in
self-defining as German and valuing this category pos-
itively, a person will evaluate the salient subgroups
East versus West Germans more positively, the more
prototypical he or she considers them to be for the in-
clusive category. Ingroup favoritism is therefore, ac-
cording to Turner (1987b), a function of the extent to
which the ingroup is perceived to be prototypical, rela-
tive to some salient outgroup, for the category includ-
ing both ingroup and outgroup. Thus, the concept of
relative prototypicality on valued dimensions of the in-
clusive category corresponds to SIT's concept of posi-
tive distinctiveness.
Consequences
With respect to their assumed role for social dis-
crimination, the concepts of an inclusive category
and its prototype have so far received hardly any at-
tention in empirical research.1 We proceed from these
assumptions and, on that basis, analyze in more detail
the role of intergroup difference. In this respect, it
may be argued that social discrimination not only re-
flects favoritism toward the ingroup due to its greater
degree of perceived prototypicality for the inclusive
category, but also that the outgroup's differences are
experienced as a challenge to one's own positions
and attributes that are seen as prototypical for the in-
clusive category and, consequently, as normative and
positively valued. The outgroup deviates from this
prototype of the inclusive category, which, however,
should still be a valid norm for them as a subgroup of
the inclusive category.These considerations are con-
sistent with SCT's conception of social influence
(Turner, 1991), according to which shared inclusion
in a social category is a precondition for the experi-
ence of subjective uncertainty through disagreement
(McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993). The in-
clusion implies a shared norm as given by the proto-
type of the inclusive category. The approach to social
discrimination and tolerance as outlined in the re-
mainder of this article focuses on these concepts of
inclusion and prototypicality.
An Approach to Social Discrimination and
Tolerance Between Groups
The Role of Inclusion and Prototypicality
for Social Discrimination
Based on the theoretical considerations presented,
it is hypothesized that an outgroup's difference will
be evaluated negatively if both ingroup and outgroup
are sufficiently included in a more abstract social cat-
egory and if the ingroup's attributes are perceived as
prototypical for the inclusive category. Group mem-
bers should be inclined to the latter perception given
SCT's assumption of a general tendency to positively
evaluate self-categories (or SIT's assumption of striv-
ing toward a positive social identity). By pronounc-
ing the positions and attributes of the ingroup to be
A corresponding role of relative prototypicality has been consid-
ered in research so far only for the level of group members and for
intragroup phenomena (Hogg, 1993). Also, in regard to intergroup
behavior, only the prototypicality of members for their group has
been considered so far, for instance concerning the impact of stereo-
type-inconsistent information on stereotype change (Johnston &
Hewstone, 1992) or concerning reactions to threatened group distinc-
tiveness (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997).
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prototypical for the inclusive category, the ingroup
claims to be the more prototypical and thus superior
subgroup, compared to the relevant outgroup. For in-
stance, following the political unification of Eastwand
West Germany, West Germans might consider typi-
cally West German attributes, like efficiency and dili-
gence, to be central for Germans in general. They
would thus evaluate East and West Germans accord-
ing to their perceived positions on these attributes
and conclude that West Germans would be superior.
This process, which is, according to our approach,
central to the phenomenon of social discrimination,
may be called projection of ingroup attributes onto
the inclusive category, or, generalization from
ingroup to the inclusive category. Through this gen-
eralization, specific ingroup attributes are rendered as
general norms claiming validity and superiority. In
contrast, differing outgroups in the inclusive cate-
gory, for whom these norms should also apply, are
considered nonnormative and inferior and their posi-
tions are deemed false.
For the phenomenon offalse consensus effect, as it
is known at the level of individuals (Ross, Greene, &
House, 1977), a similar motivational function may be
assumed; by overestimating the extent to which one's
own opinion is shared by others, the subjective validity
and adequacy of the attitude is established and
self-esteem is maintained (Marks & Miller, 1987).
With respect to the role of an inclusive category as as-
sumed here, there is the interesting finding that a con-
sensus for one's own opinion is only overestimated for
other ingroup members, but not for outgroup members
(Krueger & Zeiger, 1993; Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson,
& Copper, 1992; Spears & Manstead, 1990). To vali-
date their opinions, individuals refer to a relevant in-
clusive category; its prototypical positions constitute
valid norms relative to which one's own opinions are
normative and other positions are antinormative. Cor-
respondingly, before the German unification, West
Germans were probably less likely to evaluate East
Germans with regard to efficiency and diligence (i.e.,
typical West German attributes), because it was clear
that East Germans lived in a different political system
and East and West Germans' common identity was
less salient. Hence, a shared inclusive category onto
which West Germans could have projected their own
attributes and values was less salient or relevant to
evaluations of group differences.
Following this discussion, which is certainly remi-
niscent ofSumner's (1906) definition ofethnocentrism2
but tries to go beyond and specify the processes in-
volved, the concepts of inclusion and prototype play a
central role in the phenomenon of social discrimination
and the evaluation ofintergroup difference. Inclusion of
ingroup and outgroup leads to the expectation of equal-
ity or agreement between the groups. The prototype of
the inclusive category is the norm against which ingroup
and outgroup are evaluated and that the ingroup may
claim to better represent. Wenzel (1998, in press) pro-
posed that the same processes underlie perceptions of
justice; he assumed that inclusive categorization is the
basis for the equality principle and the (ethnocentric)
representation of the inclusive category is the basis for
subjectively just differentiations. What is regarded as
legitimate differentiation from the one party's view-
point, however, may be regarded as social discrimina-
tion from the other party's viewpoint. Social
discrimination andjustice are thus two sides ofthe same
coin.
There is a dialectical relation between difference
and identity; two groups are differentiated from each
other on the basis of their equality, and the differ-
ences between the groups are evaluated with refer-
ence to their shared identity. Although the groups are
perceived as equal in terms of their inclusion in the
same superordinate category, they are perceived as
different in terms of their prototypicality for this in-
clusive category.
Contrary to these conditions conducive to social
discrimination, it is also possible that the difference
between the two groups is considered a more funda-
mental one, so that the groups are not perceived as
part of a superordinate category and, hence, no
shared norms and prescriptions exist. It would be cru-
cial to clarify which factors influence the representa-
tion of the situation, either as one of inclusion despite
differences or as one lacking inclusion. This question
could possibly only be answered when dynamic as-
pects of group development are taken into account.
For instance, a history of shared group membership,
in contrast to a prolonged history of intergroup differ-
entiation, might make newly separated subgroups re-
fer to an inclusive category, namely their previously
shared group, when evaluating their differences. In-
terested in the processes involved in such schisms,
Sani and Reicher (1998) studied the case of the Ital-
ian Communist Party and its split into two new par-
ties. Consistent with our argument, they observed that
both new parties claimed to represent the true essence
of the former common party and portrayed the other
party as subverting it. In our terminology, derogation
of the outgroup is based on an ethnocentric general-
ization of ingroup attributes through their projection
onto the formerly common ingroup, which remains
the inclusive background. With respect to the inclu-
sive category, the ingroup regards itself as pars pro
toto, as if it alone defines the whole.
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Disagreement on the social-categorical represen-
tation. It is an important implication of this ten-
dency to generalize one's own group's attributes that
it applies equally to the perspectives of both groups
involved, leading to possible disagreement between
the groups. For instance, although West Germans
may characterize Germans primarily as self-confident
and resolute (corresponding to West German
self-stereotypes), rather than as sincere and social
(corresponding to East German self-stereotypes),
East Germans may portray Germans more in terms of
the latter attributes. Generally speaking, both groups
construe social reality on the basis of their respective
normative notions and goals and, correspondingly,
may represent the social context differently. They
differ with respect to the ways in which they catego-
rize the social world. There is a conflict over the ade-
quate social categorization itself; social discrimina-
tion is the secondary phenomenon (McGarty &
Grace, 1995).
This disagreement or conflict is essential for the
phenomenon of social discrimination. If the groups
agree on the relative prototypicality of either group for
a consensually evaluated inclusive category, then a dif-
ferent evaluation of the groups is not experienced as
social discrimination. Members may perceive their
own group as more prototypical for the inclusive cate-
gory and, thus, evaluate it more positively than the
outgroup; however, the latter may actually have the
same notion of the superordinate category. As a conse-
quence, they would evaluate the two groups in the
same way, perceive their group as inferior, and regard
the self-favoritism of the other group not as social dis-
crimination but as a legitimate evaluative differentia-
tion between the groups. Refering to the same example
as before, it might well be the case that East and West
Germans (partly) agree that Germans are typically effi-
cient and resolute (being stereotypically West German
attributes) and, as a consequence, would agree that
East Germans are of lower status than West Germans.
Indeed, although it assumes a general tendency to eval-
uate self-categories positively, SCT does not exclude
the possibility of negative evaluations:
On the contrary, one's personal self may compare un-
favorably with other ingroup members in terms of a
positively valued ingroup self-category, and an
ingroup category may be perceived less favorably than
an outgroup in terms of one's definition of ideal human
beings." (Turner, 1987b, p. 58)
The important conclusion is that a disagreement be-
tween the two groups involved is the essence of social
discrimination, potentially resulting from the recipro-
cal process of projecting ingroup attributes onto the in-
clusive category.
From our theoretical approach, disagreements be-
tween groups can be derived on at least two aspects,
namely the degree of inclusion and the representation
of the inclusive category through its prototype.
Firstly, the groups might differ in their perceptions of
equivalence on a higher level of abstraction.
High-status groups or majorities might be particularly
prone to further increase the value of their attributes,
by pronouncing them to be norms of a more inclusive
category. For example, an English person, opposing
Welsh people, could hold the view that Welsh was a
dying language and that there was therefore no rea-
son to still want to learn this language (Bourhis &
Giles, 1977)-thereby implying that "all" should
speak English. Secondly, groups could differ in their
views on the prototype of the inclusive category.
Whereas their common inclusion in the category Ger-
mans may be equally salient to West and East Ger-
mans, West Germans might think Germans are
characterized more by stereotypically West German
qualities, and East Germans could disagree and argue
in favor of reopening discussion about what should
constitute the prototype of Germans and for consider-
ing the inclusion of stereotypically East German
qualities. The vehement discussions on a new consti-
tution, occurring in the context of Germany's politi-
cal unification, may constitute a good illustration of
this point.
The extent of inclusion and the representation of
the inclusive category are both aspects of using social
categories to structure the social world and as such
are dependent on consensus and shared goals and
norms of the ingroup. Social categorizations are
rooted in the social identity of the perceiver; they are
partisan perceptions of the social world (Oakes et al.,
1994). Hence, on the one hand, social categorizations
imply norms, as given by the prototype of the inclu-
sive category, but on the other hand, they can them-
selves be conceived of as norms of social groups
(McGarty & Turner, 1992) and therefore subject to
intergroup competition (McGarty & Grace, 1995).
Therefore, superordinate categories and subcategories
have mutual normative implications and are recipro-
cally related to each other.
The aspect of inclusion and the level of abstraction
of social categories is also an integral part of ap-
proaches to reducing intergroup conflicts. Vivian et
al. (1997) differentiated three kinds of theoretical ap-
proaches to the contact hypothesis on the basis of the
respective level of categorization that is postulated to
be conducive for the development of positive rela-
tionships between members of different groups: (a)
categorization on a lower level of abstraction,
"decategorization," and personalization (Brewer &
Miller, 1984); (b) categorization on a higher level of
abstraction, "recategorization," and establishment of
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a common ingroup identity (Gaertner et al., 1993); or
(c) maintaining the ingroup-outgroup categorization
level and mutual positive intergroup differentiation
(Hewstone & Brown, 1986). Only in the latter model,
mutual positive intergroup differentiation, can the
groups continue to exist psychologically, and only
this model deals with intergroup relations, in a more
restricted sense. Although the other two models are
also instructive in regard to questions of intergroup
relations, the third model has the advantage in that it
acknowledges the reality of social groups and reflects
diversity as a social value rather than assimilation, as
this is inherent in the recategorization model
(Hewstone, 1996; see also Dovidio, Gaertner, &
Validzic, 1998). The aim of the approach presented
in this article may indeed be understood as a psycho-
logical conceptualization of this pluralistic notion of
intergroup relations that does not aim at reducing in-
tergroup diversity by changing to a lower or higher
level of categorization but rather involves the general
perception, acceptance, and positive evaluation of in-
tergroup differences. The shared inclusion in a
superordinate category is meant to be only the back-
ground for evaluating intergroup difference, not to re-
place the latter as the figure.
The Role of Inclusion and Prototypicality
for Tolerance and Plurality
The theoretical analysis of social discrimination in
terms of inclusion and prototypicality also offers the
possibility of a more differentiated understanding of
plurality and tolerance; that is, the acceptance and
positive estimation of intergroup difference. Briefly,
tolerance may be conceptualized as the perceived cat-
egorical disparity of ingroup and outgroup, so that
there is no inclusion of the groups and thus no pre-
scriptions exist according to which the outgroup' s
difference would be regarded as norm violation. Tol-
erance may also be conceptualized as a complex and
vague representation of the inclusive category, in the
sense of an "undefined" prototype that qualifies many
different attributes and positions as normative and
acceptable.
Concerning the term plurality, or tolerance, some
authors plead for a differentiation (Allport, 1954;
Chong, 1994; Graumann, 1996) that might be corrob-
orated and further psychologically elaborated by our
approach. Allport (1954) distinguished between a
type of tolerance that involves enduring something
that we dislike or find aversive and a "warmer grade
of tolerance" (p. 425), which means a feeling of
friendliness toward all kinds of people and, thus, not
only enduring but accepting them. Similarly, Chong
(1994) criticized the treatment of the concept of toler-
ance in the social sciences as the capacity to endure,
suffer, or put up with, something that one disap-
proves of or dislikes. They fail to consider that for
tolerance to develop, changes in feelings and beliefs
are essential, which should be understood as social
adjustments and changes of societal norms. Only in a
superficial sense should tolerance be seen as endur-
ance of deviation on the basis of self-restriction or
disengagement; the more substantial form of toler-
ance implies changes in the notions of what is good.
We think it may be possible to theoretically concep-
tualize these different meanings of tolerance in terms
of our concepts of inclusion and prototype.
Undefined prototype. We argued that, when
there is a salient inclusion of ingroup and outgroup,
an outgroup' s difference will be measured by the
norms of the inclusive category, that is (following
SCT) by the latter's prototypical positions. We fur-
ther assumed that the groups involved may project
their own attributes and values onto the inclusive cat-
egory, thus perceiving their own group as relatively
prototypical and positive and the outgroup as deviant
and negative. Proceding from these assumptions, it
may be possible to identify some structural properties
of the inclusive category's prototype that would pre-
vent it from being ethnocentrically construed by the
groups involved. For instance, Hogg, Cooper-Shaw,
and Holzworth (1993) assumed that the prototype of
a social category can be defined with varying degrees
of clarity. In our opinion, at least four structural prop-
erties that make up a prototype's degree of definition
can be conceptually differentiated (even if they may
be empirically correlated):
1. A prototype may be represented clearly or un-
clearly; that is, the clarity of notions on the prototype
can vary (corresponding to Hogg et al., 1993).
2. A prototype may have a small or large scope;
that is, it can be defined by few or many dimensions
and it can affect few or many aspects of life.
3. A prototype may be narrow or broad; that is, the
distribution of representative members on the proto-
typical dimension has small or great variance.
4. A prototype may be simple or complex; that is,
the distribution of representative members on the
prototypical dimension is unimodal or multimodal.
The implications for intergroup relations and deal-
ing with intergroup difference are as follows: From
Property 1, a weak representation of the prototype, tol-
erance of difference follows because no clear
evaluative standard is perceived, whereas from Prop-
erty 2, a prototype's small scope, it follows that certain
differing attributes of the outgroup are beyond pre-
167
 at UNIV OF DELAWARE LIB on June 11, 2012psr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
MUMMENDEY & WENZEL
scriptions as implied by the prototype of the inclusive
category. From Property 3, a scattered and broad pro-
totype, it follows that a bigger variance around the nor-
mative position may be accepted, and from Property 4,
a complex multimodal prototype, it follows that vari-
ous distinctive positions on the underlying dimension
may be perceived as prototypical and normative. Each
of these characteristics of the inclusive category's per-
ceived prototype-lack of clarity, small scope, large
variance, and high complexity-should contribute to
the acceptance or even the positive evaluation of inter-
group difference.
On the basis of this conceptual differentiation, it
may even be possible to make predictions about when
intergroup difference would be only accepted and
when it would actually be positively esteemed (refer-
ring to the different conceptions of tolerance men-
tioned before). It might be worthwhile to pursue the
plausible hypothesis that an outgroup's difference will
be accepted if its differing attributes are not covered by
the perceived prototype and hence are not subject to
relevant prescriptions, because the prototype is weakly
defined (see Property 1), or because it has a restricted
scope and does not apply to the attributes in question
(see Property 2). In contrast, the outgroup's difference
will be positively esteemed if the differing attributes
are themselves part of the perceived prototype, and
thus normative, because the prototype is broad and
scattered (see Property 3), or because it contains sev-
eral distinctive positions (see Property 4).
The option mentioned last, tolerance on the basis
of a complex representation of the inclusive category
(Property 4), may be regarded as the most dramatic
and theoretically challenging form of tolerance. It
also deserves particular attention because it is the no-
tion of plurality that predominates in theory and poli-
tics. For instance, Berry (1984) defined integration as
an option of interethnic acculturation that retains the
cultural identity, mores, and values of the immigrant
group that, at the same time, attempts to integrate it-
self into the existing dominant group (see also
Bourhis et al., 1997). This option corresponds to the
ideal of multiculturalism as it was expressed in Can-
ada's official policy in the early 1970s. Prime Minis-
ter Trudeau declared in those days that there would
not be any official Canadian culture and no ethnic
group would take precedence over the other. No citi-
zen, or group of citizens, was anything else other than
Canadian and all would be treated equally (as cited in
Bourhis et al., 1997). Thus, the inclusion of all
groups in a superordinate category of Canadians was
stressed, for which, however, there was no official
culture and no simple representation. The various
groups should continue to exist with their peculiari-
ties, but simultaneously constitute the higher order
Canada, like a "mosaic" (Porter, 1965, as cited in
Berry, 1984). Regarding the inclusive category of Ca-
nadians, the prototype is diverse and diversity is
prototypical.
Another interesting example refers to the current
debate in Germany on the introduction of "double citi-
zenship" that would allow foreigners to keep their for-
mer citizenships when becoming German citizens.
Whereas right-wing politicians object that such a pol-
icy would lead to disintegration and "'parallel societ-
ies'," it could be argued that (next to making it easier
for foreigners to decide to become German and fully
participate in and integrate themselves into society)
such a policy would officially acknowledge the diver-
sity of the people living in Germany. It may lead to a
more complex representation of the inclusive category
"Germany's inhabitants" that would reduce the ten-
dency of "German" Germans to feel themselves to be
the only true and legitimate inhabitants.
Finally, it should also be considered that intergroup
difference may not necessarily question the normative
positions of the inclusive category, but on the contrary
could contribute to their perceived validity and may,
thus, be attractive. Theories of social influence (see
Turner, 1991) stress that information, to be influential,
must be perceived as independent from other informa-
tion. That is, to be informative and capable of validat-
ing a shared position, information must not be regarded
as being shaped by the normative pressure of other
(similar) positions (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Wilder,
1977). The positions of different groups may be re-
garded as independent, because it can be assumed that
they were developed on the basis of different experi-
ences, cultures, and histories. Positions and notions of
different groups that are equal in a more abstract sense
are validated by the consensus between independent
groups. Hence, intergroup difference may corroborate
a group's position if there is consensus beyond the dif-
ference or, by means of abstraction, in the difference
between the groups. Diversity allows validation by dis-
similarity.
Categorical difference. From our perspective,
an outgroup' s difference will be measured by the norms
of the inclusive category when there is a salient inclu-
sion of ingroup and outgroup, that is, when ingroup and
outgroup share an evaluative background. For both
groups, then, the same norms should apply which, how-
ever, are ethnocentrically construed. It can be derived
that when no such inclusion is perceived, but the
outgroup is instead regarded as fundamentally differ-
ent, then there is no shared normative system and the
outgroup' s difference will not be considered a norm vi-
olation. Processes of exclusion and emphasis on cate-
gorical difference were similarly postulated by
Festinger (1950; see the previous section) to be reac-
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tions to deviance within groups: Group boundaries may
be redefined so that deviants are no longer perceived to
belong to the group and are no longer expected to fol-
low group norms.
We assume that corresponding processes apply
when dealing with intergroup difference. If categorical
or "insurmountable" differences between an ingroup
and an outgroup are perceived and thus a shared inclu-
sion is not sufficiently salient, then there will be plural-
ity or tolerance in the sense of unrelated coexistence, a
lack of relevance, low comparability, disconnection, or
exclusion. The strange lifestyle of a far-off "exotic"
people will not be experienced as a threat because the
distance, psychological as well as spatial, renders a
common inclusion with the ingroup improbable. The
difference can be tolerated because the validity of
one's own views are not questioned. In this way, we
may also understand the apparent paradox that many
Germans, although on the one hand generally having
negative attitudes towards Turks living in Germany, on
the other hand love to spend their holidays in Turkey.
Because during their holidays they are on Turkish ter-
ritory and in the Turkish culture, they may to a lesser
extent represent Turks and themselves as belonging to
the same higher order category and thus experience
strange habits and customs as less of a norm violation
or deviance. Similar processes could be at work in
strongly segregated societies: Despite an inclusion of
ingroup and outgroup in the sense of belonging to the
same society or state, a wide-ranging segregation of
the groups might reduce their psychological inclusion
to such an extent that the outgroup' s difference is of no
concern to the ingroup. Acculturation strategies like
segregation and separation (Berry, 1984; Bourhis et
al., 1997) might yield some psychological utility
through these processes.
Lack of inclusion is, however, only the basis for a
limited understanding of tolerance characterized by
ignorance and disregarding the other. Furthermore, a
negative evaluation and treatment of the outgroup is
still possible. The process of redefining boundaries
and the exclusion of deviant groups is usually accom-
panied by their devaluation: labelling "rigid" and
"undiscerning" minorities as lunatics not only ex-
plains their different behavior, but devalues them and
their views at the same time (Papastamou, 1986). The
redefinition of group boundaries may thus go along
with a negative evaluation. This may be even more
likely if there existed a strong historical inclusion (as
in schisms), or if the minority itself claims to belong
to the same group with a claim to the same rights, or
both.
Finally, it should be considered that lack of inclu-
sion may not only imply that the same norms and be-
havioral prescriptions do not apply to the outgroup,
but, at the same time, that the same rights do not apply
and can therefore be withheld from the outgroup. In the
situation of a moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), there
are, from the perspective of the ingroup, no normative
restrictions with respect to treating the outgroup nega-
tively or cruelly (see also for the concept of
delegitimization; Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990).
Here, it may be objected that our approach might
not cover all, and possibly not even the most impor-
tant, cases of social discrimination. For instance, is it
plausible to assume that Nazi Germans perceived
themselves as sharing an inclusion with Jews in a
higher order category? Indeed, it would seem evident
that they excluded Jews from humanity altogether to
legitimize their genocide. We believe, however, that
an exclusion from humanity would not suffice to ex-
plain the mass killing of Jews. It is not probable that
somebody would just kill and destroy everything con-
sidered to be nonhuman. Other factors could also be
responsible for the Nazi crimes against the Jews. In
fact, consistent with a higher order inclusion, Jews
had been part of the society in Germany and coun-
tries occupied by Germans, and indeed often in prom-
inent and influential roles or professions; also, the
Nazi conspiracy theories certainly implied the ascrip-
tion of human features to the Jews. To us, it seems
that the Jews were persecuted exactly because they
belonged to the society, but were accused of not fit-
ting in and, more than that, subverting it, and because
they were human, but considered an inferior and dan-
gerous kind. Indeed, the horror of the genocide
against the Jews seems to correspond to the extremity
of the Nazi ideology of the Aryan race. This ideol-
ogy, the absolute glorification of the tall, fair-haired,
blue-eyed, and light-skinned Nordic man, may be re-
garded as an extreme and prototypical case of the
projection process we propose. More generally, al-
though we are not at all claiming that it would suffi-
ciently explain the complex phenomenon of genocide
(see Staub, 1993), we propose an important factor to
be the extreme elevation of one's own group and the
corresponding perceived worthlessness of the
outgroup, based on a standard applied to both groups
but being purely represented by one's own group.
Subsequently, exclusion rhetorics may be used to le-
gitimize some degree of severity, violence, and cyni-
cism of negative acts against the outgroup.
Cross-Sectional and
Temporal-Dynamic Analyses
Our discussion makes it clear that there is no sim-
ple answer to the question about the role of inter-
group similarity and difference for group relations
and that it constitutes a major theoretical challenge.
Jetten (1997; see also Jetten, Spears, & Manstead,
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1998) was also interested in the theoretical contradic-
tion that, on the one hand, intergroup dissimilarity
should increase the salience of a group distinction
and thus the probability of social discrimination,
whereas, on the other hand, intergroup similarity
should threaten an ingroup's positive distinctiveness
and thus provide a motivation for positive differentia-
tion and social discrimination. In terms of our ap-
proach, this fundamental problem can be restated as
similarity and dissimilarity influencing both the fig-
ure of perceived intergroup difference and the back-
ground of perceived inclusion. Dissimilarity may
increase the salience of intergroup difference, lead-
ing, given a background of unaltered inclusion, to
more negative intergroup evaluations. In contrast,
similarity may increase the extent of shared inclusion
within which the perceived intergroup difference,
when it is unaltered, is evaluated more negatively.
The question of which aspect of the intergroup sit-
uation is affected by perceived similarity and dissimi-
larity requires taking account of both the given social
context and aspects of development and change
within and between groups. In our opinion, the appar-
ent paradox, as stated previously, demonstrates that a
purely cross-sectional analysis of intergroup differ-
ence, which tries to pinpoint the evaluation of inter-
group difference at a given time against the
background of the current social-categorical repre-
sentation, is not sufficient but should be comple-
mented by a temporal-dynamic analysis. For an
understanding of the role of intergroup difference, the
groups' respective developmental stages and the his-
tory of intergroup relations need to be considered
(Worchel, 1996; Worchel et al., 1992). Jetten's
(1997) finding that for real-life groups, as compared
to ad hoc groups, similarity rather than dissimilarity
increases social discrimination, may be explained, in
the context of developmental aspects, by the exis-
tence of more established intergroup differentiations
between real-life groups (which have a longer his-
tory). A "one-shot" similarity may not influence the
established intergroup differentiation; however, it
might affect the degree of perceived inclusion, hence,
the shared evaluative background onto which groups
project their ingroup positions.
In addition to cross-sectional analyses on the basis
of current social contexts, it is possible to distinguish
between at least three dynamic perspectives: the con-
sideration of (a) a group's phase (with respective
goals) as a stage of its broader history or long-term
development (Moreland & Levine, 1988; Tuckman,
1965; Worchel et al., 1992); (b) the direction of the
changes in the intergroup relations and respective
prescriptions (e.g., acculturation options; Berry,
1984); and (c) the previous state of the intergroup re-
lations, for instance, whether both groups previously
constituted one group or had been for a longer time
established as distinctive groups (cf. Worchel et al.,
1992). The latter aspect can be most directly ex-
pressed in terms of the concepts we presented. The
previous state of intergroup relations may function as
a background against which the current difference
can be evaluated, and may be analyzed, as for the
present state, in terms of salience and content (repre-
sentation) of social categorizations. For example, if
ingroup and outgroup were originally one single
group (schism), or if their inclusion was very salient,
then this inclusive category could further operate as a
salient evaluative background. As a consequence,
both groups should compete to be viewed as the
"better" subgroup of this shared inclusive category.
Each group might claim to be more prototypical for
the original common group. It would follow that in-
tergroup differences would be experienced as threat-
ening, as they would question the ingroup's
prototypicality for the inclusive category (Sani &
Reicher, 1998).
The other two dynamic aspects should not be ne-
glected, as they are related to the important role
played by group goals in the relationship between
groups. Group goals are, first, dependent on the
group's developmental stage. For example, at a par-
ticular stage of group formation, the primary goals
may be the demonstration of boundaries to the
outgroup, establishing distinctiveness and justifying
the group's separate existence (Worchel et al., 1992).
Group goals are, second, dependent on the develop-
mental direction of the intergroup relations that may
be made explicit by means of metanorms. For exam-
ple, following the political unification of East and
West Germany, the official goal for intra-German re-
lations is that East and West Germany are to become
one Germany, differences are to be reduced, and fi-
nally, intergroup differentiation is to be abolished
(i.e., a merger goal). In a similar vein, the Canadian
doctrine of multiculturalism may be understood as a
metanorm. Acculturation options as differentiated by
Berry (1984) may be conceived of as prescriptions
for the relationship between the respective groups. As
norms they are, of course, again based on social iden-
tities and the consensus that is perceived to exist
within the ingroup. These norms are not necessarily
shared between the groups. Rather, the situation in
which affected groups differ in their notions of accul-
turation may lead to particularly delicate conflicts.
Bourhis et al. (1997) were therefore very much inter-
ested in the impact of certain configurations of two
groups' acculturation goals on their intergroup rela-
tions and on the success of acculturation. Here, we
find again an illustration of McGarty and Turner's
(1992) notion that social categorizations-here con-
ceptualized as representations of what the correct re-
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lationship between two ethnic groups should be-are
themselves norms. Therefore, they do not only under-
lie social identities, but are themselves also a function
of social identities.
Conclusions
The approach put forward in this article, appearing
to us theoretically consistent and plausible, now re-
quires empirical tests. First, studies need to be de-
signed that test the assumed projection process, that is,
the tendency to generalize attributes and positions
from an ingroup to an inclusive category. For instance,
the perceived relative similarity of ingroup and
outgroup to a salient higher order category may be
used as a measure of relative prototypicality. We
would expect, and indeed have found (Wenzel,
Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 1999), that both
groups would disagree on their relative prototypicality
and that perceived relative prototypicality would sig-
nificantly predict intergroup attitudes. Second, the role
of an inclusive category's salience in social discrimi-
nation and tolerance needs to be investigated. For in-
stance, laboratory experiments could include two
phases. In the first phase, a common group identity
could be made salient or not salient; in the second
phase, subgroup differences could be made apparent
and the subgroups would have to be evaluated. We
would expect stronger derogation of the outgroup
when the inclusion of the groups would have been pre-
viously made salient. Third, evaluations and behaviors
towards outgroups need to be studied as a function of
clarity and complexity of the inclusive category's pro-
totype. For instance, a false feedback manipulation
could be used that would suggest that people have
more or less clear (e.g., more or less shared) views on
the prototype of some inclusive category. We would
expect that there would be less ingroup projection, and
thus more positive attitudes towards the differing
outgroup, when the inclusive prototype is apparently
less clearly defined. The research, in particular con-
cerning the two latter questions, should take dynamic
aspects of group development into account.
To sum up, we argue that the essential conditions
of discriminatory behavior need to be specified anew
and with more precision, although remaining in the
tradition of SIT. Furthermore, in addition to a new
conceptualization of social discrimination, the possi-
bilities of positive relationships between groups, in
the sense of tolerance and plurality, should be ana-
lyzed from the same perspective. From our view-
point, the evaluation of intergroup difference is
crucial for the quality of intergroup relations. The
classification of persons into ingroup and outgroup
alone is not sufficient for social discrimination to oc-
cur; rather, it is essential to understand what meaning
is ascribed to these categories, what content they con-
vey, and how they are evaluated on the basis of per-
ceived norms. In addition, the extent of dissimilarity
between groups alone is not decisive; rather, it is es-
sential how the similarity and dissmilarity between
groups is evaluated, against the background of a
shared understanding of the given social context
within one's ingroup. Following SCT, the inclusive
category (including ingroup and outgroup) constitutes
the evaluative basis and, as its perceived prototype,
yields the norms and standards according to which
the groups are evaluated. As a consequence, under
certain circumstances seemingly small differences
will bear a greater potential for conflict than larger
ones; namely if the groups' inclusion is more salient
in the former than the latter case, or if the inclusive
category's prototype is clearer and more exclusively
defined by ingroup positions.
According to our approach, social discrimination
reflects a disagreement between groups on the ade-
quate social categorization (Turner, 1996), in other
words, on one or several of the aspects mentioned: on
the differentiation between ingroup and outgroup; on
these categories' attributes and contents; on the kind
and extent of their shared inclusion; and on the repre-
sentation, or prototype, of the inclusive category.
Conceptualizing social discrimination as a conflict of
opinion or disagreement does not, however, mean a
simple recurrence of conflict-theory notions on inter-
group behavior. Rather, in line with the SIT and SCT
tradition, negative interdependence and conflict are
considered as variables resulting from social catego-
rizations and self-definitions that need to be ex-
plained. Perceiving a conflict requires first the social
categorization into ingroup and outgroup and, then,
as stressed here, their discrepant mutual evaluations
that may be based on discrepant social-categorical
understandings of the evaluative context. Negative
interdependence consists therefore of a perceived in-
clusion of ingroup and outgroup in a superordinate
category that is ethnocentrically construed by either
group. Conversely, tolerance may be possible if ei-
ther a lack of inclusion is perceived and insurmount-
able differences are accepted, so that prescriptions
are not shared between groups, or if the inclusive cat-
egory is represented in a vague or complex way, so
that a variety of groups are normative.
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PERSONAL RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND PREJUDICE
GORDON W. ALLPORT AND J. MICHAEL ROSS
Harvard University
3 generalizations seem well established concerning the relationship between
subjective religion and ethnic prejudice: (a) On the average churchgoers are
more prejudiced than nonchurchgoers; (b) the relationship is curvilinear;
(c) people with an extrinsic religious orientation are significantly more preju-
diced than people with an intrinsic religious orientation. With the aid of a
scale to measure extrinsic and intrinsic orientation this research confirmed
previous findings and added a 4th: people who are indiscriminately pro-
religious are the most prejudiced of all. The interpretations offered are in
terms of cognitive style.
Previous psychological and survey research
has established three important facts regard-
ing the relationship between prejudiced atti-
tudes and the personal practice of religion.
1. On the average, church attenders are
more prejudiced than nonattenders.
2. This overall finding, if taken only by
itself, obscures a curvilinear relationship.
While it is true that most attenders are more
prejudiced than nonattenders, a significant
minority of them are less prejudiced.
3. It is the casual, irregular fringe mem-
bers who are high in prejudice; their religious
motivation is of the extrinsic order. It is the
constant, devout, internalized members who
are low in prejudice; their religious motiva-
tion is of the intrinsic order.
The present paper will establish a fourth
important finding—although it may properly
be regarded as an amplification of the third.
The finding is that a certain cognitive style
permeates the thinking oj many people in
such a way that they are indiscriminately
proreligious and, at the same time, highly
prejudiced,
But first let us make clear the types of
evidence upon which the first three propo-
sitions are based and examine their theoretical
significance.
CHURCHGOERS ARE MORE PREJUDICED
Beginning the long parade of findings dem-
onstrating that churchgoers are more intoler-
ant of ethnic minorities than nonattenders
is a study by Allport and Kramer (1946).
These authors discovered that students who
claimed no religious affiliation were less
likely to be anti-Negro than those who de-
clared themselves to be protestant or Catho-
lic. Furthermore, students reporting a strong
religious influence at home were higher in
ethnic prejudice than students reporting only
slight or no religious influence. Rosenblith
(1949) discovered the same trend among stu-
dents in South Dakota. The Authoritarian
Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Lev-
inson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 212) stated that
scores on ethnocentricism (as well as on au-
thoritarianism) are significantly higher among
church attenders than among nonattenders.
Cough's (1951) findings were similar, Kirk-
patrick (1949) found religious people in gen-
eral to be slightly less humanitarian than
nonreligious people. For example, they had
more punitive attitudes toward criminals,
delinquents, prostitutes, homosexuals, and
those in need of psychiatric treatment. Work-
ing with a student population Rokeach
(1960) discovered nonbelievers to be con-
sistently less dogmatic, less authoritarian, and
less ethnocentric than believers. Public-
opinion polls (as summarized by Stember,
1961) revealed confirmatory evidence across
the board.
Going beyond ethnic prejudice, Stouffer
(1955) demonstrated that among a repre-
sentative sample of American church mem-
bers those who had attended church within
the past month were more intolerant of non-
conformists (such as socialists, atheists, or
communists) than those who had not at-
tended. It seems that on the average religious
people show more intolerance in general—
not only toward ethnic but also toward
ideological groups.
Is this persistent relationship in any way
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spurious? Can it be due, for example, to the
factor of educational level? Many studies
show that people with high education tend
to be appreciably less prejudiced than people
with low education. Perhaps it is the former
group that less often goes to church. The
reasoning is false. Sociological evidence has
shown conclusively that frequent church at-
tendance is associated with high socioeco-
nomic status and with college education
(Demerath, 1965). Furthermore, Stouffer's
study found that the intolerant tendency
among churchgoers existed only when educa-
tional level was held constant. Struening
(1963), using as subjects only faculty mem-
bers of a large state university (all highly
educated), discovered that nonattenders were
on the average less prejudiced than attenders.
These studies assure us that the association
between churchgoing and prejudice is not
merely a spurious product of low education.
Turning to the theoretical implications of
these findings, shall we say that religion in
and of itself makes for prejudice and intoler-
ance? There are some arguments in favor of
such a conclusion, especially when we recall
that certain powerful theological positions—
those emphasizing revelation, election (chosen
people), and theocracy (Allport, 1959, 1966)
•—have throughout history turned one religion
against another. And among sociological fac-
tors in religion we find many that make for
bigotry. One thinks of the narrow composi-
tion of many religious groups in terms of
ethnic and class membership, of their pres-
sure toward conformity, and of the competi-
tion between them (see Demerath, 1965;
Lenski, 1961). It does seem that religion as
such makes for prejudice.
And yet it is here that we encounter the
grand paradox. One may not overlook the
teachings of equality and brotherhood, of
compassion and humanheartedness, that mark
all the great world religions. Nor may one
overlook the precept and example of great
figures whose labors in behalf of tolerance
were and are religiously motivated—such as
Christ himself, Tertullian, Pope Gelasius I,
St. Ambrose, Cardinal Cusa, Sebastian Cas-
tellio, Schwenckfeld, Roger Williams, Ma-
hatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and
many others, including the recently martyred
clergy in our own South. These lives, along
with the work of many religious bodies, coun-
cils, and service organizations would seem
to indicate that religion as such unmakes
prejudice. A paradox indeed.
THE CURVILINEAR RELATIONSHIP
If religion as such made only for prejudice,
we would expect that churchgoers who expose
themselves most constantly to its influence
would, as a result, be more prejudiced than
those who seldom attend. Such is not the
case.
Many studies show that frequent attenders
are less prejudiced than infrequent attenders
and often less prejudiced even than non-
attenders. Let us cite one illustrative study
by Struening (1963). The curvilinear trend
is immediately apparent in Table 1. In this
particular study nonattenders had lower
prejudice scores than any group, save only
those devotees who managed to attend 11 or
more times a month. Without employing
such fine time intervals other studies have
shown the same curvilinear trend. Thus, in
The Authoritarian Personality (p. 212) we
learned that in 12 out of 15 groups "regular"
attenders (like nonattenders) were less preju-
diced than "seldom" or "often" attenders.
Employing a 26-item Desegregation Scale in
three separate studies, Holtzman (1956)
found the same trend as shown in Table 2.
If more evidence for the curvilinear rela-
tionship is needed, it will be found in com-
munity studies made in New Jersey (Fried-
richs, 1959), North Carolina (Tumin, 1958),
New England (Pettigrew, 1959), and Ohio
TABLE 1
CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND PREJUDICE AMONG
FACULTY MEMBERS OF A MIDWESTERN
UNIVERSITY
Frequency of
attendance(times per mo.)
0i
2
3
4
5-7
8-10
11 or more
N
261
143
103
84
157
94
26
21
Prejudice score
14.7
25.0
26.0
23.8
22.0
19.9
16.3
11.7
Note.—From Struening (1957).
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TABLE 2
CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND PREJUDICE AMONG STUDENTS
IN THE BORDER STATES
Nonattendcrs
Once a mo.
Twice a mo.
Once a \vk. or
oftcnet
1956 study
37
66
67
49
Mean score on D scale
1958 study
41.3
48. S
50.6
44.5
I960 study
38.1
51.4
48.4
44.3
Note,—Adapted from Holtzman (1956), Kelley, Ferson, and
Holtzman (1958), Young, Benson, and Holtzman (1960).
and California (Pinkney, 1961). One could
almost say there is a unanimity of findings
on this matter. The trend holds regardless
of religion, denomination, or target of preju-
dice (although the case seems less clear for
anti-Semitism than for prejudice against other
ethnic groups).
What are the theoretical implications? To
find that prejudice is related to frequency
of church attendance is scarcely explanatory,
since it may reflect only formal behavior, not
involvement or commitment to religious
values. And yet it seems obvious that the
regular attenders who go to church once a
week or oftener (and several studies indicate
that oftener than once a week is especially
significant) are people who receive something
of special ideological and experiential mean-
ing, Irregular, casual fringe members, on the
other hand, regard their religious contacts as
less binding, less absorbing, less integral with
their personal lives.
At this point, therefore, we must pass from
external behavioral evidence into the realm
of experience and motivation. Unless we do
so we cannot hope to understand the curvi-
linear relationship that has been so clearly
established.
EXTRINSIC VERSUS INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
Perhaps the briefest way to characterize
the two poles of subjective religion is to say
that the extrinsically motivated person uses
his religion, whereas the intrinsically moti-
vated lives his religion. As we shall see later,
most people, if they profess religion at all,
fall upon a continuum between these two
poles. Seldom, if ever, does one encounter a
"pure" case. And yet to clarify the dimension
it is helpful to characterize it in terms of
the two ideal types.
Extrinsic Orientation
Persons with this orientation are disposed
to use religion for their own ends. The term
is borrowed from axiology, to designate an
interest that is held because it serves other,
more ultimate interests. Extrinsic values are
always instrumental and utilitarian. Persons
with this orientation may find religion useful
in a variety of ways—-to provide security and
solace, sociability and distraction, status and
self-justification. The embraced creed is
lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit
more primary needs. In theological terms the
extrinsic type turns to God, but without
turning away from self.
Intrinsic Orientation
Persons with this orientation find their
master motive in religion. Other needs, strong
as they may be, are regarded as of less ulti-
mate significance, and they are, so far as
possible, brought into harmony with the reli-
gious beliefs and prescriptions. Having em-
braced a creed the individual endeavors to
internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this
sense that he lives his religion,
A clergyman was making the same distinc-
tion when he said,
Some people come to church to thank God, to
acknowledge His gloty, and to ask His guidance.
. . . Others come for what they can get. Their
interest in the church is to run it or exploit it rather
than to serve it.
Approximate parallels to these psychologi-
cal types have been proposed by the sociolo-
gists Fichter (19S4) and Lenski (1961). The
former, in studying Catholic parishioners,
classified them into four groups: the dormant,
the marginal, the modal, and the nuclear.
Omitting the dormant, Fichter estimated in
terms of numbers that 20% are marginal,
70% modal, and less than 10% nuclear. It is,
of course, the latter group that would most
closely correspond to our conception of the
"intrinsic." Lenski distinguished between
church members whose involvement is "com-
munal" (for the purpose of sociability and
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status) and those who are "associational"
(seeking the deeper values of their faith).
These authors see the significance of their
classifications for the study of prejudice,
Fichter has found less prejudice among devout
(nuclear) Catholics than among others (see
Allport, 1954, p. 421) , Lenski (1961, p. 173)
reported that among Detroit Catholics 59%
of those with a predominantly "communal"
involvement favored segregated schools,
whereas among those with predominantly an
"associational" involvement only 27% favored
segregation. The same trend held for Detroit
Protestants.
The first published study relating the
extrinsic-intrinsic dimension directly to ethnic
prejudice was that of Wilson (1960). Limit-
ing himself to a IS-item scale measuring
an extrinsic (utilitarian-institutional) orienta-
tion, Wilson found in 10 religious groups a
median correlation of .65 between his scale
and anti-Semitism, In general these correla-
tions were higher than he obtained between
anti-Semitism and the Religious-Convention-
alism Scale (Levinson, 19S4). From this find-
ing Wilson concluded that orthodoxy or
fundamentalism is a less important factor
than extrinsicness of orientation.
Certain weaknesses may be pointed out in
this pioneer study. Wilson did not attempt
to measure intrinsicness of orientation, but
assumed without warrant that it was equiva-
lent to a low score on the extrinsic measures.
Further, since the items were worded in a
unidirectional way there may be an error of
response set. Again, Wilson dealt only with
Jews as a target of prejudice, and so the
generality of his finding is not known.
Finally, the factor of educational level
plays a part. Wilson used the California
Anti-Semitism scale, and we know that high
scores on this scale go with low education
(Christie, 1954; Pettigrew, 1959; Titus &
Hollander, 1957; Williams, 1964). Further,
in our own study the extrinsic subscale is
negatively correlated with degree of educa-
tion (r = —.32). To an appreciable extent,
therefore, Wilson's high correlations may be
"ascribed" to educational level.
At this point, however, an important theo-
retical observation must be made. Low educa-
tion may indeed predispose a person toward
an exclusionist, self-centered, extrinsic, re-
ligious orientation and may dispose him to
a stereotyped, fearful image of Jews. This
fact does not in the least affect the func-
tional relationship between the religious and
the prejudiced outlooks. It is a common error
for investigators to "control for" demographic
factors without considering the danger in-
volved in doing so. In so doing they are often
obscuring and not illuminating the functional
(i.e., psychological) relationships that obtain
(see Allport, 1950).
Following Wilson the task of direct meas-
urement was taken up by Feagin (1964) who
used a more developed scale—one designed
to measure not only extrinsic orientation but
also the intrinsic, His scales are essentially
the same as those discussed in a later sec-
tion of this paper. In his study of Southern
Baptists Feagin reached four conclusions:
(a) Contrary to expectation, extrinsic and
intrinsic items did not fall on a unidimen-
sional scale but represented two independent
dimensions; (b] only the extrinsic orienta-
tion was related to intolerance toward Ne-
groes; (c) orthodoxy as such was not related
to the extrinsic or intrinsic orientation;
(d) greater orthodoxy (fundamentalism of
belief) did, however, relate positively to
prejudice.
Taking all these studies together we are
justified in assuming that the inner experi-
ence of religion (what it means to the indi-
vidual) is an important causal factor in
developing a tolerant or a prejudiced outlook
on life.
Yet, additional evidence is always in place,
and new insights can be gained by a closer
inspection of the rather coarse relationships
that have been established up to now.
THE PKESENT STUDY
We wished to employ an improved and
broader measure of prejudice than had pre-
viously been used. And since direct measures
of prejudice (naming the target groups) have
become too sensitive for wide use, we wished
to try some abbreviated indirect measures.
Further, we wished to make use of an im-
proved Extrinsic-Intrinsic scale, one that
would give reliable measures of both extrinsic
and intrinsic tendencies in a person's reli-
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gious life. For these reasons the following
instruments were adopted.
Social Problems Questionnaire
This scale, devised by Harding and Schu-
man (unpublished1; see also Schuman &
Harding, 1963, 1964), is a subtly worded
instrument containing 12 anti-Negro, 11 anti-
Jewish, and 10 anti-other items (pertaining
to Orientals, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans).
The wording is varied so as to avoid an
agreement response set.
Indirect Prejudice Measures
Six items were taken from Gilbert and
Levmson's (19S6) Custodial Mental Illness
Ideology Scale (CMI). Example: "We should
be sympathetic with mental patients, but we
cannot expect to understand their odd behav-
ior, a) I definitely disagree, b) I tend to
disagree, c) I tend to agree, d) I definitely
agree."
Four items are related to a "jungle" phi-
losophy of life, suggesting a generalized
suspiciousness and distrust. Example: "The
world is a hazardous place in which men are
basically evil and dangerous, a) I definitely
disagree, b) I tend to disagree, c) I tend to
agree, d) I definitely agree."
In all cases the most prejudiced response
receives a score of 5 and the least prejudiced
response, 1. No response was scored 3.
From Table 3 we see that while the in-
direct measures have a positive correlation
with each other and with direct measures
the relationship is scarcely high enough to
warrant the substitution of the indirect for
the direct. The high correlations between
prejudice for the three ethnic target groups
1J. Harding and H. Schuman, "Social Problems
Questionnaire," Cornell University.
TABLE 3
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN FIVE MEASURES
OP PREJUDICE
Anii-Xegro
A n li- Jewish
Anti-Other
Jungle
Aiiti-
Jewish
.63
Aiiti-
Other
.70
Jungle
.20
.67 .24
.33
CMI
.25
.31
.36
.43
Note.—N = 309.
once again illustrate the well-established fact
that ethnic prejudice tends to be a broadly
generalized disposition in personality.
Religious Orientation Measure
The full scale, entitled "Religious Orienta-
tion," is available from ADI.2 It separates
the intrinsically worded items from the ex-
trinsic, gives score values for each item, and
reports on item reliabilities. In all cases a
score of 1 indicates the most intrinsic re-
sponse, a score of 5, the most extrinsic. While
it is possible to use all 20 items as one
continuous scale, it will soon become apparent
that it is often wise to treat the two sub-
scales separately. A sample item from the
extrinsic subscale follows: "What religion
offers me most is comfort when sorrows and
misfortune strike, a) I definitely disagree, 1.
b) I tend to disagree, 2. c) I tend to agree,
4. d) I definitely agree, 5." A sample item
from the intrinsic subscale: "My religious
beliefs are what really lie behind my whole
approach to life, a) this is definitely not so, 5.
b) probably not so, 4. c) probably so, 2.
d) definitely so, 1.
SAMPLE
While our sample of six groups of churchgoers
shows some diversity of denomination and region,
it is in no sense representative. Graduate-student
members of a seminar collected the 309 cases from
the following church groups: Group A, 94 Roman
Catholic (Massachusetts); Group B, SS Lutheran
(New York State) ; Group C, 44 Nazarene (South
Carolina); Group D, 53 Presbyterian (Pennsyl-
vania) ; Group E, 3S Methodist (Tennessee); Group
F, 28 Baptist (Massachusetts).
We labeled the groups alphabetically since such
small subsamples could not possibly lead to valid
generalizations concerning denominations as a whole.
All subjects knew that they were invited to partici-
pate as members of a religious group, and this fact
may well have introduced a "proreligious" bias.
GROSS RESULTS
If we pool all our cases for the purpose
of correlating religious orientation with preju-
2
 The full Religious Orientation scale has been
deposited with the American Documentation Insti-
tute. Order Document No. 9268 from ADI Auxil-
iary Publications Project, Photoduplication Service,
Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 20540.
Remit in advance $1.25 for microfilm or $1.25 for
photocopies and make checks payable to: Chief,
Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress.
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TABLE 4
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXTRINSIC SUBSCALE
AND PREJUDICE
Anti-Negro
Anti-Jewish
Anti-Other
Jungle
CMI
.26
.21
.32
.29
.44
Note.— N ~ 309.
dice, we discover that while the findings are
in the expected direction they are much less
impressive than those of previous studies,
especially Wilson's.
Correlations with Extrinsic Subscale
Since Wilson employed an extrinsic scale
similar to ours, we first present in Table 4
our findings using this subscale and the vari-
ous measures of prejudice. Whereas Wilson
found a correlation of .65 between his ex-
trinsic and anti-Semitic measures, our cor-
relation falls to .21. In part the reason no
doubt lies in certain features of Wilson's
method which we have criticized.
Correlations with Combined Extrinsic-
Intrinsic Scale
From the outset it was our intention to
broaden Wilson's unidirectional (extrinsic)
measure to see whether our hypothesis might
hold for the total scale (combined scores for
the 11 extrinsic and 9 intrinsic items). As
Table S shows, matters do not improve but
seem to worsen. The logic of combining the
two subscales is of course to augment the
continuum in length and presumably enhance
the reliability of the total measure. It soon
became apparent, however, that subjects who
endorse extrinsically worded items do not
necessarily reject those worded intrinsically,
or vice versa. It turns out that there is only
TABLE S
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TOTAL EXTRINSIC-
INTRINSIC SCALE AND PREJUDICE
Anti-Negro
Anti-Jewish
Anti-Other
Jungle
CMI
.26
.18
.18
.21
.17
Note.—N = 309.
a very low correlation in the expected direc-
tion between the two subscales (r=.?A).
Obviously at this point some reformulation is
badly needed.
REFORMULATION OF THE APPROACH
Examination of the data reveals that some
subjects are indeed "consistently intrinsic,"
having a strong tendency to endorse in-
trinsically worded items and to reject the
extrinsically worded. Correspondingly others
are "consistently extrinsic." Yet, unfortu-
nately for our neat typology, many subjects
are provokingly inconsistent. They persist in
endorsing any or all items that to them seem
favorable to religion in any sense. Their re-
sponses, therefore, are "indiscriminately pro-
religious."
The problem is essentially the same as that
encountered by the many investigators who
have attempted to reverse the wording of
items comprising the F scale, in order to
escape an unwanted response-set bias. Uni-
formly the effort has proved to be frustrating,
since so many subjects subscribe to both the
positive and negative wording of the same
question (see Bass, 1955; Chapman & Bock,
1958; Chapman & Campbell, 1959; Christie,
1954; Jackson & Messick, 1957).
An example from our own subscales would
be: "My religious beliefs are what really lie
behind my whole approach to life" (in-
trinsic). "Though I believe in my religion,
I feel there are many more important things
in my life" (extrinsic).
The approach used by Peabody (1961)
offers us a model for analyzing our data in
a meaningful way. Peabody administered
both positive and negative F-scale items to
subjects at two different testing sessions. By
comparing each individual's responses to the
same question stated positively at one time
and in reverse at another he was able to
separate out those who were consistently pro
or anti toward the content of authoritarian
items. But he found many who expressed
double agreement (or disagreement) with
both versions of the same question. Table 6
applies Peabody's paradigm to our data.
In assigning our 309 cases to these cate-
gories we employed the following criteria.
Intrinsic type includes individuals who
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TABLE 6
FODK PATTERNS OF RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION
Agrees with
extrinsic
choice
Disagrees with
extrinsic
choice
Agrees with
intrinsic choice
.Indiscriminately
proreligious
Consistently
intrinsic in
type
Disagrees with
intrinsic choice
Consistently
extrinsic in
type
Indiscriminately
antireligious or
nonreligious"
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE or EACH RELIGIOUS TYPE IN
EACH SUBSAMPLE
fl
 Not found in present sample.
agree with intrinsically worded items on the
intrinsic subscale, and who disagree with ex-
trinsically stated items on the extrinsic sub-
scale. By the scoring method employed these
individuals fall below the median scores on
both subscales.
Extrinsic type includes individuals who
agree with extrinsically stated items on the
extrinsic subscale, and who disagree with
items on the intrinsic subscale. By our scor-
ing method these individuals all fall above
the median scores on both subscales.
Indiscriminately proreligious includes those
who on the intrinsic subscale score at least
12 points less than on the extrinsic subscale.
(This figure reflects the fact that a subject
gives approximately 50% more intrinsic re-
sponses on the intrinsic subscale than we
should expect from his extrinsic responses
to the extrinsic subscale.)
Indiscriminately antireligious or nonreli-
gious includes those who would show a strong
tendency to disagree with items on both sub-
scales. Since nonchurchgoers are excluded
from our samples, such cases are not found.
(Some pilot work with markedly liberal
groups indicates that this type does exist,
however, even among members of "religious"
organizations.)
Table 7 gives the percentage of the three
types.
RESULTS OF THE REFORMULATION
The five measures of prejudice were ana-
lyzed by a 6 (Groups) X 3 (Religious Types)
analysis of variance. Table 8 presents the
overall effects for religious types for each
of the five measures of prejudice. The
multivariate analysis of variance indicates
Religious
group
A
B
C
D
E
F
N
(94)
(55)
(44)
(53)
(35)
(28)
Consistently
intrinsic
36
35
36
32
31
39
Consistently
extrinsic
34
36
39
30
29
39
Indiscriminately
proreligious
30
29
25
38
40
22
that there is both a significant difference
between the three types of religious orienta-
tion and between the six subsamples in
the level of prejudice.3 Examination of the
means shows two trends: (a) The extrinsic
type is more prejudiced than the intrinsic
type for both direct and indirect measures;
(b) the indiscriminate type of religious orien-
tation is more prejudiced than either of the
two consistent types. Statistically all these
trends are highly significant.
3
 The multivariate F reported here is Wilk's
lambda (Anderson, 195S). Statistical computations
are summarized by Bock (1963) and programmed
for the IBM 7090 by Hall and Cramer (1962). The
univariate tests to be reported are adjusted for
unequal Ns. to obtain orthogonal estimates accord-
ing to mathematical procedures described in Hall
and Cramer.
TABLE 8
PREJUDICE AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION
Target of
prejudice
Anti-Negro
Anti-
Jewish
Anti-Other
Jungle
CMI
Mean prejudice score
Intrinsic
type
N = 108
28.7
22.6
20.4
7.9
10.2
Extrinsic
type
;V = 100
33.0
24.6
23.3
8.7
11.8
Incon-
sistent type
N = 95
36.0
28.9
26.1
9.6
13.4
F
ratio
8.6**
11.1**
10.9**
8.4**
20.4**
Multivariate analysis of variance
Source of variation
Religious type (A)
Sample groups (B)
A X B
F ratio
5.96***
3.19***
1.11*
df
10,574
25,668
50,1312
*t > .25.
**# > .001.
*** t > .0005.
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We note especially that the scores of the
indiscriminate type are markedly higher on
all measures than the scores of the intrinsic
type. Corresponding F ratios for paired com-
parisons range from 8.4 for the jungle scale
to 20.4 for the CMI scale. The differences
between the indiscriminate and extrinsic types
are smaller. For the anti-Jewish and CMI
scales these differences are, however, beyond
the .005 level; for the anti-other and jungle
scales, at the .OS level. For the anti-Negro
the difference falls below significance,
The relationship between the indiscrimi-
nately proreligious orientation and prejudice
receives support (see Table 9) when we
compare subjects who are moderately in-
discriminate with those who are extremely
indiscriminate. (In the first group the scores
on the intrinsic subscale average 16 points
lower than on the extrinsic subscale, whereas
the extreme cases average 23 points less on
the intrinsic than on the extrinsic subscale.)
The discovery that the degree of indis-
criminateness tends to relate directly to the
degree of prejudice is an important finding.
It can only mean that some functional rela-
tionship obtains between religious muddle-
headedness (for that is what indiscriminate
scores imply) and antagonism toward ethnic
groups. We shall return to this interpretation
in the concluding section of this paper.
RESULTS FOR SUBSAMPLES
It would not be correct to assume that
the variance is distributed equally over all
the subsamples, for it turns out that the de-
nominational groups differ appreciably in
prejudice scores and in religious type, as
Tables 10 and 11 indicate.
TABLE 9
DEGREES OP INDISCRIHINATENESS AND AVERAGE
PREJUDICE SCORES
TABLE 10
ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE: MEAN SCORES ON
SOCIAL PROBLEMS SCALK
Target of
prejudice
Anti-Negro
Anti-Jewish
Anti-Other
Jungle
CMI
Moderately
indiscriminate
N - 56
35.4
28.0
24.9
9.5
10.2
Extremely
indiscriminate
N =39
37.9
30.1
28.2
10.2
14.6
F ratio
.97
.90
3.25*
1.11
3.99*
Religious
group
A
B
C
D
E
F
Type M
Intrinsic
type
27.4 (34)
27.2 (19)
22.4 (16)
35.5 (17)
40.5 (11)
22.6 (11)
28.7 (108)
Intrinsic
type
34.8 (32)
32.3 (20)
36.2 (17)
28.7 (16) '.
35.5 (10) A
27.9 (11)"
33.0 (106)
Indiscrim-
inate
type
32.2 (28)
31.9 (16)
35.0 (11)
42.5 (20)
43.0 (14)
28.7 (6)
36.0 (95)
Group M
31.4 (94)
30.4 (55)
30.9 (44)
36.1 (53)
40.1 (35)
26.0 (28)
32.5 (309)
Analysis of variance
Source of variation
Religious type (A)
Religious group (B)
A X B
Error (w)
df
2
5
10
291
MS
1077.8
952.2
251.1
125.6
F ratio
8.6**
7.6**
2.0*
*t
**p .001.
It is true that when we combine sub-
samples all the trends are in the expected
direction, but troublesome exceptions occur
for single groups as indicated by the nearly
significant interaction effects. The most
troublesome contradictions appear in rela-
tion to the anti-Negro measures based on the
Harding-Sclniman scale. Table 10 discloses
certain sore points, even though the average
trend over all the subsamples is in the
predicted direction.
For Groups A, B, and C we note that the
indiscriminate type is slightly less prejudiced
than the extrinsic type, and for Groups D
and E the extrinsic type seems actually less
prejudiced than the intrinsic. (Groups I) and
E are consistently more troublesome than
other subsamples, perhaps because of some
salient racial issue in the local community.
It will be noted that both these groups
are considerably more anti-Negro than the
other subsamples.)
By way of contrast we present in Table 11
the results for the short (five-item) CMI
scale. With the exception of the indiscrimi-
nate type in Group F, the progression of
scores is precisely as expected. Each sub-
sample shows that the intrinsic type is less
prejudiced toward the mentally ill than the
extrinsic type, and the extrinsic type is less
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TABLE 11
INDIRECT (CMI) MEASURE OF PREJUDICE
Religious
group
A
B
c
D
E
F
Type M
Intrinsic
type
11.2 (34)
10.1 (19)
9.S (16)
10.6 (17)
8.6 (11)
9.2 (11)
10.2 (108)
Extrinsic
type
12.4 (32)
10.8 (20)
12.2 (17)
11.4 (16)
12.9 (10)
10.7 (11)
11.8 (106)
Indiscrim-
inate
type
13.6 (28)
13.4 (16)
12.6 (11)
14.8 (20)
13.6 (14)
9.2 (6)
13.4 (95)
Group M
12.3 (94)
11.3 (SS)
11.3 (44)
12.4 (53)
11.8 (35)
9.8 (28)
11.9 (309)
Analysis of variance
Source of variation
Religious type (A)
Religious group (B)
A X B
Error (w)
df
2
5
10
291
MS
255.0
F ratio
20.4**
36.5 2.9*
15.3 1.2
12.5
* p > .05.
** <> > .001.
prejudiced than the indiscriminately pro-
religious.4
Returning in a different way to the origi-
nal question of whether consistent extrinsic
and intrinsic orientations make for prejudice
and for tolerance, respectively, we shall now
examine this matter in each subsample sepa-
rately. Inspection of the mean scores and
4
 If we apply a more severe test, asking whether
all differences between groups are significant, we
find the following results. In four of the six groups
(in both Tables 10 and 11) the extrinsic type is
significantly more prejudiced than the intrinsic. Like-
wise in four out of six groups (Table 10) and five
out of six (Table 11), the indiscriminate type is
significantly more prejudiced than the intrinsic.
However, in only two of the six groups (in both
Tables 10 and 11) is the indiscriminate type
significantly more prejudiced than the extrinsic.
variance for the total scale indicates that we
are dealing with a relatively narrow range
of variation. To minimize the effect of a
narrow range of scores and skewed distribu-
tions, we used Kendal's (19SS) tan as a
measure of degree of relationship between
prejudice and consistent religious orientation.
The results are given in Table 12. While the
correlations are not high (14 are significant
in the expected direction), only one (in the
troublesome Group E) is significant in the
reverse direction.
EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENCES
Computing the actual years of schooling
for all groups we find that the indiscriminate
type has significantly less formal education
than the intrinsic cases (p > .005, F = 18.29),
and somewhat less than the extrinsic type
(p>.10, F = 2.89). Comparing extrinsic
with intrinsic types we find that the for-
mer has finished fewer years of schooling
(p > .10, F-3A5). (Oddly enough the
groups with highest average education are
D and E, which also displayed the highest
anti-Negro and anti-Semitic prejudice—per-
haps because of particular local conditions.)
In our survey of earlier studies we saw
that educational level is often a factor in
the various relationships discovered between
religion and prejudice. We have also argued
that demographic factors of this sort should
not be allowed to obscure the functional
(psychological) analysis that the data call
for. Granted that low education makes for
indiscriminate thinking, the mental confusion
that results from low education may have its
own peculiar effects on religious and ethnic
attitudes.
TABLE 12
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMBINED EXTRINSIC-INTRINSIC RELIGIOUS SCORES (FOR CONSISTENT
SUBJECTS) AND PREJUDICE (KENDAL'S TAU)
Religious group
A
B
C
D
E
F
Anti-Negro
.31***
.19*
.32***
-.12
-.24*
.39***
Anti-Jewish
26***
.13
.17*
.05
-.11
.13
Anti-Other
.24***
.15
.35***
-.09
-.13
.25*
Jungle
.14*
-.05
.14*
.03
.26*
-.01
CMI
19***
.03
.28***
.11
.46***
.24*
*p > .10.
**p > .05.
***# > .01.
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SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS
At the outset we stated three propositions
that seem to be firmly established: (a)
Churchgoers on the broad average harbor
more ethnic prejudice than nonchurchgoers;
(b) in spite of this broad tendency a curvi-
linear relationship in fact exists; (c) the
intrinsically motivated churchgoers are sig-
nificantly less prejudiced than the extrinsi-
cally motivated. Our present research sup-
plies additional strong support for the second
and third of these propositions.
To these propositions we add a fourth:
churchgoers who are indiscriminately pro-
religious are more prejudiced than the con-
sistently extrinsic, and very much more preju-
diced than the consistently intrinsic types.
The psychological tie between the intrinsic
orientation and tolerance, and between the
extrinsic orientation and prejudice, has been
discussed in a series of papers by Allport
(19S9, 1963, 1966). In brief the argument
holds that a person with an extrinsic reli-
gious orientation is using his religious views
to provide security, comfort, status, or social
support for himself—religion is not a value
in its own right, it serves other needs, and
it is a purely utilitarian formation. Now
prejudice too is a "useful" formation: it too
provides security, comfort, status, and social
support. A life that is dependent on the sup-
ports of extrinsic religion is likely to be
dependent on the supports of prejudice,
hence our positive correlations between the
extrinsic orientation and intolerance. Con-
trariwise, the intrinsic religious orientation is
not an instrumental device. It is not a mere
mode of conformity, nor a crutch, nor a
tranquilizer, nor a bid for status. All needs
are subordinated to an overarching religious
commitment. In internalizing the total creed
of his religion the individual necessarily in-
ternalizes its values of humility, compassion,
and love of neighbor. In such a life (where
religion is an intrinsic and dominant value)
there is no place for rejection, contempt, or
condescension toward one's fellow man. Such
is our explanation for the relationship be-
tween extrinsic religion and prejudice, and
between intrinsic religion and tolerance.
Our present task is to discover, if we can,
some similar functional tie between prejudice
(as measured both directly and indirectly)
and the indiscriminately proreligious orienta-
tion. The common factor seems to be a cer-
tain cognitive style. Technically it might be
called "undifferentiated thinking," or exces-
sive "category width," as defined by Pettigrew
(1958). Rokeach (1960) notes the inability
of the "dogmatic" mind to perceive differ-
ences; thus, whereas some people distinguish
in their thinking and feeling between Com-
munists and Nazis, the undifferentiated
dogmatist has a global reaction (cognitive
and emotional) toward "Communazis."
We have no right, of course, to expect all
our subjects to make discriminations exactly
corresponding to our own logic. Nor should
we expect them to read and respond to every
item on the Extrinsic-Intrinsic scale accord-
ing to its full meaning as intended by the
investigators. Perhaps we should be gratified
that two-thirds of our cases can be safely
classified as "consistent" (i.e., having about
the same strength of disposition toward an
extrinsic or intrinsic orientation across most
of the items). These consistent cases, as
we have seen, support the hypothesis with
which we started. It is the remaining
(indiscriminate) one-third of the cases which
obscure the trend (or diminish its statistical
significance).
In responding to the religious items these
individuals seeni to take a superficial or "hit
and run" approach. Their mental set seems
to be "all religion is good." "My religious
beliefs are what really lie behind my whole
life"—Yes! "Although I believe in my re-
ligion, I feel there are many more impor-
tant things in my life"—Yes! "Religion is
especially important to me because it an-
swers many questions about the meaning of
life"—Yes! "The church is most important
as a place to formulate good social relation-
ships"—Yes!
There seems to be one wide category—•
"religion is OK." From the way in which
the scale is constructed this undifferentiated
endorsement can be the product of an agree-
ment response set. Our inconsistently pro-
religious may be "3'easayers" (Couch &
Keniston, 1960). But if so, we are still
dealing with an undifferentiated cognitive
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disposition. We recall likewise that the in-
consistent cases have a lower level of formal
education than the consistent cases. This
factor also is relevant to the formation and
holding of overwide categories.
But why should such a disposition, what-
ever its source, be so strongly related to
prejudice, in such a way that the more
undifferentiated, the more prejudiced—as
Table 9 shows?
The answer is that prejudice itself is a
matter of stereotyped overgeneralization, a
failure to distinguish members of a minority
group as individuals (Allport, 19S4, Chaps.
2, 10). It goes without saying that if cate-
gories are overwide the accompanying feeling
tone will be undifferentiated. Thus, religion
as a whole is good; a minority group as a
whole is bad.
It seems probable that people with un-
differentiated styles of thinking (and feeling)
are not entirely secure in a world that for
the most part demands fine and accurate dis-
tinctions. The resulting diffuse anxiety may
well dispose them to grapple onto religion
and to distrust strange ethnic groups. The
positive correlation between the jungle items
and other prejudice scales (Table 3) is
evidence for this interpretation.
Our line of reasoning, readers will recog-
nize, is compatible with various previous
contributions to the theory of prejudice. One
thinks here of Rokeach's concept of dogma-
tism; of Schuman and Harding's (1964)
discovery of a "confused" type in their study
of the relation between rational consistency
and prejudice; of the same authors' work
on sympathetic identification (1963); of
studies on the dynamics of scapcgoating, the
role in insecurity, of authoritarian submis-
sion, of intolerance for ambiguity, and of
related concepts.
All in all we conclude that prejudice, like
tolerance, is often embedded deeply in per-
sonality structure and is reflected in a con-
sistent cognitive style. Both states of mind
are emeshed with the individual's religious
orientation. One definable style marks the
individual who is bigoted in ethnic matters
and extrinsic in his religious orientation.
Equally apparent is the style of those who
are bigoted and at the same time indiscrimi-
nately proreligious. A relatively small number
of people show an equally consistent cogni-
tive style in their simultaneous commitment
to religion as a dominant, intrinsic value and
to ethnic tolerance.
One final word: our research argues
strongly that social scientists who employ
the variable "religion" or "religiosity" in the
future will do well to keep in mind the
crucial distinction between religious attitudes
that are intrinsic, extrinsic, and indiscrimi-
nately pro. To know that a person is in some
sense "religious" is not as important as to
know the role religion plays in the economy
of his life. (The categories of nonreligious
and indiscriminately antireliglous will also for
some purposes be of central significance,
although the present research, confined as it
is to churchgoers, does not employ them.)
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Fundamental(ist) Attribution Error: Protestants Are Dispositionally Focused
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Attribution theory has long enjoyed a prominent role in social psychological research, yet religious
influences on attribution have not been well studied. We theorized and tested the hypothesis that
Protestants would endorse internal attributions to a greater extent than would Catholics, because
Protestantism focuses on the inward condition of the soul. In Study 1, Protestants made more internal,
but not external, attributions than did Catholics. This effect survived controlling for Protestant work ethic,
need for structure, and intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Study 2 showed that the Protestant–Catholic
difference in internal attributions was significantly mediated by Protestants’ greater belief in a soul. In
Study 3, priming religion increased belief in a soul for Protestants but not for Catholics. Finally, Study
4 found that experimentally strengthening belief in a soul increased dispositional attributions among
Protestants but did not change situational attributions. These studies expand the understanding of cultural
differences in attributions by demonstrating a distinct effect of religion on dispositional attributions.
Keywords: attribution, religious differences, cultural differences, belief in a soul
Thomas McIlvane was a postal worker in Michigan who lost his
job and was unable to appeal the decision. Soon thereafter, he shot
his supervisor, several coworkers, other bystanders, and himself.
Why would an individual engage in such behavior? There are
many possibilities. Attribution theory, one of the cornerstones of
the study of social cognition, concerns people’s explanations for
behavior. Usually, attributions are divided into two broad catego-
ries. If one thinks that McIlvane acted as he did because of
something about him as a person, this is an internal (or disposi-
tional) attribution. On the other hand, if one thinks that McIlvane’s
behavior was due to circumstances external to him as a person—in
other words, that the situation, other actors, or context might have
elicited the behavior—then “external” or “situational” attributions
are being made (Heider, 1958; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Kelley,
1971).
Social psychologists had long thought that individuals have a
strong, but often erroneous, tendency to attribute behavior to
others’ personalities and dispositions, ostensibly because the ac-
tors’ behaviors swamp the perceptual field. This tendency to
overuse internal attributions, and to underuse external attributions,
has been dubbed the fundamental attribution error or correspon-
dence bias—an error or bias due to the failure of people to
appreciate the power of the situation (Jones & Nisbett, 1971;
Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett,
1991). This view of attribution was unchallenged until research
demonstrated that members of certain ethnic cultures (e.g., East
Asians) were less prone to these errors in social cognition than
were North Americans (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Mor-
ris & Peng, 1994), ostensibly because East Asians are more likely
to engage in holistic thinking (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007; Nisbett,
2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) or because they
have an interdependent sense of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991;
Triandis, 1995).
Religious Differences in Attribution
While the effects of Eastern versus Western national cultural
identities on attribution have been well explored, other cultural
influences on attribution have not been well studied. However, this
is an important and timely new direction for work on culture and
attribution. Recent work has begun to document differences in
attributions to fate according to both ethnicity and religion. East
Asian Canadians were more likely than European Canadians, and
Christians were more likely than non-Christians, to attribute events
to fate. For Christians, this was due to greater religious devotion,
but for East Asians, it was attributed to more holistic thinking
(Norenzayan & Lee, 2010). There is a dearth of literature inves-
tigating how religious beliefs and cultural identities might influ-
ence other kinds of attribution—and none that address religious
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variation in the tendency to commit the fundamental attribution
error. In the present research, we focus on religious group differ-
ences in attributions. Specifically, we predicted that Protestants
would be particularly dispositionally inclined in their attributions
compared with Catholics. Further, we theorized that this difference
arises because of a greater belief in a soul among Protestants.
Belief in a Soul
The concept of a soul is rooted in both the Hebrew nefesh and
the Greek psyche, meaning “breathing” creature. Although the
same word is used for both animals and humans, the term soul, as
presented in the Scriptures, indicates the inner nature and entire
personality of a human as it proceeds from God (Unger, 1988/
1957). In the Abrahamic religions (e.g., Judaism, Islam, and Chris-
tianity), the idea of the soul may have added metaphysical mean-
ings associated with religion, morality, or the afterlife (Bering,
2006).
The concept of the soul became particularly important in West-
ern thought with the Greek philosophers who tried to resolve the
logical problem of changes they observed across time (Brown,
Murphy, & Maloney, 1998; Martin & Barresi, 2006). The question
was, How could a person be both the human who attended the
theater last night and the being who will, for example, travel to
Rome next month? There were three solutions. Atomists held a
material view that individual change occurred as atoms came
together, remained stable for a time, and then moved apart. There
was no need for an ethereal component to explain human phenom-
ena. Aristotle argued, instead, that there must be a changeless, but
not necessarily immortal, principle (i.e., the Aristotelian “form”)
within humans. However, the Platonic view, similar to that of the
early Christians (or adopted from Plato by the Christians), was that
there was an essential self—a psyche, or soul—that primarily
resides in a changeless realm, a spiritual dimension (i.e., the
Platonist “Idea”), in which the soul is immortal.
In Western thought, these three differing notions of the soul
have a long history. The writings of the early Christian leaders
such as the apostle Paul, Justin Martyr, Augustine, and Thomas a`
Kempis each reflected Aristotelian or Platonist explanations of the
soul (Brown et al., 1998; Turner, 1911). These church fathers
elaborated on the importance of the cultivation of inward virtue,
the concept of an ideal (Christ-like) human, and the possibility of
the afterlife of the soul in another realm. The apostle Paul writes,
“Though the outward man perish, the inward man is renewed day
by day” (2 Corinthians 4:16).
In the medieval period of Western history, the Holy Catholic
Church had become virtually the only religion in western Europe.
The clergy alone had access to the Scriptures, the papacy had
become corrupt, and sins and souls were atoned for by payment to
the church (Hopfe & Woodward, 2004). Thus, in 1517 Martin
Luther posted his theses on the door of the Catholic Church in
Germany, declaring that individuals were able to relate directly
with God, without the mediation or intercession of the institutional
church and its clergy. These so-called Protestants had been handed
a fearsome mandate by Luther. They as individuals, and not the
church, were now responsible for the condition of their own souls
(Williams, 2002).
John Calvin’s teachings strengthened the Protestant focus on
personal salvation and spiritual growth, and these beliefs have
often been cited as contributing to the legacy of individualism in
America (e.g., de Tocqueville, 1969; Hopfe & Woodward, 2004;
Weber, 1958/1988; Williams, 2002). Among the early American
settlers, for example, great care was taken to record one’s conver-
sion narrative, internal religious experiences, and phases of spiri-
tual growth in order to “prove” one’s salvation and good standing
with God. The focus on individual salvation gained momentum in
later American Protestant revivalist movements with an increasing
emphasis on emotional conversion experiences and the internal
sense of being “saved” or “born again.”
We suggest that for religious people, and for Protestant Chris-
tians especially, the soul is very much a salient concept and that
belief in a soul promotes a tendency to attribute behavior to
dispositions, not situations. For Protestants, the soul is commonly
emphasized. The pastorate is defined as the “care of souls” (E. L.
Johnson, 2007; Moreland, 2007), and Horatio G. Spafford’s
(1828–1888) hymn It Is Well With My Soul has been recorded by
at least six different Christian music groups in the past decade.
Consequently, we hypothesized that belief in a soul may be espe-
cially salient and meaningful to Protestants for the following three
reasons: (1) Adherence to a belief that psychological states con-
tinue after death necessitates belief in some form of mind–body
dualism (e.g., Bering, 2006); (2) the unique emphasis on individual
attainment of salvation by faith rather than ritual participation
remains a fundamental doctrine in Protestant Christianity (e.g.,
Cohen, Siegel, & Rozin, 2003; Williams, 2002); and (3) Protestant
Christians’ reliance on the Scriptures as the word of God may
provide reinforcement for religious beliefs regarding the soul.
Protestants are not the only religious groups to believe in a soul, of
course, but their beliefs about the soul are in some ways different
from those in other religions, in ways that we propose have
implications for dispositional attributions.
Indeed, we propose that this notion of the soul is different
enough even from Catholic views of the soul that Protestants, to a
greater extent than Catholics, will show an increased tendency
toward internal attributions. Although all forms of Christianity—
including Catholicism and Protestantism—teach that Jesus Christ
is the Savior, the role played by individual persons versus reliance
on church rituals is widely diverse. Since the Protestant Reforma-
tion, most non-Catholic Christians have believed, for example, that
repenting of one’s sins and trusting in Jesus Christ as the Savior
will assure rewards in the afterlife. This “inner” form of religion,
described by the sociologist Max Weber (1922/1993, 1958/1988)
and later measured as intrinsic religiosity by Allport and Ross
(1967) and Gorsuch and McPherson (1989), is typically contrasted
with both intrinsically and “extrinsically” motivated Catholicism
with its more ecclesiastical requirements for salvation (Cohen,
Hall, Koenig, & Meador, 2005). While inward devotion remains
important for the Catholic, participation in the sacraments and
recognition of papal authority and priestly mediation are central in
attaining salvation. The catechism of the Catholic Church (1995),
for example, lists 54 entries for sacraments or sacramentals but
only six entries for the word soul.
Thus, although many religious groups recognize the existence of
the soul, Protestant Christians may place special emphasis on the
inward state and beliefs of the individual (i.e., orthodoxy) rather
than the rituals, ethnicity, or governance of the community (i.e.,
orthopraxy; Cohen et al., 2003, 2005; Cohen & Hill, 2007). The
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Christian theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768 –1834)
summed up the inward nature of his faith tradition in this way:
[It] springs necessarily and by itself from the interior of every better
soul, it has its own province in the mind in which it reigns sovereign,
and it is worthy of moving the noblest and the most excellent by
means of its innermost power and by having its innermost essence
known by them. (Schleiermacher, 1799/1988, p. 17)
It is our hypothesis that enduring Protestant teachings and beliefs
about the soul result in an attribution style for that group that is
distinct even from those of Catholics.
Overview of the Present Research
Given this theological and historical overview, our goal was to
investigate whether and how history and theology shape the ex-
isting psychological tendencies of Catholics and Protestants (Co-
hen, 2009). Prior work has shown that such theological and cul-
tural differences between members of different religious groups
include differences in domains such as relationality in work con-
texts (Sanchez-Burks, 2002), moral judgment (Cohen & Rozin,
2001), religiosity (Cohen et al., 2003), and forgiveness (Cohen,
Malka, Rozin, & Cherfas, 2006). In the present research, we
investigate how the history, culture, and theology of religious
groups have shaped psychological processes—in this case, attri-
bution.
Would one expect Protestants, relative to Catholics, to endorse
greater internal attributions, lesser external attributions, or both?
Although it may seem intuitive that internal and external attribu-
tions are logical opposites (Heider, 1958), there is evidence that
they can be independent (Kashima, 2001). That is, for a person to
say that a behavior is caused by internal factors is not to say that
the person does not also see situational influences on that behavior.
More specifically, when confronted with a behavior, North Amer-
icans seem to first make a dispositional attribution and then adjust
that attribution based on awareness of contextual factors (Gilbert
& Malone, 1995; Krull, 1993; Trope, 1986). Therefore, in these
studies, we made separate predictions regarding internal and ex-
ternal attributions. We hypothesized that Protestants would prefer
internal attributions to a greater extent than would Catholics,
because the soul is internal to the person. In addition, lay beliefs of
the soul suggest people ascribe purpose and intentionality to be-
haviors (Bering, 2006). On the other hand, there is no reason to
suspect Protestants would make more or less external attributions
than would Catholics; thus, we did not expect to find any differ-
ence in external attributions between these religious groups.
To summarize, we assert that being raised in Protestant religion,
even compared with Catholic religion, results in distinct cultural
representations. Among these representations for Protestants is a
strong belief in individual souls. This belief in (or representation
of) a soul then leads Protestants to endorse internal attributions to
a particularly high degree. Thus, in the present studies, we inves-
tigated (a) the extent to which Protestant religion exerts a distinct
influence on attributions and (b) the process by which this occurs.
In all of these studies, we compared Protestants with Catholics,
which we believe yields a rigorous and conservative test of our
theorizing that historical and theological concerns about the soul
continue to exert an influence on Protestants’ social cognition
today.
In Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that Protestants would
prefer internal attributions more than Catholics would, even when
controlling for a number of potential confounds—the need for
structure, the Protestant work ethic, and intrinsic and extrinsic
religiosity. We predicted no such difference for external attribu-
tions. In Study 2, we again tested whether Protestants would make
more dispositional attributions compared with Catholics and, fur-
ther, whether belief in a soul would mediate this effect.
Although correlational tests of mediation are commonly used in
social psychological research, experimental tests are more rigorous
(MacKinnon, 2008; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). In Study 3,
we sought to experimentally demonstrate the link between Prot-
estant (vs. Catholic) religion and belief in a soul by use of a
priming manipulation. Finally, to garner further support for belief
in a soul as a driver of Protestants’ dispositional attributions, we
manipulated belief in a soul in Study 4. If belief in a soul actually
mediates Protestants’ dispositional bias, then experimentally
strengthening belief in a soul should cause Protestants to become
more dispositionally focused.
Study 1
In this study we examined the internal and external attributions
of Protestants and Catholics. We also sought to rule out plausible
but theoretically irrelevant confounds such as the need for struc-
ture, the Protestant work ethic, and intrinsic and extrinsic religi-
osity. Thus, we sought to provide evidence for Protestants’ greater
tendency to make dispositional attributions compared with Cath-
olics and to dispel criticism that this religious difference is simply
an artifact of other psychological processes or tendencies that are
not of current theoretical relevance.
One potential confound in our study was that Protestants could
be more cognitively rigid—valuing structure and clear answers,
rather than being able to entertain and tolerate ambiguity (Barrett,
Patock-Peckham, Hutchinson, & Nagoshi, 2005; Cohen, Shariff,
& Hill, 2008). A relatively greater need for structure could relate
to focusing on the individual when explaining behavior, rather than
taking a more holistic approach by focusing on how an individu-
al’s behavior is caused by contextual factors. We measured such
tendencies with the Need for Structure scale (Thompson, Nacca-
rato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001), an adaptation of Neuberg,
Judice, and West’s (1997) Need for Closure Scale.
Another confound that might be greater among Protestants than
Catholics is the value of hard work—the Protestant work ethic.
Weber (1958/1988) claimed that Protestantism promoted capital-
ism because the status of one’s soul as saved or damned (preor-
dained in Calvinist theology) could be gleaned from one’s earthly
prosperity (see also Sanchez-Burks, 2002). Nowadays, however,
treatments in the social sciences of the Protestant work ethic focus
on the value of hard work, which is quite distinct from notions
about the status of the soul and its original theological underpin-
nings (Christopher, Zabel, Jones, & Marek, 2008; Miller, Woehr,
& Hudspeth, 2001). For this reason, we treated Protestant work
ethic as a potential confound and not as an explanation of any
effects.
In this study, we also used measures of intrinsic and extrinsic
religiosity (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989) to rule out the possibility
that it is some general aspect of religiosity among Protestants that
explains their particularly dispositional attributions.
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Method
Participants. Participants were 233 students from a large
public university in the southwestern United States. There were
104 Catholics (42 men; 62 women) and 131 Protestants (41 men;
90 women). Participants were allowed to select more than one
ethnicity. Among Catholics, there were 3 Asian Americans, 1
African American, 34 Hispanics, and 69 Caucasians. Among Prot-
estants, there were 5 Asians, 5 Asian Americans, 15 African
Americans, 11 Hispanics, 4 Native Americans, and 95 Caucasians.
To verify that religious group was not confounded with other
demographic variables, we ran correlations between them (coding
Caucasians as 0 and every other ethnicity as 1). Results revealed
no significant relationship between religious group and sex (r 
.08, p  .21) or ethnicity (r  .05, p  .42).
Procedure. Measures of attribution were borrowed from Ki-
tayama, Imada, Ishii, Takemura, and Ramaswamy (2006). Partic-
ipants were presented with four short scenarios probing attribu-
tions for both moral and immoral behaviors and were then asked to
rate statements about internal and external attributions. A sample
scenario was
Sara Martin is a top executive at a pharmaceutical company that
recently developed a new and expensive drug for treating malaria.
Shortly after the company developed the drug, there was a significant
outbreak of malaria in Africa. In response, Sara Martin decided to
donate a lot of medicine to the countries in Africa needing assistance.
There was another positive scenario in which the protagonist, a
professional baseball player, donated his time to hold baseball
camps for poor children. There were also two negative scenarios—
one about a doctor who hid a mistake that led to a patient’s death
and another about a municipal official who took bribes or kick-
backs.
For the present research, these scenarios have the advantage of
having moral connotations. Because of our theoretical perspective
that it is the Protestant concern with the nature of the individual
soul (likely to be saved or damned) that would drive differences in
attributions, we selected morally charged scenarios that could be
seen as being diagnostic about the condition of the soul.
For each scenario, participants rated on 7-point scales their
agreement with two items reflecting internal attributions and two
items reflecting external attributions (one an attribution per se and
the other a counterfactual that behavior would be different if the
individual’s features or the situation had been different). For
example, we asked people to rate their agreement with the follow-
ing sentences: “Features of Sara Martin (such as her character,
attitude, or temperament) influenced her behavior (donating ma-
laria medicine to countries in Africa needing assistance)” and
“Sara Martin would have acted differently if her features (such as
her character, attitude, or temperament) had been different” versus
“Features of the environment that surround Sara Martin (such as
the social atmosphere, social norms, or other contextual factors)
influenced her behavior (donating malaria medicine to countries in
Africa needing assistance)” and “Sara Martin would have acted
differently if features of the environment that surround her (such as
the atmosphere, social norms, or other contextual factors) had been
different.” The reliability was good for both the external (  .72)
and internal (  .81) attribution scales.
We measured need for structure (Thompson et al., 2001) to
examine the possibility that Protestants and Catholics could differ
in rigid or dogmatic thinking, which could relate to attributions.
The Need for Structure Scale has two subscales: Desire for Struc-
ture (four items; sample item: “I enjoy having a clear and struc-
tured mode of life”) and Response to Lack of Structure (seven
items; sample item: “I become uncomfortable when the rules in a
situation are not clear”). In this sample, these two subscales were
highly correlated (r  .50), and we did not have different predic-
tions about the two subscales. In the interest of parsimony we thus
combined them into one scale, which we refer to as Need for
Structure.
We measured Protestant work ethic with 19 items from Mirels
and Garrett (1971). Sample items are “Our society would have
fewer problems if people had less leisure time” and “If one works
hard enough he is likely to make a good life for himself.” We
dropped one item because of a typographical error (we inadver-
tently presented “Most people spend too much time in unprofitable
amusements” as “Most people spend too much time in profitable
amusements”). We combined all items into a Work Ethic scale
(consistent with one factor reported by Mirels & Garrett, 1971).
We also measured intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (Gorsuch &
McPherson, 1989). Intrinsic religiosity is usually seen as reflecting
ultimate goals and as internalized, mature religious motivations.
Extrinsic religiosity is often taken to relate to an instrumental,
immature use of religion, such as for social contacts (Allport &
Ross, 1967). Given that intrinsic religiosity is theoretically about
sincere religious motivation, one could theorize that the value that
Protestantism places on intrinsic religiosity could be an explana-
tion for differences in patterns of attributions. We did not take this
approach for several reasons. One is the criticism that the guiding
theory behind these constructs may be apt only in an American,
Protestant cultural context and less applicable among Catholics
given Catholics’ greater emphasis on communal religion (Cohen et
al., 2005). Indeed, intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were corre-
lated in very different patterns among Protestants (negatively
correlated), Catholics (uncorrelated), and Jews (positively corre-
lated) in a study by Cohen and Hill (2007). Furthermore, it is not
especially clear on the basis of inconsistent factor analytic prop-
erties or on the basis of face validity that intrinsic religiosity
measures sincere religiosity as an ultimate goal or that extrinsic
religiosity measures insincere religiosity as a means to an end
(Pargament, 1992). We felt we were on safer ground treating these
items as general indications of religiosity, and we therefore treated
them as covariates.
Results and Discussion
We first calculated correlations between religious group (Prot-
estant vs. Catholic) and potential confounds. Protestants were
higher than Catholics in intrinsic religiosity (r  .14, p  .05),
marginally higher in extrinsic religiosity (r  .11, p  .10), and
not significantly different in work ethic (r  .03, p  .68) or need
for structure (r  –.07, p  .28). We controlled for these variables
in our analyses discussed next, to make sure that differences in
attribution were not due to variations between religious groups in
these confounds. The result yielded a very conservative compari-
son between Protestants and Catholics.
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Because we made a priori directional predictions regarding
religious group and internal attributions, we report one-tailed tests
of this hypothesis throughout the article. In a multiple regression
analysis (see Table 1)—controlling intrinsic religiosity, extrinsic
religiosity, work ethic, and need for structure—being Catholic
versus Protestant had a significant effect on internal attributions
(b  0.20, SE  0.12,   .12, p  .05). In a similar regression
analysis, consistent with our hypotheses, there was no effect of
religious group on external attributions (b  –0.06, SE  0.14,
  –.03, p  .66).
This study supported our hypothesis that Protestants would
endorse internal attributions more than Catholics would. It further
supported our view that there is no such difference in external
attributions.
Study 2
In Study 2, we attempted to replicate the internal attribution
differences seen in Study 1 and then examined the mediating role
of belief in a soul.
Method
Participants and procedure. The participants in this study
were 154 Protestants (32 men; 122 women) and 118 Catholics (28
men; 89 women; 1 did not report sex) from a large public univer-
sity in the southwestern United States. Among Catholics there
were 3 Asians, 3 Native Americans, 35 Hispanics, 76 European
Americans, and 1 who failed to report ethnicity. Among Protes-
tants there were 99 European Americans, 31 African Americans,
12 Hispanics, 3 Asian Americans, 3 Native Americans, 3 Asians,
1 “other,” and 2 who did not report ethnicity. Participants received
course credit in a sociology course for completing the survey. As
in Study 1, we ran correlations between religious group and
demographic variables to make sure there was no confound be-
tween religious group and sex or ethnicity. Results showed no
correlation between religious group and either participant sex (r 
.04, p  .54) or ethnicity (r  –.001, p  .98).
Belief in a soul was measured using eight items, including
several reverse-scored items (  .81; “I believe that every person
has a soul”; “People are not just physical, but they also have a
soul”; “After death, the soul lives on”; “I do not believe in a soul”;
“Death ends all forms of life forever”; “Earthly existence is the
only existence we have”; “There is an immortal part of a person”;
and “People are no more than a physical body”). Internal and
external attributions were measured as in Study 1.
Results and Discussion
In a multiple regression analysis, and as in Study 1, Protestants
endorsed internal attributions to a greater extent than did Catholics
(b 0.24, SE 0.10,   .15, p .008). For mediation analyses,
this is the direct path of the independent variable, religious group,
on the dependent variable, internal attributions (see the horizontal
path in Figure 1). Again, there was no effect of religious group on
external attributions (b  0.15, SE  0.14,   .07, p  .27).
We next set out to find whether Protestants had greater belief in
a soul than Catholics (see the ascending path from the independent
variable, religious group, to the theorized mediator, belief in a
soul, in Figure 1). Results revealed that Protestants did indeed have
greater belief in a soul than did Catholics (b  0.32, SE  0.13,
  .15, p  .007).
Controlling for belief in a soul reduced to marginal significance
the effect of being Protestant versus Catholic on internal attribu-
tions (b  0.15, SE  0.09,   .09, p  .06). In addition, belief
in a soul had a significant effect on internal attributions, while
controlling religious group (see the descending path in Figure 1;
b  0.30, SE  0.04,   .38, p  .001). A Sobel (1982) test
confirmed a significant indirect effect of being Protestant versus
Catholic on internal attributions via belief in a soul (z  2.32, p 
.02). These analyses satisfy all the conditions for partial mediation
(Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Thus, in Study 2, we replicated our finding from Study 1 that
Protestants are more dispositionally, but not more situationally,
focused than Catholics are. In addition, we found support for the
hypothesis that this effect is mediated by belief in a soul.
Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence for our hypothesis that the
activation of cognitive representations of Protestant religion acti-
vates belief in a soul, which then leads to internal attributions. In
Study 3, we sought to provide experimental evidence for the causal
pathway between the activation of cognitive representations of
Protestant religion and belief in a soul. Consequently, we primed
religious representations among Protestants and Catholics and
expected to find that belief in a soul would increase among
Table 1
Regression Results Predicting Internal and External Attributions in Study 1
Predictor
Internal attributions External attributions
b SE  b SE 
Religious groupa 0.197 0.117 .119 0.061 0.137 .032
Need for structure 0.005 0.006 .057 0.002 0.007 .023
Intrinsic religiosity 0.003 0.008 .024 0.002 0.009 .019
Extrinsic religiosity 0.008 0.008 .071 0.026 0.009 .197
Protestant work ethic 0.009 0.006 .108 0.006 0.007 .069
a Catholic (1) versus Protestant (2).
 p  .05.  p  .01.
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Protestants to a greater extent than among Catholics after the
prime.
Method
Participants and procedure. Sixty-eight Catholics (31 men;
37 women) and 75 Protestants (29 men; 45 women; 1 person who
did not report sex) who were psychology undergraduates at a large
public university in the southwestern United States participated for
course credit. Sixty-three percent of the Catholic participants were
European American, and 69% of the Protestant participants were
European American.
We reasoned that religious representations would be accessible
among both those who were currently practicing their religion and
those who had been raised in the Christian religious tradition.
Therefore, we counted participants as Catholic or Protestant if they
either currently identified themselves as such (ns  46 and 51,
respectively) or had been raised in a Catholic or Protestant house-
hold even if they no longer identified themselves as belonging to
those religions (ns 22 and 24, respectively). This also allowed us
to overcome potential ceiling effects if people who identify them-
selves as currently Protestant are highly likely to chronically
endorse belief in a soul.
We primed religion by asking participants to write a few sen-
tences about being a member of their faith or tradition. In the
control condition, we asked participants to write a few sentences
about their hobbies. We then measured belief in a soul using the
belief in a soul scale from Study 2 (  .92).
Finally, we asked participants to complete the following scales:
Need for Structure (Thompson et al., 2001), work ethic (Mirels &
Garrett, 1971), and intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (Gorsuch &
McPherson, 1989). These scales were used as covariates in the
analyses in the next section.
Results and Discussion
There was a main effect of religion, whereby Protestants be-
lieved in a soul more than did Catholics, replicating our prior
findings, F(1, 135)  4.10, p  .045. There was also a significant
interaction between prime (religion vs. control) and religion (Cath-
olics vs. Protestants), F(1, 135)  5.01, p  .027. Protestants who
were primed with religion believed in a soul significantly more
than did Protestants who were in the control condition (p  .04),
while there was no such difference for Catholics (p  .26; see
Figure 2). Thus, in support of our hypothesis, priming religion
activated belief in a soul to a greater extent for Protestants than for
Catholics.
Study 4
If belief in a soul is indeed the reason that Protestants are
especially prone to making dispositional rather than situational
attributions, strengthening belief in a soul should lead Protestants
to make even more internal attributions but should not change
external attributions. We tested these hypotheses in Study 4.
Method
Participants and procedure. The participants in this study
were 55 Protestants (28 men; 27 women) at a large public univer-
sity in the southwestern United States. There were 7 Asians, 3
Asian Americans, 9 African Americans, 8 Hispanics, 5 Native
Americans, 32 Caucasians, and 2 “other.” Participants received
partial course credit for filling out the questionnaire.
We experimentally manipulated belief in a soul by asking par-
ticipants to write an essay for or against the existence of a soul.
Before they began writing, participants were given the following
instructions:
You will be RANDOMLY selected to be either “for” or “against” this
issue. Please try to write a convincing essay EVEN IF YOU DO NOT
AGREE with the side you were assigned to. The mark of a successful
writer is that they can write about any topic convincingly, and we
would like to see how well students can do that.
In addition, we gave participants a few arguments to start off
with, to further prime the idea that a soul does or does not exist.
For example, we told participants writing against the existence of
a soul that a point they could make in their essay is that “after
people die, there is no brain activity.” An example we gave to
participants writing for the existence of a soul is that “people often
report having after death or out of body experiences.” Participants
spent about 5 min writing about their assigned topic.
Previous research on persuasion has suggested that writing an
essay for or against a randomly assigned topic can strengthen
belief in that topic, even if the opinion is not one that the partic-
Catholic (1) vs. 
Protestant (2) 
Belief in a 
soul 
Internal 
attributions 
.38*** .15** 
.15**   /   .09†
Figure 1. The effect of being Catholic versus Protestant on internal
attributions is significantly mediated by belief in a soul in Study 2 (z 
2.32, p  .02). The effect of being Catholic versus Protestant on internal
attributions presented before the slash is the effect without controlling for
belief in a soul. The same effect presented after the slash is the effect while
controlling belief in a soul. Standardized regression coefficients are pre-
sented. † p  .10.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Figure 2. In Study 3, Protestants primed with religion had greater belief
in a soul than did those in a control priming condition, but Catholics did not
differ significantly.
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ipant originally held (Cooper, Mirabile, & Scher, 2005). Thus, the
priming task could experimentally strengthen or weaken belief in
a soul, which should already be a belief that exists to varying
extents in Protestants.
After writing their essay, participants read and answered ques-
tions about the same attribution scenarios as in the previous
studies.
Results and Discussion
In a regression analysis, our experimental manipulation had a
significant effect on internal attributions (b  0.72, SE  0.32,
  .29, p .02). Protestants who wrote an essay for the existence
of a soul made more internal attributions than did Protestants who
wrote an essay against the existence of the soul. As predicted, there
was no such effect for external attributions (b  0.14, SE  0.26,
  .07, p  .59). The results of this study provide further
evidence that belief in a soul leads Protestants to make more
internal, but not external, attributions.
General Discussion
We have argued that Protestant Christians are more likely to
offer more internal explanations for behavior, even compared to
Catholics. We showed this was so in Study 1, even after control-
ling for several potential confounds (the need for structure, intrin-
sic and extrinsic religiosity, and the Protestant work ethic).
Our demonstration that Protestants are prone to internal attribu-
tions is important because one could imagine that theological and
historical differences among religious groups in the United States
exert little or no influence on people’s current psychological
tendencies. We suggest that distal historical and theological cir-
cumstances can still be reflected in people’s judgments (Cohen,
2009; Conner Snibbe & Markus, 2002). These results are consis-
tent with other research showing that members of religious groups
still differ in theologically determined ways, in domains including
work ethic (Sanchez-Burks, 2002), moral judgments (Cohen &
Rozin, 2001), the extent to which religiousness depends on prac-
tice and faith (Cohen et al., 2003), intrinsic and extrinsic religious
motivation (Cohen & Hill, 2005), and forgiveness (Cohen et al.,
2006).
Our findings are also informative because there is a strong
alternative theoretical possibility. One could theorize that Protes-
tants may actually be more prone to making external or situational
attributions than members of other religions. Despite the fact that
Protestantism can be dubbed an individualistic religion inasmuch
as it is primarily concerned with individual faith (Cohen et al.,
2005), it could also be argued that, historically and psychologi-
cally, Protestants were collectivists with a desire to form a com-
munity based on codified social norms. In many ways, the Puritan
immigrants exemplified collectivist values of being voluntarily
bound by mutual covenant to live in community, to establish a
proper social order, and to maintain harmony within the commu-
nity. An individual’s identity was defined not only by personal
choice but also by good standing in the religious community,
everyone being subject to jeremiads aimed at shuffling stray Chris-
tians back into the fold.
Moreover, religion has also been explained as a culturally
evolved way to promote cooperation, a solution to the problem of
living in large-scale societies of unrelated individuals (Atran &
Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Shariff & Noren-
zayan, 2007; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003; Wilson, 2002).
Indeed, religious people from many religious traditions, includ-
ing Protestantism, are more likely to espouse what are viewed as
collectivistic values, including tradition and conformity (e.g.,
Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995).
Using the independent and interdependent self-construal scales of
Singelis (1994), Cohen and Rozin (2001) found that interdepen-
dence, but not independence, was correlated with religiosity for
both Jews and Protestants. Thus, Protestants—who are more fo-
cused on tradition, conformity, cooperation, and interdepen-
dence—could have been theorized to be more prone to making
external and less prone to making internal attributions than are
Catholics. However, we found support for the exact opposite
prediction—Protestants make more internal, but not external, at-
tributions compared with Catholics.
What is it about Protestant religion that makes people more
internally focused? We theorized that this is because Protestants
believe more strongly in, and are more concerned about, the
condition of souls. In Study 2 we found that belief in a soul
partially and significantly mediated differences between Protes-
tants and Catholics in tendencies to endorse internal attributions.
One problem with the interpretation of many mediation analyses is
that they rely on correlational evidence without evidence of cau-
sality (MacKinnon, 2008). Study 3 found that Protestants primed
with religion had the highest belief in a soul compared with
Catholics and compared with Protestants not primed with religion.
Furthermore, Study 4 found that strengthening belief in a soul
increased the tendency of Protestants to provide internal, but not
external, attributions. We are confident from the results of these
studies that Protestants have greater representations of belief in a
soul relative to Catholics and that this partially accounts for
Protestants’ relatively greater tendency to be dispositionally bi-
ased.
Martin Luther introduced the Protestant Christian belief that
salvation comes through grace and faith alone, unmediated by a
priest or religious institution. Many years later, a persecuted Prot-
estant contingent immigrated to the New World, not only seeking
religious freedom but also aiming to build a righteous “City on a
Hill” (Morone, 2004). Each later Revivalist movement, including
the fundamentalist and charismatic movements of the previous
century, reinforced Protestants’ concern for the status of one’s
soul. It seems that this focus on the soul causes Protestants to be
more concerned than members of other religions (here, Catholics)
with dispositional causes for the behavior of others—often com-
mitting what has been termed in the social psychology literature as
the fundamental attribution error.
The debate about the soul that began among the Atomists,
Aristotelians, and Platonists has not diminished and, indeed, is
reflected in the psychological literature today. Although forgotten
by some, the term psychology is literally translated as “the study of
the soul,” and some early psychologists referred to the field as the
study of souls. However, by 1957, Gordon Allport complained,
“As every reader knows, modern empirical psychology . . . sepa-
rated itself sharply with religion. ‘Psychology without a soul’
became its badge of distinction and pride” (p. v).
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Future Directions
We now consider two recommendations for future research, one
on the distinction between internal and external attributions and
the other on how religious differences in attribution may relate to
research regarding East–West differences.
With regard to the measure of attributions we have used across
studies, two directions for future research are warranted. First, we
used scenarios that depicted highly moral (e.g., charitable) and
highly immoral (e.g., taking a bribe) behaviors. We chose these
scenarios because it is our theory that Protestants scrutinize the
internal motivations for behavior because they are attempting to
gauge the condition of a person’s soul. Moral scenarios seemed
well suited to addressing this research question. It would be
interesting to discover in future research whether Protestants ex-
plain other kinds of behavior (ones that are not moral or immoral)
in terms of dispositional or internal determinants. If attribution
differences exist for only moral scenarios, this would lend further
support to the notion that Protestants make attributions for behav-
ior primarily with an eye toward the moral condition of the soul.
If attribution differences also exist for nonmoral scenarios, how-
ever, it would suggest that the Protestant tendency to make dispo-
sitional attributions is either more general or more multiply deter-
mined than just being concerned with the condition of the soul. In
other words, the moral attributional outlook may generalize to
causal explanations for a broader set of behaviors.
A second future direction for work on religion and attributions
has to do with finer distinction between types of attributions. To
say that a behavior was driven by a person’s dispositions or
internal factors is not necessarily to say that a person was respon-
sible, or agentic, for that behavior (Hilton, Smith, & Kin, 1995;
Kashima, 2001; Semin & Marsman, 1994). However, we point to
this as an important direction for future research; that is, to see
whether Protestants are particularly likely to hold people agenti-
cally or morally responsible for the behaviors that Protestants see
as internally or dispositionally driven.
Another recommendation for future work concerns the relation-
ship between religion and previously found East–West differences
in attributions. Although the present research focuses on whether
North American Protestants are particularly dispositional, it al-
ludes to a broader potential direction for future research—the
relationship between religion and nationality as influences on
attribution. Is it possible that some of the attribution findings
commonly attributed to East–West differences could actually be
due to religious disparities between those countries? In some
preliminary research, we found that Hong Kong Protestants were
more likely to make internal compared with external attributions
than nonreligious individuals or people of other faiths (Li, John-
son, & Cohen, 2009). This implies that Protestants in countries
other than the United States have similar attribution styles to those
in the United States. On the other hand, the effect of religion can
vary in different ethnic groups. For example, religiousness is
correlated with political conservatism among European Americans
and Asians but not among African Americans and Latinos, because
different values correlate with religiousness in these different
groups (Cohen et al., 2009). How various cultural identities (in-
cluding ethnicity, nationality, religion, and others) interact is an
important direction for future psychological research (Cohen,
2009).
Broader Theoretical Implications
Religious ideologies have played an important role in U.S.
history and continue to do so today. Approximately 77% of U.S.
citizens self-identify as Christian (Pew Forum on Religion &
Public Life, 2008), including 49.8% Protestant, 24.5% Roman
Catholic, 1.3% Mormon (Latter-day Saints), and 1.1% others. Yet
the influence of religion on research outcomes in psychology is
often overlooked (Conner Snibbe & Markus, 2002). Over the last
century, Christianity in America has developed into a marketplace
of ideas with many different denominations and sects as well as
professions of being “spiritual but not religious.” One could well
imagine, therefore, that members of various religious groups
would show similar psychological tendencies, given that the cur-
rent religious culture and climate in the United States would be
seen as a homogenizing force and one that reflects people’s indi-
vidual choices, not their historically descended group identities.
However, the historical roots of Protestantism continue to flour-
ish in America, with over 23% of Americans being affiliated with
Renewalist (e.g., Pentecostal or Charismatic) churches and over
51% of all Christians being identified as Baptist—denominations
that continue to emphasize the internal, personal nature of religi-
osity (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008). We suggest
that the beliefs and values of these groups should not be glossed
over in social psychological research. Furthermore, it is an impor-
tant theoretical issue in the study of culture to elucidate whether
and how historical and theological developments influence the
psychological processes and tendencies of modern members of
those religious groups.
Previously, there has been little research on the influence of
religion on attribution (but see Norenzayan & Lee, 2010). Differ-
ences in attribution between groups were usually compared be-
tween Easterners and Westerners and explained by factors such as
collectivism versus individualism, or holistic versus analytic think-
ing. The studies described in this article, on the other hand, suggest
that religious cultural identities strongly and specifically influence
whether someone is more likely to make internal attributions.
More broadly, we believe the connection between religion and
various cultural processes is vastly underexplored. Psychology as
a field has made commendable strides in cross-cultural research,
but it is important to consider the possibility that religions also
have distinct histories, cultures, and worldviews (Cohen, 2009;
K. A. Johnson, Hill, & Cohen, 2010). Though sometimes difficult
to separate, the study of the effects and interactions of varying
cultural identities may make unique contributions to the psycho-
logical processes being researched.
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Religious diversity and religious toleration
PHILIP L. QUINN
University of Notre Dame
Awareness of religious diversity is nothing new under the sun. The early
Christian martyrs were doubtless aware that others in the Roman Empire did
not share their religious beliefs. Yet it is arguable that awareness of religious
diversity has recently assumed qualitatively new forms. Among the factors
that might account for this transformation is the increased contact people now
have with religions other than their own. Modern technologies of travel and
communication foster interchanges between adherents of different religions.
Modern scholarship has made available translations of and commentaries
on texts from a variety of religious traditions, and cultural anthropologists
have recorded fascinating thick descriptions of the practices of many such
traditions. People who live in religiously pluralistic democracies have ample
opportunities to acquire personal familiarity with religions other than their
own without leaving home. It now is therefore harder than it once was to
hang onto negative stereotypes of or rationalize hostile reactions to the prac-
titioners of religions other than one’s own. But many people succeed in doing
so; increased contact often enough produces greater friction. News media
have bombarded us with the sights and sounds of religious conflict in Belfast,
Beirut and Bosnia. In Africa Muslims clash with animists, in India Hindus
and Muslims struggle bitterly, and in Europe Catholic Croats go to war with
Orthodox Serbs. The city of Jerusalem remains a focal point for religious
quarrels among Jews, Christians and Muslims. In the eighteenth century,
Kant complained that the history of Christianity could justify Lucretius’s
exclamation, tantum religio potuit suadere malorum!1 At the beginning of the
twenty-first century, support for Lucretius comes from several religions and
many parts of the world. The religions of the world may be able to understand
one another better now than ever before, but their ability to live together in
peace still has not yet been secured.
Recent philosophical work that is responsive to the contemporary chal-
lenge of religious diversity has centered in the areas of epistemology and
political philosophy. In epistemology, the main issue has been whether or
not, given what we now know about religious diversity, exclusivism remains
a defensible position. Exclusivism is the view that one religion is basically
correct and all the others go astray in one or more ways. It has several dimen-
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sions. Doctrinal exclusivism is the view that the doctrines of one religion are
mostly true while the doctrines of all the others, where there is conflict, are
false. Soteriological exclusivism is the view that only the path proposed by
one religion leads securely to the ultimate religious goal, salvation or libera-
tion. And experiential exclusivism is the view that the religious experiences
typically enjoyed by the adherents of one religion are mostly veridical and
conflicting experiences typical of all the others are nonveridical. It is, of
course, entirely consistent to accept exclusivism in one of these dimensions
while rejecting it in another. For example, some Christians who are doctrinal
exclusivists hold that salvation is available to devout members of other reli-
gious traditions, though such Christians often insist that, unbeknownst to
those outside Christianity, their salvation comes through Jesus Christ. Starting
from the observation that, as far as we can tell empirically, all the world
religions are more or less equal in their salvific efficacy, that is, their ability to
transform their practitioners from being self-centered to being centered on a
transcendent reality, John Hick has mounted a powerful attack on exclusivism
in all three dimensions. While admitting that religious diversity does, or at
least can, undermine the epistemic credentials of experiential or doctrinal
exclusivism to some extent, William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga have
replied with arguments aimed at showing that Christian exclusivism of some
sort continues to enjoy an epistemic status high enough to make it a rational
option even when religious diversity is taken into account. And other philos-
ophers have added their voices to the discussion of this issue.2 In my opinion,
the debate on this topic has more or less reached a stand off. The positions
that are live philosophical options have been fairly thoroughly mapped out,
and the main arguments for and against each of them have been developed in
some detail. I doubt that there is a realistic prospect of the issue which divides
exclusivists from their philosophical opponents being decisively settled or
even moved appreciably closer to a resolution by additional arguments.3
One might think of exclusivism of another kind as the chief problem
addressed by the response to religious diversity within contemporary polit-
ical philosophy. In this case, exclusivism is the view, advocated by several
liberal political philosophers, that religion ought to be excluded from the
public square in modern liberal democracies. More precisely, political exclu-
sivists hold that religious arguments should be excluded from the public
political discourse of religiously pluralistic democratic societies on certain
fundamental questions.4 Robert Audi has argued vigorously for a version of
exclusivism that includes a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support
any law or policy that restricts conduct unless one has and is willing to
offer adequate secular reason for such advocacy or support. Appealing to
grounds of fairness, Nicholas Wolterstorff has challenged Audi’s position
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and forcefully criticized the general exclusivist point of view of which it
is an instance.5 The most nuanced liberal exclusion of the religious so far
developed is contained in the political philosophy of John Rawls. According
to its ideal of public reason, which imposes a duty of civility, we are not
to introduce into public political discourse on constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrines, reli-
gious doctrines all being understood to be comprehensive, unless we satisfy
the proviso that we do so in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason
itself.6 My impression is that, unlike the debate about exclusivism in epistem-
ology, this dispute remains in flux to some extent and has not yet reached
a stand off. Confirming evidence for this impression may be derived from
the fact that Rawls has modified his position to allow that reasons drawn
from comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced
into public political discussions at any time subject to the proviso that in due
course reasons in compliance with the ideal of public reason are presented to
support whatever the comprehensive doctrines were invoked to support.7 To
be sue, the modified view still has a proviso attached, but it is more permissive
than the proviso of the original view and so is less likely to raise the hackles
of religious citizens of a democracy.
I confess I find it a bit odd that the main response to religious diversity
in recent liberal political philosophy has focused on the issue of whether or
not religious argument should be excluded from public discourse. Given the
widespread religious conflict mentioned previously, I cannot help thinking
that religious toleration is a more urgent global political issue and that the
rather narrow focus on religious discourse in liberal democracies is a bit
parochial. I have some ideas about factors that may contribute to explaining
the narrow focus, though they are somewhat speculative. One factor is fear of
divisiveness. It would be natural to search for moral grounds for constraints
on the use of religious arguments in the public square if one were afraid that
in a religiously divided society their use would be likely to be destabilizing.
Jeffrey Stout expressed such fear not so long ago. Arguing against Basil
Mitchell’s proposal that traditional theism be employed in order to revitalize
public discourse, Stout claims that ‘the risks of reviving religious conflict like
that of early modern Europe are too great’.8 I myself reckon that the proba-
bility of reigniting the Wars of Religion by including religious arguments in
public political discourse is quite low, and so I think that such fear, however
real it may be, is unrealistic. It seems to me that, even if the practice of reli-
gious toleration in Western democracies is no more than a modus vivendi, it is
supported both by the settled habits of religious citizens and by the weight of
their traditions to a degree that lends it great robustness. Another factor that
may play an explanatory role is complacency about the historical achieve-
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ments of political philosophy. It would be understandable if people saw no
need for new arguments to clinch the case for religious toleration because
they thought conclusive arguments were already available in the classic works
of liberal political philosophy. One might, for example, look to John Locke’s
work as a source of arguments for religious toleration.9 According to Locke,
religious persecution is bound to be ineffective and hence is irrational because
its goal is to get people to adopt different religious beliefs and people do not
have direct voluntary control over their religious beliefs. However, as Jeremy
Waldron has recently shown Locke’s case for this position falls apart under
critical scrutiny, and there is no way to reconstruct it to meet the objections.10
Or one might look to John Stuart Mill for an argument for religious toleration
that at least is successful by utilitarian standards.11 But David Lewis has
shown that Mill will lose his case if he argues against a clever utilitarian
religious Inquisitor.12 So complacency about the justification of religious
toleration is, I think, unwarranted.
My main aim in this paper is to broaden the focus of the discussion of
religious diversity in political philosophy to include arguments against reli-
gious intolerance. I shall not try to refurbish the arguments of Locke or Mill;
indeed, I shall depart altogether from the British historical tradition of liberal
thought. I shall instead exploit the historical resources of a continental tradi-
tion of liberal thought by examining arguments against religious intolerance
developed by Pierre Bayle and Immanuel Kant. I choose these particular
arguments for scrutiny because they enable me to reach a secondary goal,
which is to bring the discussion of religious diversity in political philosophy
into contact with the discussion in epistemology and to try to establish some
connections between them. The idea that there should be such connections
has been rendered intuitively vivid by Avishai Margalit. He draws attention
to the parable of the three rings, made famous in Lessing’s play Nathan the
Wise. In Margalit’s version of the story, a king leaves a legacy of three rings
in his three sons; one of the rings is of great value while the other two are
no more than good imitations. The religious analogy is clear. The king is
God; the real ring is revealed truth; and the three sons are Moses, Jesus and
Muhammad. Reflecting on the parable, Margalit points out that, apart from
the king, ‘no one else knows for certain which ring is the real one. This doubt
should lead to an attitude of “respect and suspect”, because it is possible that
the truth is in another religion’.13 It is precisely the connection Margalit sees
between epistemic uncertainty and the relatively tolerant attitude of respect
and suspect that interests me. I propose to explore that connection and to try
to clarify what its implications are through an examination of the arguments
of Bayle and Kant. I do not pretend to return a final verdict on the general line
of philosophical thought to which those arguments are meant to contribute.
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In this paper, I shall ignore some of the issues that have been prominent
in other recent treatments of toleration in political philosophy. I am not going
to investigate the topic of whether ordinary language marks a conceptual
distinction between toleration and tolerance. Nor do I plan to take a stand
on whether it is a necessary truth that one can only tolerate things one views
as bad or evil. I do not have a definition or an analysis of toleration to offer.
I shall work with an intuitive notion of religious intolerance that has within
its extension behaviors such as killing people for heresy or apostasy, forced
conversions and preventing people from engaging collectively in worship.
My interest here is restricted to the fairly specific topic of the ethical or moral
status of such intolerant behaviors.14
The remainder of the paper is divided into three part. In the first, I rehearse
arguments about the negative epistemic consequences of religious diversity.
The other two parts address the question of what impact the conclusions of
such arguments might have on further arguments against intolerance. The
second part subjects to critical analysis an argument by Bayle; the third does
the same to an argument of Kant.
1. Alston and others on religious diversity
William P. Alston acknowledges that religious diversity gives rise to an
epistemological problem for his view that experience of God confers prima
facie justification or beliefs about how God is manifested to the experiencer.
He defends this view from within the perspective of a doxastic practice
approach to epistemology.15 A doxastic practice is a practice of forming
beliefs together with a series of possible overriders for the prima facie justi-
fication a belief derives from having been generated by the practice. Doxastic
practices are to be evaluated, from an epistemic point of view, in terms of their
likelihood of producing true beliefs, that is, in terms of their reliability. Basic
doxastic practices, for example, sense perception, are socially established
practices whose reliability cannot be established in a noncircular manner.
Alston thinks it rational to grant prima facie acceptance to all basic doxastic
practices that are not demonstrably unreliable or otherwise disqualified from
rational acceptance. In other words, basic practices are innocent until proven
guilty. He also observes that a practice’s claim to rational acceptance is
strengthened if it enjoys self-support. When he turns his attention to the
religious realm, he supposes that each of the major traditions has within it
a practice of forming beliefs about how Ultimate Reality, whatever it may be,
manifests itself in or through religious experience. As he divides up the pie,
different religions have different experiential practices because the systems
of possible overriders vary so much from one religion to another. Among
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them is the Christian practice (CP). For Alston, CP is a basic practice that
is not demonstrably unreliable and derives self-support from, for instance,
the way in which its promises of spiritual development can be seen, from
within the practice, to be fulfilled in the lives of some of its practitioners.
However, he allows that other religious doxastic practices are basic too, are
also not demonstrably unreliable, and enjoy as much self-support as CP does.
In short, CP has rivals that are on an epistemic par with it, and this is why
religious diversity creates an epistemological problem for it. And, needless
to say, each of these rivals is in the same situation; CP’s problem is also a
problem for Buddhist practice (BP), Hindu practice (HP) and so forth. Does
this disqualify CP and its rivals from rational acceptance?
Alston thinks not. He does admit that religious diversity decreases the
justification its practitioners have for engaging in CP, but he denies that it
does so to such a degree that it is irrational for them to engage in it. His main
argument for this denial deploys an analogy with a counterfactual scenario
involving rival sense-perceptual doxastic practices. Imagine that there were,
in certain cultures, a socially established ‘Cartesian’ practice of construing
what is visually perceived as an indefinitely extended medium more or less
concentrated at various points, rather than, as in our ‘Aristotelian’ practice,
as made up of more or less discrete objects scattered about in space. Further
imagine that there were, in yet other cultures, an established ‘Whiteheadian’
practice in which the visual field is taken to be made up of momentary events
growing out of one another in a continuous process. Suppose that each of
these three practices served its practitioners equally well in their dealings
with the environment and had associated with it a well-developed physical
science. Suppose also that we were as firmly wedded to our ‘Aristotelian’
practice as we in fact are but were unable to come up with any non-question-
begging reason for regarding it as more accurate than either of the others.
Alston concludes that, absent any non-question-begging reason for thinking
that one of the other two practices is more accurate than my own, ‘the only
rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of which I am a master
and which serves me so well in guiding my activity in the world’.16 But
the sheerly hypothetical sense-perceptual scenario is precisely parallel to our
actual situation with regard to CP and its religious rivals. Hence, by parity
of reasoning, the rational thing for a practitioner of CP to do is to sit tight
with it and continue to form beliefs making use of it. And, again by parity of
reasoning, the same goes for practitioners of BP, HP and other uneliminated
rivals of CP.
Alston’s critics have argued that he has not established his conclusion.
Though he concedes that it is pragmatically rational for its practitioners to
sit tight with CP, William J. Wainwright contends that Alston has not shown
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it to be epistemically rational for them to do so. The fact that CP is socially
established, significantly self-supporting and not demonstrably unreliable is,
he grants, a good reason for regarding it as prima facie reliable. However,
the existence of rival religious experiential practices that are also prima facie
reliable is, he claims, a good reason for thinking that CP is prima facie
unreliable. It is epistemically rational to engage in CP if the good reason for
viewing it as prima facie unreliable neither counterbalances nor outweighs
the good reason for viewing it as prima facie reliable. It is not epistemically
irrational to engage in CP if the good reason for considering it prima facie
unreliable does not outweigh the good reason for considering it prima facie
reliable. According to Wainwright, the most Alston’s argument shows is that
the good reason for thinking that CP is reliable is not outweighed, in which
case engaging in it is not epistemically irrational. It does not show that it is
not counterbalanced, and so it does not show that engaging in CP is epistem-
ically rational. Wainwright therefore thinks the most Alston establishes is that
engaging in CP ‘is pragmatically rational, and not epistemically irrational’.17
My objection to Alston’s conclusion can be traced back to a disagreement
between us about the lesson to be derived from his sense-perceptual analogy.
As I see it, one way to explain the success of the three sense-perceptual
practices in the analogy is to suppose that each of them is reliable with
respect to the appearances the physical environment presents to its practi-
tioners, but none is reliable with respect to how the physical environment is
in itself. Hence it would be rational to modify the Aristotelian practice from
within so that the new outputs are beliefs about the appearances the physical
environment presents to its practitioners rather than beliefs about how the
physical environment really is independent of the practitioner. And, of course,
this Kantian turn would be equally rational for Cartesian and Whiteheadean
practitioners. So while I grant that sitting tight would be a rational option,
I deny Alston’s stronger claim that it would be the rational thing to do. By
parity of reasoning, then, I conclude that, though it would be rational for
practitioners of CP to continue to engage in it, it is not the only rational course
of action for them in light of the facts of religious diversity. It would also be
rational for them to revise CP in a Kantian direction and to make efforts to
get the modified practice socially established. And, again, the same goes for
practitioners of BP, HP and other religious experiential doxastic practices.18
Despite their disagreements on points of detail, Alston and his critics
concur in thinking that religious diversity has a negative impact on the justi-
fication for engaging in CP or its rivals such as BP and HP. At least for those
who are aware of it, religious diversity seriously diminishes the justification
for continuing to form beliefs in any of these ways. What remains in dispute is
whether justification decreases to the extent that there are rational alternatives
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to sitting tight with CP, for example, taking the Kantian turn, or even to such a
degree that it is epistemically not rational or irrational to continue engaging in
CP. In what follows I shall make use of the shared agreement that justification
for engaging in CP or any of its rivals is substantially decreased by religious
diversity; I shall not appeal to any of the disputed claims about the exact
extent of the decrease. Of course, experiential doxastic practices are not the
only sources of support for the systems of belief of the world religions. As
Alston reminds us, Christianity also purports to derive support from other
sources such as the arguments of natural theology, tradition and revelation,
which he takes to include divine messages to prophets, divine inspiration
of oral or written communications and divine action in history. However,
though additional sources may mitigate the epistemic problem of religious
diversity, they clearly cannot eliminate it. After all, some of the other sources
confront their own problems of religious diversity. The conclusions of the
metaphysical arguments of natural theology conflict with the conclusions of
impressive metaphysical arguments in nontheistic religious traditions. The
claims of the texts and traditions Christians take to be religiously authoritative
must be set against conflicting claims derived from the texts and traditions
to which non-Christians grant religious authority. And, as Hume’s essay on
miracles reminds us, Christian claims about divine action in history compete
with the claims of other religions about which historical events have decisive
religious significance. Moreover, as Alston insists, the various sources of
Christian belief are supposed to provide one another with mutual support and
to contribute to a cumulative case for Christianity. So when religious diversity
decreases the justification for relying on one of them, it also weakens the
others it is supposed to support as well as the cumulative case that rests on
all of them. Using a familiar metaphor, Alston summarizes his position this
way: ‘Though each of these considerations can itself be doubted and though
no single strand is sufficient to keep the faith secure, when combined into a
rope they all together have enough strength to do the job’.19 Fair enough, but
by the same token, when one or more stands is weakened or cut due to the
problem of religious diversity, the rope is weakened and its ability to keep the
faith secure is diminished. Thus, absent a special reason to think otherwise, I
shall assume that religious diversity has a negative epistemic bearing not only
on the beliefs that are outputs of CP but also on other parts of the total system
of Christian belief and that the same goes for rivals such as BP and HP and
the total religious belief systems for which they are sources.
It is worth noting in passing that even Alvin Plantinga, who is more
intransigent than some other defenders of Christian exclusivism, acknowl-
edges that awareness of religious diversity can and often does have a negative
epistemic impact on religious beliefs.20 According to his account of warrant,
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which is what, when enough of it is added to true belief, yields knowledge,
warrant is directly proportional to level of confidence in, or degree of strength
of, belief. Awareness of religious diversity therefore can and often does
decrease warrant by acting directly to reduce confidence in or strength of
belief. Indeed, it can even deprive one of knowledge. It is possible, Plantinga
thinks, that someone who would have had religious knowledge in the absence
of an awareness of religious diversity lacks knowledge in its presence because
of the reduction of confidence and hence warrant produced by that awareness.
However, Plantinga goes on to claim that this loss of confidence need not
happen and, even if it does happen, need not be permanent. As he sees it,
then, the reduction of warrant produced by an awareness of religious diversity
can be counteracted simply by a return of the confidence whose loss gave rise
to the reduction. Whether Plantinga is right about this last point depends, of
course, on whether his account of warrant is correct. Since his development
of that account is spread out over three rather large volumes, I cannot in this
paper even begin to address the issue of its correctness with the attention to
detail that would be needed to settle it.21 So I will leave it an open question
whether the negative epistemic impact to which awareness of religious diver-
sity gives rise can be counteracted in the simple way Plantinga thinks it can.
2. Bayle in defense of religious toleration
Born in 1647, Pierre Bayle was raised a Protestant in predominantly Roman
Catholic France. Both his father, Jean, and his older brother, Jacob, were
ordained ministers. When he went to study at the Jesuit Academy at Toulouse
in 1669, Pierre converted to Catholicism, but he returned to Protestantism
after eighteen months. Fearing persecution on account of his relapsed status,
he fled in Geneva in 1670. In 1675 he became a professor of philosophy at the
Protestant Academy of Sedan. The Academy was closed by royal decree in
1681, and he moved to Rotterdam, where he lived for a quarter of a century.
Persecution of Protestants by Catholics grew worse during these years. Jean
Bayle died in March 1685. On June 10, 1685, Jacob Bayle was arrested
and imprisoned. Pierre learned that he had indirectly caused his brother’s
arrest. Angered by criticism Pierre had published, the French authorities were
treating his brother as his surrogate because they could not reach him in
Rotterdam. Jacob was tortured, and his health was broken in an unsuccessful
attempt to compel him to renounce his religious loyalties. On October 22,
1685, the Edict of Nantes was revoked, and the persecution of Protestants in
France thereafter increased in intensity. On November 12, 1685, Jacob Bayle
died in prison. The following year Pierre published his most impassioned and
sustained defense of religious toleration.22
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Its full title is Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ,
‘Contrain-les d’entrer’ (Philosophical Commentary on These Words of Jesus
Christ, ‘Compel Them to Come In’).23 The words of Jesus referred to in
its title come from the Parable of the Great Dinner in the Gospel of Luke.
In the story, when the invited guests make excuses for not coming to the
dinner and even poor folk brought in from the neighborhood do not fill all
the places, the angry host says to his servant: ‘Go out into the roads and
lanes, and compel people to come in, so that my house may be filled’ (Luke
14:23). Starting at least as far back as Augustine, Christians used this verse
as a proof-text to provide biblical warrant for forced conversions. The first
part of Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary contains nine arguments against
interpreting the verse according to what Bayle describes as its literal sense,
by which he means the sense in which it can be used to serve this intolerant
purpose. Though it bills itself as a reply to objections to the arguments of
the first part, the second part also sets forth some of Bayle’s positive views
on religious toleration, including his historically influential doctrine of the
rights of an erring conscience.24 The nine arguments of the first part cover a
lot of territory. For example, one of them is a clever ad hominem (or, perhaps,
ad ecclesiam) argument. Bayle points out that if Christians who think Luke
14:23 justifies them in making forced conversions were honest about their
intentions, the rulers of non-Christian peoples such as the Chinese would have
reasonable grounds for excluding Christian missionaries from their realms.
Another should strike a sympathetic chord in the minds of readers of scrip-
ture who reject the practice of proof-texting. After arguing that Luke 14:23
should be interpreted in the light of its context, Bayle tries to show that
interpreting the verse in a way that supports forced conversion ‘is contrary
to the whole tenor and general spirit of the Gospel’ (p. 39). However, the
argument of greatest philosophical interest is one which combines morality
and epistemology. I shall concentrate on that argument.
According to Bayle, the general principle on which the argument rests
is ‘that any particular dogma, whether advanced as contained in Scrip-
ture or proposed in any other way, is false, if repugnant to the clear and
distinct notions of natural light, principally in regards to morality’ (p. 33).
As the reference to clear and distinct notions of natural light suggests, Bayle
is working with a Cartesian epistemology in which the epistemic status of
deliverances of the natural light is sufficiently high to guarantee their truth.
Examples he gives of deliverances of the natural light of reason that come
from outside morality are such truths as ‘that the whole is greater than
its parts; that if from equal things we take away equals, the results will
be equal; that it’s impossible that two contradictories be true; or that the
essence of a subject actually subsists after the destruction of the subject’
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(p. 28). We should, of course, view the last of these examples with suspi-
cion. It is tantamount to the thesis, which is in dispute between Platonists
and Aristotelians, that properties can exist uninstantiated. Still, in philosophy
three out of four is not a bad record, and the other examples make it clear
enough what sorts of propositions are supposed to be deliverances of the
natural light. So I think we should grant Bayle the principle that if a doctrine
is contrary to the natural light, then it is false.
At the beginning of the second chapter of the first part, Bayle tells us how
he proposes to make use of this principle. He says: ‘The literal sense of these
words is contrary to the purest and most distinct ideas of natural reason; it
is therefore false. The business now is only to prove the antecedent, because
I presume the consequence was sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing
chapter’ (p. 35). His argument will thus have the following form:
(1) If the words ‘Compel them to come in’, interpreted literally, yield a
proposition contrary to the natural light, that proposition is false.
(2) The words ‘Compel them to come in’, interpreted literally, do yield a
proposition contrary to the natural light.
(3) Hence that proposition is false.
We are committed to allowing Bayle to assume (1), because it is an instance
of the principle we have already granted him. So if he establishes (2), as he
has promised, he will be in a position to infer (3) from (1) and (2) by modus
ponens.
The argument for (2) has four steps. I shall quote the first and last of
them in full because I want to comment on each of them at some length.
Bayle first claims ‘that by the purest and most distinct ideas of reason, we
know there is a being sovereignly perfect who governs all things, who ought
to be adored by mankind, who approves certain actions and rewards them,
and who disapproves and punishes others’ (p. 35). His next point is that we
also understand by the natural light that the principal worship we owe to
the supreme being consists of inner acts of the mind. It would be as silly to
suppose that God would be pleased by mere external behavior, Bayle remarks,
as it would be to imagine that a king would regard as homage a situation in
which the wind posed statues in deferential postures by knocking them over
whenever he happened to pass by. It follows, Bayle then observes, that even
when worship involves exterior signs it must also include inner mental acts.
His fourth and final point is this:
It is evident then that the only legitimate way of inspiring religion is by
producing in the soul certain judgments and certain movements of the
will in relation to God. Now since threats, prisons, fines, exile, beatings,
torture, and generally whatever is comprehended under the literal signifi-
cation of compelling, are incapable of forming in the soul those judgments
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of the will in respect to God which constitute the essence of religion,
it is evident that this is a mistaken way of establishing a religion and,
consequently, that Jesus Christ has not commanded it (p. 36).
What are we to make of this argument?
I think that, as it stands, it is a mess. Consider first Bayle’s first step. It
is plausible to suppose he thinks that a Cartesian ontological argument is the
source of our knowledge of God’s existence from the purest and most distinct
ideas of reason (‘les plus pures et les plus distinctes idées de la raison’).25
But, unlike Descartes, we do not believe that the premises of a Cartesian
ontological argument are deliverances of the natural light. Indeed, even if,
unlike Kant, we think there is a valid ontological argument whose premises
are rationally acceptable, we do not believe they have an epistemic status
as high as the law of noncontradiction or other things that are supposed to
be known by the natural light.26 Cosmological arguments for the existence
of God are in the same boat.27 And so too, it seems to me, are all other
known arguments of natural theology. So I think Bayle’s first step is already
a misstep. It insures that he will not get to a conclusion, guaranteed by the
natural light, to which the interpretation of Luke 14:23 he wants to reject is a
contrary.
Consider now Bayle’s final step. He asserts that compulsive measures
are incapable of forming in the soul the judgments of the will in respect
to God, whatever they may be, that constitute the essence of religion (‘ne
peuvent pas former dans l’âme les jugements de volunté, par rapport à Dieu,
qui constituent l’essence de la religion’).28 We may be sure, I think, that if
compulsion really cannot produce the internal acts of mind that are essential
to true worship, then Jesus has not commanded compulsion, at least not for
this purpose. But is it evident by the natural light that compulsion in incap-
able of producing those interior acts? It seems not. It may be that religious
beliefs, for example, are not under the direct control of the will so that people
threatened with religious persecution cannot simply become converts by
deciding to do so. But even if compulsion is incapable of producing converts
in the short run, it may be effective in the long run in the manner imagined
in the distopian fiction of the twentieth century. Or perhaps Pascal was right
when he advised the libertine wagerer to attend mass and use holy water,
thinking that outward practice would eventually generate inward belief. If so,
compelling outward practice would be a rational means to the end of inducing
belief. Issues about whether or not various techniques of brainwashing will
produce changes in belief are empirical; we would not expect them to be
settled solely by the natural light of reason. Like Locke, Bayle is vulnerable
to empirical confutation on this point.
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After having raised similar objections to Locke’s view, Waldron remarks
that ‘what one misses above all in Locke’s argument is a sense that there is
anything morally wrong with intolerance, or a sense of any deep concern for
the victims of persecution or the moral insult that is involved in the attempt
to manipulate their faith’.29 This suggests that we would be doing Bayle a
favor if we substituted explicitly moral considerations for claims about the
efficacy of compulsion at this point in his argument. Even if compulsion of
certain sorts turns out to be effective in causing the inner mental acts that are
essential to religion, it may nevertheless be wrong to use it for that purpose.
We know that Bayle means to appeal to moral considerations sooner or later.
Near the beginning of the first chapter of the first part, he announces that he
is ‘relying upon this single principle of natural light, that any literal inter-
pretation which carries an obligation to commit iniquity is false’ (p. 28).
So maybe Bayle’s best bet is simply to insist that it is morally wrong to
use compulsion to produce the inner acts that are essential to religion. If he
does, he has available to him the following argument. According to the literal
interpretation of Luke 14:23, Jesus has commanded the use of compulsion to
produce those inner acts. This command carries with it an obligation to use
compulsion for that purpose, since commands of Jesus are divine commands
and so impose obligations. But the obligation to make such a use of compul-
sion is an obligation to commit an iniquity, because it is morally wrong to
use compulsion thus. Hence the literal interpretation of Luke 14:23 is false,
and so Jesus has not commanded the use of compulsion to produce the inner
acts essential to religion. This argument has the merit of giving Bayle the
conclusion he wants at the fourth step of his larger argument.
However, next we must ask about the epistemic status of the moral prin-
ciple we have allowed Bayle to assume for the sake of this argument. Is it
evident by the natural light that it is morally wrong to use compulsion to
produce the inner acts that are essential to religion? I doubt it. What is more,
I think Bayle himself could not consistently even hold that this principle
is true unless it is qualified by a ceteris paribus clause. This is because he
allows that God ‘may dispense with His own laws in certain cases’ (p. 121).
Indeed, he believes that God can dispense from the Decalogue’s prohibition
on homicide. There are, he affirms, circumstances that ‘change the nature of
homicide from a bad action into a good action, a secret command of God,
for example’ (p. 171). And he goes on to claim that such circumstances are
sometimes actual, that God sometimes does dispense from this precept (Dieu
dispense quelquefois de ce précepte).30 The cases Bayle has in mind are,
of course, the biblical stories in which God commands homicide. The most
famous of them is the akedah, the binding of Isaac, recounted in Genesis 22;
according to that story, which serves as the basis for Kierekegaard’s teleolog-
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ical suspension of the ethical, God commanded Abraham to slay his son.31
Since Bayle is prepared to make exceptions even to the prohibitions of the
Decalogue in such cases, he has left a loophole open to religious persecutors.
He cannot consistently deny at least the possibility that they are right if they
claim they have been dispensed from the principle that it is morally wrong to
use compulsion to make converts or claim they have received a secret divine
command to employ compulsion for this purpose. Proving a negative is often
very difficult, and I think the present case is one of the hard ones. I do not
see how Bayle could hope to prove that the religious persecutors have not, in
fact, been thus divinely dispensed or secretly divinely commanded.
In my opinion, though at this point I am going beyond anything to be
found in Bayle’s text, the best strategy for the defender of toleration is
to conduct the argument entirely in epistemic terms and not to make any
dubious appeals to the Cartesian natural light. The epistemic credentials of
two conflicting claims are to be assessed and then compared. One is a moral
principle to the effect that intolerant behavior of a certain kind is wrong;
the other is a conflicting religious claim about that intolerant behavior. The
applicable epistemic principle is that, whenever two conflicting claims differ
in epistemic status, the claim with the lower status is to be rejected. If it can
be shown that the epistemic status of the moral principle is higher than the
epistemic status of the conflicting religious claim, then the epistemic principle
licenses an inference to the conclusion that the religious claim is the one to be
rejected. It is fortunate for the defenders of toleration that the strategy depends
only on qualitative judgements of comparative epistemic status, for it seems
likely that we are incapable of discovering a precise quantitative account of
levels of epistemic status. It would be nice for the defenders of toleration if all
our moral principles to the effect that intolerant behavior of a certain kind is
wrong had the very highest epistemic status possible. But since there may be
few if any moral principles about the wrongness of intolerant behavior with
this status, it is again fortunate that the strategy still has a chance of success
even if it uses a moral principle with a somewhat less exalted epistemic status.
Yet the strategy does not guarantee success, because it does not preclude
the possibility that in some cases a religious claim supporting intolerant
behavior will turn out to have a higher epistemic status than a conflicting
moral principle. Hence the strategy does not beg the question against advo-
cates of religious intolerance, though the defenders of toleration will naturally
hope that it may serve at least to limit the scope of epistemically respectable
intolerance. And the epistemic consequences of religious diversity may have
a role to play, at least in some cases, in applications of the strategy that yield
successful arguments for religious toleration of one kind or another. It may
happen that a religious claim supportive of a certain sort of intolerance has a
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lower epistemic status than a conflicting moral principle favoring toleration
entirely or in large part due to the decrease in the religious claim’s status
resulting from an awareness of religious diversity.
To help fix ideas, let us return briefly to the issue that vexed Bayle. A
valid argument parallel to the one he offered that employs the strategy outline
above has the following shape:
(4) If the moral principle that using compulsion to produce the inner acts
essential to religion is wrong has a fairly high epistemic status and
the religious claim that using compulsion for this purpose is obliga-
tory because Jesus commanded it has a lower epistemic status, then the
religious claim is to be rejected.
(5) The moral principle that using compulsion to produce the inner acts
essential to religion is wrong does have a fairly high epistemic status.
(6) The religious claim that using compulsion for this purpose is obligatory
because Jesus commanded it does have a lower epistemic status.
(7) Hence, the religious claim is to be rejected.
The proposition expressed by (4) is an instantiation of the strategy’s
governing epistemic principle. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument,
that the moral principle cited in (5) does have a reasonably high epistemic
status but falls short of being evident by the natural light, absolutely certain
or anything similar. It is an intuitively plausible principle. And even if, strictly
speaking, it needs to be qualified by a ceteris paribus clause to handle things
like secret divine commands, the possibility of a violation of such a clause
is not at issue in the present context. Debate can then focus on the epistemic
status of the religious claim cited in (6). Some of Bayle’s own arguments
in the Philosophical Commentary bear on this question. If he is correct
in thinking that this religious claim is contrary to the tenor and spirit of
the Gospels, this consideration will do something to decrease its epistemic
status. But the religious claim is not without a certain amount of support. It
has behind it the authority of a tradition of Christian thought and practice
in which it is entrenched. I think considerations of religious diversity can
play a valuable role in defeating the epistemic authority of this tradition.
They do so indirectly by diminishing the epistemic rationality of the whole
Christian package or worldview of which the tradition is a part. And, since
Christianity itself is internally complex and contains competing traditions,
some of which are more tolerant than the Augustinian tradition that endorses
compulsion, such considerations also operate more directly to decrease the
epistemic status of that tradition in particular and hence of the religious claim
about what Jesus commanded embedded in it. By my lights, the total evidence
strongly support (6), and so I think the argument of which it is a premise is
sound.
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In a couple of ways, it is of course a weak argument. Even if it is
successful, it eliminates only one ground for the use of compulsion by the
religiously intolerant. However, if we are committed to the project of trying
to persuade the intolerant by arguments, it may be practically desirable to be
able to argue against their grounds for intolerance one at a time. In addition,
the argument does not aspire to eliminate the grounds of all forms of religious
intolerance at one fell swoop. But, again, it may be of practical importance
to be in position to argue against various form of intolerance piecemeal,
starting with the worst. The strategy I have outlined and illustrated can be
used repeatedly provided enough moral principles of fairly high epistemic
status can be mobilized for inclusion in the premises of its multiple imple-
mentations. So my illustrative argument should be understood as part of a
cumulative case against religious intolerance.
3. Kant on conscience and inquisitors
The argument by Kant I wish to consider is set forth in the fourth section
of the second part of the fourth book of his Religion within the Boundaries
of Mere Reason. In that section, he presents a doctrine of conscience. As he
defines it. ‘conscience is a consciousness which is of itself a duty’.32 The
definition poses for Kant the question of how a state of conscious awareness
can be an unconditional duty. In attempting to answer his question, Kant starts
from the moral principle, which he says needs no proof, that we ‘ought to
venture nothing where there is danger that it might be wrong (quod dubitas,
ne feceris! Pliny)’ (pp. 202–203).33 He takes it to be a consequence of this
principle that I have an unconditional duty to be aware that any action I want
to perform is morally right. I do not have to know, with respect to human
actions generally or with respect to all possible actions, whether they are right
or wrong. But concerning any action I propose to perform, ‘I must not only
judge, and be of the opinion, that it is right; I must also be certain that it
is’ (p. 203). Kant contrasts his view with probabilism, which he defines as
‘the principle that the mere opinion that an action may well be right is itself
sufficient for undertaking it’ (p. 203). As I see matters, the probabilist thinks
that I may go ahead with an action I propose to perform if I am aware that it
is probable that it is right. Holding us to a higher standard, Kant insists that I
may go ahead with an action I propose to perform only if I am aware that it is
certain that it is right. The comparison thus forces us to view the certainty at
stake in Kant’s claim as epistemic rather than merely psychological. I may not
go ahead with my proposed action if all I am aware of is strongly believing
or being utterly convinced that it is right. In short, I have a duty to be aware
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that it is epistemically certain that an action I propose to perform is morally
right before I perform the action. If I act in the absence of this awareness, I
act unconscientiously and hence violate this duty, even if the action I perform
is, in fact, right and so I violate no further duty in performing it. The demands
of conscience are therefore very strict according to Kant.
Kant supplements his brief and abstract treatment of his general views
on conscience with an application of his doctrine to a particular case of
some interest to the defenders of religious toleration. He asks us to imagine
an inquisitor whose exclusivist faith is so firm that he is willing to suffer
martyrdom for it, if need be, and who must judge the case of someone,
otherwise a good citizen, charged with heresy. If the inquisitor condemns
the heretic to death, Kant wonders, should we say that the inquisitor acted
in accord with an erring conscience or should we say instead that he acted
with a lack of conscience and hence consciously did wrong? Kant allows that
the inquisitor acted with firm conviction and for a reason. He builds it into the
case that the inquisitor ‘was indeed presumably firm in the belief that a super-
naturally revealed divine will (perhaps according to the saying, compellite
intrare) permitted him, if not even made a duty for him, to extirpate supposed
unbelief together with the unbelievers’ (p. 203).34 Could such an inquisitor
get off the hook by pleading to the lesser charge of acting in accord with
an erring conscience and so, as Bayle thought, acting within his rights. Kant
thinks not. His famous argument for this negative conclusion deserves to be
quoted in full. Kant says:
That to take a human being’s life because of his religious faith is wrong
is certain, unless (to allow the most extreme possibility) a divine will,
made known to the inquisitor in some extraordinary way, has decreed
otherwise. But that God has ever manifested this awful will is a matter
of historical documentation and never apodictically certain. After all, the
revelation reached the inquisitor only through the intermediary of human
beings and their interpretation, and even if it were to appear to him to
have come from God himself (like the command issued to Abraham to
slaughter his own son like a sheep), yet it is at least possible that on this
point error has prevailed. But then the inquisitor would risk the danger of
doing something which would be to the highest degree wrong, and on this
score he acts unconscientiously (pp. 203–204).
In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant returns to the case of the akedah, which
is alluded to in the second parenthetical remark in the passage quoted above,
in order to say more about Abraham’s epistemic situation. He there insists
that ‘Abraham should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: “That I
74 PHILIP L. QUINN
ought not to kill may good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition,
are God – of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice
rings down to me from (visible) heaven.” ’35
According to Kant, then, Abraham cannot be epistemically certain that the
voice he hears comes from God. Hence he cannot be aware that it is certain
that killing his son is right or even obligatory. If he proceeds to kill his son, he
violates the duty of conscience to have such an awareness and so acts uncon-
scientiously. He thus displays a lack of conscience because he consciously
violates this duty. Moreover, Abraham can be certain that killing his son is
wrong unless, allowing for the most remote possibility, God commands it.
If he proceeds to kill his son, he also runs the very great risk of wrongly
doing so. Therefore if Abraham proceeds to kill Isaac, he surely violates a
duty to act conscientiously and most likely also violates a duty not to kill his
son. Similarly, Kant’s inquisitor cannot be epistemically certain that scripture
actually records a divine command to eliminate unbelievers along with their
heresies. So if he condemns the person accused of heresy to death, he surely
violates a duty to act conscientiously and most likely also violates a duty not
to kill people on account of their religious faith.
It is, I think, illuminating to view Kant as working with the epistemic
argumentative strategy I outlined in my discussion of Bayle. The inquis-
itor can be almost certain that it is wrong to kill people on account their
religious faith; he falls short of complete certainty only because he allows
for the remote possibility of a divine command to do so. But the inquisitor
cannot be anywhere close to certain that it is right or even obligatory to kill
unbelievers because God decrees it, since he cannot achieve anything close
to certainty that scripture expresses such a divine command. Hence the claim
that it is right or even obligatory to kill unbelievers is to be rejected. In order
to keep the subsequent discussion simple, let us set aside the complications
that Kant’s doctrine of conscience would introduce into this picture of the
basic argumentative strategy.
Difficulties with Kant’s use of this strategy are similar to those that arise
in the case of Bayle. Kant has a very optimistic view of the ability of human
cognitive faculties to deliver epistemic certainty about principles of moral
wrongness. Those of us who live in societies that are, morally speaking, less
homogeneous than his was may well reasonably be less optimistic than he
was on this score. It seems to me no accident that his examples, killing one’s
good son or killing people on account of their religious faith, are among
the most favorable cases for his position. Ignoring the remote possibility of
special divine commands, I am willing to grant that it is certain that killing
people for their religious faith is wrong. But I doubt that the principles of
wrongness that cover the full range of intolerant practices to which I am
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND RELIGIOUS TOLERATION 75
opposed can all achieve the lofty status of epistemic certainty, though of
course I believe they are all true. Consider, for instance, exile, which in
a passage quoted above Bayle offers as an example of compelling. Is it
really epistemically certain that sending people into exile or, more gener-
ally, expelling or excluding them from a political community because of their
religious faith is morally wrong? Is it certain that the magistrates of Calvin’s
Geneva would have done wrong if they had expelled Roman Catholics from
the city under conditions in which the exiles were compensated for lost prop-
erty? Is it certain that the elders of a contemporary Amish farming community
would do wrong if they excluded non Amish from their community? Living
in a religiously homogeneous community can realize some very important
values. It does not seem certain to me that it is always wrong, even apart
from special divine commands, to endeavor to defend or preserve such values.
Hence I think the argumentative strategy I am discussing will not rule out all
the forms of intolerance I oppose if it can only be successfully employed with
principles of moral wrongness that are epistemically certain or nearly so.
However, another difficulty becomes urgent if we envisage making use
of the strategy with principles of moral wrongness that fall a good deal
short of epistemic certainty. As traditionally conceived, God is omnipotent
or, at least, very powerful. It would thus seem to be within God’s power to
communicate to us a sign that transmits to the claim that God commands
some intolerant behavior, such as issuing threats to heretics, a fairly high
epistemic status. Kant, to be sure, would not have found this idea congenial.
Speaking rather dismissively, he insists: ‘For if God should really speak to a
human being, the latter could still never know that it was God speaking. It is
quite impossible for a human being to apprehend the infinite by his senses,
distinguish it from sensible beings, and be acquainted with it as such’.36
Suppose we concede to Kant that one who hears a booming voice resounding
from the visible heaven cannot be absolutely or apodictically certain that it
is God speaking, because, as the quoted remark suggests, some alternative
possibilities cannot be conclusively eliminated, so that one cannot know, in
some emphatic sense, that it is God speaking. It does not follow that hearing
such a voice cannot confer on the claim that God has commanded what it is
taken to command a fairly high epistemic status. Therefore it seems possible
for even sense-perceptual experience to bestow on the claim that an intol-
erant act is obligatory because it is divinely commanded an epistemic status
higher than that of a conflicting principle of moral wrongness that falls a
good deal short of certainty, in which case, according to the argumentative
strategy under consideration, it is the moral principle that is to be rejected.
What is more, if philosophers such as Alston are correct, as I think they
are, then divine commands can also be communicated to us by means of a
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kind of religious perception that is distinct from, though analogous to, sense
perception. And, other things being equal, this perceptual source can also
contribute to raising the epistemic status of the claim that an intolerant action
is obligatory because divinely commanded to a level in excess of a conflicting
principle of moral wrongness that is less than certain. So if we apply the
argumentative strategy in question to cases in which the moral principle we
appeal to has an epistemic status appreciably less than certainty, we cannot
guarantee that it will not lose out in competition with a conflicting religious
claim about an obligation imposed by divine command that has achieved a
higher epistemic status. In short, there is no good reason to deny that claims
about divine speech, communicated to us by means of sense perception or by
means of a distinctively religious sort of perception, can acquire a fairly high
epistemic status in some cases, other things being equal, a status elevated
enough to exceed that of conflicting moral principles.37
It is at this point, I think, that the epistemic consequences of religious
diversity can do something to advance the cause of religious toleration. The
existence of religious diversity will reduce the epistemic status of claims that
God has commanded and thereby made right or obligatory intolerant behavior
to a level below that which they would occupy were there no epistemic
consequences of religious diversity. So when the argumentative strategy we
are examining is applied to moral principles that are less than certain, it is
likely to succeed more often, given the epistemic consequences of religious
diversity, than it would otherwise. It is probably impossible to say with preci-
sion how many cases of success will be the result of this factor. And there is
no guarantee that, even with its assistance, the strategy will be successful for
all the cases in which the champions of religious toleration would like to have
strong arguments against intolerant individual actions and social practices.
What is the upshot? I have tried to show that there is an epistemic strategy
for arguing against various forms of religious intolerance to be found in the
neighborhood of arguments actually offered by Bayle and Kant. The strategy
involves attempting to establish that moral principles which support toleration
have a higher epistemic status than conflicting religious claims which support
intolerance. My objection to both Bayle and Kant is that they were exces-
sively sanguine about the epistemic prospects of moral principles. In light of
our greater experience with the reasonable moral disagreements of modernity,
it is not plausible for us to suppose that all the moral principles needed to
develop a case for a doctrine of religious toleration that is broad in scope
using the strategy will be evident by the natural light or apodictically certain.
But when the strategy is employed in cases of moral principles with a lower
epistemic status, it may well turn out, other things being equal, that religious
claims which support intolerance have a higher epistemic status than such
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moral principles do. Recent work in religious epistemology becomes relevant
at this point in the discussion. The negative epistemic impact of religious
diversity reduces the epistemic status of religious claims supporting intoler-
ance below what it would otherwise be. It thereby can contribute to improving
the success rate of the strategy when it is applied to construct piecemeal argu-
ments against religious intolerance of various kinds. Religious diversity thus
both creates the need for toleration and contributes to its epistemic grounds.
I do not claim to have exhausted the contributions Bayle or Kant can make
to contemporary philosophical discussions of religious toleration. It seems to
me their work is of lasting importance not only on account of its high quality
but also because they address the topic from within a broadly Christian reli-
gious perspective. Their arguments can speak on behalf of religious toleration
in a way religious believers may find sympathetic or, at any rate, so I hope. In
expressing this hope, I am clearly disagreeing with those who regard Bayle
and Kant as hostile to Christianity and to religion generally, skeptics at best
and unbelievers at worst. In this controversy, I side with those who have
argued that Bayle and Kant were believers, though not orthodox Christians
by various traditional standards.38 I think they were exploring, in ways from
which we still have something to learn, possibilities for religious existence
within modern pluralistic societies. If religious people today ignore what they
have to teach, they run the risk, as Robert M. Adams puts it, of blinding
themselves ‘to permanently important possibilities of religious life’.39 Since
I share with Adams the aspiration to be religious while living fully within
a religiously pluralistic cultural environment, I consider it valuable to look
to thinkers such as Bayle and Kant for lessons about how this might be
accomplished.40
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